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Abstract 
 
 
 This dissertation takes a fresh look at the forgotten generation of servicemen and women 
who served in theater during the Korean War.  Beginning with their shared childhood, growing 
up during the Great Depression and World War II, this narrative account follows the story of 
American men and women as they enlisted in or were drafted into the Armed Forces, took basic 
training, shipped out to the Korean Peninsula or Japan, lived in the war zone, and returned home 
to a country that seemed not to have noticed their absence.  Special attention is paid throughout 
to the complex interplay between service members and the home front and to the changes which 
occurred in both the lives of individual Americans and in American life as a result of wartime 
experiences.  Though not a treatise on civil rights, the dissertation examines how integration in 
training and in foxholes helped break down racial barriers.  
 Research for this project comes from the Library of Congress’s Robert A. Taft Papers 
and Veterans History Project Collection, the Eisenhower Papers, various collections at the 
National Archives and the Center for the Study of the Korean War, veteran surveys at Carlisle 
Barracks, oral history collections, published and unpublished memoirs, collections of veteran 
poetry, and contemporary newspaper and magazine stories. 
 This work adds greatly to the historiography of the American soldier, connecting military 
and social history and examining both the personal and collective consequences of waging war 
the American way.   
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PREFACE 
 
“We came back in dribs and drabs.  By and large the public was tired of war and ignored Korea unless it 
directly affected them.”—Norman Weibel, Korean War veteran.1 
 
“I was surprised by the lack of interest back home….People usually said, ‘Where have you been, on 
vacation?’”—Bob Chester, Korean War veteran.2 
 
“We did what our country called us to do.  Is it too much to ask that we be recognized for what we did?”—
Harold L. Mulhausen, Korean War veteran.3 
 
 
During the Korean Conflict, America shipped the bodies of those killed in action home 
for burial for the first time.  With little by way of ceremony or pomp, the remains of soldiers who 
had died in Korea were interred in simple graves that merely identified the person’s name, rank, 
and date of birth.  Only later did Americans think to add “Korea” to the stones, ascribing a time 
and place, if not a meaning to their deaths.  Some 33,700 American soldiers ended their wartime 
tour of duty in Korea this way while another 1.8 million returned home alive but alone and 
shrouded in the same anonymity, the forgotten soldiers of a forgotten war.4 
 Unlike their older brothers and cousins who served in World War II and returned to 
tickertape parades and the boisterous tunes of welcoming bands, Korean War veterans returned 
quietly to a country that had scarcely missed them.  Though Americans had initially rallied to the 
war drum when President Harry S Truman called on the nation to defend South Korea from 
                                                 
1 Norman Weibel, Korean War Veteran Survey, 8, Center for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University, 
Independence, Missouri (hereafter CFSOKW). 
2 R. W. Chester, Korean War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW. 
3 Harold L. Mulhausen and James Edwin Alexander, Korea:  Memories of a U. S. Marine (Oklahoma City, OK:  
Macedon Publishing Company, 1995), i. 
4 There are 6.8 million Korean War era veterans, but only 1,789,000 of those served in theater.  See Tom Heuertz, 
“The Korean War + 50:  No Longer Forgotten, Teaching Resources,” Box FF “A.0957-A.0986,” Folder A. 0974, 
CFSOKW and “Section XI:  Mortality and Combat Service,” “Section 11,” 1, U.S. President’s Commission on 
Veterans Pensions (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 61, Dwight David Eisenhower 
Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter Bradley Commission and DDE Library). Because of the rotation system, these 
veterans of the Korean War returned individually rather than with their platoons or units.  As a result, quite often the 
trickling home of soldiers went unnoticed and unmarked by communities around the United States.  See Chapter 4 
for more on the rotation system.   
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communist aggression, the lack of home front participation in the form of rationing or other 
personal sacrifice soon made Korea only a minor distraction for many Americans.5  As soldiers 
still green to battle clung to the Pusan Perimeter, as Marines fought their way out of a place 
called Chosin Reservoir with frozen feet and staggering casualties, and as dogfaces tried to hold 
the line in a bloody stalemate half a world away, Americans at home went on with business as 
usual, concentrating on making the most of the prosperous post-World War II economy.  Fearing 
wartime shortages, they snapped up furniture and televisions, refrigerators and cars.6  In Fords 
and Lincolns and Chevrolets, the war drove right out of the minds of many Americans and into 
the middle and back pages of newspapers.  Returning veterans could only wonder at the world 
that had seemingly forgotten them in their absence, surprised that “there was no evidence that the 
civilian population of the USA even knew (or cared) that those of us getting off the ship had seen 
desperate combat.”7 
And if average Americans found themselves too busy with life to pay attention to the 
conflict raging thousands of miles away in Korea or to the soldiers trickling home, movie-
makers, novelists, and even historians proved no better at acknowledging the sacrifices made by 
those American servicemen and women.  Throughout the war and in the years following, 
Hollywood produced a number of war movies, but most of them looked back to the “good war,” 
World War II, for inspiration.  The silver screen showed John Wayne, Henry Fonda, Humphrey 
Bogart, Robert Mitchum, Randolph Scott, and a host of other stars heroically battling Nazis and 
                                                 
5 An August 20-25, 1950 Gallup poll showed that 65% of Americans believed that the United States had NOT made 
a mistake in deciding to defend Korea.  By January 1-5, 1951, that percentage had fallen to 38%, and throughout the 
war popular support for military intervention in Korea continued to decline.  Also, as it became clear that the war 
would have little effect on the home front, interest in the conflict waned.   See George Gallup, Jr., “Korean War,” in 
The Gallup Poll:  Public Opinion 2000 (Wilmington, DE:  Scholarly Resources Inc., 2000), 194. 
6 See John E. Wiltze, “The Korean War and American Society,” Wilson Quarterly 2 (Summer 1978):  131. 
7 Robert Henderson, Korean War Veteran Survey, 9, CFSOKW. 
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“Nips” in such classics as Flying Leathernecks (1951), Battle Cry (1955), and Bridge on the 
River Kwai (1957).  To be sure, Korea did provide backdrop for a number of films, but with few 
exceptions these failed to catch hold of the popular imagination and seemed simply to reuse 
themes and storylines from World War II.8  The one exception to this might be M*A*S*H (1970) 
which set out to portray the lives of doctors and nurses in a mobile army surgical hospital during 
the Korean War, but in the end the film seemed more adept at reflecting the values and issues 
belonging to the Vietnam era than at depicting life in Korea.  Some fifty years later, the trend 
remains the same—movie studios churn out new World War II classics like Saving Private Ryan 
(1998), Pearl Harbor (2001), and Flags of Our Fathers (2006), but largely ignore the Korean 
War and the men and women who served in it.  When Paramount Pictures remade Manchurian 
Candidate in 2004, originally a movie centering on a prisoner-of-war brainwashed by the 
Chinese, they stripped the story of its original Korean War setting, placing it instead in the Gulf 
War.   
With its dependency upon public interest for earnings, one can readily understand why 
Hollywood paid such short shrift to the Korean Conflict and its veterans, but academics and 
scholars have also shown great reluctance in tackling the first hot war of the Cold War.  While 
they have written hundreds, perhaps thousands of books on Vietnam, the second major flare-up 
of the Cold War, historians have produced only a handful of volumes dedicated to the Korean 
                                                 
8 Two books in particular make clear the discrepancy in number and quality between movies about World War II 
and the Korean Conflict.  Larry Langman and Ed Borg’s Encyclopedia of American War Films, an exhaustive 
compilation of films produced from the 1940s through the late 1980s, devotes ten times as much space to World 
War II films as it does to Korean War films.  In the book, even movies about World War I, the Civil War, and 
Vietnam individually fill more lines than those about Korea.  Lawrence Suid’s Guts and Glory provides a more 
analytical approach, explaining that the nature of the Korean Conflict simply made it less suitable as a topic for 
filmmakers than World War II.  See Langman and Borg, Encyclopedia of American War Films (New York:  Garland 
Publishing, 1989) and Suid, Guts and Glory:  the Making of the American Military Image in Film, revised and 
expanded edition (United States:  University Press of Kentucky, 2002). 
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War experience.  The majority of these concentrate on the military campaign itself or on the 
foreign policy that failed to prevent hostilities.   Some look at the American home front during 
the Cold War, but with a few exceptions, these focus so narrowly as to preclude any real analysis 
of the impact of the Korean War on domestic life.9   In some cases, the home front studies even 
fail to mention the Korean War at all.  Elaine Tyler May’s landmark study on the Cold War 
family, Homeward Bound, talks at length about the structure of the American family in the 1950s 
but never addresses the millions of families who sent husbands, sons, and fathers overseas to 
fight and sometimes die in Korea.10  Not surprisingly, with so little attention paid in general to 
the conflict, Korean War veterans are all but excluded from the scholarly literature.   Only a few 
works, like Rudy Tomedi’s No Bugles, No Drums, Linda Granfield’s I Remember Korea, and 
Donald Knox’s two volume oral history of the Korean War take a close look at those who laid 
their lives on the line at the 38th Parallel.11  And, while these books do a good job of allowing 
veterans to tell their stories, they provide little analysis, focusing primarily on wartime 
experiences and leaving the Korean War soldier turned veteran a mystery.    
With the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War now past, the time has come for a fresh 
and more comprehensive look at the men and women who marched to the “land of the morning 
calm” from June 1950 to July 1953.  Of the 6.8 million survivors of the Korean War era, only 3.9 
million remained in 2000 and the U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that by 2010 
                                                 
9There are some noteworthy exceptions to this.  Lisle Rose’s Cold War Comes to Main Street spends a good deal of 
time investigating the impact of the Korean War on domestic attitudes and life and David Halberstam’s The Fifties 
makes frequent references to both the war and the return of those who served overseas.  See Lisle Rose, The Cold 
War Comes to Main Street:  America in 1950 (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1999) and David Halberstam, 
The Fifties (New York:  Villard Books, 1993). 
10 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound:  American Families in the Cold War Era (New York:  Basic Books, 1999). 
11 Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums:  An Oral History of the Korean War (New York:  John Wiley & Sons, 
1993).  Donald Knox, The Korean War:  Pusan to Chosin:  An Oral History (New York:  Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich, 1985).  Donald Knox, with additional text by Alfred Coppel, The Korean War:  Uncertain Victory, the 
Concluding Volume of an Oral History (New York:  Harcourt,  Brace, Jovanovich, 1988).  Linda Granfield, I 
Remember Korea:  Veterans Tell Their Stories of the Korean War, 1950-1953 (New York:  Clarion Books, 2003). 
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only 2.5 million will still be alive, none under the age of 70.12  The generation is passing and 
with it the opportunity to give a face to those who served and to understand the impact that this 
war had on veterans and on the world to which they returned.   
This study focuses on the veterans of the Korean War, their backgrounds, training and 
wartime experiences, attitudes, and post-Korea lives.  Raised during the Great Depression and 
the Second World War, the men and women who served in Korea learned firsthand the sacrifices 
that Americans might be called upon to make in the name of country. After the defeat of the 
Nazis and Japanese, however, few could have expected that one day Uncle Sam would ask them 
to participate in a ground war of their own.  Situated between World War II and the Vietnam 
War, did this generation patriotically heed the call to colors as they saw fathers and brothers do 
in the 1940s or did they seek to avoid the draft and shun volunteering as their sons and daughters 
in the 1960s and 1970s?  Did they protest military service?  If not, what led them to quietly bear 
the responsibility of a war half a world away?  And, was that burden shared equally by all 
Americans or did people perceive, as they did during the Vietnam War, that factors like race and 
social class created inequities in the system and in the nation’s defense of liberty? 
Most of the soldiers and Marines who fought on the Korean Peninsula as well as the 
nurses and doctors who tended them ended up in the war zone by either enlisting or accepting 
induction through the Selective Service system.  But, relying on atomic deterrence and air power, 
President Truman all but ended the draft and pared down the military in the 1940s, making it 
necessary to call up men from the National Guard and Reserves when hostilities erupted along 
the 38th Parallel in the summer of 1950.  Armed with the American “can do” spirit, a small core 
                                                 
12 U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Analysis, Office of Program and Data 
Analyses, Data on Veterans of the Korean War, June 2000.  (online publication at 
www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc). 
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of regular military men and women supplemented by reservists and newly trained inductees set 
out to make a good showing in Korea.  But, as they reached the dirty, bloody war being fought in 
Korea’s hills, did infantrymen and support personnel think the land and people on whose behalf 
they had been summoned worth the price?  As the war dragged on and it became clearer to those 
fulfilling their obligations overseas that the American public had little interest in the struggle 
over real estate in Korea, what motivated them to keep fighting and at what personal cost did 
they do so?  Had America adequately trained these sons and daughters for the challenges they 
now faced?  
In contrast to previous wars, servicemen and women returned home from Korea 
individually, rotating out after completing a set number of months in country.  Some did arrive to 
parades or welcoming bands, but most experienced a quieter homecoming.  Rather than 
celebrating the end of the war as they had in 1945, Americans seemed anxious to simply put 
Korea behind them as soon as possible and forget it ever happened.  Of course, Congress did 
pass a Korean G.I. Bill in 1952, but it was less generous than that of World War II in its 
readjustment benefits, further acknowledgement of the country’s tepid gratitude.  So rewarded 
for doing their duty, did the veterans of Korea use the G.I. Bill as readily as their predecessors or, 
like other Americans, did they try to forget their service and pick up their lives just where they 
had left off?  After their war, did Korean veterans suffer lasting effects from their wartime 
experiences?  How did the war change them?  Known as the “silent generation,” did Korean War 
veterans ever recover their identity as war veterans? 
While Truman had issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948 in hopes of desegregating the 
Armed Forces, little had been done to accomplish that end before the Korean War began.  
Manpower pressures on the peninsula, however, forced commanders in the field to integrate 
 xiii
units there and by the end of the war blacks and whites regularly served in the same units at both 
training and duty stations.  In what ways did these experiences serve to change the attitudes of 
individual service members toward race?  When they returned to their hometowns, did men and 
women see local customs differently in light of their exposure to different types of people while 
in the military or in the war theater?  Did Korean War veterans become activists as Vietnam 
Veterans did later? 
With so little scholarly research available on Korean War veterans, these are difficult 
questions to answer.  However, given the current war in Iraq and the cyclical return of veterans 
to American society, the endeavor to identify both the impact of war on participants and of 
veterans on American culture remains worthy.  And, approaching the sixtieth anniversary of the 
beginning of their war, it is time to recognize the veterans of Korea.   Relying upon such diverse 
sources as statistical data from the Bradley Commission Report, Korean War Veteran Surveys, 
personal memoirs, oral histories, archival records, public opinion polls, Project Clear reports, 
contemporary newspaper and magazine articles, and studies on the draft, this work seeks to give 
a voice to those who served in the Korean War and to place them in the larger context of 
American history.   
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CHAPTER 1:  TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
 
“It was our generation’s turn to answer the country’s call.”—Lawrence Cole, Korean War veteran.1 
 
“I was brought up in poverty during the Great Depression.  I remember World War II very vividly….It was 
a disgrace not to serve our country in one way or another.  It really was ‘our country right or wrong.’”—
Ralph Cutro, Korean War veteran.2 
 
“And when I was told to go and do something, all I thought of was just go and do it.  I never thought, I never 
gave it a second thought.”—Joseph W. Jimenez, Korean War veteran.3 
 
“My generation never questioned authority, we merely complied.”—Bernie Ruchin, Korean War veteran.4 
 
 
 William Dannenmaier missed serving in World War II by just about a year because of his 
age.  But as a young man, he did not fret over skipping such an important generational 
experience.  In fact, when he had registered for the draft as required by law, Dannenmaier never 
expected to go anywhere, except maybe to graduate school.5  He reflected to himself on his luck, 
that the war was over and despite the requirement to register for the Selective Service, “young 
men’s lives were no longer forfeit.  We could plan our futures—and have them.”6    
Though they did not say so, Robert Baken, Lynn Hahn, Rudolph Stephens, Howard 
Matthias, and Bill Anderson probably all felt the same optimism and self-determination as 
Dannenmaier.  Born in 1930, Baken also bypassed the Second World War and by the early 1950s 
had settled comfortably into the study of electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of 
                                                 
1 Lawrence Cole, Korean War Veteran Survey, 4, Center for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University, 
Independence, Missouri (hereafter CFSOKW).  
2 Ralph Cutro, Korean War Veteran Survey, 13, CFSOKW. 
3 Joseph W. Jimenez (AFC 2001/001/7979), Folder 3, Interview by Colleen Fulco of Joseph W. Jimenez, 29 May 
2003, 13, Veterans History Project Collection, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress  (hereafter VHPC, 
AFC, LOC). 
4 Bernie Ruchin, email to Melinda Pash, 3 July 2004, in author’s possession. 
5 Despite the end of World War II, Selective Service laws remained in place almost continuously until the Korean 
War.  Refer to George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2 and 116. 
6 William D. Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents:  An Infantryman in Korea (Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 
1999), 10. 
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Technology.7  He planned to graduate and saw no reason why he should not.  Lynn Hahn and 
Rudolph Stephens had settled into something a bit cozier.  Hahn, walking down an Alma, 
Michigan street in the fall of 1950, met Beatrice Ruth Allen and after a brief courtship they 
became engaged.8  Similarly, Stephens, only eleven when World War II started, had decided by 
1951 that he wanted to marry his girlfriend.9  Nothing in the seemingly placid and prosperous 
years after 1945 had prepared Hahn and Stephens for the possibility that they would not soon 
follow up their betrothals with honeymoons and dinner parties, and maybe even a baby or two.  
As for Howard Matthias and Bill Anderson, they chose very different directions than their peers.  
Matthias, graduating college and concerned about the draft looming over him, enlisted in the 
Marines, despite his own imminent engagement.10  In April 1950, at the ripe old age of 17, with 
his parents’ consent, Anderson enlisted in what he believed to be the United States’ peacetime 
Army Air Force.11  No doubt he foresaw an uneventful military career with decent pay and a 
nice, dependable retirement at the end. 
It is hard to say if Virginia Jennings Watson was also thinking about retirement when she 
enlisted in the Navy. After all, every branch of the service mustered married women out pretty 
quickly, so a permanent career in the Navy would have doomed her to a lifetime spent as an old 
maid.  But, her father had been an aviator in World War II and her mother, a proudly naturalized 
American citizen, had been a Navy yeoman in Estonia during World War I, so military service 
                                                 
7 Robert E. Baken (AFC 2001/001/1443), Folder 2, Interview by Matthew Baken, 23 November 2001, 2, VHC, 
AFC, LOC. 
8 Lynn Harold Hahn, Memoir (Korean War Educator website at http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/), 2. 
9 Rudolph W. Stephens, Old Ugly Hill:  A G.I.’s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952-1953 (Jefferson, 
NC:  McFarland and Company, 1995), 14. 
10 Howard Matthias, The Korean War—Reflections of a Young Combat Platoon Leader, revised edition 
(Tallahassee, FL:  Father & Son Publishing, 1995), 1-2. 
11 William E. Anderson, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
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came naturally.  And, Virginia’s father seemed thrilled when she decided to join up.12  Betty Jo 
Alexander’s father could not have reacted more differently.  A serviceman in World War II, he 
had come to think of military nurses as prostitutes and he and Betty Jo’s brother, also a World 
War II veteran, definitely did not want Betty Jo to enlist in the Navy of all things!13  The 
alternative of staying in Altus, Oklahoma and picking cotton, though, had little appeal and Betty 
Jo did not let the weeds grow under her feet before marching down to the recruiter’s office.  
While not subject to the draft like their male counterparts, Virginia and Betty Jo found the 
promise of military service too alluring to resist. 
Across the country the story was the same.  In America’s big cities and small towns, in 
the mountains and on the plains, along the coasts, in the countryside and on thousands of little 
farms, the young men and women who belonged to the generation after the “greatest generation” 
busily plotted the courses of their futures.  But somewhere in between all the dreams, 
engagements, weddings, births, college pins, careers, and carefully constructed plans, timing 
intervened.  On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea.  To almost everyone’s 
surprise, President Harry Truman set his jaw against this further expansion of communism and 
wasted no time in committing American soldiers and sailors to a limited war in Korea.  As a 
result, many of those young men and some of the young women who had escaped the perils of 
service in World War II, along with many who had served during that war, received a new 
“invitation” from Uncle Sam to come and fight (or nurse those fighting) half a world away in 
Korea.14  As Dannenmaier observed, “Now it was my turn.”15   
                                                 
12 Frances Omori, Quiet Heroes:  Navy Nurses of the Korean War, 1950-1953, Far East Command (St. Paul, MN:  
Smith House Press, 2000), 70. 
13 Ibid., 69. 
14 It should be noted that the Korean War was not fought solely by new draftees and recruits.  Shortages of military 
manpower at the beginning of the war due to the drastic dismantling of the World War II military made necessary 
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Whatever arrangements had been made, whatever prospects waited just on the horizon, 
the Korean War and the draft were about to reconfigure the life blueprints of many young 
draftees and enlisted men and women.  Like hundreds of thousands of others, Dannenmaier, 
Baken, Hahn, Stephens, Matthias, and Anderson all ended up in a war zone in Korea instead of 
in Michigan or California building lives at home during the early 1950s.  Dannenmaier enlisted 
in order to avoid the draft, replacing graduate school with boot camp, at least for the time being.  
But, he did have his undergraduate degree.  Baken did not even get the chance to finish college 
before mustering in.  On summer break 1951, he received his draft notice and the draft board 
denied his appeal to complete college before serving based on his non-enrollment that summer.  
He mustered in September 1951.16  Stephens, believing that nothing could come of an 
engagement interrupted by a long wartime separation, broke off his engagement.  Years later he 
still maintained that he never quite got over his fiancé.17  Hahn went ahead and married Beatrice, 
spending his last three months before Korea as a married man.  They recently celebrated their 
50th wedding anniversary.18  Matthias also married his girl before shipping out and on the eve of 
his departure learned she was pregnant.  Whether good luck or bad, he received a Purple Heart 
wound and was sent home in time to welcome the new arrival.19  Anderson, like many Korean 
War era volunteers, experienced Korea as a grunt in ground combat.  By the time Anderson 
enlisted, the Air Force had separated from the Army, a little fact that the recruiter failed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
the call up of tens of thousands of reservists and national guardsmen, many of whom had already served in World 
War II.   
15 Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents, 2. 
16 Robert E. Baken, Interview by Baken and Baken, 2, VHPC, AFC, LOC. 
17 Stephens, Old Ugly Hill, 14. 
18 Lynn Harold Hahn, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 1-2. 
19 Matthias, The Korean War, 176. 
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mention when he was signing up.20  Virginia Jennings Watson and Betty Jo Alexander received 
orders to report overseas as Navy nurses.  While some women sent to Japan or Korea felt great 
trepidation, Watson looked forward to helping the war effort and doing “something 
worthwhile.”21  Numberless and nameless others put their plans on hold or abandoned them 
entirely and went to Korea, Japan, or Navy or hospital ships stationed in the Far East. They had 
babies born while they stood in the foxholes, lost girlfriends and boyfriends and wives due to 
their absence, gave up good jobs, turned into soldiers, earned their stripes, or simply changed 
their plans and perhaps themselves as a result of their service.   
Born during the Great Depression and sandwiched somewhere between the “Good War,” 
World War II and the “bad war,” Vietnam, the men and women who served during the Korean 
Conflict shared more than just the donning of military issue olive drab.22  They were a generation 
of their own, influenced by a childhood made common by the uncommon events they shared—a 
deep and nearly universal economic depression and then a war of unprecedented scale followed 
by what many hoped would be an enduring peace.  Little did they know it then, but this historical 
backdrop served to uniquely prepare some of them to accept their roles in Harry Truman’s war 
over a small, squalid, maybe even insignificant piece of Asia called Korea. 
Though most of the men and women destined to serve in Korea and the Far East 
Command would have been too young to remember October 24, 1929, they would certainly 
recognize the effects of that day on their lives.  “Black Thursday” as it was called marked the 
end of the roaring twenties and the beginning of the decade long economic decline that started on 
                                                 
20 William E. Anderson, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
21 Omori, Quiet Heroes, 15. 
22 The projected average age for Korean War veterans in 2010 according to the U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
is 78.5, making 1931 the median birth year.  See U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Analysis Office of Program and Data Analyses, Data on Veterans of the Korean War, June 2000 
(online publication at http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc) .   
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Wall Street and rippled through the various Main Streets of America.  Throughout the country, 
banks closed, factories sat collecting dust, farmers threw in their rakes as their properties were 
foreclosed, and average Americans wandered the streets or rode the rails in search of work.  For 
the children born in these years of widespread poverty, there were tangible and sometimes 
terrible consequences.  Poor diet and the inability to afford proper medical care led to 
malnourishment, a rise in diseases like rickets and pellagra, and lifelong health issues.  The high 
rate of unemployment meant that many suffered eviction, hunger, discomfort, and parental 
absence as fathers or mothers job-hunted.  Not uncommonly, youngsters had to suspend their 
schooling to either find employment themselves or help out at home or on the farm. 
But the Great Depression served as an effective teacher to these kids, even if most of the 
lessons were bitter to learn.  If they were old enough, boys and girls learned to work and work 
hard without complaining or questioning.  They plowed fields, hawked newspapers, sold apples, 
cared for younger siblings, and fed livestock.  Like the adults around them, children of the 
Depression sacrificed and pulled together with their loved ones, their communities, and their 
country to survive hard times.  And, they learned a new American lesson, too, that the 
government could be their friend.  President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, begun in 1933, 
didn’t pull the United States out of depression, but it did ease the suffering of countless 
Americans who benefited from its various programs aimed at relief, reform and recovery.  
Children who had known only empty bellies and hardscrabble existences could see the difference 
that government assistance made and they learned to trust and love their Uncle Sam.23  For many 
it would be difficult to shake the image of a benevolent president wisely acting in the best 
                                                 
23 In chapter 1 of his book, Lisle Rose makes a compelling case for the idea that the Great Depression and the New 
Deal changed Americans’ way of thinking with regard to the government.  See Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes 
to Main Street:  America in 1950 (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1999). 
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interests of the country—even when shivering through Korean winters and ducking showers of 
Chinese bullets. 
 As babies and young children of the Great Depression, most of the Korean War 
generation sat on the sidelines during World War II, too young to be drafted or even to enlist.  
But, the Second World War would nonetheless prove a milestone in their lives.  Unaware of the 
isolationism and malaise that had lingered after World War I, the men and women who would 
later serve in Korea were ten and eleven year old kids when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.  
They saw how Americans joined together to back the war effort, even if that meant making grave 
sacrifices.  For their part, sixteen million American men, including the fathers and older brothers 
of those who would later serve in Korea, stepped into military uniforms ready to do their duty 
and lay down their lives in defense of the country.  Those left behind on the home front did their 
part, too.  Whole towns turned out to say goodbye to their native sons being shipped off to war.  
Ordinary Americans, even young ones, grew Victory Gardens, saved scrap metal and paper, 
bought war stamps and war bonds, harvested the pod from milkweed for the making of 
parachutes, and patriotically rallied behind their government.24  In the schools, club periods 
became “victory periods” and junior ROTC units donated their time to pick up metal and other 
materials and load them onto trains bound for national collection points.25   Many students quit 
school altogether in order to enlist or go to work in defense plants.26  With fathers and older 
                                                 
24 In their memoirs and interviews, Korean War veterans commonly talk about their own war efforts during World 
War II.  Even as kids, they were expected to offer their labor and time.  For some personal accounts, see Richard 
Bevier, “Nearly Everyone Should Write a Book,” account attached by the author to Korean War Veteran Survey, 3, 
CFSOKW;  Professor Charles Marx, Oral History by Dr. Orley B. Caudill, 28 October 1976, Volume 185 (1981), 
transcript, Mississippi Oral History Program, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, 3;  Glen 
Schroeder, Memoir, (Korean War Educator), 1;  and Ralph David Fly, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
25 See Martin Markley, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
26 One Korean War veteran noted that his class size shrunk from 213 to 151 because of students leaving to serve the 
war effort in one way or another.  See Martin Markley, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
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siblings gone in service of one type or another, younger children bucked up, taking on adult 
responsibilities at home and within the community.27  When asked to conserve, Americans 
accepted the severe rationing of such items as gasoline, meat, butter, sugar, and flour, and they 
continued to support the war.  For hundreds of thousands of kids, the message must have been 
clear; in a time of war American citizens rally together, sharing the sacrifices and keeping the 
trust with those whom they have called to serve.  
 In addition to burdens, World War II provided a great amount of excitement for those 
growing up.  Just the thought of war thrilled some of them.  Jack Orth remembers sitting around 
the dinner table when his family heard the news of Pearl Harbor.  “Everyone was in a state of 
shock.  Can you imagine how exciting this was to a ten-year-old kid?”28  And if the real war 
proved insufficient to keep the attention of youths, the “reel” World War II often did the trick.  
Saturday matinees routinely featured John Wayne or Robert Mitchum in motion pictures 
guaranteed to titillate audiences with true or manufactured wartime heroics.  Even after the war 
ended, Hollywood deluged young moviegoers with films glorifying the men who fought at the 
Battle of the Bulge or Wake Island.  For many, Sergeant Stryker, the cool-under-pressure bona 
fide hard-ass Marine in The Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) served a far greater purpose than simple 
entertainment.  He and other characters like him became influential role models for the 
generation of men that had missed out on World War II.  As one Korean War veteran put it, “I 
had been exposed to everything about warfare by Hollywood.  These visions filled my head 
when I joined up for the Korean War.  My intentions were to kill a few North Koreans or 
                                                 
27 In his book on children born in America from 1932 to 1945, Tuttle emphasizes that one of the major effects of the 
Second World War on kids was the increased burdens falling on their shoulders due to the absence of fathers and 
older siblings.  See William M. Tuttle, Jr., “Daddy’s Gone to War:” The Second World War in the Lives of 
America’s Children (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993), 241. 
28 Jack Orth quoted in Henry Berry, Hey, Mac, Where Ya Been?  Living Memories of the U. S. Marines in the 
Korean War (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 282. 
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Chinese, maybe get a small wound and be taken care of by a June Allyson or Doris Day type 
nurse.  Then I would return home to a hero’s welcome and have nice things said of me for the 
rest of my life.”29  Others felt the same way and when the Korean War rolled around, they 
determined to pay their debt to America and become heroes in their own right, heroes worthy of 
depiction on the silver screen.30   
 If exposure to World War II influenced the young men of the Korean generation to enlist, 
it sometimes had a different effect on young women.  The movies occasionally depicted nurses, 
WAVES, or WACS as American heroines, but many returning fathers, brothers and sweethearts 
sang a different tune about female military service.  Rather than touting feminine heroics and the 
glamour of wartime nursing, protective fathers stressed the uncertainty of military life.  Brothers 
offered favorable appraisals in general of “women in uniform EXCEPT that they do not think it 
is good for their sisters.”31  Boyfriends frequently went further, associating women in service 
with immorality and poor reputation.32  All in all, “they would say bad things about the women 
in the service.”33  No wonder then that by the time of the Korean War, female recruiters faced a 
difficult task, to convince women to join the military despite negative feedback from their family 
                                                 
29 James Ryan, “The Chit,” 1, an unpublished piece included by the author with Korean War Veteran Survey, 
CFSOKW. 
30 It should be noted that even before the Korean War many men expected to serve in the military for at least a part 
of their lives.  Richard Bevier notes, “It was universally accepted that upon graduation from high school, all fit 
young men would hasten to apply for enlistment in the branch of service of their choice.”  Richard Bevier, Korean 
War Veteran Survey, 3, CFSOKW. 
31 Public Relations Coordinator, Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, “Policy Guide for Women in the Armed Services Information Program 1953 U. S. Army, U. 
S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, U. S. Marine Corps,” 8, Staff Files, Files of the Special Assistant Relating to the Office of 
Coordinator of Government Public Service Advertising, Women in the Services—Correspondence 1952-53, Box 9, 
folder “Women in the Service (Policy Material),” Dwight David Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter, 
DDE Library). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Grace S. Alexander, Interview by Hermann J. Trojanowski, 20 January 1999, Women Veterans Historical Project, 
Oral History Collection, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 10-11.  (Hereafter WVHP, OHC, UNCG) 
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or friends.34  Still, women were not immune to the patriotism engendered by the Second World 
War and the Korean Conflict did claim its share of servicewomen.  They did not always muster 
in for the same reasons as their male counterparts, but women also remembered the patriotic 
lessons of their youth.35  Margie Jacob and a multitude of others could claim “patriotic response” 
as an important reason for their enlistment in the years after World War II.36 
With the surrender of the Germans and then the Japanese, American patriotism soared to 
new heights as did American gratitude toward those who had fought.  Noisy parades, tickertape, 
and a flurry of speeches and parties greeted returning G.I.s.  In almost every town, bands played 
songs commemorating World War II soldiers and organizations like the American Veterans of 
World War II (AMVETS) sprouted to represent and pay homage to the new veterans.  Unlike 
their counterparts from earlier wars, World War II veterans also received very generous support 
from the federal government.  The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or the G.I. Bill of 
Rights as it was more commonly known, allotted federal money to help veterans buy homes and 
businesses or go to school.37  Within a few years, some 8 million veterans had spent about $14 
billion taking advantage of these educational benefits.  So many ex-G.I.s entered college, in fact, 
that many universities had to set up Quonset huts on campus to house all of them.  The men and 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 In the early 1950s, an Air Force study of female enlistment found that women joined military service for five 
basic reasons:  overseas service (travel), self-improvement and education, interesting work, to meet new people and 
make new friends, and out of patriotism.  These reasons might not differ so much from the reasons that men joined 
up, but men seem far more likely in their memoirs, interviews, and surveys to stress the relationship between their 
enlistment and their experiences with patriotism during World War II.  See Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Memorandum for the Advertising Council, “Information About Women in the Armed Services,” 8 
December 1952, 5, Staff Files, Files of the Special Assistant Relating to the Office of Coordinator of Government 
Public Service Advertising, Women in the Services—Correspondence 1952-53, Box 9, folder “Women in the 
Service (Policy Material),” DDE Library.   
36 Margaret S. Jacob, Korean War Veteran Survey, 3, CFSOKW. 
37 The World War II GI Bill subsidized tuition, fees, and books for veterans attending college or some other 
approved institution (such as a trade school or in some cases a secondary school for those who did not yet have a 
high school diploma). 
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women entering college directly from high school could not help but be impressed with the older 
veterans in their midst.  In his memoir, Charles Cole notes, “[We] were continually reminded 
both of sacrifice and patriotism.  We seemed a humble minority in the flood of returning ex-G.I.s 
who shared our classes.”38  Certainly, not all of those who served in World War II benefited from 
it or could take advantage of the programs designed to help them ease back into civilian life, but 
from the perspective of the generation just a step younger, veterans had become a special group 
in society, revered, honored, and remunerated.  The men and women who would muster in for 
the Korean War would expect to do their duty, but they would also expect the same gratitude on 
the part of the nation that sent them.   
World War II caused some peculiar fallout for the Korean War generation.  When it 
ended, it left America at peace, but it also left in place the Selective Service system of 1940.  
Though President Truman was dismantling the military at an almost alarming rate, males ages 
21-36 still had to register for the draft and were liable for one year of active duty and ten years in 
the reserves.39  After an aborted attempt to replace the Selective Service Act with a Universal 
Military Training bill, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948 which lowered the 
ages of eligibility for registration to 18-26, set the age of induction at 19-26, and increased the 
tour of duty to 21 months.40  Boys maturing during and after World War II would find the draft 
an ever-present force in their lives.   
The changed landscape of the world in the postwar years, however, made military service 
both less likely and more tolerable.  The Second World War divided the globe into newly minted 
                                                 
38 Charles F. Cole, Korea Remembered:  Enough of a War: The USS Ozbourn’s First Korean Tour, 1950-1951 (Las 
Cruces, NM:  Yucca Tree Press, 1995), 20. 
39 Flynn, The Draft, 7. 
40 Black leaders like A. Philip Randolph in particular refused to support Universal Military Training because such a 
law would require that African Americans serve in a segregated Army.  See Paul T. Murray, “Blacks and the Draft:  
A History of Institutional Racism,” Journal of Black Studies 2:1 (September 1971), 66-9. 
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great powers, like the United States and the Soviet Union, and vanquished countries, a category 
that included almost everyone else.  And while the atomic bomb would eventually scare 
Americans right out of their homes and into underground shelters, in 1945 the country’s sole 
guardianship of atomic weaponry provided a certain “atomic security.”41  Russia might loom 
threateningly on the horizon, but it would not take American ground troops to quell any 
difficulties—nuclear weapons would do the trick.  Even as late as 1949 when the Soviet Union 
exploded their own A-Bomb, few Americans suspected that American boys might be called to 
fight in another war with traditional weapons and tactics.  Evidently, Harry Truman did not think 
so either.  By March 1949, the organized reserves had been pared down to 746,000 and by the 
end of the year all branches of the military halted enlistments.  The regular Army had strength of 
only 591,000 by mid-1950, somewhat strange in light of the fact that only recently Russia had 
exploded its own atomic bomb, Mao had seized mainland China for communism, containment 
had made military assistance to Greece and Turkey necessary, and Europe had depended on the 
Marshall Plan to shore them up against further decline and the potential siren song of 
communism.42  Stranger still, young Americans continued to believe throughout what would 
later be viewed as unsettling if not turbulent events that they could count on one thing—they 
would not be required for the same kind of wartime service that veterans of World War II had 
performed.  Any war would be a worldwide affair and it would be fought with nuclear weapons 
rather than conventional armies.43 
Unfortunately, the men and women born a little too late to muster into America’s World 
War II military machine would be just in time to discover that the atomic security they believed 
                                                 
41 For the transformation of American attitudes toward nuclear weapons, see Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light:  
American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1985). 
42 Flynn, The Draft, 109. 
43 For an echo of this thought in a Korean War veteran’s memoir, see Cole, Korea Remembered, 20. 
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in was no security at all.  Despite organized demands by citizens in Shawnee, Oklahoma and 
elsewhere that the government drop atomic bombs on Korea and use nuclear weapons on the 
battlefield, the “police action” in Korea from 1950 to 1953 would be fought like thousands of 
wars before—by soldiers mucking around on the ground with guns.44  On the bright side, 
probably no generation of American youth before or since was better prepared to deal with such 
a reversal of fortune than that which grew up to fight in Korea.  Despite ethnic, racial, religious, 
political, and regional differences, they all listened to the same baseball games at night on the 
radio, wore the same clothes, shopped at the local A&P, ate macaroni and cheese for dinner, and 
most importantly absorbed those lessons of hard work, obedience, and duty to country from their 
childhood experiences.45  So when the country called on them in June 1950 and in the months 
and years after, those selected from among their Korean War cohorts heeded the call.  No strong, 
organized draft protest ever developed during the Korean Conflict as it had in earlier wars and as 
would resurface with Vietnam and very few men attempted to dodge the draft.  Out of the 
roughly 2 million men involuntarily inducted from 1950 to 1953, only 20,080 ever faced 
prosecution for violating the draft and of those only 9890 were convicted.46  Like Jimmie Clark 
they understood that “It’s your privilege to disagree, but not disobey” and so “off we went to 
unknown places to serve our country as our leaders suggested.”47 
Still, not all soldiers marched willingly or happily to the Korean War, and it is 
remarkable that so few resisted the draft or protested the war itself, simply resigning themselves 
to their fates.  Separated by only a little over a decade from their younger brothers and sisters of 
                                                 
44 Rose, Cold War Comes to Main Street, 291-301. 
45 Lizabeth Cohen’s monograph, Making a New Deal:  Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, 2nd edition (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press, 1990), explains that throughout the 1930s differences between Americans were 
becoming less and less profound. 
46 Flynn, The Draft, 127-128. 
47 Jimmie L. Clark, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 1. 
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the Vietnam War, why did Korean soldiers not burn their draft cards and line the street in front 
of the White House demanding an end to the conflict?  The answer lies in part in their timing.  
The late 1940s and early 1950s were years of conformity.  The second Red Scare made 
Americans look carefully at anyone who stepped outside the political or social bounds and the 
consequences for such deviance could be devastating not only to individuals but to their families.  
Homosexuals found themselves investigated as security risks, advocates of peace suffered 
charges of communism, and outspoken critics of segregation had passports revoked.  World War 
II might have stirred up some resentment against the status quo and restlessness on the part of 
African Americans, Hispanics, women, and others, but such disillusionment would not blossom 
into full blown rights revolutions until the 1960s and for the time being consensus about 
American life in general remained virtually unshaken.  When men grew up, they became the man 
in the gray flannel suit, married June Cleaver, and raised a family.48  And when asked to fight on 
behalf of American conformity to the doctrine of containment, they marched to war.   
Unknown to them at the time, these children of the Great Depression and Second World 
War would be the last of their kind, a generation characterized by unquestioning obedience and 
trust.  Their war, the war for conformity, would turn out to be one of a series of pivotal events 
spinning Americans in a thousand directions and creating more questions than answers.  The 
Cold War would harden and become ever more frightening, pushing Americans toward less 
consensual and more precarious conformity at home.  Communism would be exposed as 
fractured and splintered rather than monolithic, leading many to question the necessity of 
fighting it at all.  Joseph McCarthy would reveal himself as a red-baiting, demagogic bully in the 
                                                 
48 See Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound:  American Families in the Cold War Era (New York:  Basic Books, 
1999). 
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Army-McCarthy hearings, sickening those who watched it on television.  Segregation would end 
and the national Civil Rights Movement would gear up, dividing the country on questions of 
race.  Women, Native Americans, and Mexicans would challenge the status quo, redrawing 
societal expectations.  Government leaders would prove untrustworthy, paving the way for future 
generations to question authority.  Worldly and jaded G.I.s taking advantage of the World War II 
and Korean G.I. Bills would transform education, generating new lessons that bred less 
optimistic, more critical students.  And Korea would become a reference point for those 
summoned to fight in Vietnam, leaving many young men and women unable to find a successful 
patriotic answer to whether or not the new war was worth it.  Twenty years after the Korean War, 
the country was the same but the people had changed—they were still all Americans but the old 
homogeny and agreement born of the Great Depression and World War II was gone. 
The men who fought in Korea and the women who served in theater were no braver than 
the soldiers at Khe Sanh, Grenada, Panama, Mogadishu, or Iraq.  In the history of American 
soldiers and veterans, they can claim no monopoly on that active love of country sometimes 
labeled patriotism.  But, a different America had produced them and more than the draftees of 
Vietnam or the all-volunteer force of recent years, they carried into battle and overseas duty the 
certainty that where they led the country would follow.  In 1950 or 1951, they were too young to 
remember other American wars fought for lesser motives with less enthusiasm on the part of 
citizens than World War II.  Perhaps naively they imagined that they were marching to the beat 
of the same drums that had carried their fathers, brothers, and older sisters to France or Germany 
in the Second or even the First Great War.  They could not yet hear that the tune was changing 
and that those values embedded in them during a childhood of economic trouble and war were 
becoming if not outdated at least less universal.  When they returned, Korean War soldiers and 
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service women discovered that the country they thought they were leading had outpaced them 
and moved on and they felt forgotten.  This is their story. 
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CHAPTER 2:  MUSTERING IN 
 
“Lord I got my questionnaire, Uncle Sam’s gonna send me away from here/He said J. B. you know that I 
need you, Lord I need you in South Korea.”—stanza of “Korea Blues.”1 
 
“Greetings from the President of the United States.”—from Jimmie L. Clark’s draft letter.2 
 
“He was like a million other guys.  Whenever folly, blunder, wasted power, brought again the need for them, 
they came.”—From Jackland Marmur, “The Bloodstained Beach.”3 
 
“In the old country they say you gotta go in the army, you go.  But here no one says you gotta go in these 
Marines.  Why you go?  You don’t like your home, your family, whatsamatter?”—Joe DeMarco’s father 
when he enlisted in 1948.4 
 
 
 “You’ll be soooorry!”  The taunt from those who knew, who had already been there, 
usually came just a little too late—like after raw recruits or inductees had already signed away a 
year or two or five of their lives to the military.5  And by then, many of those being warned 
already felt sorry.  Mustering into the U. S. Armed Forces during the Korean War era, as in other 
periods, sometimes amounted to nothing short of humiliation or hassle.  For enlistees, the 
process began with a trip to the nearest recruitment office, frequently located in the local Post 
Office.  Rural or small town residents might have had to travel to a larger community, but that in 
itself presented little hardship, unless of course one were black.  In that case, special 
arrangements would have had to be made for travel, food, and lodging since de jure and de facto 
segregation throughout much of the country, and especially in the South, limited one’s options.   
                                                 
1 “Korea Blues” quoted in Doris Schmidt, “Americans Change Their Tune:  The Korean War in Country and Folk 
Music, as Represented in Billboard and Sing Out! Magazines,”  49, Box “A.0776 to A.0806,” folder 0784, Center 
for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University, Independence, Missouri (Hereafter CFSOKW). 
2 Jimmie L. Clark, Memoir (Korean War Educator website at http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/), 1. 
3 Jackland Marmur, “The Bloodstained Beach,” in F. VanWyck Mason, ed., American Men at Arms:  The Best of 
Fiction From Three Wars (Boston:  Little, Brown, and Company, 1964), 564. 
4 Joe DeMarco quoted in Henry Berry, Hey Mac, Where Ya Been? Living Memories of the U. S. Marines in the 
Korean War (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 133. 
5 Glenn Schroeder recalls that when he arrived at the San Diego Naval Training Center a group of guys who had 
recently finished training kept yelling “You’ll be sooorry” over and over at the group of trainees just entering.  
Glenn Schroeder, Memoir (Korean War Educator) 3. 
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Once at the recruitment center, the potential enlistee gave background information—age, 
race, educational level, marital status, number and ages of dependents, criminal record, etc.—to 
“fast-typing sergeants” who quickly created a file for the applicant.6  Enlistees before the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea also had to supply three letters of recommendation written on 
their behalf.7  Anita Bean, a foster child from the age of three when her mother passed away, had 
to get her referrals from the state when she enlisted in 1950.8   If everything looked good—age 
between 18 and 26 for males (or 17 with a parent’s signature) and 21 to 35 for females (or 18 to 
35 with a parent’s consent), apparent good health, no evidence of an immoral character such as 
would warrant an administrative disqualification, and in the case of women single with no 
dependents under age 18—the candidate moved to the next level, the mental qualification exam.9   
Men, women, enlistees, and draftees all took the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) or 
                                                 
6 “100 Volunteer for Army, Air Force in Single Day,” Baltimore Afro-American, 5 August 1950, 7. 
7 Several veterans mention this, including James Coulos and Donald M. Byers, Army Service (Korean War) 
Questionnaire, page 1 for both surveys, 2nd Division, 23rd Regiment, Alphabetical Box 1, Department of the Army, 
U. S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Hereafter Carlisle Barracks). 
8 Anita Bean, Korean War Veteran Survey, 2, CFSOKW. 
9 The ages accepted varied somewhat by branch of service.  The Marine Corps accepted men 17-28, but the Air 
Force usually required applicants to be 19 or 20, depending on what one wanted to do.  “Report on Conditions of 
Military Service for the President’s Commission on Veterans Pensions,” 15-17, U. S. President’s Commission on 
Veterans’ Pensions (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, Dwight David 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.  (Hereafter Bradley Commission and DDE Library).  Many things could 
qualify for apparent bad health.  Listening to news of the Korean War, Charlie Carmen heard that his old outfit, 
Baker Company 5th Marines, was engaged in hard fighting and decided to reenlist.  He had been in a car wreck some 
time earlier and still had unhealed cuts which prompted the Marine recruiter to refuse his enlistment.  Charlie had to 
wait until all of his cuts healed before being reaccepted into the Corps. By then he had lost his status as sergeant and 
had to go in as a private first class.  Charlie Carmen, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 1.  While there were strict age 
limits for entering the military even with parental consent, enlistees rarely had to provide proof of age and numerous 
accounts exist of boys as young as 15 or 16 joining the service.  In all, some 200,000 veterans of World War II and 
the Korean Conflict are believed to have joined the military as underage kids.  Such was the case with Don Green 
whose father died leaving 11 kids on a family farm in Nevada.  At age 14 Green saw military service as his only 
way out of poverty and so joined up.  He turned 16 while fighting in Korea.   “Military Veterans Say They Were 
Underage,”  New York Times, 29 October 2003, Article 0654, CFSOKW.  Similarly, Charles Marx, pressed by 
economic worries, asked his mother to sign him into the Air Force.  On his fifteenth birthday he was sworn into 
service as a 17 year old.  Professor Charles Marx, Oral History by Dr. Orley Caudill, 28 October 1976, Mississippi 
Oral History Program, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, 4.  Even more shocking, 
Richard Cecil Jones, a 13 year old African American boy, joined the Army and did duty at two different camps 
before writing home to have his mother get him out of the service.  See “Lad, 13, ‘Jives’ Army, Does 145 
Days…Bubble Bursts,” Pittsburgh Courier, 2 February 1952, 13.  Also, “Soldier, 14, Coming Home,” New York 
Times, 11 April 1951, 31. 
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similar exams at either a recruitment center or an examining station.10   A hybrid aptitude-
intelligence test consisting of 100 questions covering vocabulary, math, spatial relations, and 
mechanical ability, the AFQT determined the fitness for service of the inductee or enlistee and 
indicated where a passing candidate might fit in the military machinery, what MOS (military 
occupational specialty) or job best suited them.  With less access to quality classroom education, 
minorities such as African Americans scored lower on the AFQT and had much higher rejection 
rates than whites.11  A low score, though perhaps embarrassing, did not necessarily mean 
rejection, however.  High school graduates “were automatically declared acceptable even if they 
failed to achieve the required score on the test.”12  And, prior to any disqualification, low-scoring 
registrants with less than a high school degree met with personnel psychologists who conducted 
personal interviews to establish whether or not they had the mental ability to serve.13  Also, as 
manpower needs went up, the minimum acceptable score on the mental exams went down.14  In 
                                                 
10 After October 1951, medical and mental exams were both performed by the Armed Forces Examining Stations.  
Prior to that, Induction stations gave the mental test.  After 31 December 1952, women took the Armed Forces 
Women’s Selection Test (AFWST) rather than the AFQT.  “Enlistment Procedures,” 16, (Bradley Commission):  
Records 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE Library.  For a more detailed discussion of the AFQT, see 
Bernard D. Karpinos, “Mental Test Failures,” in Sol Tax, The Draft:  A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1967), 35-53. 
11 Harold Wool, “Military Manpower Procurement and Supply,” in Roger W. Little, ed., Social Research and 
Military Management:  A Survey of Military Institutions (Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces, Inc., 
September 1969, AFOSR 70-0661TR), 41 and 44.  Just prior to the Korean War, 62% of blacks scored in the lower 
percentile ranges of the AFQT compared with 33% of whites.  While many were still mustered in, they received 
different MOS’s and assignments than those who scored higher.  Leo Bogart, ed., Project Clear:  Social Research 
and the Desegregation of the United States Army (New Brunswick, NJ:  Transaction Publishers, 1992), xxiii.  
During the war 69% of white accessions scored above mental group IV but only 21% of other groups did.  About 
4.3% of whites and 31.3% of other registrants entered the military via administrative acceptances.  “Section 1:  
Selection Process,” 20, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE Library. 
12 “Report on Conditions of Military Service for the President’s Commission on Veterans Pensions,” TAB AF-1, 
(Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE Library. 
13 “Processing Procedures, 1950-1953 (Reproduced from ‘Medical Statistics of the United States Army,’ 1953; in 
press.),”48, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE Library. 
14 During wartime, the military not infrequently lowers standards for service in order to fill the ranks rapidly.  In the 
Iraq War, borderline troops not only ended up qualifying for positions beyond their capabilities, but ended up on the 
front.  See Dan Ephron, “He Should Never Have Gone to Iraq,” Newsweek 151: 26 (30 June 2008), 33-34. 
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September 1949, one needed to score at least 49% to qualify for service, but by July 1951, 10% 
would do the trick.15 
Those found mentally acceptable had only one more obstacle to overcome before being 
sworn into their chosen branch of the military, the often dreaded physical exam.  While female 
veterans rarely mention the physical at all in their writings and interviews, male veterans 
frequently describe it as “a very dehumanizing experience.”16  Male enlistees and draftees lined 
up either naked or in their skivvies as military medical staff walked along examining them one 
by one, checking, among other things,  private parts for signs of disease, rectums for 
hemorrhoids, and feet for flatness.17  All that remained for physically fit recruits and inductees 
was to take their oaths and then catch a train or bus to basic training.  For most this proved pretty 
uneventful after the drawn out processing-in, but for some it provided a measure of excitement.  
Ralph David Fly, enlisting in the Navy, had his June 1951 swearing-in at a movie theater in 
Seattle just before the premiere of what else but Gary Cooper’s “You’re in the Navy Now!”18  
For their troubles, these new Marines, soldiers, and sailors received, after reaching their 
destinations and waiting in yet another line, their new military issue clothing.  Even many of 
those who had not wanted to join the service to begin with could not help but admire and be 
proud of their wonderful new uniforms.  At the end of all the lines and red tape and after much 
                                                 
15 In the years before Korea, when manpower needs and enlistment and draft quotas were low, the minimum 
acceptable score on the AFQT kept increasing.  In March 1947, a score of 31% was acceptable, but by September 
1949 one needed at least 49%.  The Korean War’s manpower shortage caused the minimum score to drop.  In July 
1950, non-high school graduates continued to need a 49%, but high school graduates slipped by with 31%.  With 
Chinese intervention in November 1950, the levels dropped again and all male applicants scoring 21% were 
accepted.  By July 1951, the standards dropped dramatically.  Males achieving only 10% on the AFQT were 
considered fit for service.  “Report on Conditions of Military Service for the President’s Commission on Veterans 
Pensions,” TAB AF-1, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE Library. 
16 Ralph David Fly, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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anticipation or dread, entrants finally came to be officially mustered into the United States 
Armed Forces.19 
Such was the scenario played out millions of times during the Korean War as young men 
and women had to be newly mustered or re-mustered into the Armed Forces of the United States 
in order to fill out the ranks.  After World War II ended, President Harry S Truman and his 
military planners focused on preparing for worldwide atomic war.20  In the new era of 
superpowers, no one expected conventional weapons or troops to play much of a role.  As a 
result, the various branches of the U. S. military had been pared down by 1950 to the point where 
the government itself conceded that more money would have to be spent rebuilding the Armed 
Forces if the country wanted to present a credible posture against communist aggression.21   With 
the outbreak of war in Korea in late June 1950 and Truman’s determination to use American 
troops to “police” the fray, the need for a bigger military became even more acute.  Initially, 
General Douglas MacArthur pulled troops on duty in Japan for the Korean operation, but quickly 
realized that these would not suffice.  Not only were the garrison forces there unprepared for 
combat after months or even years of easy duty, they were understrength as well.22  Before long, 
American soldiers in Korea found themselves cornered in the Pusan Perimeter.  Replacements 
                                                 
19 In actuality, the order of events after passing the mental qualification test could vary.  Some were sworn in 
immediately and then issued clothes, others had to travel somewhere in order to take the oath, and yet more were 
issued clothing only once they reached basic training. 
20 W. D. McGlasson, “Manpower for the Korean War,” VFW (June/July 1990), 23, Article 0057, CFSOKW and 
William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier, White Army:  The 24th 
Infantry Regiment in Korea (Washington D.C.:  Center of Military History, United States Army, 1996), 29. 
21 In National Security Council (NSC) 68, produced in April 1950, the government acknowledged the inadequacy of 
the U. S. armed forces.  George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1993), 
110.  See also James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York:  William Morrow and 
Company, 1988), chapter 2, for a discussion of the Armed Forces on the eve of the Korean War.   
22 It is interesting to note that more than a few of those stationed in Japan and subsequently sent to Korea had at one 
time been classified “limited service” for mental or physical reasons.  Some time after World War II, the 
classification had been abolished, and with their consent these soldiers were put on “general duty,” but many were 
given comfortable assignments in quiet places like Japan.  Many of these became psychiatric casualties after only a 
few days of combat in Korea, further weakening the U. S. presence there.  Albert J. Glass, “Psychiatry in the Korean 
Campaign,” U. S. Armed Forces Medical Journal 4:10 (October 1953), 1392-1393. 
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and more units would be needed immediately.23  The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, only 
recently turning away enlistees, suddenly needed to fill uniforms and fast.   
All branches of the service stepped up their attempts to attract voluntary recruits and to 
keep the servicemen they had on hand by offering enticements for reenlistment or  simply by 
extending involuntarily enlistments that were due to expire.  For its part, the Army made 
especially good use of the Selective Service System, the draft, to fulfill its manpower needs.  
But, new recruits, voluntary or otherwise, took time to train, time that MacArthur insisted U. S. 
troops in Korea did not have.  By July 9, 1950 Congress authorized the call up of Reserve 
troops.24  Typically these would have been used to train new soldiers, but with the situation 
critical, many found themselves promptly headed for the combat zone.  The combination seemed 
a winning one.  MacArthur’s daring mid-September Inchon landing secured South Korea and by 
early October American troops were pressing into North Korea.  Draft calls, enlistment quotas 
and the military’s manpower needs should have fallen to near prewar levels, but as luck would 
have it a new and unexpected enemy entered the fight.25  Chinese “volunteers” crossed the Yalu 
on October 16, 1950 and by November 26 the Chinese had trapped and destroyed much of the 
United Nations force in North Korea, including about 20,000 Koreans and Americans at Chosin 
Reservoir.  The boys would not be home by Christmas.  Instead, many more would be needed for 
what was metamorphosing into a much longer conflict than anticipated.  The whole process of 
filling the ranks took on new life and another generation of young Americans found it their turn 
                                                 
23 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, 112-113. 
24 Ibid., 113. 
25 Chinese Premier Chou En-lai told Indian Ambassador Pannikar that China would not intervene in the war if only 
South Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel but that China would intervene if United States troops did.  The 
Indians quickly gave this information to the British who in turn warned the Americans.  The C.I.A., President 
Truman, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, however, did not take the threat seriously and as a result did not 
anticipate Chinese intervention.  James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York:  William 
Morrow & Company, 1988), 83. 
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to heed the nation’s call to arms.  Through enlistments, Reserve recalls, National Guard call-ups, 
and the draft, over 6 million men and women mustered into the U. S. military during the Korean 
War period.26   No doubt more than a few of them were very “soooorry!” 
 
The Volunteers 
 
 The Korean War rekindled a dying Selective Service System that in fiscal years 1948 and 
1950 had not even drafted anybody.  Even after the U.S. entered the Korean War, inductees 
rarely comprised more than 38% of those entering Uncle Sam’s military.27  Volunteers, 
guardsmen, and reservists accounted for the majority of those who served.28  When the war 
began in June 1950, career soldiers and leftover World War II volunteers or recruits from the 
interwar period made up the backbone of the Armed Forces.  For them, the military made signing 
on for the Korean effort easy—the various branches simply extended expiring enlistments 
involuntarily.29  But, in the three years that followed, a million and a half new enlistees joined 
the old salts.  Why did these choose to voluntarily enter into wartime military service?   And why 
had the older volunteers enlisted in the first place? 
                                                 
26 Although the armistice was signed in July 1953, the Korean War era is generally defined as June 25, 1950 to 
January 31, 1955.  In these years, 6,807,000 men and women served in the U. S. armed forces.  “Cost of War,” 
Central/Official files, OF 152-H, Box 819, DDE Library.   
27 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, 119.  This is consistent with the Vietnam War when draftees, draft-motivated 
enlistees, and true volunteers each accounted for about one third of those serving.  Christian G. Appy, Working-
Class War:  American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 128.  
B. G. Burkett, Stolen Valor:  How the Vietnam Generation was Robbed of its Heroes and its History (Dallas, TX:  
Verity Press, Inc., 1998), 52.  During World War II, however, over half of those who served were draftees.  
“National Survey of Veterans, 1987,” National Archives, RG 015, Box 1 (hereafter NA). 
28 It should be noted that not all volunteers joined the Korean War military willingly.  Reservists and National 
Guardsmen tended to be volunteers in the sense that they chose to sign up, but they neither expected nor, in most 
cases, wanted to be called to active duty.  See below. 
29 As early as July 18, 1950, only a couple of weeks after the beginning of the Korean Conflict, the Air Force had 
already extended all enlistments set to expire before July 18, 1951 by 12 months.  The Extension of Enlistment Act 
of 1950 authorized the President until July 9, 1951 to extend the enlistments of members of the armed services by 
twelve months. 
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 For males, the draft provided the most obvious reason to enlist.30  Under the Selective 
Service Act of 1948, men 18 to 26 had to register for the draft and those 19 to 26 were eligible 
for a 21 month tour of duty.31  Even non-citizens found themselves draft vulnerable under the 
1948 law unless they were willing to sacrifice the possibility of future naturalization.32  In the 
pre-Korea years, the likelihood of being drafted remained low and few men received notices for 
induction.  But, if drafted, the chances of entering the Army were high since only the Army and 
Marine Corps actually admitted draftees. The Air Force and Navy relied on all-volunteer forces.  
After Truman began committing troops to Korea in June 1950, draft calls skyrocketed from their 
previous levels and many more youths could expect their names to be chosen.  Like Glen 
Schroeder, many young men simply enlisted in order to have a choice about which branch they 
served. Glen joined the Navy to “avoid being a grunt….I didn’t want to crawl around in the mud, 
but go to sea instead.”33  Similarly, James Brady “rather liked the idea of being an officer, and 
the Marines had an undeniable cachet.”34  Others simply did not want to wait around for the draft 
to call them.  Like Huston Wheelock they “wanted to get it over with and serve my time.”  
                                                 
30 Often the draft is cited as the “most important single factor motivating young men to volunteer for service.”  
Wool, “Military Manpower Procurement and Supply,” in Little, ed., Social Research and Military Management, 70.   
31 The Universal Military Training and Service Act of June 1951 lowered the age of induction to 18.5 and 
lengthened the term of service to 24 months.  Draft vulnerable ages in part account for the relative youthfulness of 
Korean enlisted men when compared to earlier wars.  In World War I, men 18 to 40 inclusive and in both World 
War II and the Spanish American War men 18-45 inclusive were required to register for Selective Service.  Thus the 
average age of the Korean War soldier was 23 while his World War II counterpart was 26. “Report on Conditions of 
Military Service for the President’s Commission on Veterans Pensions,” table 2a, and “Section 11,” 8, (Bradley 
Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58 and 61 respectively, DDE Library. 
32 By 1951, Congress imposed draft liability on all permanent residents and other male aliens who had been in the 
country a year or more.  James B. Jacobs and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U. S. Armed Forces:  A Historico-
Legal Analysis,” Armed Forces and Society 7 (1981), 193.  Legislation passed on June 30, 1950 (Public Law 597) 
allowed for the enlistment of 2500 qualified, unmarried male aliens over 18 and under 35 for a term of five years or 
more.  United States Statutes at Large, 81st Congress, 2d Session 1950-1951, volume 64, part I, Public Laws and 
Reorganization Plans (Washington, D. C.:  U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 316.  Some men, of course, did 
choose to go back to their native countries rather than be drafted—even if they had become naturalized citizens.  See 
“Two Delinquents Now Abroad,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9 August 1950, 18. 
33 Glen Schroeder, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
34 James Brady, “Leaving for Korea,” American Heritage 48:1 (February-March 1997), 72. 
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Wheelock did not even care which service he went into, selecting the Marines because that was 
the first recruiter he ran into at the office!35   Ford Dixon wanted to finish his military obligations 
before entering college, so at 17 he mustered in.36  Donald Bohlmann and others chose to enlist 
in National Guard units even if they were due to be activated because if they had to serve they 
wanted to “be amongst people I knew.” 37   
 Still more volunteered for the National Guard in an attempt to either beat the draft or 
escape the war.  Classified I-A (available for service), Frank Rowan discovered through a friend 
that he could fulfill his military obligations by joining the California National Guard, serving 7 
years and becoming exempt from being drafted into the Army.  It did not work out quite as he 
planned, though.  Lured by the extra “rations and quarters” pay and the privilege of wearing the 
uniform to work, Rowan went on duty as an “Active Duty National Guardsman,” then got 
conscripted into the regular Army and shipped to Korea in the early months of the war.38  Bob 
Carpenter, owner of the Philadelphia Phillies, encouraged two of his players, Charlie Bicknell 
and Curt Simmons, to avoid conscription by joining the Guard in 1949.  A year later, their 
division, the 28th Infantry Division, got orders to activate and prepare for combat.  Bicknell got 
sold to the Braves, sent down to the minors on waivers, and played his last game on September 
6, 1950, the same day he left for basic training.39  These cases were not unusual and many men 
                                                 
35 Dawn Scher Thomae, “Wisconsin Warriors:  Interviews with Native American Veterans,” LORE 43:3 (September 
1993), 9-18 (online at www.mpm.edu/collect/vet.html). 
36 Ford Dixon, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 1, 1st Cavalry Division, Surnames A-L, Carlisle 
Barracks. 
37 Donald A. Bohlmann, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 1, 1st Cavalry Division, Surnames A-L, Carlisle 
Barracks. 
38 Frank Rowan, “History of the 161st Ordnance Depot Company and the 502nd Ordnance Depot Platoon 
1948/1952,” updated 9 October 2001, 1-5, included with Korean War Veteran Survey, CFSOKW. 
39 G. Richard McKelvey, The Bounce:  Baseball Teams’ Great Falls and Comebacks (Jefferson, NC:  McFarland & 
Company, 2001), 92. 
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who joined either the National Guard or Reserves found that these did not offer a safe haven 
from service in Korea. 
Others thought joining either the Navy or Air Force might keep them out of harm’s way.  
Ralph Fly’s father pressured him to join the Navy because “he thought it would keep me out of 
Korea.”40  For Franklin Manzar, the draft was imminent and so he “joined the Air Force with the 
intention of not going to Korea.”41  Such plans might have worked out for some boys, but like 
these, many ended up serving active duty in Korea.  Navy and Air Force enlistees went in fewer 
numbers to the war zone than dogfaces or Marines but they still went. 
 To be sure, male volunteers often hoped to get a better deal than the draft by enlisting, 
but a shorter time in service was not one of the perks.  Inductees served between 21 and 24 
months active duty, but volunteers faced considerably longer periods of service.  In the Army, 
Selective Service registrants could enlist for the same period of time as draftees, but entering the 
regular Army meant a term of between 3 and 6 years.  The Navy offered only 4 or 6 year tours of 
duty, regardless of Selective Service status and the Naval Reserve required 4 years.42  At the 
beginning of the Korean War, the Marine Corps only had 4 and 6 year enlistments, but in August 
1950 the Corps began offering 3 year terms as well.  One could join the Marine Corps Reserve 
for 3 or 4 years.43  The Air Force accepted volunteers for 3, 4, 5, or 6 years.44  Under the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, anyone under 26 mustering into the 
                                                 
40 Ralph David Fly, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2. 
41 Franklin Kenneth Manzar (AFC 2001/001/16128), Folder 3, Interview by Alexa Kapilow, 1 February 2003), 1, 
VHPC, AFC, LOC. 
42 The Navy did give applicants under 18 a “minority term,” meaning that these served only until some time before 
their 21st birthday.  Women in the Navy signed up for the same terms as men. 
43 After November 1952, men who had previous Marine service could enlist for 2, 3, 4, or 6 year enlistments.  There 
seems to have been an earlier precedent for three year enlistments during the 1948-1949 military doldrums.  Ralph 
Cutro enlisted on November 29, 1949 for three years.  Email Ralph Cutro to Melinda Pash, 24 December 2005, in 
author’s possession. 
44 Female medical and dental personnel and nurses could enlist in the Navy for 2 years, but others had to serve 3 
years like the men. 
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military for the first time had an 8 year obligation to be served either on active duty or in the 
reserves.  Even if a volunteer banked on a short war, they could not count on serving a reduced 
time in the military like their World War I or World War II counterparts whose terms of 
enlistment held them no longer than six months beyond the period of the emergency.45  But for 
some, choosing their branch of service or gambling that their reserve unit would not be needed 
proved enough incentive to volunteer.  All in all, draft pressure almost doubled the number of 
male enlistments per month.46 
 While the draft provided a potent inducement to enlistment, men and women volunteered 
during the Korean War era for other reasons as well.  Left-over patriotism from the Second 
World War along with a sense of nostalgia or duty compelled many to answer the call to colors.  
Fred Smith remembers that after World War II, “patriotism…was an important part of our 
lives…and we felt we needed to do something for our country.”47  Arthur Smith agreed “because 
all the guys went through World War II to do their thing to save this country, and I thought that’s 
what we were doing.”48  Warren Grossman wanted to offer “service to my country in time of 
need.”49  Clyde Queen “felt a compelling obligation to serve my country…and to me that was the 
most important thing in my life.”50  Even women, who often entered service for what might be 
termed “practical” reasons, remark that volunteering “had a kind of patriotic sense about it in 
                                                 
45 “Section X:  Duration of Service,” 8-12, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 61, 
DDE Library. 
46 With the absence of the draft in 1947, only 9-14,000 men enlisted per month.  After Truman requested a new draft 
in March 1948, enlistments increased to 20,000 per month.  40% of enlistees who were polled admitted that they 
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47 Commander Fred Ewing Smith in Frances Omori, Quiet Heroes:  Navy Nurses of the Korean War, 1950-1953, 
Far East Command (St. Paul, MN:  Smith House Press, 2000), 84. 
48 Arthur Smith, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 1. 
49 Warren Grossman, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 1, 1st Cavalry Division, Surnames A-L, Carlisle 
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50 Clyde H. Queen, Sr., (AFC 2001/001/10115), Folder 2, Transcript (Written answers to interview questions), 1, 
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doing something for my country.”51  For the same reason, Native Americans also rallied to the 
flag.  In September 1950, Dr. Frank E. Becker, National Secretary of the Indian Association of 
America, offered the government a plan to organize Native American military reserve units 
specializing in communications in order to channel the energy of 6000 military age men on 
reservations for service to the country.52  Gilbert Towner had heard that Indians, as wards of the 
government, could be exempted from wartime service, but he thought it a “high honor to fight, 
anytime, anywhere, to protect the country we love.”53   
Those too young to have participated fully in World War II enlisted in the interwar and 
Korean War eras because they could not shake the feeling that they had missed something 
significant.  During high school, John Nolan’s classmates disappeared as volunteers or inductees, 
leaving him with “this hang-up feeling that it was an experience that I wanted to share.”54  
Anthony Herbert, determined not to miss out, tried to enlist for World War II service at age 14, 
but his high school principal ratted him out as underage.  Three years later, he hurried to enlist 
again because he knew “that there would be another war, and I would be in it.”55  Arden Grover 
signed up because he was “not going to sit on the sidelines” if another war broke out.56  Jack 
Orth, who had felt cheated when World War II ended, thought himself lucky when Korea came 
along because:  “Now I could go to war.”  He later reflected that “I must have been nuts,” but at 
                                                 
51 Shirley Brantley, Interview by Eric Elliot, 2 May 2001, WVHP, OHC, UNCG, 15. 
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the time memories of what he had missed secured his enlistment.57  The son of Japanese 
immigrants, Akira Chikami had served in World War II, but missed out on combat so he decided 
to see what the Korean War could offer him.58   Seymour Harris, also a World War II veteran, 
rejoined because “an irresistible urge drew me toward enlistment.  I hadn’t done all that well 
with the CBs and wanted another chance to prove myself.”59 
 Despite the boom years after World War II, financial need prompted many to muster into 
military service.  As John Kamperschroer recalls, “Patriotic?  I don’t think so.  There was a poor 
future for farm boys.”60  In the same vein, Wadie Moore asserts “Patriotism never occurred to 
me.  I had one desire.  That was to escape degradation and poverty.  I mean clapboard, two-
room, chicken house kind of poverty.”61  For Gilbert Towner, the reservation had little to offer 
and he believed he could “take better care of my mother with a steady pay coming from the 
Marine Corps.”62  Joe Connors, a Chippewa Indian, George Hopkins, Joseph Morey, and Richard 
Ballenger all needed work and so volunteered.63  On an internship at Philadelphia General 
Hospital, Hank Litvin had work but no pay.  When a Navy captain came around offering 
ensign’s pay in return for 24 months service after completing his internship, Hank signed up.64  
Douglas Anderson joined up when he ran out of funds for college and Charles Smith, a Native 
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American, signed up in hopes of getting G. I. educational benefits. 65 Similarly, Shirley Brantley 
“was looking for some way to continue my education and get to see something besides 
Pittsburgh,” so she entered the Air Force.66  Robert Chappell, a black sharecropper, viewed 
military service as his only ticket to getting any kind of education.67  Out of money at M.I.T., 
Richard Kohl joined the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers ROTC because it paid 2/3 of a person’s 
way through school.68  J. F. Warnock enrolled in ROTC at Utah State University because it 
promised $27 a month, a lot of cash for a poor college kid.69 For numerous volunteers, service 
represented something very tangible—several pairs of shoes, nice clothes, a regular paycheck, 
and the chance for a better life.70  Service “was a matter of necessity—the patriotism thing came 
along a couple of years later.”71 
 In some instances, military service provided the only viable option for potential enlistees.  
Unprepared for college and uncertain about his future, Elmer Payne saw military service as “an 
escape.”72  Johnson Slivers, a 16 year old Navajo, turned to the Army because he “had nowhere 
to go.”73  Melvin Rookstool, Elmer Bailey, and James Murphy had places to go alright, but if 
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they wanted to see beyond the bars of juvenile hall or the jailhouse, they’d enlist.  Sixteen year 
old Rookstool had been “just knocking around,” getting “involved in some problems” when the 
judge offered him a choice of either joining the Army or going to reform school.  It wasn’t long 
before Rookstool wished he’d chosen differently, but he’d already been mustered in!74  Bailey, 
an African American, stood accused of dallying with a white man’s woman and it seemed his 
options were suddenly narrowed to “getting strung up by a lynch mob, going to jail, or joining 
the Army.”75  A judge made the choice simple for Murphy, “Either join or go to jail.”76  For 
others, who had already been in trouble, joining up for the Korean War could provide the easiest 
way to a second chance.  President Truman issued Executive Order 3000 in December 1952 
offering a full pardon to “all persons convicted of violation of any law of the United States” who 
served in the Armed Forces for at least a year and separated from active service under honorable 
conditions during the Korean Conflict.77   
 For those maturing during and after World War II, family military tradition frequently 
pulled them toward the recruiter’s door.  Like the character Conway in the Sands of Iwo Jima, 
more than a few shipped in because they were expected to ship in:  “Seems every time there’s a 
war the men in my family join the Marines….I’m simply here for tradition.”78  For Louis Lyons, 
whose ancestors fought in the Revolution and Civil War and whose 5 brothers all served in 
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World War II, enlistment on his 17th birthday must have seemed very natural indeed.79  James 
Boden, who lost an uncle in World War I, a cousin in World War II, and a friend at Chosin 
Reservoir in Korea, heard the siren song of the service just as clearly and enlisted at age 18.  
Joseph Brown’s father and uncle, both wartime veterans, helped him decide to join the Navy in 
1949.80  Listening to the stories of his father, a World War I soldier, and Old Man Caldwell, a 
slave turned Union soldier during the Civil War who later helped bring Geronimo back from 
Mexico and fought at San Juan Hill, Charles Bussey “always wanted to be a soldier.”81  He was 
“prepared to live for my country, fight for my country, and if necessary, to die for it.”82  With a 
father who fought as a Marine in World War I even before he had citizenship and forefathers 
who fought for the “homeland of the Ancient Ones,” Gilbert Towner asked “How could I be any 
different?”83   
Many of the women who enlisted also had some sort of family military heritage.  The 
Marines were a tradition for Mary Ann Bernard whose father and sister had both served in the 
Corps.84  Jane Heins Escher’s father had been in the Navy and she followed in his footsteps 
becoming a WAVE.85  Valeria Hilgart, who joined the Marine Corps, had a brother and sister 
already in the Marines and her father had served in World War I.86  In 1952, Maria Matta, whose 
brother had been killed in action in Korea, paid her own way from Puerto Rico to the United 
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States to enlist in the Marines.87  Looking at the family histories of both men and women who 
served in the Korean era, volunteer and draftee alike, a majority had relatives or loved ones who 
served before them.88  Military tradition might not have been the main reason for enlisting, but 
no doubt it accounted at least in part for the willingness of many to seek out enlistments of their 
own. 
Foreign residents volunteered for service in hopes of expediting the naturalization 
process.  After World War I and World War II, veterans with honorable discharges could be 
naturalized as U.S. citizens as outlined in the Immigration and Naturalization Act.  Initially, the 
government made no such provisions for the aliens who donned U. S. uniforms during the 
Korean War.  However, in June 1953, Congress passed Public Law 597 which entitled foreigners 
who had completed five or more years of military service to be deemed lawfully admitted to the 
country for permanent residency if otherwise qualified for citizenship.89  This law expired of its 
own terms on December 31, 1955, but new legislation followed to permanently amend the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act to favor Korean veterans.90   
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a host of other things enticed youths to visit their local 
post offices and hitch up for tours of duty.  The military, especially in wartime, offered 
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unparalleled adventure for kids who craved a view of something more than their hometowns.91  
Enlisting in the Navy or Marines seemed a fine way to see the world while performing a service 
that the country would appreciate.92  Those old enough and interested enough to fear 
communism thought the war tendered a unique opportunity to “fight it in someone else’s country 
… [and] stop the Communists there.”93   Others, who had been in service before, re-upped in 
order to increase their rank,94 be with old buddies,95 or simply fill their time.  Some, like Franklin 
Hodge, were already planning for retirement.  He calculated that by rejoining the military and 
making a career of it he could retire at 39 with over $150 a month.96  Captain Helen Brooks 
reentered the Navy as a nurse because “they desperately needed help in Korea.”97  Franklin 
Hodge joined up to avenge his brother’s death and Joseph Timanaro signed up in order to seek 
revenge for the North Korean atrocities he had read about in the newspaper.98  George Pakkala, 
an American citizen raised in Finland, enlisted in order to learn English.99  Many women, if not 
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enlisting in general for the uniform, at least chose their branch of service because the uniforms 
looked sharp.100  As many reasons to enlist existed as there were volunteers.101 
 Interestingly, while women volunteered for many of the same reasons as their male 
cohorts, they more often stressed practical reasons over patriotic ones.  Very limited in career 
choices, especially in occupations that paid well, many females desired a career in the Armed 
Forces.  As one enlistee later put it, “I decided to join the military because I perceived my only 
options to be teacher, nurse, secretary, or the nunnery.”102  The passage of the Army-Navy Nurse 
Act in April 1947 and the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in June 1948 gave women a 
real incentive to enlist in military service.103  While not abolishing restrictions on servicewomen, 
such as unmarried without minor dependents, these acts did create a permanent place for women 
in the military organization and did guarantee a pay scale similar if not equal to that of men 
doing the same kinds of work.104  And, increasingly, military women could choose what work 
they did.  Before the end of the Korean War, women in the Air Force had achieved entrance into 
many aviation specialties and women Marines had broken out of strictly administrative jobs and 
                                                 
100 Many women comment on the allure of military uniforms in their memoirs and interviews.  See Jane Heins 
Escher, Interview by Eric Elliot, 20 May 1999, 10, and Shirley Brantley, Interview by Eric Elliot, 2 May 2001, 7, 
WVHP, OHC, UNCG. 
101 One reason seldom mentioned for enlisting during the Korean War is fear of social ostracism.  During the Civil 
War especially but also during World War II, men who failed to sign up for service found themselves labeled 
cowards.  During the Civil War, women would not even consider being courted by a man who refused his manly 
duty.  This kind of pressure seems absent from the Korean era.  Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage:  The 
Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York:  The Free Press, 1987), 87-93. 
102 Soderbergh, Women Marines in the Korean War Era, 30. 
103 For more on the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, see Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An 
Unfinished Revolution (Novato, CA:  Presidio, 1982), 113-122. 
104 Judith Bellafaire, “Volunteering for Risk:  Black Military Women Overseas During the Wars in Korea and 
Vietnam,” Women in Military Service for America Memorial (http://www.womensmemorial.org/ 
Education/BWOHistory.html).  Also, Cynthia Kellogg, “Door is Open for Women in the Forces,” New York Times, 
25 November, 1955, 35. 
 36
could gain posting to overseas duty stations denied them after World War II.105  Few other places 
in American society promised these same benefits.  By 1952, the Navy concluded that women 
enlisted out of a desire to travel or have a career, gain education or self-improvement, receive job 
training, take advantage of educational benefits, or wean themselves from family dependency.  
The study failed to mention duty to country as a motivating factor at all.  The Army decided that 
patriotism did matter, but came after the desire for overseas service, self-improvement and 
education, interesting work, and meeting new people and making new friends.106  As Katherine 
Towle notes, one did “not join the services primarily for patriotic reasons.”107  By contrast, 
studies conducted on male inducements for enlistment during the Korean War era placed 
patriotism at the top of the list with draft motivation, choice of service, recruitment, and the 
Korean G. I. Bill weighing heavily on the decision.108 
 Not surprisingly, African Americans sometimes found choosing military service more 
difficult than their white comrades.  They possessed the same love of country and personal and 
financial reasons for wanting to enlist, but they also resented the idea of sacrificing again for a 
country that could not be depended upon to show gratitude.  Many remembered that black World 
War II veterans returned not only to a climate of discrimination and segregation, but to outright 
hostility.  Isaac Woodward, still in his uniform, had been pulled off of a bus and beaten and 
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blinded by a southern sheriff.109  In the first six weeks of 1946, Birmingham, Alabama city 
policeman killed five African American veterans.110  All over the country, lynching increased 
after the war.111  From the vantage point of some blacks, Korea looked no better.  Numerous 
articles in the Black Press decried the unfair treatment of black soldiers facing courts martial at 
much higher rates than whites and other pieces documented that white troops in Korea were 
flying the Confederate flag or that the white rapists of the wife of an African American soldier 
fighting in Korea had been let off easy in North Carolina.112  No wonder that many began to 
question black participation in the war and ask “Why should Negroes die for second-class 
citizenship” or insist that “The United States should bring its troops home to fight for democracy 
here in this country!”113  They did not want to be in the front lines in Korea but then return to the 
back of the bus back home. 
Still, African Americans found plenty of reasons to volunteer for or reenter the Armed 
Forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  In 1948, Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 
which called for equal treatment and opportunity for all service members regardless of race, 
color, religion, or national origin.114  The measure did not immediately desegregate the military 
(that would come later, in part due to manpower needs in the Korean trenches), but it did 
                                                 
109 John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day:  The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South 
(Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 362-3.  See also Bernard Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A 
History of Black Americans in the Military (New York:  The Free Press, 1986), chapter 13A, which discusses at 
length the violent treatment of returning black World War II veterans. 
110 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 361-2. 
111 1952-1954 would be the first lynching-free years after the end of World War II.  For a discussion of lynching and 
discrimination after the war, see the introduction to Gail Williams O’Brien, The Color of the Law:  Race, Violence, 
and Justice in the Post-World War II South (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
112 “Smearing Negro GI’s in Korea,” Crisis (December 1950), 715.  Alex M. Rivera, Jr., “Dixie Justice,” Pittsburgh 
Courier, 2 February 1952, 1 and 4. 
113 Roy C. Wright, editorial, Pittsburgh Courier, 27 January 1951, 11.  John E. Rousseau, “’War With Korea Not 
Cure’ Patterson Tells La. Negroes,” Pittsburgh Courier, 3 March 1951, 2. 
114 Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 (Washington, D. C.:  Center of Military 
History, U. S. Army, 1981), 312.  Interestingly, gender was not listed as a factor to be ignored. 
 38
represent a sure step up from the Jim Crow South or even the civilian North.  Charles Bussey 
happily left his job as policeman in California where he had been stationed in the black ghetto 
despite finishing first in his class at the Police Academy for a return to active duty in August 
1948.115  Similarly, James Allen, who had grown up sharecropping in Florida, decided after a trip 
to New York that he did not want to go back to Ocala and Jim Crow and so enlisted at age 18.116  
Beverly Scott saw the Army as an honorable profession.  “There was no better institution in 
American life … than the army for the black man in the forties and fifties. … You had more 
leverage in the army.  You always had somebody you could go and complain [to] about bad 
treatment.  A black man couldn’t do that in civilian life.”117  Hundreds of others felt the same 
way and signed on, some for the rest of their careers.  African Americans also volunteered 
because they believed that their service would help to change the racial situation at home.  As 
Gerald Early notes, “They saw there was a connection, that you’d be able to make a stronger 
argument when you came back:  ‘We fought for this country, and we deserve to be treated as full 
citizens.’”118  During the war, African Americans began to call for “unprecedented 
consideration.”  They wanted to do their duty, but in return, they expected “all of the rights 
guaranteed … by the Constitution.”119  After 1950, when racial quotas limiting black enlistments 
were lifted, blacks, like other Americans, would knock on the recruiter’s door.120 
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Lastly, recruitment provided a final impetus for volunteers during the Korean War period.  
Male or female, black or white or something in between, the military had a plan to attract 
American youths to voluntary enlistments.  For boys, the process often started as early as the 
high school years.  Recruiters visited schools, held career days, and served as display models for 
the fancy new uniforms willing candidates might themselves wear one day.  Those almost old 
enough to serve in World War II absorbed the bombardment of propaganda put out by the 
government and recruiting agencies during that war.  They internalized the lesson that failure to 
serve brought scorn and shame.121  After 1951, high schools throughout the country began to 
show a series of films produced by Coronet Films.  With titles like “When You Enter Service,” 
“Military Life and You,” and “What It’s All About, Your Plans, Service, and Citizenship,” these 
sound motion pictures ostensibly attempted to “help guide young people facing the difficult task 
of civilian-to-military adjustment” brought about by the draft.122  In reality, the films cast 
military service in such a positive light that groups like the National Council Against 
Conscription urged people to write their Congressmen and “tell them what you think of their 
[Coronet’s] program for making America military-minded.”123   
In addition to preparing boys mentally for later enlistment or induction, the various 
services offered programs in the 1940s aimed at enrolling younger men.  Both the Navy (V5) and 
Army (ASTRP) had programs in place for 17 year olds that allowed them to enlist but go to 
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school until they turned 18.124  College men, of course, could join ROTC, a program designed to 
produce military officers.  For blacks this sometimes presented a problem as segregated schools 
did not always offer ROTC courses and not all ROTC programs accepted African Americans.125  
But other options were available.  Charles Bussey recalls joining the Citizens’ Military Training 
Camp (CMTC), another system for developing Army officers that was open to men of color.  
Before Korea, these recruitment efforts bore enough fruit that not everyone who wanted to enlist 
could get into the military.  High school diploma in hand, Richard Bevier began looking for a 
branch of the service in which to enlist.  He first tried the Air Force where he and a score of 
others were released after their physical exams revealed elevated pulse rates due more to the fact 
that no billets existed for new enlistees than to anything else.  He then offered himself to the 
Marines which, also out of quotas to fill, cut him loose for dental reasons.  Not quite 18, Bevier 
found himself a veteran of not one, but two branches of the Armed Forces.126 
Once the Korean War broke out, recruiters had billets aplenty and began soliciting male 
enlistments in earnest.  Though they could not offer bounties or other monetary compensation as 
recruiters in the Civil War had done, they promised an assortment of benefits—ranging from free 
lifetime health care for those who served 20 or more years to educational assistance under the 
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1952 Korean G. I. Bill—whether or not they had the power or authority to make good on their 
word.127  One potential recruit, Ray Deimler, found himself dogged by the local recruiting 
sergeant relentlessly until he agreed to join up.128  The Armed Forces also spent loads of cash on 
advertising and other efforts, so much in fact that Secretary of Defense George Marshall and 
Assistant Secretary Rosenberg had to defend their budget.129  Posters appeared in schools and 
post offices touting the merits of service and recruiters made the rounds as the Armed Forces 
tried to lure young men to service and perhaps to Korea.   
Even in the slow years after 1945, the military targeted men for recruitment, but most 
branches of the service ignored women, having little use for females within their ranks.  By June 
1950, the WACs numbered only 7000, the WAVES 3200, and the Women Marines under 600.130  
Suddenly, the new mobilization seemed to demand a far larger female presence in all the 
services.  The Navy wanted female hospital corpsmen to replace men sent overseas.131  All 
branches needed women to tend to nursing or administrative tasks so that men in Korea could 
hope for rotation out, future scientists could continue college training instead of mustering in, 
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and families could remain undisrupted.132  Enlisting females did not necessarily save men from 
being drafted, but it could free men up for other things.133  To these ends, a flurry of recruitment 
activity ensued.  The Navy announced its intention to enlist 10,000 women and after August 
1950 raised its female enlistment quota so that by March recruiters were pressing to enroll 528 
women per six week period.134  Assistant Secretary of Defense Anna Rosenberg asked Congress 
to raise the 2% ceiling on women in the military and prompted Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall to form the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) to 
assist with and advise on female recruitment.135  Suddenly, posters and even television 
commercials advertising the services to women appeared as did a much increased number of 
female recruiters.136  By December 1952, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines combined had 
close to 250 women in 44 stations exclusively assigned to recruitment.137  As early as July 1951 
these efforts were paying off.  The WACs could claim 12,000 women in uniform, the WAVES 
6300, and the Women Marines 2065.  Both encouraged and driven by these numbers, in October 
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1951 Rosenberg announced the biggest campaign for female recruitment since World War II.  
President Truman personally launched the appeal to women, and rumors circulated that unmet 
quotas could result in a draft on women.138  In October 1952, 48,700 servicewomen reported for 
duty, but that was still well short of the military’s goal of 112,000.139  In the early months of 
1953, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services launched a new program to 
recruit quality female citizens, 18-35, in excellent physical condition, with a high school or 
college degree, and of high character.  In addition to the usual tactics, potential female enlistees 
would be treated to slogans like “There’s a job for you—and you’re needed for it” and “I’m set 
for life” (with all the job training opportunities offered by the military).140   Just as it did for men, 
the increased pressure of recruitment worked its magic on many young women, casting a spell 
that prompted them to muster into one of the services. 
 During the Korean Conflict, as in other wars, voluntary enlistment for whatever reason 
did not ensure that new enlistees would remain satisfied with their decision to join the Army, 
Marines, Navy, or Air Force.   Soon after mustering in, a great many men and women like 
Raymond Delcambre could not help but ask themselves, “What in the world did I get myself 
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into!?  And how could I get out?”141  Travel, which had seemed so exotic before, became less 
glamorous when one was stuffed with 200 other people on an ancient, unheated train with hard 
wooden seats headed for a college gym or training barracks.142  Instead of adventure, many 
youths found only homesickness and regret as their tours of duty began—regret that sometimes 
deepened as news and casualty reports filtered in from Korea confirming that this “police action” 
was in fact nothing less than an old-fashioned war.  Also, families did not always support their 
loved ones’ decision to muster in.  When Joe DeMarco joined the Marines, his father responded, 
“In the old country they say you gotta go in the army, you go.  But here no one says you gotta go 
in these Marines.  Why you go?  You don’t like your home, your family, whatsamatter?”143  
Along with the fact that volunteers frequently had less education and scored lower on mental and 
physical tests, buyer’s remorse helps to account for the low retention and increased delinquency 
rates of enlistees when compared to draftees.  Despite claims by Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall that volunteers had higher morale and served longer than inductees, volunteers 
throughout the Korean War proved less likely to complete their terms of service than those 
forced into uniform by the draft.144  While 95% of draftees received honorable discharges, only 
62% of volunteers did.  Still, the majority of enlistees eventually came to terms with their 
situation and more than a few grew to feel that “the Army was home” or that “there’s something 
about the Army that I like.”145   
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Regardless of long-term satisfaction, motives for enlistment stayed constant throughout 
the Korean Conflict.  The volume of enlistments, however, dropped with each year of the war.  
In fiscal year 1951, 630,000 Americans entered the Armed Forces by enlisting, but by fiscal year 
1953 only 397,000 entrants could claim voluntary accession.146  No doubt personal reasons 
weighed heavily on the decision of whether or not to enlist, but so did the home front climate.  In 
the early months of 1950, potential volunteers had no reason to suspect that the Korean Conflict 
would command any less of the public’s attention and patriotic support than World War II.  
Aside from a few naysayers who wrote President Truman to complain that American 
intervention in Korea differed little from the “naked aggression” of Hitler’s regime, a handful of 
folk singers like Woody Guthrie, Communists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, most Americans 
supported military efforts in Korea.147  An August 1950 Gallup Poll showed 65% of Americans 
firmly behind the war effort.148  Even the Socialist Party’s National Action Committee voted 
unanimously to back the action.149   
As the war dragged on, however, public interest and support waned.  By the first week of 
January 1951, after Chinese intervention, only 38% of Americans still thought that Korea was 
not a mistake, if they thought of the war at all.150  The buying frenzy that had characterized 1950, 
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when people still worried that war would directly affect their ability to purchase sugar, 
shortening, or televisions, had drawn to a close, leaving Americans free to concentrate on things 
other than the war effort.151  Headlines concerning strikes, domestic events, and even UFOs 
rather than war news monopolized the front pages of most newspapers.  Servicemen and women 
stationed stateside appeared invisible as Korea’s police action status allowed them to wear 
civilian duds instead of uniforms when off post and not on duty.152   In October 1951 U. S. News 
and World Report labeled Korea the “forgotten war,” not surprising given that in a poll that same 
month 56% of Americans agreed that Korea was an “utterly useless war.”153   
But, Korea was not totally forgotten.  Few people bothered to protest the Korean War 
vocally, but anti-war demonstrations did take place, if only on a small scale.  On June 25, 1951, 
the first anniversary of the Korean War, a half dozen or so Catholic Workers joined David 
Dellinger of the War Resisters League and Bayard Rustin of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in 
Times Square to call for peace.  Despite some public confusion, in this case an angry spectator 
mistook the pacifist Catholic Workers for communist Daily Workers and punched Dellinger in 
the face, activists planned and executed protests throughout the war.154  Also, folk artists churned 
out anti-war songs for the duration of the conflict.  In “I Just Wanna Stay Home,” Irwin Silber 
opined that he didn’t “wanna die for the stock exchange.”155  Boots Casetta’s “Little Bronze 
Medal” clearly tried to stir pacifism by lyrically dramatizing a mother’s plea to save her son after 
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having lost a husband and son to war already.  It ended with:  “I’ve got one more son and he’s 
turning sixteen, please don’t take him off for your war;  I swear he’s too young for shooting a 
gun, and I don’t want no medals no more … Now all of you mothers, just tell all the others that 
we don’t want no medals no more.”156  All this negativism and indifference took its toll on the 
American public and by extension on enlistments.  Support for the war bobbled up and down 
from 35% to 37% through 1952 and 1953, finally settling at about 50% in January 1953, but 
potential recruits seldom could have imagined that the same patriotic impulse existed for this war 
that had materialized during World War II.157   
 Throughout the Korean War era, men and women did not necessarily flock to enlist as 
had their cousins and brothers of the Second World War.  And, in general, however much they 
liked to believe that they were answering the same glorious call, they marched to the recruiters’ 
offices without the same single-minded purpose as their recent forebears.  For the men and 
women who volunteered for Korean service, there was no Pearl Harbor, no Nazi Regime, and no 
sacrifice universal enough to be endured by all Americans whether at home or abroad.  Instead, 
there were a variety of personal needs, a pressing draft, an often indifferent populace, and the 
country’s call to colors.  Raised to be people of grit and sacrifice, the boys and girls of the Great 
Depression and World War II volunteered to muster in and do their duty, perhaps not happily, 
but with determination and in greater numbers than their sons and daughters when the next war 
started.158   
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The Reservists and National Guardsmen 
 
 Altogether, June 1950 turned out to be a bad month for National Guardsmen and 
Reservists.  Budget crunches early in the month had led to a series of layoffs among active 
personnel, who then had to find other means of employment and income.  While perhaps 
disappointed, few protested the decision.  Most reservists, while joining up for the same reasons 
as regular military enlistees, expected to be used only in case of emergency and took their move 
to inactive status in stride.  But the month was not over yet.  Sitting in front of his girlfriend’s 
house on his way to another town and a new apprenticeship with Monterey Optical Company, 
former active Guardsmen Frank Rowan heard news of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on 
the radio.  “Oh shit,” he said.  “In a month I will be in the Army.”159  It took a little while for the 
news to really sink in, but all over the country Guardsmen and Reservists had the same startled 
reaction.  The impossible had happened—peace had been shattered and Americans were about to 
march again to war. 
Within days of entering the fighting, Congress granted President Truman the authority to 
call units or individuals of the National Guard and Reserves to active duty for up to 21 
months.160  The military first sought volunteers from among the reserve components, but when 
few appeared, involuntary reserve call-ups proceeded and in August 1950, 600 reserve units 
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shifted to active duty.161  For the first time in history, women reservists, especially those in 
critical ratings such as hospital corpsmen and supply clerks, were involuntarily mobilized along 
with the men.162  National Guard units also felt the pull and from August 1950 to February 1952, 
some 19 increments of them would be taken, totaling 138,597 guardsmen in eight Infantry 
Divisions, three Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), and 266 separate battalions, companies, and 
detachments.163  Under normal circumstances, all of the reserve troops would have trained raw 
recruits and inductees, but low manpower levels in Korea demanded replacements double quick 
time and many of the recalled Guardsmen and Reservists shipped out for the war zone as either 
soldiers or nurses soon after activation.164  As a result, despite the opposition which developed to 
calling up National Guard and Reserve units, even more had to be called to active duty!  When 
the Korean War ended, close to 700,000 Reservists and Guardsmen could claim service through 
recall or activation.165   
A handful of reserve personnel simply accepted their orders or even welcomed the 
chance to go on active duty when called.  Hank Buelow, who had enlisted in the National Guard 
at age 15, rejoiced when his unit got activated during Christmastime 1950.  Though a full time 
                                                 
161 Flynn, The Draft, 112-114.  See also Wiltze, “The Korean War and American Society,” 131. 
162 As the war continued, some branches of the service revised their policies on what factors disqualified a woman 
for service.  The Navy, for instance, by the end of the war no longer allowed women to leave simply because they 
were married or even because their husbands were wounded or discharged.  Ebbert and Hall, Crossed Currents, 129.  
See also Soderbergh, Women Marines in the Korean War Era, 45 and 112 and Colonel Mary V. Stremlow, A 
History of the Women Marines, 1946-1977 (Washington, D. C.:  History and Museums Division, U. S. Marine 
Corps, 1986), 44.   
163 In fact, this total represented 37% of the National Guard forces available!  Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, 4-
5. 
164 Many Guardsmen and Reservists shipped out to Korea as individual replacements instead of as units as many 
units were in poor condition and unprepared to fight effectively.  Flynn, The Draft, 114. 
165 Most sources place the figure of reservists who served in the Korean War era at approximately 700,000.  See 
Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance:  The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam 
Generation (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 50 and Flynn, The Draft, 119.  Others place the figure at closer to 
a million reserve type personnel.  See McGlasson, “Manpower for the Korean War,” 25. 
 50
student at Colorado A & M, Hank wanted to muster into active service.166  For the inactive 
reserves, the perks of being involuntarily recalled often softened the blow of activation.  Unlike 
reservists who volunteered for active duty, those forced back into uniform against their wishes 
retained their termination promotion rank, giving them an advantage over everyone else and 
prompting complaints by jealous regulars and draftees.167  For Martin Markley and others it 
seemed a sign that they should not only willingly fall in for service or Korea, but that they should 
make a career out of the Army or Marines where no better avenue to advancement existed than 
combat.168   
Many Guardsmen and Reservists, though, complained bitterly about their recall to colors 
and refused to come quietly.  One unhappy California Guardsman waiting for his ship to the Far 
East told a newsman, “I thought I was signing up to fight Oregon!  I didn’t know Governor 
Knight was mad at Mao Tse Tung!”169  Others pointed out the inequity of calling older reservists 
who had jobs and families while younger men without children could apply for an assortment of 
deferments and exemptions.170  And, many of those being tapped for duty had already given a 
chunk of their lives to Uncle Sam.171  Wallace Donaldson, drafted during World War II, had just 
finished school and finally reached the position where he could make money when he received 
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his Korean War recall notice.172  Thomas McLain fulfilled his obligation to the Army and 
became a civilian again on June 25, 1950, just three months before being pulled back into olive 
drab and put on duty at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.173  Scott Defebaugh, a World War II 
hospital corpsman who had worked several jobs and used the G. I. Bill to train to be a teacher, 
got activated the very day he was supposed to begin teaching 9th grade in Woodward, 
Oklahoma.174 Disgusted with their plights, retreads and other individuals called up for the 
Korean emergency wrote their senators and congressmen, and sometimes even President 
Truman.175  The backlash prompted Major General Lewis B. Hershey, the Selective Service 
Director, to declare “Everyone wants out;  no one wants in.”176  For its part, the Army pointed 
out that those being summoned to service had drawn the pay as guardsmen or reservists.177  
Washington officials failed to note, however, that many of those being called to duty served only 
in the inactive reserves and thus had received no monetary compensation at all.  Fearing a 
broader conflict with Russia and perhaps even total war, the military had decided to save its 
better-trained, paid active reservists for later.178  Ultimately the military could argue only that 
Reservists and Guardsmen had entered their contracts voluntarily and concede that in calling up 
the reserves “military necessity overrode considerations of equity and justice.”179 
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For scores of Guardsmen and Reservists, recall to service caused more than a minor 
inconvenience.  The initial uncertainty of just who might be called up caused employers to refuse 
jobs to reserve type personnel, and to deny promotions to or even fire those already employed.  
Banks and insurance companies turned down loan and policy applications, and the offended 
party had no legal recourse.180  For veterans, the July 1951 expiration date of the World War II 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 could not be put on hold and more than a few worried 
that another stint in service would deny them their benefits.181  Once orders came, men and 
women had to report regardless of their personal or financial situations and before any effort 
toward exemption would be entertained by the military.  Regrettably, records of inactive 
reservists had not been updated in years, in some cases since World War II, and men with ten 
children and nurses with babies and toddlers of their own became at least temporarily caught in 
the country’s manpower net.182   
Countless others had their whole lives disrupted by the new call to arms.  John Saddic, a 
World War II purple heart veteran and Marine Corps Reservist, had a wife and family to support 
but found himself forced to muster into the Marine Corps at too low a rank to be granted a family 
allowance.  Welfare told him to sell his furniture, the Red Cross advised him to go on welfare, 
and only after he went to the newspaper with his story did he garner any assistance at all.  When 
he returned home from Korea with frozen feet, the Red Cross began hounding him to repay the 
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“loan” he had received!183  Harry VanZandt, another World War II veteran, got his notice to 
report while lying in bed with pneumonia.  He did manage to get a deferment due to illness, but 
in the end it did not save him from leaving his wife and son and heading out for another overseas 
tour of war.184  A Texas Reserve sergeant who had worked to set up a prosperous plumbing 
business in the years after the Second World War worried that his absence would result in the 
repossession of all his tools by the bank, leaving him without much to return to.  Professional 
men fretted over lost promotions and opportunities, doctors wondered if after service they would 
be too old to pick back up again and build a private practice, and recent graduates felt uneasy 
about waiting years to apply their education to real-life work.185  Fathers and husbands and 
World War II veterans, both male and female, felt punished for their loyalty to country and 
cheated that so many Americans were escaping military service altogether while they were 
plucked from their civilian lives, many for the second time.  Defense Secretary George Marshall 
agreed, but at least for a while Reservists and Guardsmen continued to muster in for the Korean 
War.186 
Mustering in for a second time proved easy enough for most Guardsmen and Reservists, 
too easy in fact for some, but the actual process varied from place to place and unit to unit.  For 
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all, it began with notification.  Most Guardsmen and Reservists received an official letter with 
orders to report, but MPs visited a lucky few to break the news and some Guardsmen got word in 
person while at summer camp.  Not surprisingly, Guardsmen, who held weekly meetings, trained 
on weekends, and attended summer camps, were caught less off guard than inactive Reservists 
who never participated in drills or other exercises and many of whom did not even belong to a 
particular unit.  After receiving notice, it was time to report and without much delay.  Harold 
Mulhausen, a Marine Reservist, remembers that he was allowed about a week to quit his job and 
make arrangements for his family before checking in at the Reserve Center for transportation to 
Camp Pendleton, California.187  George Tsegeletos got activated into the Marine Corps while at 
his first summer camp and his unit was ordered home only briefly to “get your things in order” 
before returning to Camp Pendleton.188  Conrad Grimshaw, a National Guardsmen, had seven 
days to prepare to leave his home for active duty.189  Aside from a few who were too ill to report 
immediately or who were still in high school, Reservists and Guardsmen found it difficult to 
garner any extra time before reporting.190  Men and women scurried around to un-rent 
apartments, resign from jobs, withdraw from college, store possessions, cut hay, move up 
wedding dates, and kiss their loved ones goodbye.  Some units required members to fit physical 
exams or vaccinations into their already hectic schedules or to participate in recruitment drives 
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when units were understrength.191  Then, they gathered at the same armories as their World War 
II forebears not so many years before, and the same townspeople collected to wish them well and 
to memorize the faces that might never return.192  Boarding buses or trains or cramming into 
cars, recalled servicemen and servicewomen headed out toward active duty and camps and bases 
all around the country. 
Once settled at Fort Lewis or Camp Pendleton or wherever else they had ended up, 
Guardsmen and Reservists had much to do in preparation for regular military service.  
Occasionally medical exams were administered, but more frequently candidates were found 
“physically fit for duty” without even being seen by a doctor.193  Those not yet immunized 
received their vaccinations and then it was on to the business of making ready for war.  From this 
point on, time moved rapidly for Reservists.  At camp, some reserve units classified their 
members as older veterans who were “combat ready,” men who needed a refresher in “combat 
training,” and new recruits who needed boot camp, sending them to either the war zone or 
training accordingly.194   However, early in the war, when manpower shortages in Korea 
demanded more troops immediately, many Reservists regardless of experience spent only days 
or weeks drilling before shipping overseas.  Sometimes, men who recently had joined the 
reserves boarded the troop ship without ever having been taught to handle a weapon!195  One 
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Reservist complained that after fighting at Inchon, Seoul, Chosin, and the Guerilla Sweep, the 
Marines wanted to send him back to the States for boot camp.196  Nurses especially found 
themselves quickly mustered in and deployed, so fast in fact that they had to borrow uniforms.  
In more than a few cases, the Navy and Marines discovered married women or mothers within 
their ranks, but by then, the women were already at their assignments and had to be formally 
discharged as soon as replacements were found.197  National Guardsmen faced much the same 
general process as Reservists, but sometimes took longer to leave the camps.  In the fifties, the 
Guard did not require recruits to take basic training and as a result many Guardsmen started 
active duty in boot camp.  Volunteers for Korea, though, like the Reservists, steered toward the 
war zone with great speed and with only a couple of weeks home before their departures. 
As they mustered in, many Guardsmen and Reservists felt that they followed in the 
footsteps of the reserve personnel called to service in World War II.  In 1950 as in 1941 Guard 
and Reserve units mirrored the communities they were leaving behind.  The faces of brothers and 
cousins filled the ranks as they set out for destination points unknown.  But the Korean War 
would prove a very different experience.  Those who left together did not always remain together 
as many units were either broken apart or reconfigured before they ever reached battle.  
Recruitment drives plumped up units with new people, the classification of individuals in 
different categories of combat readiness splintered units, and often individual replacements were 
plucked from the ranks and sent over separately.198  While some units did reach Korea intact, 
many others contained totally different personnel by the time they boarded the ship.199  
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Reservists and Guardsmen summoned for the Korean Conflict might have expected to be among 
friends and relatives when it came their turn to soldier, but a great many found themselves facing 
the task alone.  With hardship and loneliness caused by their departures, many couldn’t help but 
feel “when we slipped our lines at the dock, and later as we passed under the Golden Gate 
Bridge, that perhaps this was not quite working out as we had planned.”200 
 
The Draftees and the Deferred 
 
 “Greetings from the President of the United States”—boys around the country cringed 
when they read the words.201  Harry Truman was not inviting them to a cotillion or dinner, not 
even for tea and pastries.  In fact, he was not really greeting them at all.  The words simply 
prefaced the letter informing millions of young men that their time to report for the Korean War 
draft had come.  Within sixty days of hostilities in Korea, monthly draft calls spiraled upward 
from the post-World War II doldrums, reaching 50,000 by September 1950 and 80,000 by 
January 1951.202  Calls averaged about half a million a year throughout the war but might have 
risen even higher had MacArthur not emptied training units in order to provide combat units in 
Korea with replacements, making it impossible to prepare a larger number of draftees for 
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service.203  Local boards, made up of unpaid civilians, scrambled to sift through millions of 
Selective Service registrants and classify them as fit for selection, deferment, or exemption.204  
Amazingly, these boards managed to not only meet the calls, but produce more names than 
requested every single month of the war.205  As a result, draftees accounted for over 30% or 
about a million and a half of those who mustered in for the conflict.206   
 Upon receiving their draft notifications, potential inductees had only ten days to report to 
the local board for classification.  Those who failed to appear for any reason risked having their 
names turned over to the United States Attorney General for prosecution for delinquency.207  
One fretful woman appealed to Senator Robert Taft on behalf of her husband, a Merchant Marine 
aboard a transport ship delivering supplies to the Far East, because the local board had turned 
him in to the federal authorities for not reporting or appealing his I-A (available for service) 
status in person.208  Others failed to report for less innocent reasons.  Some had been careless 
about updating address information and had no idea they had even been called, but others 
deliberately side-stepped the draft board.209  That World War II sense of participating in 
something important had vanished and registrants were sometimes driven to become no-shows 
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by their lack of enthusiasm for military life.210  As hostilities dragged on, a kind of malaise about 
the war also played a role.  Again and again local boards found themselves having to explain to 
draftees that “they have an obligation to their country that they must perform.”211  But not all 
registrants agreed that they owed such service.  Minorities pointed out the irony of the country 
expecting them to fight abroad for rights and freedoms they were themselves denied at home.212  
One Native American woman wrote President Truman in disgust, saying the Navajos “have not 
been helped and you ask for our boys.”213  Many African Americans felt the same way.  Not 
surprisingly, some men, like Roosevelt Ward, Jr., executive secretary of the Labor Youth 
League, and James Lawson, a future Nashville Civil Rights Movement leader, chose prison over 
Korea.214   
Still, delinquencies ran low throughout the Korean War.  Many might have felt like Rudy 
Stephens that they “wanted to run away, assume a strange name, and get lost in this big country 
of ours.”215  They might even, as Mickey Scott asserts, have known the way to Mexico or 
Canada.216  Probably more than a few of them thought the draft board unfair in forcing them into 
service while others went free.217  But on the whole, the men summoned to report for the draft 
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came when called.  In 1950, the Justice Department prosecuted only 4490 men for draft evasion, 
convicting 1750.  Even fewer inductees attempted to evade the draft in 1951, the first full year of 
the war, and of 3680 facing charges only 1560 were found guilty.  By 1952, the number of cases 
rose to 5610 with 3130 convictions, leading up to 1953, the most popular year for skipping out 
on the Korean War draft, when 6300 trials resulted in 3450 guilty verdicts.218  As months of war 
lengthened to years, the number of draft dodgers did increase, but never to the levels of the 
Vietnam War or even of the World Wars.  The numbers remained both low and manageable.  
Like Peter Santella and Tom Clawson, few veterans can even remember men who sought to 
avoid the draft by fleeing to another state or country.219  Clawson notes, “I had no thought, and I 
knew of nobody in high school or college who ever said to me, ‘We’re going to try to avoid the 
draft,’ or go to Canada or any of that stuff.  It just wasn’t heard of back then.”220   
But why did Korean War era inductees, especially those receiving their notices after it 
became clear that Korea would never be a popular war like World War II, not stage 
demonstrations, burn their draft cards, or simply flee to someplace safe, somewhere where they 
couldn’t be brought back, dressed up, and shipped off to war?  Given the draft resistance of 
World War I, which in some cases required the dispatch of federal troops to quell armed bands of 
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deserters, and in the wake of Vietnam, it seems inconceivable that when faced with the prospect 
of being sent overseas to fight in the inhospitable landscape of a country most Americans neither 
knew nor cared about, most young men accepted their fate.221  Many scholars have concluded 
that low draft calls solve this intriguing puzzle.  They argue that because so few men were 
actually called up during the Korean War, little opportunity for delinquency or incentive for 
organized resistance existed.222  While compelling, especially with regard to the two World 
Wars, this thesis has severe limitations when applied to Vietnam.  The Vietnam War posted far 
higher rates of delinquency than the Korean War, but draft calls for Korea consistently outpaced 
those of the Vietnam era by some 200,000 annually.223  Also, Selective Service inducted 
1,529,539 men from June 1950 to June 1953, almost as many as during the entire nine years of 
the Vietnam War when 1,857,304 draftees mustered into the Army.224  And, if draft calls 
themselves were to blame for delinquency, the rates would remain steady even if the raw 
numbers fluctuated by going up with high calls and down with low calls.  Something other than 
low draft calls must explain why more Korean War draftees did not choose to evade the draft.  
The veterans themselves when asked to explain why they decided to report for duty cite a 
number of reasons, with patriotism of one sort or another crowning the list.  Called only a few 
years after the patriotic fervor of World War II, the men of Korea believed then and still believe 
“it was our duty to serve our country.”225  As Joseph Fabiani relates, “I was a very proud young 
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American going off to serve my country in a time of war.”226  Unlike many of the next 
generation, they would not turn the United States down when it needed men.227  Additionally, 
while the draft could present a financial or career opportunity, draft evasion in the fifties would 
end in nothing less than humiliation and time in the penitentiary.  Mickey Scott remembered the 
disgrace heaped by communities on those who tried to beat the draft in World War II, extending 
even to their families.  “Weather stripping was the snickered name [given to babies born to draft 
vulnerable men], the connection being to keep one out of the draft.”228   Rudy Stephens realized 
that if he tried to outrun his orders to report, “the military would be looking for me for a long 
time to come” and he “didn’t want to take the chance of going to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to 
spend time behind bars.”229  As a generation, Korean War era draftees, trained by the Great 
Depression to accept their responsibilities without question and hardened from witnessing the 
sacrifices made by many Americans during the Second World War, could not conceive that it 
might be possible to refuse Uncle Sam’s invitation to the draft and get away with it.  They “came 
from an era of ‘It’s your privilege to disagree, but not disobey.’”230  For them, despite great 
public indifference to the Korean War, no TET Offensive took place to rally the forces of 
opposition and make draft resistance seem an almost moral choice, and, unlike Vietnam, the war 
ended before average Americans had time to get tired enough of it to protest.  And, if their 
determination to fulfill their duty wavered, the draftees, like the volunteers, had plenty of 
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examples encouraging them to accept their turn as soldiers.  Fathers, uncles, cousins, brothers, 
and friends had already served in one of the World Wars or even in Korea.  How could they 
refuse to do likewise?  For most, the answer was clear, they could not. 
Once deciding to report, potential inductees presented themselves to the local board of 
their community where they received classification in the least liable category for which they 
were eligible.231  Those without claim to deferment or exemption moved on to Armed Forces 
Examining Stations for preinduction exams, both mental and physical.232  These tests determined 
whether a registrant would be rejected (classified IV-F for mental or physical exam failure) or 
classified I-A (available for service).233  Rejections, however, like deferments, could be 
temporary.234  Throughout the war, Congress and Selective Service lowered test standards in 
order to widen the manpower pool, meaning that many who had been disqualified on the basis of 
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test failure later had to be reclassified as acceptable.235  Classification, even for those deemed I-
A, did not end the suspense of the process.  Low draft calls meant that not every person available 
for service needed to be called up.  While local boards followed an order in summoning draftees 
to muster in, it could be difficult to predict the date when one would be required to appear for 
induction.236  Dan Grimes complained that the draft board alerted him of his imminent call-up in 
November 1950, but kept delaying his entrance into the Army.  Finally, he informed the local 
board that if they did not draft him fast he was going to enlist in the Air Force.  Soon he found 
himself wearing the Army’s uniform and “considering pros and cons of deserting.”237  Whether 
good luck or bad, not everyone received such a quick response.  Delays and uncertainties made it 
difficult for men, especially those with wives, to prepare for their departures.  As one potential 
inductee wrote, he did not know whether to store his belongings and rent his house immediately 
or wait because neither the draft board nor he knew when he’d be leaving.238  Eventually, when 
the call came, draftees went through a final induction exam, took their oaths, and pulled on their 
uniforms in preparation for shipment to basic training. 
In theory, all young American men of draft age should have shared equally the burden of 
the draft, but Selective Service provisions and deferment and exemption policies worked to 
spread service liability unevenly.  During the first few months of the conflict, mental test 
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qualification standards led to a high rate of rejection among men from underprivileged 
backgrounds, allowing them to avoid service while leaving better-heeled and better educated 
registrants stuck in the draft pool.239  In fact, mental test failure became a major source of 
“deferment” or exemption during the war for African Americans and others who were too poor 
to attend college or to show that military service worked a financial hardship on their families.240  
By June 1951, the Universal Military Training and Service Act rectified the inequity by 
dramatically dropping the minimum allowable AFQT score and allowing many of those who 
previously had been disqualified to enter service.241  Rejection rates based solely on the mental 
test fell from 16.5% from July 1950-December 1951 to 13.2% of those selected in 1952.242   
Rejection rates as a whole, whether for administrative reasons or mental or physical exam 
failures, also fell as the war continued and manpower needs increased.  In July 1950, Selective 
Service rejected 59% of all candidates for induction, but the percentage continued to drop to a 
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58, DDE Library.   
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low of 27.7% in February 1951.243  Lower rejection rates meant that a broader base of males was 
eligible to be called into the country’s service.244  Eliminating one imbalance in the system, 
however, did not prevent others from forming or continuing.  Eligibility to serve became more 
widely spread with each passing year of the conflict, but some boys remained more vulnerable 
than others to Selective Service and involuntary induction.245 
Throughout the war, ministers of religion and divinity students received exemption, but 
conscientious objectors did not.246  Conscientious objectors were liable for either noncombatant 
service or civilian work, depending on how they felt about contributing to the war effort.247  Ted 
Head discovered this the hard way.  Classified I-A by the local draft board, Head attempted to 
avoid service by seeking reclassification as a “pacifist on religious grounds.”  Failing at that, 
Head went through all the in-processing until reaching the induction center where he refused to 
“‘step forward’ when his name was called to place him officially in the military service.”  
Convicted of draft evasion, a judge sentenced the twenty-two year old to three years in a federal 
penitentiary with the possibility of a stay of sentence only if Head agreed to muster in as a non-
combatant.248  Since no distinction had been made for COs who served during World War II, 
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many conscientious objectors found themselves drafted for a second time during the Korean War 
as if they were registering for the first time.  Such was the case with Robert Dudgeon who had 
already served 22 months in the Second World War.  The local board classified him as IV-E 
(conscientious objector opposed to both combatant and non-combatant role but available for 
service), rather than as exempt for previous service.249   
In general, exemptions also went to military veterans who had served for a minimum 
period of time and been discharged under honorable conditions.250  Timing could be cruel, 
however, and a great many men missed exemption by only days or weeks of service.  Raymond 
Johnston served in the Pacific from August 1945 to August 1946, racking up enough terminal 
leave to earn him a cash settlement from Congress, but found himself 19 days short of the one 
year mark that would have gotten him a Korean War draft exemption.251  Marvin Beech, Jr., a 
World War II Navy veteran who served 33 months of his 3 year enlistment before being 
discharged in the congressional effort to reduce manpower also found himself called up for 
Korea.  While willing to serve, Beech could not “see why I have to do my duty twice.”252  
Similarly, Doug Brown, who had served 10 months in the Navy during 1945-46 and been drafted 
again in November 1950, wondered why he and others like him could not be at least “given 
credit on a month for month basis for previous service toward the present requirement of 24 
monthly.”253  For those in the Merchant Marine during World War II, legislation offered no 
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exemptions at all, disappointing given that men currently in the Merchant Marine Reserve, many 
of whom had never even seen duty, enjoyed exemption.254  Men who had risked their lives in 
Italy or on islands in the Pacific could not believe that they would be subject to the Korean War 
draft simply because they had been mustered out before six months or a year of active duty.  
They had wives and homes and new college degrees and as a group they felt that their 
obligations to country had been met.  In the end, the pleas of veterans failing to meet the 
minimum service guidelines for exemption went without further action on their behalf, but a 
majority of World War II veterans and a sizable chunk of those who began service after that war 
did obtain immunity from the draft.255 
In addition to exemptions, a number of deferment options offered temporary relief from 
draft vulnerability during the Korean War years.  The 1948 Selective Service Act deferred for 
dependency reasons all married registrants as well as most men with children.  In any given year 
of the war, about a million registrants held dependency deferments.256  This policy caused much 
controversy, however.  Angry reservists complained that they had been recalled without 
consideration of their marital or dependency status. Divorced, non-custodial fathers pointed out 
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that even if they paid child support they could not be considered for deferment.257  And, some 
men tried to take advantage of the system by stacking dependency deferments on top of other 
deferments.  Louis Perrino, given a postponement of induction in order to complete school, 
married shortly before his time to report and tried to get a dependency deferment from the local 
board on account of his wife’s pregnancy.258  In actuality, cases of deferment pyramiding were 
rare, but the perception that men were evading service led to changes in the law.259   As Private 
Gerald W. Long, whose wife was expecting triplets, learned, by 1951, married men without 
children could not expect a deferment unless they could prove hardship and the policy of 
discharging soldiers with four or more dependents applied only to “civilian components of the 
army—such as the Oklahoma national guard” and not to draftees or volunteers.260  In 1953 
President Dwight Eisenhower issued an executive order ending deferments for fatherhood 
altogether.261 
Despite surpluses in government warehouses, many farm workers could thank political 
lobbying and leftover World War II protections of agriculture for qualifying them for II-C 
classification (deferred for agricultural occupation).262  For some, like Bill Dallas, who got to 
stay home only until crops could be harvested in the fall of 1950, the deferment proved only 
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temporary.263  For others, faced with local boards either indifferent to or downright antagonistic 
toward removing farm hands from the draft pool, the deferment turned out to be elusive.  One 55 
year old farmer with 600 acres to work bemoaned the fact that his eldest son had been drafted in 
September 1950 and his younger son was set to be called in early 1951.264   Another man, 
afflicted with “double herna and arthuritus [sic],” had 139 acres of corn to harvest but couldn’t 
be assured by the board that his 22 year old son would get an extension to see them through the 
season.265    In tens of thousands of other instances, though, farm types did get deferred, often for 
the duration of the conflict and even when they quite clearly should not have.266  Public opinion 
held that farm hands should be drafted, but ultimately a higher percentage of agricultural laborers 
received deferment than any other occupational group during the Korean War.267   
Farmers secured more than their fair share of deferments, but Selective Service sought to 
protect other occupational fields as well.  Classes II-A (deferred for occupation) and II-B 
(deferred as government official) existed to defer men employed in any one of a number of 
professions deemed essential to the national health, safety, or interest.268  The government 
especially concerned itself with protecting industrial manpower, science, technology, and 
production.  Petroleum drillers, microbiologists, engineers, geophysicists, machinists, 
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millwrights, patternmakers, saw-smiths, shipmasters, tool and die makers, mathematicians, 
government officials, and many others could count on staying home instead of mustering in.269   
Lastly, large numbers of students enjoyed deferments during the Korean Conflict.270  
Under the Selective Service Act of 1948, high school students under age 20 and some college 
students received I-S classification (student deferment to complete high school or the current 
academic year) so long as they continued to do satisfactory schoolwork.271  This system, 
however, which really only delayed induction for a short while, proved inadequate at mollifying 
many Americans.  Students halfway through their degree programs wanted time enough to finish 
college before beginning military service.  Professional and scientific groups warned that 
drafting college students would deplete the country’s personnel resources in the very fields 
crucial to winning the Cold War.  These elements pressed at the national level for more generous 
college deferments.272  On March 30, 1951, despite his desire to avoid any type of “class 
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legislation,” Truman issued an executive order creating a new student deferment program.273  
College males wishing to postpone induction until graduation could do so by passing with 70% 
or better the 150 question multiple choice Selective Service College Qualification Test or by 
ranking in the top half of their class, and then asking the local board for II-S (student deferred to 
complete college) classification.274   Undergraduates and graduates alike were eligible, but those 
deferred could only earn a single degree under the system and their draft vulnerability extended 
to age 35.275  Hundreds of thousands of men took the SSCQT during the war and tangible results 
followed.  About half a million Selective Service registrants succeeded in getting II-S 
deferments.276  By 1952, three-quarters of the nation’s male college student population had 
secured some kind of deferment or exemption to shelter them at least temporarily from military 
service.277   
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Whether exempted for a low score on the exam or veteran status or deferred for school 
work or as an agricultural worker, most of the millions of men shielded from the draft considered 
themselves just plain lucky and nothing else.  They did not see their draft status as privileged 
treatment and many expected to take their turn if or when the time came.  College students in 
particular viewed deferment as merely a postponement of military service—and for good 
reason.278  Amendments made to the Universal Training and Service Act in 1951 extended the 
liability for service to age 35 for men deferred for reasons other than hardship or dependency.279  
When sociologists questioned a sample of students at 11 universities in 1953, 91% of them said 
they anticipated serving at least three years in the military after completing their education.  
Overwhelmingly they acknowledged military service as a duty of citizenship and frowned upon 
deliberate attempts to evade it.280   
For Americans outside of draft protection, however, things often looked quite different.  
Draftees could not help but notice just who failed to turn up at basic training or more revealingly 
in the foxholes of Korea.  While college deferred men often talked of their willingness to serve 
after completing their schooling, few rushed to enlist after getting their degrees.  Of 11,079 men 
classified II-S in April 1951, only 20% had entered the military a year later, with 50% still II-S 
and the other 30% reclassified but not yet mustered in.281  Some university students went to great 
lengths to legally avoid military responsibility.  William Dannenmaier marveled that both a 
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football player from the University of Missouri and a basketball player from Washington 
University in St. Louis failed their mid-1951 physicals while he passed with flying colors.282  
James Brady watched the son of “some big noise in Washington” get off the troop ship in Japan 
while everyone else went on to Korea.283  Mothers wanted to know “why college students have 
any more right to be deferred than a young man … working and waiting until financially able to 
take the training for his life’s work.”  They asked, “Isn’t this country, the college boy’s country 
and hasn’t he just as much right to defend it … as the less fortunate ones who were nabbed 
before they were financially able to enter schools?”284  Other Americans, sensing that draft 
policies failed to share service obligations fairly among draft age cohorts, insisted that “the rich 
should go as well as the poor.”285  Foreshadowing the troubles of the Vietnam era, charges of 
class and race bias followed the draft throughout the Korean War.286  No matter what registrants 
with exemptions or deferments thought about their classifications, average Americans and 
inductees often believed that middle and upper class white men had managed to get a better deal 
from Selective Service.287  So widespread was this notion that President Eisenhower’s Assistant 
Secretary of Defense John Hannah labeled Korea “a poor man’s war.”288 
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In reality, the draft probably did catch more men from Harlem or Muskogee than 
Manhattan or Tulsa, with high school rather than college diplomas.289  But, Selective Service 
provided only one avenue to military duty during the Korean War period, accounting for far 
fewer accessions than voluntary enlistment.  If one considers that college-educated men joined 
up in numbers roughly proportionate to their percentage of the population, and that regardless of 
income factors the military participation rate for the draft age cohort averaged 70-75%, the 
Korean era military seems quite equitable in its manpower procurement.290  Also, though the 
regular draft slanted in favor of the rich and educated, Selective Service targeted doctors, 
dentists, and others with the 1950 Doctors’ Draft.  All males under 50 in medical, dental, or 
allied fields had to sign up, even those already in the draft pool.291  Like regular inductees, they 
could try for deferments or exemptions, but in 1952 shortages of qualified personnel led the 
Department of Defense to decree that anyone fit to carry on a private practice was fit for military 
duty.292  The Doctors’ Draft actually resulted in few inductions, but it did pressure tens of 
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thousands of men into enlisting, picking up commissions and bonuses, and serving 12 months.293  
And, it helped to remedy some of the inequalities inherent in the Selective Service system. 
Like draftees of the Civil War and World War I and even the “Good War,” most of those 
who appeared for induction during the Korean War would rather have stayed home.  Few 
draftees relished the idea of stomping around in military issue boots, especially if those boots 
marched them into a war zone.  Even fewer wanted to leave everything and everyone familiar 
behind.  Unlike many of the boys of World War I or World War II who served alongside friends 
or neighbors, the draftees of Korea rotated in and out of service alone.294  They tried for 
exemptions and deferments and they blamed local boards or appeals boards or the “damned” 
Selective Service when it came their time to muster into the Army.  But they did not riot like 
New Yorkers conscripted during the Civil War nor attack federal officials enforcing the draft as 
men did during the First World War and they seldom ran from the draft as many of their brothers 
of the Vietnam era.295  They groused and griped and grumbled, but draftees did the jobs Uncle 
Sam asked them to do and they did it better in many instances than those who willingly signed 
up for military service.296  The draftees, though, by and large remained civilians at heart.  They 
wore the uniforms, but it was the value that they placed on citizenship, the acknowledgment of 
                                                 
293 Flynn, The Draft, 154-159;  Otto F. Apel, Jr. and Pat Apel, M*A*S*H:  An Army Surgeon in Korea (U. S. A.:  
University Press of Kentucky, 1998);  and Dorothy G. Horwitz, We Will Not Be Strangers:  Korean War Letters 
Between a M.A.S.H. Surgeon and His Wife (Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 1997). 
294 During World War I, men were drafted by geographical area.  In World War II, troops were replaced by unit—
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Acknowledge a War, 109. 
295 The July 1863 draft riots proved the greatest incident of domestic violence to that time.  See Mark E. Neely, Jr., 
The Fate of Liberty:  Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1991), 69 and 133. 
296 See section on volunteers above. 
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duty drilled into them during childhood that caused them to pack up and go “to unknown places 
to serve our country as our leaders suggested.”297   
 
Who Mustered In During the Korean War Era? 
 
 Dressed in olive drab or navy blue and with ready salutes, the men and women who 
mustered in for the Korean Conflict looked much the same as those who entered the Armed 
Forces during other American wars.  But, as scholarship has shown, the composition of the 
American military has never remained constant, and the color and kinds of faces in uniform have 
changed from generation to generation.  And, Korea was a war between wars—between World 
War II, when participation in the military became a generational experience, and Vietnam, when 
service grew into an issue of socio-economic class.298  So the question arises, just who served in 
the Armed Forces during the early 1950s and what characteristics did they share with each other 
or with veterans of other eras?  Was the Korean War military a middle ground between World 
War II and Vietnam? 
 As soldiers and military personnel go, those who served during the Korean Conflict were 
a youthful lot.  Conditions in Korea demanded the quick mobilization of manpower, but unlike 
World War II or even the Civil War the Armed Forces did not need every able man young or old 
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to slip into uniform.  Initially, the Department of Defense recalled Reservists and Guardsmen for 
shipment to Korea, but as the war continued Selective Service and recruiters targeted younger 
men for induction and enlistment.299  Despite the efforts of local boards to call up older 
registrants first, the draft pressured enough teenagers to enter the Army and Marines that mothers 
complained about being “sick and tired of this child draft” and asked “when did this country get 
so bad off it has to take our children directly out of schools to protect us?”300  By 1952, troops in 
the field noticed the “youthful homogeneity” of their platoons and noted that most of their 
comrades seemed to be between the ages of 18 and 21.301  In all, the average age of American 
soldiers was 23 during the Korean War, three years younger than in World War II and the Civil 
War and two years younger than in World War I.302  But, if one considers that this number 
includes the typically older reserve type personnel called up during the first year of the war, it is 
possible that the average soldier of Korea, especially after 1951, was actually closer in age to his 
19 year old Vietnam War counterpart than the statistics imply.303  Also, given the types of 
                                                 
299 Under the 1948 draft law, men 19-26 could be inducted, but the 1951 UMT&SA lowered the age to 18.5, a 
change which led to much debate in Congress.  Ultimately, unable to change the policy, some congressmen fought 
to lower the voting age “enabling every one of those boys, whom they are going to draft … to vote regardless of age.  
If they are old enough to fight they are old enough to vote.”  Congressman Edwin Arthur Hall in Congressional 
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300 Mrs. A. E. Erickson to Robert A. Taft, 3 March 1952, Taft Papers, Box 1196, LOC.   
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the average enlisted man was 26, while in Korea he was only 23.  Offsetting the general youth of the Korean War 
military, officers during the Korean period had an average age of 33, 3 years older than the average World War II 
officer.  “Section 11,” 7-8, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-1958, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 61, DDE Library.   
303Some scholars place the average age of Korean War soldiers at 20.  Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean 
War, 45.   This seems possible in light of available data.  In 1955, the Bradley Commission estimated that almost 
half of Korean War veterans with no World War II service were 22 years old or younger during the Korean War.  Of 
3,188,000 such veterans, 26,000 were under age 18 and another 1,406,000 were age 18-22.  “Veteran Population—
General,” folder “Estimated Age of Veterans in Civil Life, June 30, 1955,” (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1955-
1958, A 69-22, Box 85, DDE Library.  Also, a 1987 survey of veterans found that a little over 79% of those who 
served in Korea were between the ages of 16 and 25 in 1953.  “1987 Survey of Veterans (conducted for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs by the U. S. Bureau of the Census) (July 1989),” 19, NA, RG 015, Box 1.  
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MOS’s for which men with less education could qualify, great probability exists that younger 
men more often found their way to the war zone as front line soldiers or Marines than did older 
candidates who had more skills or experience to offer.   
 Though not subject to the same draft pressures as men, enlisted women and even many 
female officers in the Korean War Armed Forces tended to be quite young.304  Perhaps because 
of regulations restricting married women and mothers from military service, teenagers made up 
40% of new female recruits after June 1951.  By December 1952, more than half of the enlisted 
women in all branches of service were under age 26 and in the Marine Corps 52% were 18-21 
and in the Air Force 47% were 18-20.  The Army and Navy retained greater numbers of older 
enlistees, but the Army still had 35% between 18 and 20 in its ranks and the Navy had 27% 
under the age of 20.  Not surprisingly, nurses and women medical specialists in all the corps 
were older, having completed degree programs of one type or another before entering service.  
But, officers not infrequently fell into younger age groups.  About 36% of female Army officers 
were age 30 or under and in the Marine Corps 51% were age 21-25.  Only the Navy could boast 
67% of female officers over the age of 30.305  For women as for men during the Korean War, the 
faces behind the uniforms reflected a certain youth as service became the obligation of ever 
younger Americans, a trend that would continue into the Vietnam era.306 
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305 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Advertising Council, “Information About 
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 Despite their age, recruits and draftees in the early 1950s possessed educational levels 
favorably comparable to those of their World War II brethren.  America had changed in the 
interwar period, giving kids the opportunity to acquire more years of schooling at a more tender 
age than in the past.307  Also, with manageable draft calls, Selective Service could be somewhat 
more selective in choosing registrants for active duty.308  As a result, about 50% of Army 
enlisted personnel in the Second World War had completed at least 12 years of school, but 
52.6% of enlisted military personnel in 1952 had high school diplomas and another 9.9% could 
claim some college credit though not a university degree.309    In this way, the Korean War 
proved a stepping stone to the better educated Armed Forces of the Vietnam War when about 
60% of the troops had high school diplomas.310   
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1970 to a high of 65.5% in 1968.  Overall, though, 60.3% of those who served in the Vietnam years had completed 
 81
While pressure from the Korean draft ensured the enlistment and induction of high school 
graduates, student deferment policies worked to reduce the draft vulnerability of college and 
university students, resulting in a decline in the percentage of servicemen with college diplomas.  
In World War II, 8.5% of the troops held bachelor’s degrees or better, but by the Korean War 
only 3.9% did and the rate would slip further to just 2.6% during the Vietnam War when gross 
inequities resulted in protest.311  Not surprisingly, however, officers had a higher level of 
education than enlisted men.312  Some 46.6% of commissioned officers during the Korean 
Conflict had college degrees and an additional 29.6% had at least some college.  Only 4.4% of 
officers had not completed high school.  This trend toward a better educated base of officers 
continued after the war and by 1965, over 70% of officers would possess a college diploma and 
less than 1% would lack a high school degree. 313  Among average G. I.’s, though, college 
diplomas remained scarce.   
Ironically, despite mental test qualification standards and the drift toward better educated 
personnel, a large percentage of men with less than a fourth grade education filtered into service, 
especially into the Army, during the Korean War era.  Almost 150,000 men of 2 million 
receiving special training fell under the label “illiterate, non-English speaking, and below 4th 
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313Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, 196.  Some sources estimate that 55% of all Korean era officers had college 
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grade educational level.”  More than twice as many men were so categorized during World War 
II, but they amounted to a small minority of the 7 million trained.314  By the Vietnam War, less 
educated men would again find it difficult to qualify for military service and only about 21% of 
Americans with less than an 8th grade education would muster in as opposed to the Korean War 
when 35% did.315  Still, as a whole the 1950s military seemed to be moving away from both the 
uneducated and the highly educated and toward the vast middle ground of high school graduates. 
Given the narrowing educational level of G. I.’s during the Korean War, one might 
reasonably wonder if the social classes of the men and women answering the call to colors also 
changed.  Did the burden of service fall to members of all social strata as in the Second World 
War or did the sons and daughters of the working class disproportionately carry the 
responsibility as in Vietnam?316  Increasingly aware of student and other deferments, many 
people at the time certainly came to believe that draft policies protected an economic or 
“intellectual elite” while pressing poorer folk into the military machine.317  Assistant Secretary of 
Defense John Hannah even asserted that “there is too much validity in the statement often made 
that the son of the well-to-do family goes to college and the sons of some of the rest go to 
Korea?”318  While many scholars agree, asserting that Korea was indeed a “poor man’s war,” the 
likelihood of military service in actuality had less to do with whether or not one came from a 
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wealthy family than with other factors like reserve call-ups, draft pressure, and recruitment.  
Office managers, steelworkers, salesmen, and the unemployed all sent their sons into the Army 
or Marines or one of the other branches of service in roughly proportionate numbers, with 67-
76% of draft age cohorts donning uniforms.  Only the sons of farmers could claim a significantly 
lower rate of military service, with 56% of them joining up.319  In general, service remained the 
obligation of all classes of eligible men.320   
While social status had little effect on whether or not one mustered into the Armed 
Forces during the Korean War, it probably did affect how men served their time.  Upper class 
youths who had been able to not only complete high school but afford some college before 
entering service were well-positioned to move on from basic training to either advanced training 
or specialized units while the sons of the lower classes with their rudimentary schooling shuttled 
off to the front lines as combat infantrymen.321  A study of men from Detroit determined that the 
casualty rate dropped as the income level rose and that nonwhites suffered a rate twice that of 
their white counterparts.322  While flawed in various ways, the study does support the 
conclusions of many scholars that combat units in the war zone had an unduly high concentration 
of soldiers from the lower and working classes.323  Also, the Bradley Commission concluded that 
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while 64% of accessions in the Army at home during the Korean War had tested above mental 
group IV, only 15% of men sent to overseas commands had.324  The Korean War military might 
not have suffered from class bias, but the units in Korea quite likely did. 
Unlike men, women came to the military from a more limited range of social classes.  
Regulations requiring a high school diploma or the equivalent effectively weeded out women 
who for economic or other reasons had failed to finish their education.  Women with few work 
skills and those on the lower end of the occupational pay scale also tended to remain civilians.  
At least in the Air Force and Navy virtually no domestic workers, food service personnel, 
agriculturalists or horticulturalists left their day jobs to answer Uncle Sam’s call.325  Similarly, on 
the upward end of the scale, few coeds traded their textbooks for service stripes and female 
managers and professionals steered clear of the recruiter’s office.  Of servicewomen claiming a 
previous career, the vast majority listed clerical or secretarial work as their mainstay.326  Later, as 
days of war spun into months and years, all of the services accepted younger women who had 
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not yet begun gainful employment, but nothing suggests that these teenagers differed socially 
from their more mature peers.  The women who looked for opportunity in the Armed Forces 
belonged to neither the lowest station of society nor the highest.   
 Racially, the faces of the troops during the Korean War revealed a new and slightly 
darker American military.  During World War I and World War II as in the years before Korea, 
the Armed Forces employed a variety of means to limit minority and especially black 
participation in the military.327  All branches of service established quota systems, allowing only 
a certain number of African Americans into uniform, and then shepherded the fortunate few into 
special segregated units.328  On the eve of Korea, however, racial policies began to change.  
Hamstrung by black resistance to his proposal of Universal Military Service and genuinely 
touched by the plight of African American World War II veterans, Truman issued Executive 
Order 9981 in July 1948.329  This order not only called for equality of treatment and opportunity 
for all servicemen, by which Truman meant the eventual integration of the military, but for the 
creation of the Fahy Committee which would suggest and implement changes.330  Ultimately, 
pressure from the Fahy Committee along with manpower needs in Korea caused the Army and 
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even the Marines to integrate troops in the war zone and abolish quotas.331  By April 1950 the 
legal barriers blocking black enlistment had lifted.  As a result, the percentage of African 
Americans mustering into the military began to rise, especially in the Army.  In 1949, only 5.9% 
of those in the Armed Forces and 8.6% of Army soldiers were black, but by 1954 7.9% of 
military and 11.3% of Army personnel could claim African heritage.332  This trend continued 
into the next war.  By 1965, 9.5% of military personnel and 12.8% of the Army were black.333  
And, unlike their brothers of the First and Second World Wars, the “tan” soldiers of Korea and 
Vietnam were more likely than others to do their duty “in country” and in combat.334 
 Every state produced recruits and inductees for the Korean Conflict, but a lower 
percentage of draft eligible men mustered in from the Far West and South than from other 
sections of the country.  Overall, 79% of Northerners and 76% of Midwesterners served, but only 
70% of men from the Far West and 72% of Southerners did.335  In part, the rural nature of states 
like Mississippi or Wyoming helps to account for this disproportion.  With a high percentage of 
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Fronts, 22.  Appy, Working-Class War, 18-19.  Puerto Ricans were also more likely to see combat in Korea than 
during either of the World Wars when many of them were sent to guard the Panama Canal.  Matthew Hay Brown, 
“New Generation Fights for 65th,” Orlando Sentinel (FL), 27 May 2002, A 1. 
335 These figures come from averaging the percent of men from metropolitan areas, small towns, and rural 
residences from each section of the country who served.  Klassen, Military Service in American Life Since World 
War II, 234. 
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their populations living outside of metropolitan areas or small cities, Western and Southern states 
simply had lots of men eligible for agricultural deferments and a higher percentage of rural 
dwellers in these areas got deferred than in other regions of the country.336  Also, especially in 
the South, the general health and educational level of residents prevented many males from 
entering the military.  Mental exams like the Armed Forces Qualification Test had a provisional 
minimum threshold equivalent to about an eighth grade education.337  This presented a stumbling 
block for men in states like North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana where the median number of school years completed by persons age 25 and older fell 
months or even a year short of the eighth grade standard.338  Consequently, these states led the 
country in IV-F classifications with Mississippi suffering a higher rate than the Virgin Islands.339  
In all, the Armed Forces rejected only 11% of Northern boys, but declared almost 18% of 
Southerners unfit for one reason or another.340   
 Saddled with high rates of rejection, some Southern states might have failed to shoulder 
their share of the manpower burden for Korea, but Southern men were still well represented in 
the Armed Forces.  West Virginia had 95,000 men or 4.73% of its total population in uniform.341  
Only Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont could come close to that rate of participation.  
                                                 
336 Of men living in rural areas, 14% of Northerners, 15% of Midwesterners, 15% of Southerners, and 24% of men 
in the Far West received deferments.  Ibid., 239. 
337 Ibid., 9. 
338 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1953, 117. 
339 Southern states topped the list in terms of IV-F classification rates.  The highest rates were as follows:  Puerto 
Rico 43.5%, Mississippi 24.1%, Virgin Islands 21.4%, North Carolina 20.9%, Georgia 18.4%, Alabama 18.3%, 
South Carolina 18.2%, and Louisiana 18.1%.  By contrast, the lowest rates were:  South Dakota 7.1%, Utah 7.3%, 
Kansas and Minnesota 7.6%, Wyoming 7.7%, Indiana 7.9%, and New Hampshire 8.2%.  Southern states also had 
higher preinduction exam rejection rates.  The highest rates were:  Puerto Rico 70.3%, South Carolina 62%, Virgin 
Islands 56.3%, Mississippi 56%, Alabama 54.8%, Louisiana 54.5%, Arkansas 52.6%, and Georgia 50%.  The lowest 
rates were:  Kansas 19.6%, North Dakota 19.7%, Panama Canal Zone 20.5%, Minnesota 20.6%, Utah 21.3%, Iowa 
21.2%, South Dakota 22.2% and Nebraska 23.2%.  Southern states even accounted for the highest rates of induction 
exam rejections.   Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1953, 74-75, 84, and 91. 
340 In the middle, 14.3% of Midwesterners and 15.3% of Far Westerners were rejected.  Klassen, Military Service in 
American Life Since World War II, 244. 
341 Oklahoma had a rate of 4.29%.  Congressional Record, Appendix, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, vol. 105, A6153. 
 88
Alabama alone of the Southern section ranked among the ten states with the lowest rates of 
service, not surprising given that as late as the induction exam Selective Service rejected 6.5% of 
Alabamans.342   Also, though Southern states did not provide the sheer numbers of men that New 
York, Pennsylvania, or California produced, a high percentage of Southerners ended up as 
casualties of the war.343  Almost 1% of West Virginians in service died in action as did .7% of 
men from Kentucky.344  West Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Virginia, Louisiana, 
Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, and South Carolina all fell into the top twenty of states which 
suffered the highest percentage of population killed or wounded.345  And, Southerners supplied 
much of the leadership for the Korean War as men from the South were more likely to muster in 
as officers or officer candidates than men from other sections of the country.346  Memoirs and 
scholarly studies alike make reference to the Southern flavor of military leadership.347  Despite 
entering service at a somewhat slower pace than their Midwestern or Northern counterparts, 
Southern men did fulfill their duty to country throughout the early 1950s.  Unlike the Vietnam 
                                                 
342 Only 1.94% of Alabama’s population served during the Korean War era.  Other states with low participation rates 
were:  Delaware (3.14%), New York (3.25%), New Jersey (3.37%), Ohio (3.41%), and Illinois (3.42%).  Ibid.  By 
the induction exam, weaker applicants had already been weeded out, but Southern states still had a surprisingly high 
rate of rejection.  With a rate of 9.4%, Arkansas actually surpassed Alabama, as did Louisiana (8%), South Carolina 
(7.6%), Texas (6.8%), and Oklahoma (6.4%).  By way of contrast, Guam’s rate was .5% and Nebraska’s was 2.8%.  
Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1953, 91. 
343 As far as sheer numbers, New York (482,000), Pennsylvania (405,000), and California (379,000) had the most 
men in uniform.  Congressional Record, Appendix, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, vol. 105, A6153. 
344 West Virginia claimed the honor of being the state with both the highest percentage of its military population 
killed in action and the highest percentage of its total population killed or wounded during the Korean War.  The 
state with the lowest percentage killed or wounded was Alabama.  The states with the most men killed or wounded 
were New York (8786) and California (9513).  Congressional Record, Appendix, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, vol. 
105, A6153 and Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, vol. 105, part 11, 13924. 
345 Other states included Arizona, South Dakota, New Mexico, North Dakota, California, Minnesota, Maine, 
Wyoming, Indiana, and New Hampshire.  Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, vol. 105, part 11, 
13924. 
346 Klassen, Military Service in American Life Since World War II, 259. 
347 A 1950 study showed that Army and Navy officers in 1950 overwhelmingly had been born in the South or had a 
southern affiliation.  The same pattern was evident as late as 1964.  Wool, “Military Manpower Procurement and 
Supply” in Little, ed., Social Research and Military Management, 68. 
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War, which ironically would have a distinctly Southern bent, no single section of the country 
during the Korean Conflict bore a strikingly disproportionate burden in delivering soldiers.   
 Like men, women came from all over the United States and from as far away as Puerto 
Rico to join up.  Also like their male counterparts, many came from states like California, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois.348  Overwhelmingly, though, female candidates hailed 
from small towns or cities rather than from sprawling metropolitan areas.  In 1952, the Marine 
Corps determined that only 35% of its female recruits lived in cities of 100,000 or more and the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force found that fewer than 30% of their enlistees came from cities that 
size.  In all branches of service about another 25% of women called cities of 25-100,000 home, 
but 35-52% traded farms or small towns or cities for the military life.   Except for nurses and 
medical specialists who came from places large enough to have accredited schools, female 
recruits tended to come from places with smaller populations.349  Strangely, this pattern 
resembles the manpower paradigm of the next war in which rural and small town America 
provided more military personnel proportionately than central cities or even working class 
suburbs.350   
 Whether from the West Coast or the East or from somewhere in the middle of the 
country, many soldiers of Korea had already mustered into the Armed Forces at least once.  
                                                 
348 A July 1951 Navy study found that most female Navy recruits came from the general areas of New York 
(12.2%), Boston (12%), Philadelphia (8%), Pittsburg (7.5%), Chicago (7.2%), Atlanta (7.1%), Los Angeles (6.5%), 
San Francisco (5.5%), and Detroit (5.5%).  The rest hailed from areas around Cincinnati, Dallas, Washington D. C., 
Kansas City, Minneapolis, Seattle, New Orleans, Denver, and Honolulu.  Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Memorandum for the Advertising Council, “Information About Women in the Armed Services,”  8 
December 1952, 4, Staff Files, Files of the Assistant Relating to the Office of Coordinator of Government Public 
Service Advertising (James M. Lambie, Jr.), Box 9, DDE Library. 
349 Ibid.  Also, “Policy Guide for Women in the Armed Services Information Program, 1953, U. S. Army, U. S. 
Navy, U. S. Air Force, U. S. Marine Corps,” 9 February 1953, 5, Staff Files, Files of the Special Assistant Relating 
to the Office of Coordinator of Government Public Service Advertising (James M. Lambie, Jr.), Box 9, DDE 
Library.   
350 In part, lenient agricultural deferments during the Korean War explain why more small town and rural boys did 
not end up in the military and in Korea.  With regard to Vietnam, see Appy, Working-Class War, 14. 
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Especially early in the war when manpower needs reached critical levels, the Armed Forces 
pulled World War II veterans out of Reserve or Guard units and returned them to active duty.  
And, leading the return troops were the old salts, sergeants or lieutenants or other officers who 
had stayed in service after the Second World War, or in some cases the First World War.351  
Eventually, newly minted military men became the face of Korea’s Army and Marines, but at 
war’s end 20% of soldiers could claim service in at least two wars.352  Close to a million men 
served in both Korea and World War II.353  But, duty did not always stop in 1953 or 1954.  
Almost 200,000 of those who had served in both World War II and Korea went on to wear their 
uniforms for the Vietnam War, as did another 273,000 veterans of Korea alone.354  For many 
young men, Korea turned out to be only one of their defining wars. 
 In the end, the men and women who filled uniforms for the Korean Conflict both 
resembled World War II’s “Greatest Generation” and foreshadowed Vietnam’s reluctant one.  
They came from all parts of the country and most sectors of the economy and they shared the 
patriotism and willingness to serve of an earlier time.  But, increasingly throughout the early 
1950s the faces of the troops reflected the shifting demographics of postwar America.  Younger, 
better educated, and more racially diverse than their brothers and sisters of World War II, these 
new soldiers became a generation of their own and a stepping stone to the Armed Forces of the 
next war.  Not all who mustered into the military, though, would march to the beat of Uncle 
Sam’s drum.  First they would have to cross through that age-old rite of passage, basic training. 
                                                 
351 James Hamilton Dill, Sixteen Days at Mungol-li (Fayetteville, AR:  M&M Press, 1993), 402.   
352 Boris R. Spiroff, Korea:  The Frozen Hell on Earth:  A Platoon Sergeant’s Diary, Korean War 1950-1951 
(Baltimore, MD:  American Literary Press, Inc., 1998), 9. 
353 President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, Readjustment Benefits:  General Survey and Appraisal.  A 
Report on Veterans’ Benefits in the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 161. 
354 U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Analysis, Office of Program and Data 
Analyses, Data on Veterans of the Korean War, June 2000 (online publication at 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc), 2. 
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CHAPTER 3:  YOU’RE IN THE ARMY (OR NAVY, MARINES, OR AIR 
FORCE) NOW! 
 
“Your military career is about to begin.  Perhaps you think it has begun already, but you haven’t seen 
anything yet.  You’re in the Army now.”—Major General John M. DeVine to “rawcruits” at Fort Dix 
Induction Center, 1950.1 
 
“I was frightened, homesick, hated the sergeant, and the food was terrible.”—Stanley Cohen, Korean War 
veteran, on his first days in service.2 
 
“[Training] is when I learned to smoke cigarettes and drink beer.”—William Gilwee, Jr., Korean War 
veteran.3 
 
 “Marine boot camp—what else can I say?  The Drill Instructors started by scaring the hell out of us, then it 
got worse.”—James Murphy, Korean War veteran.4 
 
“…By discipline and modern military technology, young men from farms, urban areas, slums, rural 
communities, and wealthy suburbs are molded into a group of killers.”—Daniel Wolfe, Korean War veteran.5 
 
“It is foolhardy to assume that we can undo a lifetime of moral and ethical training in fourteen weeks and 
actually train men to kill.”—Army Intelligence Officer.6 
 
 
The crowds could sometimes be fickle, especially when the buses or trains were only 
headed toward Boot Camp training grounds and not toward actual combat.  Depending on the 
weather or the number of men and women leaving or the size of the community or whether or 
not the country happened to be at war, farewell gatherings might be as small as a few loved ones 
or as large as the whole town.  In any case, the new soldiers arrived at the train or bus station 
with duffle bags in hand, as ready as possible for the upcoming weeks or months that would 
transform them into “Government Issue.”  Then the oft repeated ritual began.  Anxious mothers 
and wives tried to keep from crying too hard, sweethearts planted kisses in hopes that they might 
not be forgotten, fathers gave last minute pieces of advice, and babies squealed while older 
                                                 
1 Major General John M. DeVine quoted in “New Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times, 23 July 1950, 4.  
2 Stanley J. Cohen, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, Center for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University, 
Independence, Missouri (hereafter CFSOKW). 
3 William J. Gilwee, Jr., Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
4 James L. Murphy, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
5 Daniel Wolfe, Cold Ground’s Been My Bed: A Korean War Memoir (New York:  iUniverse, Inc., 2005), 24. 
6 An unnamed Army intelligence officer quoted in Seymour Bernstein, Monsters and Angels:  Surviving a Career in 
Music (U.S.:  Hal Leonard, 2002), 199. 
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children clambered up and down the safety rails oblivious to the day’s portent.  Even a few 
husbands and boyfriends turned out to bid farewell to wives and girlfriends who had either 
enlisted or been called up from the Reserves.7  Then, when the order came, these soon-to-be 
servicemen and servicewomen piled into train cars and bus seats, waving goodbye and blowing 
barrages of kisses to their friends and families and civilian lives.  The men and women who 
would serve during the Korean War belonged to the military now.8   
It did not take long to wash down the last bites of a Red Cross doughnut with coffee or to 
smoke a few of the free cigarettes handed out by the various military service clubs and it did not 
take long for those headed toward basic training or Boot Camp to realize that they had left much 
of the familiar behind and that more than miles separated them from home.  The train ride alone 
often proved eye-opening.  Young men and women who had been sheltered in America’s small 
enclaves could only wonder at the multitude of vices indulged in by other trainees en route to 
their training destinations.  Still naïve if not just plain green when he left Oklahoma for Camp 
Pendleton, California, Harold Mulhausen had heard about “goings on,” but never really 
witnessed such an abundance of drinking, gambling, cussing, dirty song singing, and smoking as 
                                                 
7 Journalists during the Korean War paid special attention to new twists in the old drama of military separation.  
Newspaper articles described not only the strange situation of women boarding troop trains while their husbands 
stayed behind, but also the even stranger situation of servicewomen heading in one direction for military training or 
duty while their husbands went in another direction for the same.  With Reserve call-ups of both men and women, 
National Guard activations, and the draft, a dual military career marriage became not uncommon in the early 1950s.  
See “Several Hundred Seattle, Everett Men Bid Good-bys to Families,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 10 August 1950, 
1 and “Boy Friends Cheer Girls Off to War, New York Times, 16 September, 1950, 5. 
8 In most cases, the scene at the train or bus station marked a real break between individuals and their communities, 
but, especially with regard to National Guard troops, this was not always the case.  Sometimes goodbye parties 
refused to say goodbye.  After weeks of farewell dinners, picnics, and dances throngs of hometown folks not only 
turned out to watch the Oklahoma 45th Division’s departure for Camp Polk, Louisiana, but to follow them there by 
car.  Over the course of the Thunderbirds’ training, everything from girlfriends to furniture traveled the dusty 
highway between Oklahoma and Louisiana.  Permanent farewells had to wait until the division’s overseas posting 
many months later.  See William M. Donnelly, Under Army Orders:  The Army National Guard During the Korean 
War (College Station, TX:  Texas A & M Press, 2001), 35-38.  Also see “Furnishings for Day Room?  Incidental 
Now, Says Mother,” Daily Oklahoman, 25 February 1951, 18A. 
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when he boarded the troop train.9  One can only imagine what he might have thought of fellow 
Marine James Putnam who joined other recruits in drinking and partying even before the train 
arrived at the station to carry them to Parris Island, South Carolina. Putnam and his cronies 
became so uncontrollable that the train conductor simply unhooked their cars, leaving them to 
party outside of Atlanta, Georgia until they all ran out of money and the Marine Corps found and 
attached them to another east-bound train.10    
These antics, while entertaining, usually turned out to be only one of many firsts 
experienced by troops along the well-worn train tracks carrying them toward military life.  Many 
trainees had never traveled far from home before and had never come into close contact with 
people from other sections of the country.  Now they found themselves crammed into close 
quarters aboard troop trains with people who spoke and looked differently than they did.11  For 
Northerners the journey could be especially unsettling.  Training centers did exist in the North, 
but far more were located south of the Mason Dixon line where climate made year round training 
much more viable.12 That meant that men and women accustomed to a more integrated world 
learned firsthand the rules of the segregated South.  Years later, Mary Robinson remembered her 
astonishment at seeing “White Only” sections in Virginia train stations and segregated barracks 
                                                 
9 Harold L. Mulhausen, Korean War Veteran Survey, 4-5, CFSOKW. 
10 James H. Putnam, Memoir, (Korean War Educator), 3. 
11 Many veterans mention hearing new accents for the first time on the way to basic.  Ralph Cutro remembers his 
New York group of Marine recruits being joined by men from Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut:  “We started 
to tease each other about our funny strange accents.” Ralph Cutro to Melinda Pash, email, 28 February 2006.  
National Guard and Reserve troops often avoided this aspect of transportation as they tended to come from the same 
localities and travel together to their final destination. 
12 In August 1950, the Army’s basic replacement training centers included Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Knox, 
Kentucky; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Ord, California; Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; Camp 
Breckinridge, Kentucky; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.  “Army Ready to Open 11 Training Centers,” New York 
Times, 17 August 1950, 16. The Marine Corps’ basic training locations included Parris Island, South Carolina and 
San Diego, California.  The Navy primarily offered Boot Camp at Great Lakes, Illinois, but moved female recruits 
to Bainbridge, Maryland in 1951.  Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall, Crossed Currents:  Navy Women from World 
War I to Tail Hook (Washington, D.C.:  Brassey’s, 1993), 129.  Most Air Force recruits attended basic training at 
Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, the only Air Force basic training location at the start of the war.  E. 
W. Kenworthy to Eric Severeid, 24 February 1950, Box “Desegregation of the Armed Forces, Box 1,” CFSOKW. 
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at Fort Eustis:  “This was a surprise to me—a kid from the North.”13  For African Americans 
born and raised in New York or Philly, the introduction to the South went beyond surprising—it 
was nothing less than traumatic.  Despite their military status, blacks in the South were simply 
black and had to obey the signs dictating where they could drink, eat, use the restroom, enter or 
exit train or bus stations, and shop for supplies.14  Even so, these recruits and draftees had 
entered a world of non-civilians and as time went by trainees accustomed to segregation had 
adjustments of their own to make.  The military not surprisingly shipped and trained men and 
women separately, but over time all branches of the Armed Forces phased out racial segregation 
in the training and transport of troops.  Executive Order 9981 in 1948 had ordered the integration 
of the military and by March 18, 1951 all basic training within the United States was 
integrated.15  Southern trains might still enforce segregation, but once trainees entered the 
military reservation they left all guarantees of racial separation behind and almost certainly could 
look forward to at least some exposure to persons of other colors.16   
For a few recruits and draftees, the train ride provided the only introduction to military 
life before reaching Boot Camp or basic training, but many others stopped off at reception 
                                                 
13 Mary Robinson, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
14 Segregation also affected Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other dark-skinned groups who found themselves 
subject to local southern laws and practices.  See Peter A. Soderbergh, Women Marines in the Korean War Era 
(Westport, CT:  Praeger, 1994), 59. 
15 Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the Armed Forces:  Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia:  
University of Missouri Press, 1969), 209. 
16 Many different types of people came into contact with one another for the first time at basic training.  Hawaiian 
veterans recall that Boot Camp first introduced them on a personal basis to “haoles” and blacks from the mainland.  
Louis Baldovi in Louis Baldovi, ed., A Foxhole View:  Personal Accounts of Hawaii’s Korean War Veterans 
(Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 18.  Guy Bishop notes that growing up in a white Protestant town of 
700 people he had never even met a Catholic before entering the Army.  Guy C. Bishop, Korean War Veteran 
Survey, 4-6, CFSOKW.  Such encounters were not always as positive as they might have been, however. Marian 
Nicely recalls that black and white WACs got along well at Ft. Lee, Virginia until they were advised that they could 
not associate off post and that certain parts of town were off-limits to all African Americans.  As a result their 
friendships then splintered along racial lines.  Marian Nicely, The Ladies First Army (Ligonier, PA:  The Fairfield 
Street Press, 1989), 17.  William Pickett describes his contact with large numbers of African Americans during 
training as depressing.  William A. Pickett, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW.  The military setting did not 
always overcome racial prejudices.   
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battalions somewhere along the way for a week or two of processing-in.17  Here, trainees got 
their first real glimpse of military life.  Cadre at these centers greeted them by calling roll—
mispronouncing even the simplest of names—and by assigning the bewildered-looking 
newcomers a variety of tasks and putting them to work right away.  Depending upon one’s luck 
or demeanor, they could end up “policing” or cleaning the grounds, standing guard at night, or 
pitching in on KP or kitchen duty.  Additionally, trainees had to attend to numerous other details.  
Piles of paperwork had to be completed, including medical history forms and the assignment of 
allotment insurance to wives or parents in case one died while in service to Uncle Sam.  Written 
examinations had to be taken to allow the military to gauge whether or not one needed remedial-
type training or to determine an individual’s assignment within a particular corps.18  Physical 
examinations, including tooth inspections and, in the case of men, “short arm” or genital 
inspections for venereal disease, had to be endured, complete with vaccinations for those not yet 
immunized.   
More importantly, while at the reception battalions, trainees began the long and painful 
process of leaving their individuality behind and accepting their place on the lowest rung of the 
military ladder.  Warned before leaving home to pack only the bare essentials—a toothbrush and 
razor, a pair of underwear or two, and maybe a change of clothes—trainees by both necessity and 
instruction began to dress alike once they received their uniforms from the quartermaster.  Only 
                                                 
17 Some reception battalions functioned at Boot Camp locations, but it was not uncommon from World War II 
through the Korean War for trainees to be shipped from home to a processing center and then to basic training.  
Kenneth McCormick, for example, was inducted at Ft. Omaha and then shipped to Camp Crowder, Missouri for 
processing before being sent to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii for basic training.  Kenneth McCormick, “Memoirs of 
Ken McCormick,” 18-20, included by author with Korean War Veteran Survey, CFSOKW. 
18 Prior to 1948, the Army assigned recruits to a specific branch at enlistment and recruits took specialized rather 
than general basic training.  “New Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times, 23 July 1950, 4.  By 1955, a program 
was in place whereby men with less than a fourth grade education or with low scores on the aptitude tests spent 3 to 
4 weeks in a transitional unit where they learned basic English, reading, writing, math, citizenship, and simple 
fundamental military duties before entering basic training.  “Training at Fort Dix-II,” New York Times, 6 July 1955, 
12. 
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the fact that the military required trainees to stencil their names and serial numbers onto 
everything issued them distinguished one pair of fatigues or boots from another.  In addition to 
dressing alike, all trainees made a mandatory visit to the post barber shop where the barbers 
invariably asked each customer how they wanted their hair cut.  Most men wanted a little off the 
sides or top or perhaps a nice trim, but all left the chair with the same close, clean, standard issue 
buzz cut.  As Louis Baldovi notes, “In less than a minute I was practically bald.”19  For women, 
hair was normally cut to the bottom of the jacket collar, shorter hair being discouraged as 
unfeminine and perhaps a sign of lesbian tendencies.20  By now, the trainees not only looked 
alike, they had learned to act alike as well, to conform to the military’s demand that they obey 
orders.  John Williams and his tent mates had internalized this lesson so completely that they 
complied when men came to their tents at three in the morning, ordered them to fall out, fall in, 
and double-time march for two miles in the cold.  Told at the end to wait for the next soldier, 
Williams and the others didn’t move until morning came without anyone else appearing and they 
realized that they were standing on the road beside their tent.21  Indeed, even before reaching 
Boot Camp trainees discovered that military life could be filled with hardship.22 
                                                 
19 Louis Baldovi in Baldovi, ed., A Foxhole View, 18.  Also, Shelley Stewart and Nathan Hale Turner, Jr., The Road 
South:  A Memoir (U.S.:  Warner Books, 2002), 168-169. 
20 Nicely, The Ladies First Army, 14.  None of the services explicitly forbade women from wearing their hair short, 
but concerns about homosexuality which began as early as World War II did lead training cadre to keep a close eye 
on “mannish” or “athletic” women and to interrogate and harass those suspected of lesbianism.  Soderbergh, Women 
Marines in the Korean War Era, 61;  Mary Ann Humphrey, My Country, My Right to Serve:  Experiences of Gay 
Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present (New York:  Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 11-20;  
Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire:  The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II (New York:  The 
Free Press, 1990), 260-265;  and Leisa D. Meyer, “Creating G.I. Jane:  The Regulation of Sexuality and Sexual 
Behavior in the Women’s’ Army Corps During World War II,”  Feminist Studies 18:3 (Autumn 1992),  581-601.  
Also, Leisa D. Meyer, Creating GI Jane:  Sexuality and Power in the Women’s Army Corps (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 153-156. 
21 John E. Williams to Melinda Pash, email, 7 May 2004, in author’s possession. 
22 Some trainees began trying to escape military service during their processing-in.  John Williams describes a man 
who desperately tried to convince officials he was crazy by pretending to be driving a car wherever he went.  John 
E. Williams to Melinda Pash, email, 7 May 2004.  Kenneth Kendall notes that while at Fort Knox, Kentucky for 
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However educational the trip to basic training turned out to be, though, it still did not 
prepare most trainees for what awaited them on the other end.  Regardless of branch of service, 
basic training or Boot Camp had one mission—to tear down the civilian and build up an effective 
member of the military machine.23  And the clock began ticking the moment that new recruits 
and draftees stepped foot on the military post.  From that point forward it no longer mattered 
who or what one had been in civilian life—male or female, black or white, rich or poor, educated 
or unschooled. The only thing that mattered was that trainees learned to be homogenous if not 
interchangeable parts of their particular armed force, accepting of orders, disciplined, and 
prepared for whatever duty lay ahead.  Still, basic training for those who would serve during the 
Korean Conflict varied in length and intensity from service to service and sometimes from year 
to year within the same service.  
 
Army Basic Training 
 
Throughout the Korean War era, no branch of the Armed Forces strained harder to train 
new recruits and draftees than the Army.  Of the 5,720,000 selective service registrants examined 
from July 1950 to July 1953 who went on to serve in the wartime military, 2,834,000 received 
their training from the Army.  In addition, the Army accepted 1,475,700 or 94% of the era’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
processing-in, 8 recruits committed suicide by jumping off a water tower.  Kenneth R. Kendall, Memoir, (Korean 
War Educator), 4-5. 
23 Almost all literature on basic training emphasizes the primary function of tearing down the individual Boot and 
refashioning him or her into a soldier.  See “Report on Training,” December 1955, 35, U. S. President’s Commission 
on Veterans’ Pensions (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, Dwight David 
Eisenhower Library (Hereafter Bradley Commission and DDE Library);  Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers:  
Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam (U. S.:  University Press of Kansas, 2003), 27; and James 
R. Ozinger, Altruism (Wesport, CT:  Praeger, 1999), 58. 
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draftees into its ranks.24  Under the best of circumstances, training so many new soldiers would 
have posed difficulties, but the situation in 1950 made completing the task frighteningly 
burdensome.  Post-World War II personnel cuts had all but emptied the Army’s pockets of 
qualified basic training instructors, and the immediate deployment of Reserve troops to Korea in 
the early months of the war intensified that shortage.  With few options open, and with stateside 
trainees and Korean War soldiers and units waiting, the Army simply decided to shorten the 
basic training cycle so that existing schools and instructors could more quickly churn out 
overseas replacements and possible training cadre.25  By August 1950, basic training for men had 
been reduced from 14 weeks to only 6 weeks to be followed by another 8 weeks of technical or 
unit training.26  Even so, the Army continued to hunger for replacements and in October 1950 it 
shortened WAC basic from 13 to 8 weeks so that more women soldiers would be available to 
replace men in stateside jobs, freeing them to in turn replace men in Korea.27  Throughout the 
war, high ranking officers as well as various members of the press complained that 6 or 8 weeks 
                                                 
24 Of selective service registrants taking their preinduction exam from July 1950 to July 1953, 1,177,000 served in 
the Navy, 424,000 in the Marine Corps, and 1,285,000 in the Air Force.  The Marine Corps also received 84,447 or 
6% of draftees.  The Navy and Air Force did not participate in the draft.  “Report on Conditions of Military Service, 
Section 1, Selection Process,” 14, (Bradley Commission):  Records 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE 
Library. 
25 When deciding to reduce the length of basic training during the Korean War, Army planners no doubt looked back 
to World War II when manpower shortages had been alleviated by reducing Boot Camp to six weeks.  Also, 
shortening basic training must have seemed an appropriate response to the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee’s 
charges of “inexcusable and indefensible waste” in the “valueless repetition of basic.”  “Waste in Training Laid to 
Army Units,” New York Times, 26 December 1951, 1. 
26 “Fort Dix Training Shorter, Tougher,”  New York Times, 12 August 1950, 4;  Daniel Zimmerman, Images of 
America:  Fort Dix (U.S.:  Arcadia, 2001), 8; “Report on Training,” December 1955, 36, (Bradley Commission):  
Records, 1954-58, A69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, DDE Library;  and U. S. Department of Commerce, Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.:  U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 101. 
27 Betty J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 1945-1978 (Washington, D.C.:  Center of Military History, U. S. 
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of basic turned out green troops, but with few exceptions the Army stuck to its guns, producing 
an astounding number of new soldiers in a very short period of time.28   
Regardless of when one entered the Army or how long basic training lasted, the 
experience remained fairly similar for Korean War trainees.  Most men and women arrived at the 
training camp with strangers that they had just met on the train or bus rather than with hometown 
friends.29  In the years of peace after World War II, the Army entirely abandoned previous 
policies of creating geographically-based units to come to basic, train, and then serve together.  
Instead, trainees from all over the country shipped in to basic training camp, only to be assigned 
to different units based on individual skills after completion of the course.  And, not infrequently 
these trainees approached training camps for the first time well after dark.  Whether official 
policy or not, the Army took advantage of nighttime arrivals to throw new troops off balance.  In 
fourteen or twelve or even six weeks, the Army hoped to transform these undisciplined civilians 
                                                 
28 An unidentified high-ranking officer told the New York Times that Army trainees needed 14 to 16 weeks of hard 
basic training and that 8 weeks was not enough.  “Need of Training Revealed in Korea,” New York Times, 3 
November 1950, 4.  After the war, Colonel F. W. Gibb agreed saying that forces in 1957 were better trained than 
those during the Korean War because “during an emergency, when you train a large number of people in a short 
length of time…you actually put more people through, but you do not give them the degree of training that we feel 
is required.”  Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of the Army Appropriations for 1957:  Hearings, 84th Congress, 2d session, 1956, 494.  In 1953, there was a point at 
which basic training was lengthened to 12 weeks, but in general training stayed in the 6-8 week range.  “Army to Let 
G.I.’s Pick Buddies to Live and Fight in 4-Man Teams, New York Times, 5 July 1953, 1.  As late as 1955, training in 
the Army remained at 8 weeks.  “Training at Fort Dix-II,” New York Times, 6 July 1955, 12. 
29 Even for those who took basic training after World War II there were some exceptions to this.  National Guard 
and Reserve troops, of course, often arrived at Boot Camp as a group. Also, late in the Korean War, in an effort to 
restore camaraderie within the ranks, a new program was introduced to allow men to train, eat, sleep, and then fight 
with three buddies of their own choosing.  “Army to Let G.I.’s Pick ‘Buddies’ to Live and Fight in 4-Man Teams,” 
New York Times, 5 July 1953, 1.  More interestingly, in an effort to increase female enlistment after the start of the 
Korean War, both the Army and Air Force promised high school coeds and girls’ clubs and organizations that as 
many of them as chose could enlist together and the corps would make sure that they at least went through basic 
training together.  “Armories Sought for Reserves’ Use,” New York Times, 4 December 1950, 20. 
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into combat-ready infantrymen and the sooner trainees could be mentally torn down, the sooner 
training cadre could rebuild them as soldiers.30   
Naturally, given the Army’s mission, most recruits and draftees did not find the Army 
particularly welcoming upon their arrival at basic.  Some drill sergeants and training cadre made 
a point of immediately heaping abuse on men and women fresh from induction centers or 
reception battalions.  Rudolph Stephens remembers that as soon as he got to basic “a big black 
sergeant started cursing us and calling us foul names.”31  For men like John Kamperschroer, who 
came from homes where “4 letter words were not used,” such language provided a rude 
introduction to military life. 32   For Stephens, this particular incident “was hard to take because 
very few of us had even spoken to a black person in our lives.”  In reality, training cadre usually 
greeted newcomers somewhat more cordially than this, but trainees still tended to feel a wave of 
regret upon arriving at basic training.  Homesick, frightened, and tired, they “didn’t know what 
to do or why I was there.”33  Before long, though, most realized that they simply had to get used 
to things because “there wasn’t anything any of us could do about it.” 34 
No matter what time of the day or night trainees pulled into camp, they soon found their 
way to the barracks for a first look at their new home.  Certainly, Korean War era volunteers and 
draftees did not expect luxury, but even so they could not help but be disappointed when they 
                                                 
30 James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, Education in the Armed Forces (New York:  Center for Applied 
Research in Education, Inc., 1965), 28-29 and Dave Moniz, “Army Updates Training,” www.usatoday.com, posting 
5 January 2004. 
31 Rudolph W. Stephens, Old Ugly Hill:  A G.I.’s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952-1953 (Jefferson, 
NC:  McFarland and Company, 1995), 15. 
32 John R. Kamperschroer, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
33 Robert Shields, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
34 Stephens, Old Ugly Hill, 15.  While stories like Stephens’ are prolific, many troops, such as those sent to 
Schoefield Barracks, Hawaii, had more positive arrival experiences.  When Kenneth McCormick arrived at the dock 
in Hawaii, a Navy friend met him with a hula girl and a photographer to commemorate the occasion.  McCormick, 
“Memoirs of Ken McCormick,” 21.  Before Charles Brown boarded the Army trucks that would carry him to the 
base, he enjoyed a big welcome complete with an Army band and native girls who put wreaths of flowers around the 
newly arrived trainees’ necks.  Charles L. Brown, Memoirs (Korean War Educator), 4. 
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saw the buildings that would house them for the better part of two months.  In order to 
accommodate the huge flow of trainees after the outbreak of the war, the Army reopened camps 
that had been mothballed or simply left to rot after 1945.35  Troop quarters consisted of 
“temporary” wooden structures built cheaply to house the soldiers of a different war and they 
had the appearance of abandoned buildings.36  Some even had doors or windows missing, and 
almost all relied upon primitive coal furnaces for heat.  At Camp Lee, Virginia, smoke from a 
local chemical plant permeated everything including the female trainees’ uninsulated living 
quarters.37  But, “since their flimsy walls and floors had not yet collapsed, and their showers 
were still functional, they were deemed appropriate to accommodate the recruits for Korea.”38   
Inside the barracks, more surprises awaited the temporary occupants of these temporary 
shelters.  Comfort and privacy had become things of the past.  Rows and rows of beds, really just 
three inch thick mattresses resting on wire springs, ensured cramped, uncomfortable quarters for 
would-be sleepers.39  In the bathrooms, common showers ruled the day.40  Forty or fifty men or 
women might be expected to rotate through only five or six showers each morning before 
marching to the mess hall for breakfast.  Toilets sat unshielded by stalls and not uncommonly 
faced the only available sinks.  As one veteran recalls, “sometimes, depending on what was 
                                                 
35 Merle Wysock describes these conditions at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky in Korean War Veteran Survey, 3, 
CFSOKW.  See also “Training at Fort Dix,” New York Times, 5 July 1955, 12, which discusses the need for new, 
permanent barracks even after the end of the Korean War. 
36 This is how Daniel Wolfe describes the accommodations at Indiantown Gap.  He goes on to report that in order to 
earn weekend passes he and the other trainees had to thoroughly clean these old structures.  On at least one occasion, 
the barracks failed inspection and the men paid by spending the weekend on “toilet drill,” running back and forth on 
the command of a whistle from the bunks to the bathroom to raise or lower the toilet seats.  Wolfe, Cold Ground’s 
Been My Bed, 19 and 27-28.  Women describe similar experiences with training barracks.  See Nicely, Ladies First 
Army, 11 and Dorothy Rechel, Oral History by Eric Elliott, 22 January 2001, Women Veterans’ History Project, 
Oral History Center, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 14 (Hereafter WVHP, OHC, UNCG). 
37 Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 76-79. 
38 Wolfe, Cold Ground’s Been My Bed, 28. 
39 Ibid., 21 and Rechel, Oral History by Eric Elliott, 22 January 2001, WVHP, OHC, UNCG, 14. 
40 Margie Jacob, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
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served for dinner, a trio or quartet would be performing for an uninterested audience of 
handwashers or shavers.”41   
New trainees almost always received some type of orientation from company 
commanding officers either at the reception battalion or shortly after arriving at Boot Camp.42  
“Your military career is about to begin,” these lectures started.  “Perhaps you think it has begun 
already, but you haven’t seen anything yet.  You’re in the Army now.”43  Part pep talk, the 
speeches went on to detail all the benefits of Army life—free food, clothing, housing, and a 
steady salary, not to mention status.  “Mama will be very proud that her boy is not a mama’s boy 
any longer.”  But they also informed “rawcruits” that “in return, you are expected to work, and I 
mean work” and warned that some would never make the grade because “the going is too 
rugged.”  Trainees also learned some of the do’s and don’ts of Army life, starting with “do not 
go absent without leave.”  Some camps even issued information packets with admonitions 
against going AWOL printed repeatedly throughout.44   
With introductions out of the way, training began in earnest.  Designed to tear down 
trainees’ civilian identities, inculcate them with military customs, and work them into physical 
fitness, the first couple weeks of basic training made even the toughest men and women question 
their abilities.  Highly regimented, each day typically began before sunrise and sometimes before 
reveille.  Trainees got up, showered, shaved, dressed, and got into formation to march to the 
                                                 
41 Wolfe, Cold Ground’s Been My Bed, 25-27. 
42 William E. Anderson, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2-3 and Donald Chase, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 
2. 
43 Major General John M. Devine quoted in “New Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times, 23 July 1950, 4. 
44 Even with all the effort given to ensure that trainees did not flee Boot Camp, some did go AWOL and an even 
larger number thought about it.  At Fort Dix, 90% of trainees complained to chaplains and another 5% consulted 
psychiatrists during their basic training.  “New Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times, 23 July 1950, 4.  
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mess hall for morning chow.45  After eating, it was time to either clean the barracks and latrines 
or head off to training.46  Rain or shine, every day included not just classroom sessions on 
subjects like map-reading, achievements and traditions of the Army, and personal hygiene, but 
also plenty of outdoor field exercises and calisthenics.47  Occasionally, films on topics like the 
need for soap and how to use it broke the monotony.48  By lunch, hungry trainees devoured 
whatever the cook gave them and then returned to the day’s business.49  After the evening meal, 
trainees finally had some free time, but even then they had to polish shoes, wash and iron 
uniforms, and “police” their living quarters.  If they finished their chores quickly enough, they 
might slip down to the service club for a game of ping pong, a snack or beer, some live 
entertainment or even a dance if women had been brought in by a local social group.50  Lights 
out came around 2100 hours or 9 p.m., not a minute too soon for most of the exhausted trainees, 
but training cadre not infrequently awakened them in the middle of the night to inspect 
footlockers or wooden floors.51  Around the clock, strict instructors demanded perfection from 
the hapless trainees who could not help but feel that “even by trying to do right, one could be 
                                                 
45 Harold Selley, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2-3.  Some trainees refused to shower daily with the result that 
the entire barracks failed inspection.  In such cases, trainees were not above administering a “GI shower,” painfully 
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William E. Anderson, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 4. 
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humbled quickly and unfairly.”52  Luckily, most trainees adjusted fairly swiftly to military life as 
they were either too busy following orders to think about it or too tired to give any thought to 
whether or not they were happy.53   
In between inspections and physical conditioning, the Army imparted a number of 
fundamental skills to trainees in the first few weeks of basic training.  These largely 
undisciplined troops learned to obey orders and conduct themselves with a military bearing.  
Men and women who had come to camp slouching and dragging their feet, became accustomed 
to standing up straight, lining up in an organized manner, and marching on demand, sometimes 
for miles.  Through drills and classroom instruction they learned to find their way with only a 
compass, read maps, properly attach gas masks, sanitize living quarters, employ appropriate 
military jargon, and, in some cases, distinguish their left hand from their right.54  Trainees also 
became familiar with the most important tool of their new trade—the M-1 rifle.  No one would 
have the opportunity to actually fire this weapon until at least the third week of basic training, 
but by then all trainees would be proficient in disassembling, cleaning, and assembling it.  
Without exception, drill instructors and training cadre emphasized the M-1’s centrality to 
battleground survival and told their trainees to “make it your friend, take it apart, oil it, keep it 
clean, and take it to bed with you.”55   
By the beginning of the third week, recruits and draftees were on their way to physical 
fitness and it was time for the real work to begin.  Having beaten trainees into submission, drill 
instructors and cadre now started to build soldiers.  Some trainees got the chance to participate in 
                                                 
52 Robert Popenhagen, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
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54 Frank Faculjak remembers that he turned left instead of right in a marching drill so the drill instructor issued him a 
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“confidence courses” to boost their self-esteem.  Daniel Wolfe describes how his unit marched 
three miles before beginning just such a course where the men had to hop from tire to tire, crawl 
through puddles under barbed wire fences, hurdle a twelve foot wooden wall, and cross a stream.  
After ten minutes rest, the men then embarked on a hike through the mountains that kept them 
out until almost two in the morning.56  Tired or not, trainees still had duties, like KP or standing 
watch as fireguard, to attend to and they still had to get up early the next day ready to process all 
of the information that the Army deemed crucial to their survival.  Specialists taught trainees 
elementary first aid, the art of camouflage and concealment, the proper way to construct field 
fortifications and dig foxholes, and how to effectively wield a bayonet.57  Under supervision—or 
more accurately under scrutiny—trainees practiced hand to hand combat, obstacle courses, and 
foxhole drills where tanks rumbled right above their heads.58   
After the first few months of the Korean War, the Army also added more realistic 
maneuvers to its basic training line up.  In general, the Army had done little to update training 
methods or technology since the Second World War and had become quite complacent in the 
belief that no reason existed for tough, realistic training.59  When North Korean forces almost 
pushed American troops off the peninsula, however, the Army recognized that it had to better 
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prepare its soldiers for the task of fighting.60  As a result, basic training personnel began to 
develop infiltration and other exercises to familiarize and inure trainees to the sights, sounds, and 
smells of real battle.61  At Fort Dix, cadre treated trainees to a course where they crawled under 
barbed wire obstacles dragging their M-1 rifles as buried explosive charges detonated around 
them and live machine gun bullets “whizzed inches above our heads.”62  Then, officers examined 
the rifles for dirt and anyone unfortunate enough to have emerged with a less than clean M-1 had 
the pleasure of repeating the ordeal.  At the end, drill sergeants gave the order to fix bayonets and 
charge dummies that had been strung up in the trees.  Seymour Bernstein remembers that one of 
his officers marked the occasion by shouting, “Scream, damn you!  Scream as you go in for the 
kill!  That’s how you scare the hell out of the enemy!”63  By 1952, Fort Dix had also added a 
maneuver taken straight from the hills of Korea.  In their last week of basic training, soldiers 
charged “Ridge 102,” using live ammunition.64  Similarly in an exercise described by one 
veteran as a “son of a bitch,” the Hawaii Training Center had trainees jog uphill behind tanks for 
almost a mile only to be assaulted with live ammunition at the base of Hill 904.65  Such 
simulated battle conditions were thought by more than a few to be worse than those in the 
Korean war zone.  
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Whatever else trainees did while at basic training, they spent the majority of their time 
after the first two weeks learning to use the Army’s stockpile of weapons.66  The M-1 remained 
the primary focus, and in eight weeks each trainee fired some 502 rounds in an effort to achieve 
reasonable accuracy.67  Cadre also introduced trainees to a host of other devices being used in 
Korea such as M-30s, browning automatic rifles (BARs), 60 mm mortars, .30 caliber air-cooled 
machine guns, bazookas, .45 caliber pistols, 37 mm recoilless rifles, and all types of grenades.68  
Not surprisingly, accidents could and did happen.  At Fort Hood, a private gunned down a 
lieutenant saying he “would do anything to get out of the army” and at Fort Dix a corporal 
narrowly saved the day when a trainee froze after unlocking a grenade.69  Private Charles 
Burrows died not long after his arrival at Camp Stoneman, California when someone 
accidentally shot him.70  Such incidents coupled with the amount of time spent firing different 
weapons prompted many trainees to conclude that the entire object of basic training was to teach 
them to “forget thinking and learn to kill.”71  Like Rudolph Stephens, they believed that they 
“learned the same thing over and over again, and that was how to kill, kill, kill.  That’s all you 
heard day in and day out, how to kill someone.”72  True or not, if trainees managed to internalize 
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the willingness to take another life, then they had in fact made the transition from citizen to 
combat soldier that the Army desired.73 
For both men and women, basic training ended the same way, in a long bivouac designed 
to expose them to everything that they might encounter on a real battlefield.74  Just as they would 
have to do if sent to war, trainees left the security of their barracks and marched or jogged ten or 
twenty miles weighted down with full packs, heavy tent equipment, M-1 rifles, and the 
disassembled parts of various other weapons.  Ambulances tagged along behind to pick up men 
who fainted from exhaustion, but otherwise no one could expect to hitch a ride on a truck.75  As 
one Korean War veteran told William Abreu, “In Korea there might not be trucks.  It may rain all 
day, snow all day, and sweat may be running down your ass all day.”76  After setting up camp, 
trainees engaged in a number of different activities.  Some cadre continued weapons training.77  
Others conducted more grueling exercises such as dumping trainees out miles from their new 
camp, handing them a compass, a map, and a book of matches and expecting them to find their 
way back alone.78  Usually, trainees participated in some sort of a mock battle.  They assaulted 
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hills, tried to infiltrate enemy lines, and dug foxholes.  No matter how well individuals or units 
did, instructors quickly pointed out that “this was a piece of cake compared to what you’ll find in 
Korea.”79  
For men who graduated basic training after the first few months of the Korean War, such 
warnings had great resonance.80  Army policy in previous years had been to assign new soldiers 
either to advanced training or stateside duty stations before shipping them abroad.  As late as 
July 1950, the Army sought enlistments by promising “no present plan” to “use the recruits 
overseas.”81  However, manpower shortages in Korea increasingly pressured the Army to send 
men fresh from basic training to the war zone as individual replacements and by September 1950 
the press and others began accusing the Army of using green troops in the Korean theater.  Army 
spokesman, not surprisingly, denied these charges, but admitted that soldiers with at least 
fourteen weeks of individual and unit basic training could be sent. 82  Just over a year later and 
deeper into the war, the Army officially revised its system, allowing men entering service for the 
first time to be sent overseas directly after basic training, which by this time had been shortened 
to produce more soldiers in fewer weeks.83  The FECOM assignment became so common for 
new basic training graduates that in some cases the Army simply mimeographed the order and 
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82 “Army Denies Use of Green Troops,” New York Times, 10 September, 1950, 6. 
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passed out copies when men returned from their final bivouac.84  Some trainees did manage to 
enter advanced training programs or officer candidate schools after their six or eight weeks of 
basic, but for many more basic training provided the only training they would receive before 
departing for Korea as “qualified killers.”85 
Both during and after the war, questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
Army’s basic training in preparing soldiers for battle surfaced.  In 1950, one high ranking officer 
complained about the “creampuff army,” declaring “we’ve got to teach ‘em how to fight, get rid 
of the non-essentials and get down to tough, hard bed-rock training.” 86  He went on to say that 
basic training needed to be longer, at least fourteen to sixteen weeks, and that training needed to 
include more night training, reconnaissance on foot, and guerilla warfare tactics.  A colonel in 
Korea told reporter Marguerite Higgins that soldiers had been “nursed and coddled, told to drive 
safely, to buy war bonds, to avoid VD, to write a letter home to mother, when somebody ought to 
have been telling them how to clear a machine gun when it jams.”  He reminded Higgins of the 
human consequences of making men “learn in combat, in a matter of days, the basic things they 
should have known before they ever faced an enemy.”  They became casualties because “some 
of them don’t learn fast enough.”87  After the war, an Army panel found that the Army could 
have fought better in Korea and lamented that “the Chinese were tough…they knew how to 
endure…[while] we had to have three squares a day—and two of them had to be hot or junior 
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86 Quoted in “Need of Training Revealed in Korea,” New York Times, 3 November 1950, 4.     
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would write his congressman or his mother.”  One of the officers declared, “We are training for 
survival and the sooner everybody understands that, the better.”  Mostly composed of Korean 
War veterans, the panel recommended major overhauls in Army training, starting with stricter 
discipline, off-post saluting, and a merit-based ranking system.88  General Walter Beddell Smith, 
appearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, acknowledged that men 
with only a few months training saw action in both World War II and Korea, but asserted “it 
would be criminal if we did it again.”  Smith believed that twelve months training of soldiers 
would be best, but that “6 months represents an irreducible minimum.”89  As prisoners of war 
began returning in the wake of “brainwashing” allegations, Army officers and psychiatrists in 
part targeted the training which had failed to inculcate the kind of devotion to God and country 
that would fortify soldiers during such an ordeal.  The Army had been too solicitous of its 
trainees’ welfare, such critics charged, leaving soldiers undisciplined and ignorant of American 
democracy.90  Many Americans simply believed that the Army had not provided tough enough 
training to its recruits and draftees and as a result had not produced men mentally and physically 
conditioned to fight.91   
                                                 
88 “Army Going Back to Tough Training,” New York Times, 15 August 1954, 45. 
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91 “Army Going Back to Tough Training,” New York Times, 15 August 1954, 45.  In his memoirs, General Mark 
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The troops themselves often agreed that their military schooling had holes in it larger 
than those made by their M-1 bullets.  Exhausted, they missed out on lectures that could “spell 
the difference between life and death” in Korea and, while reaching a certain comfort level with 
the Army’s weapons, few became marksmen in so short a time.92  Sometimes men earned 
proficiency ratings on equipment that they could barely use.  On the day of his tank driver’s test, 
Vince Krepps could not get the tank out of first gear and simply ambled around aimlessly until 
the instructor asked a soldier sitting next to him how he had done.  “Great,” was the reply and 
Krepps passed the exam.93  In more than a few cases, men found themselves on a Korea-bound 
troopship trying to make up for what they had not learned at basic training.  Walter Ogasawara 
found out after sailing that he would become the gunner of a 57 mm recoilless rifle team.  “I 
knew shit about firing a 57 mm recoilless rifle.”  So, while en route, he simulated firing it 
without ammunition.  Similarly, Pedro Behasa worked on getting used to the 60 mm mortar 
while aboard ship, but he at least received eight rounds of ammunition for “live” practice.94  No 
wonder, then, that a great many of those ordered to Korea felt like Merle Wysock, that “I really 
wasn’t ready to be an infantryman even after…basic training.”95   
For men who entered service before the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, another factor 
hindered the effectiveness of their basic training—the fact that they had completed it months or 
                                                                                                                                                             
sure his military service would help him, but that she should realize that we would have him for eighteen months 
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Monsters and Angels, 199. 
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even years earlier.  Lured into the military by recruitment posters that emphasized the benefits of 
military life, these troops joined an Army that in the post-World War II 1940s seemed to have 
forgotten that the principal business of soldiers remained to fight and if need be to die.96  
Convinced of the supremacy of nuclear weapons, the Army in these years used basic training to 
apply a thin layer of military socialization before ordering men to their first assignments.97  
Unfortunately, this system allowed men to learn a particular specialty without really internalizing 
how to be a soldier.  Consequently, when hostilities began in Korea, Army cooks, lifeguards, 
drivers, teletype officers, and clerks suddenly found themselves headed to the battle zone as 
riflemen and infantrymen, jobs for which they had never received adequate preparation.98  Such 
was the experience of Milton Griffey, operator of a quartermaster laundry in Japan in 1950.  
Ordered to the Pusan Perimeter, Griffey on arrival asked where to find his laundry.  To Griffey’s 
horror, he received an M-1 rifle and the news that “You are an Infantry soldier.  No laundry duty 
here!”99  Griffey made a fast transition and performed well, but others proved less lucky.  Men 
died, went home wounded, and even became prisoners of war because their training had been 
either incomplete or too long before the war to remember.  Also, longtime soldiers often carried 
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the additional weight of physical unfitness.  Speaking of the Occupation forces sent to Korea in 
the early days of the war, one sergeant remarked, “Some of them are so goddam fat they can’t 
hardly walk around.  Most of them haven’t had to put their pants on for years; always had a 
couple of geisha girls to do that for ‘em.”100  Some, in fact, went to war so out of shape that when 
enemy forces broke the lines they just sat down and waited to be captured.101   
Still, while Army basic training had some grave limitations, it did prepare most men well 
enough that they survived their wartime tours of duty.  Not every skill of soldiering could be 
imparted in a matter of weeks, but even the softest recruits and inductees who completed the 
course left it strengthened physically, conditioned to obey orders and perform duties despite fear, 
and more confident in themselves and their superiors.  The sleepless conditions at basic became 
tutorials for battle where exhausted men had no choice but to work and fight through days, 
nights, or even weeks.102  Films and classes on hygiene translated into fewer deaths from disease 
and infection than in previous wars.103   Hours and days spent at the firing range encouraged the 
bulk of the Army’s trainees to shoot their weapons even if they did not feel totally comfortable 
with the idea of killing. The ratio of fire, or the percent of men firing their weapons in battle, 
increased significantly in the Korean War from World War II.104  Especially after combat 
veterans returned from Korea to become instructors, basic training became more informative, 
more relevant to the war at hand and trainees increasingly felt “physically and mentally 
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conditioned to fight.”105  Pointing out that many of the Army’s trainees had been born into the 
Great Depression and grew up during World War II in distraught homes with absent fathers, one 
officer claimed that the Army provided men with discipline and something more—a newfound 
pride in themselves.106  A few even developed a life-long admiration for the way the Army could 
“train young soldiers to do things they had not previous talents for…in short periods of time.”107 
Observers from the press duly noted that Army basic training had taken clerks, factory hands, 
and schoolboys and given them the “weathered look of well-trained troops.”108  By December 
1951, the Senate Preparedness Committee concurred, pronouncing Army training satisfactory.109  
In the final analysis, Army basic training in the Korean War period had both strengths and 
weaknesses, but drill instructors and cadre usually did the job they were called to do—they 
provided trainees with an introduction to warfare.  And, then, as now, the Old Salts rested easy 
with the knowledge that the Army could teach men to march and give them the fundamental 
skills of soldiering, but that no amount of training or time could prepare soldiers for combat like 
combat itself.  
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Marine Boot Camp 
 
 “Sand Fleas,” “Shit Birds,” Boot Camp “POWs,” you could call them anything but 
Marines. 110  Recruits and inductees in the Korean War era could not be Marines, could not even 
wear the Corps’ emblem until successfully completing Boot Camp.111  Like the Army, the 
Marine Corps in the early 1950s had an obligation to train and produce combat-ready 
infantrymen in as short a time as possible, but the Marine Corps stood unparalleled among the 
Armed Forces in instilling esprit de corps in those who would join its ranks.  Unlike Army 
trainees who could end up at any one of many basic training centers, all with their own strengths 
and specialties, all regular Marines passed through either Parris Island or the San Diego Recruit 
Depot, Boot Camps dedicated to only one thing, the building of Marines.   
More challenging than the basic training offered by other branches of the military, 
Marine Corps basic began almost the moment that trainees boarded the camp-bound shuttle.  If 
enlistees or draftees had entertained any notions that Boot Camp would not be as bad as the 
stories they had heard, the desolate landscape along the way must have given them pause.  
Except for a few loblolly pines and a red cedar or two, Parris Island, tucked away in the sandy 
part of South Carolina, supported virtually no grass or shrubbery and in the hot, sultry summer 
months the unshaded heat beat down on buses, buildings, and people relentlessly.112  San Diego, 
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of course, appeared less foreboding, but even there entering trainees would have been hard-
pressed to not realize the camp’s utter isolation from civilian life.   
At the end of the line, things only got bleaker.  Instead of providing reception battalions 
or a slow, easy in-processing phase, the Marine Corps immediately began to tear down and 
discipline trainees.  Mean-tempered sergeants boarded the buses cursing and shouting at their 
new charges, ready to enforce all the rules and make it clear that “our souls belonged to God, but 
our butts belonged to the United States Marine Corps.”113  Huston Wheelock recalls that on his 
arrival at the San Diego Recruit Depot, three guys lit up cigarettes in front of a “no smoking” 
sign.  The Marine cadre threw “them up against the wall and beat the hell out of them right 
there.”114  Anyone still unconvinced that the Marine Corps meant business had a very long eight 
to fourteen weeks ahead of them.115   
Marine Boot Camp followed the same general format as Army basic training and instilled 
many of the same skills.  Just as in the Army, newcomers repeated such mundane tasks as 
policing the barracks and making the bunks while cadre interminably found fault with their 
efforts.  Physical drills, calisthenics, long marches, and bivouacs trimmed down the overweight 
and built up the skinny and scrawny.  The undisciplined learned, often through hard knocks, to 
stand at attention, to address everyone over the rank of private first class as “sir,” and to obey 
orders unquestioningly.  Educational films and lectures informed trainees about the ravages of 
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venereal disease, the proper way to treat minor wounds, and a plethora of other military subjects.  
Boots memorized the General Orders, endured the gas chamber exercise, and demonstrated their 
swimming proficiency.  A few weeks in, trainees began regular trips to the firing range to 
practice their marksmanship with the M-1 rifle and other weapons.116  And, like their Army 
counterparts, Marine trainees looked forward to earning some “free time.”   
But, Marine Corps Boot Camp for all its similarities was not Army training.  Determined 
not only to achieve the highest possible survival rate in battle, but to be the premier branch of the 
Armed Forces, the Marine Corps pushed its trainees, at least its male trainees, to the limit both 
mentally and physically.117  Drill sergeants awakened Boots before dawn to begin days that 
would last sixteen to twenty hours.118  And in those long days, Boots learned to perform with 
perfection or to suffer terrible consequences.  Serious about stamping out individual identity and 
building Marines, cadre unhesitatingly employed corporal punishment.  Men caught smoking 
had to smoke an entire pack of cigarettes with a bucket over their heads.119  Those who failed to 
shave at the ordered intervals found themselves dry shaving while marching and singing the 
Marine Corps Hymn.120  Messing up during a drill could earn one a whack on the head with a 
“swagger stick,” a cut down broomstick.  Freezing during grenade practice might result in a good 
beating administered by the drill instructor.  One trainee caught with three candy bars had to eat 
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them on the spot, wrappers and all.121  Another who coughed up phlegm and spit it out without 
permission had to lick it up off the ground.  Not infrequently, an entire platoon paid for one 
man’s mistake by missing out on recreational time or by drilling longer.122  From the standpoint 
of the cadre, one man’s mistakes in battle could cost the lives or freedom of everyone.123   
Similarly, in war, one simply did not have any recreational time so why should there be 
any at Marine Boot Camp?  Technically, Marine trainees had Sundays off, but in reality the 
pressures of basic training rarely subsided even for a day.  Unsatisfied and overzealous drill 
instructors took free time away in a flash, ordering platoons which had performed poorly during 
the week to drill on Sundays and organizing competitive and compulsory football games and 
boxing matches to fill the day for the others.124  Even treats, like a trip to the movies, could be 
used to teach lessons.  Ralph Cutro remembers that once a week on very cold nights the cadre 
marched recruits to the drive-in to freeze “our tails off” in a sort of cold weather exercise.125  
While brutal, most Marines who served in the Korean War and other wartime eras look back 
upon Boot Camp as instrumental to their survival.  “They taught us everything we needed to 
keep us alive when we went into combat.”126  Some even credit it with “the most amazing 
transition I can ever imagine…much of that training helped all of us involved, both in Korea, and 
life long after.”127 
                                                 
121 Robert B. Campbell, Memoir, (Korean War Educator), 3. 
122 James H. Putnam, Memoir, (Korean War Educator), 5. 
123 While cadre and drill instructors seem to have had great latitude in disciplining their trainees, the Marine Corps 
did on occasion try overzealous trainers for the maltreatment of recruits.  One veteran, Glenn Potts, mentions that 
throughout his basic training the D.I. repeatedly harassed him and refused to allow him to go to sick bay although he 
had been injured in an automobile accident.  That D.I. was later convicted of charges stemming from his 
mistreatment of trainees.  Glenn Potts to Melinda Pash, 5 July 2004, in author’s possession. 
124 James H. Putnam, Memoir, (Korean War Educator), 4. 
125 Ralph Cutro, email to Melinda Pash, 28 February 2006, in author’s possession. 
126 Leonard G. Sewell, Korean War Veteran Survey, 6, CFSOKW. 
127 John “Jack” Orth, Korean War Veteran Survey, 5, CFSOKW. 
 120
Even more than the Army, the Marine Corps regimented the life of its trainees.  Almost 
from arrival, Boots did everything as a group and they did it in a uniform way.128  They got up at 
the same time and made their bunks at the same time in the same way.  When it came time to 
shower, the men lined up, marched to the showerhead as a group, pulled the ring to wet their 
bodies, applied soap in the prescribed order to their various body parts, rinsed, dried, and 
marched back to the bunks.  Trainees went to chow together, trained together, and learned to do 
every task identically throughout their day until they all went to bed at the same appointed time.  
Boots even learned to communicate with one another using approved Marine vocabulary.129  No 
longer did male or female trainees go upstairs or downstairs—they went topside or down below.  
They hit the deck, not the floor, and walls and windows became bulkheads and portholes while 
latrines became heads.  Also, Boots learned that no matter where they were, the rules and 
procedures remained the same.  Whether on base, at the pool, on a train, at the movies, stateside, 
or overseas, the Marine Corps expected Marines and Marine trainees to employ the lessons they 
had been taught and to recognize the chain of command.130  In quick fashion, trainees learned to 
act and be alike and they also learned to respect and rely upon those who had internalized the 
same lessons as themselves.  For many Marines, this lesson stuck with them not only in the heat 
of battle where they acted without ever doubting that their comrades would back them up, but in 
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later life as well.  They, like Norman Weibel, were certain that “I could always count on my 
buddies and they on me.  Response would be instantaneous.”131 
Those who completed Boot Camp felt more than a deep sense of accomplishment.  They 
had watched some of their number wash out, unable to handle the constant pressure, and seen 
others held back by an inability to perform satisfactorily on proficiency tests.  But they had made 
it and these new Marines saw themselves in a new light.  Strict drill instructors and cadre had not 
only prepared them well for whatever duty lay ahead, they had transformed them as individuals.  
“We arrived at boot camp as mere boys, but left there as men.” 132 No prouder day could be 
imagined than graduation where the former trainees finally got to pin the Corps emblem on their 
uniforms, a symbol that they had entered the exclusive world of Marines.  They passed in review 
in front of the camp’s big brass while a Marine Corps band played and friends and family looked 
on.  Whatever else they did in life, Korean War era Marines could reflect on the fact that they 
had accomplished this. 
Marines they might be, but for those destined for wartime duty in Korea, more training 
waited just around the corner.  Unlike the Army which shipped new soldiers straight from six or 
eight weeks of basic to the war zone, the Marine Corps decreed in September 1950 that all 
Marines leaving for Korean duty had to have at least twelve weeks of training.133  Also, by the 
end of the war, all war-bound soldiers had to pass through specially designed programs at Camp 
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Pendleton, California before their embarkation to Korea.  New Boot Camp graduates assigned to 
any of the supporting arms groups, such as artillery or tanks, first entered a Supporting Arms 
Regiment for an additional four weeks of training.  All men at the rank of sergeant or below with 
less than six months in a military occupational specialty (MOS) passed through the Infantry 
Training Regiment for four weeks of infantry training.  All Marines, regardless of length of 
service, joined the Staging Regiment for three weeks of processing, physical and combat 
conditioning, lectures and demonstrations, and intensive cold weather training.134 
At the Staging Regiment, the final stop before heading to the Far East, Marines received 
all of their combat equipment from helmets and rifles to mess kits and canteens.  They updated 
their administrative records, including pay allotments, insurance, wills, emergency data forms, 
and dog tags.  Doctors and dentists performed thorough examinations, making sure cavities got 
filled, shots were up to date, and men met the minimum standards of physical fitness.  “Nothing 
was left to chance, no body part left unexamined.”135  Trainees attended lectures and classes on a 
variety of subjects such as how to live in the field, laying and removing land mines and booby 
traps, and life aboard troop ships.  Experts warned them once again of the dangers of venereal 
disease, producing photos and films that showed “scabbed, deformed, and oozing genitalia.”136  
Officers emphasized the Universal Code of Military Justice, again and again cautioning Marines 
not to do anything that might land them in a naval prison or worse.  Men practiced for war by 
marching, completing obstacle courses, conducting close order drills, throwing live grenades, 
and firing pistols, carbines, and BARs.   
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Perhaps most importantly, especially for those leaving for Korea in winter, Marines at the 
Staging Regiment underwent cold weather training.  While still at camp, they watched films 
demonstrating how to survive the cold and the consequences of improper preparation.  James 
Brady recalls a color film clip in which the surgeon didn’t have to cut off the toes of a frostbite 
victim, “he simply bent them back and they broke off in his surgical glove, all five toes, bloody 
at the stump but otherwise black and dead.”  Brady also remembers the lesson—“Avoid 
this…keep your feet dry, change your socks, and don’t get frostbite.”137  Then the men received 
the latest in military issue winter clothing—long underwear, fur parkas, wool gloves, socks, hats, 
vests, and, by late 1952, rubber thermal boots—along with another demonstration on the use and 
care of their new items.  After such preliminaries, the men were loaded onto Greyhound buses 
for a twelve hour trip to Pickel Meadows, California in the Sierra Nevadas where they would 
spend six days and nights surviving the elements. 
   At Pickel Meadows, the Marines learned many things about surviving in the cold.138  
They built shelters for themselves, melted snow to make water, warmed frozen rations to an 
edible temperature, and came to understand that weapons performed differently at extreme 
temperatures.  After the second day, Marines spent their time hiking through the snow, breaking 
trails, crossing streams, and living out of their packs.  Now sufficiently beaten down by the 
weather, trainees learned that the Marine Corps had another lesson in store for them.  Frostbite or 
hypothermia could kill, but so too could the enemy.  Marines pretending to be Chinese soldiers 
took every opportunity to attack the hapless and exhausted trainees—they pounced in the dead of 
night after men had bedded down, at wayside lunch breaks, and as men stopped to catch their 
                                                 
137 James Brady, The Coldest War:  A Memoir of Korea (New York:  Orion Books, 1990), 7. 
138 Near Sonora Pass, Pickel Meadows proved an ideal training ground for the Korean War.  Mountainous and 
isolated, Pickel Meadows remained frigid almost year round with snow blanketing the landscape.  Daytime 
temperatures ranged from 10-48 degrees, but fell well below zero at night.  Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 9. 
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breath after miles of hiking through the thin air.  Trainees unfortunate enough to be captured did 
not return to some safe, warm holding cell.  Instead, their captors interrogated them all night in 
sign language and Chinese terms.139  Eventually, the exercise ended and the trainees returned to 
Camp Pendleton, but the brutal and realistic experience left its mark on all.  Back at camp, some 
men even had to be treated for frostbite.140  Only now did the Marine Corps deem its men ready, 
after a final parade and a weekend of liberty, to ship out for the real war in Korea.141   
 Marine Corps basic training differed from Army Boot Camp in many ways, but most 
importantly, for the Marines basic truly represented only a single step in a thorough and lengthy 
training process.  In explaining why Marines in prisoner of war camps did not “crack” as often as 
Army soldiers, Colonel Frash emphasized that the Marine Corps did not rely only upon past 
training, but instead continuously trained its troops.  He said, “From the day a man enters the 
Marine Corps he is under training of some sort or another….His officers are constantly under 
training.”142  And the kind of training that Marines received mirrored the situations they would 
face in combat as nearly as possible.  Trainees underwent extreme physical and mental 
challenges with little rest or respite.  Thus, the Corps rarely had occasion to commit “green” or 
under-trained troops to battle or to command positions within the war zone.143  As a result, 
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Marines in Korea could fall back on what they had learned and represent well the Corps that sent 
them. 
 
Navy and Air Force Boot Camp and Basic Training 
 
 Like all branches of the military, the Navy and Air Force used basic training to 
indoctrinate recruits and prepare them for life within the service.144  Trainees learned military 
customs and courtesies, discipline, personal hygiene, pride in unit, rules of conduct, emergency 
first aid, and military insignia.145  Most Boots also got the opportunity to drill and become 
familiar with weaponry, such as the M-1 rifle.146  In general, however, both Navy and Air Force 
basic training focused less on the development of combat skills than on other things.   
 Navy Boot Camp, which lasted 9 to 11 weeks during the Korean War period and took 
place at either Great Lakes, Illinois or San Diego, California, sought to instruct recruits on naval 
history and traditions while familiarizing them with the skills they would need aboard ship or in 
future technical training.147  The Navy provided trainees with a copy of the “Sailor’s Bible,” or 
the Blue Jackets Manual—outlining the duties and requirements of becoming a seaman and 
                                                                                                                                                             
R. Kirkland, “Soldiers and Marines at Chosin Reservoir:  Criteria for Assignment to Combat Command,” Armed 
Forces & Society 22:2 (Winter 1995):  257-274. Even for the Marines, this was not always true.  Especially early in 
the war reservists shipped out with only a couple weeks of refresher training behind them.  See “National Guard and 
Reserve Training” below.   
144 Neither the Navy nor Air Force accepted draftees during the Korean War. 
145 “Report on Training,” December 1955, 35, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A69-22 and 79-6, Box 58, 
DDE Library and Shelburne and Groves, Education in the Armed Forces, 28. 
146 Women in the Navy learned standard military drill, but they did so without rifles.  Rogers, “These Boots Wear 
Skirts,” 1025.  In 1951, women’s recruit training moved to Bainbridge, Maryland where larger facilities were 
available.  Ebbert and Hall, Crossed Currents, 129. 
147 Early in the war, the Navy permanently cut Boot Camp from 14 to 11 weeks.  Heavy enlistments in December 
1950 led to a temporary reduction to 9 weeks.  “Great Lakes ‘Boot’ Training Cut,” New York Times, 7 January 1951, 
64.  Also, “Report on Training,” December 1955, 38, (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A69-22 and 79-6, 
Box 58, DDE Library. 
 126
containing information on ships—and expected them to know it.  Both men and women studied 
naval exploits from John Paul Jones to the Battle of Midway and learned to recognize different 
types of ships and flags.148  They learned about naval organization and the different rates and 
rankings of personnel.  Classroom lectures explained compass directions, semaphore signaling, 
ship navigation, the types and uses of aircraft and weapons, and the contents of the Universal 
Code of Military Justice.  Cadre conducted hands on drills to familiarize trainees with fire 
fighting techniques, damage control, anti-aircraft gunnery, and gas mask usage.149   Male 
enlistees also watched films on the prevention of venereal disease and underwent exercises 
designed to help them survive at sea.  At some point during their training, men jumped into the 
water from twenty or thirty foot towers and then took off their trousers to use them as flotation 
devices.150  Throughout the course, recruits took a number of pop quizzes and exams on the 
material thrown at them, but in the end, everything came down to whether or not one could 
swim.  No matter how well a trainee had done on other things, he or she could not graduate Navy 
basic until passing a swimming proficiency exam, treading water for thirty minutes and 
swimming the length of the pool.151   
 Having separated from the Army, the Air Force revamped its 8 to 13 week basic training 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s.152  Recruits continued to learn military drill and basic military 
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subjects, but new elements became increasingly important.  For women, more formal studies 
replaced long marches, bivouacs, and combat training.  Female trainees attended refresher and 
new courses in advanced mathematics, citizenship, airplane recognition, map reading, first aid, 
personal hygiene, and survival in the tropics or the Arctic.153  Men submitted to an Airman 
Classification Test Battery where information on their educational background, occupation, 
hobbies, and aptitudes was collected and handed over to Career Guidance personnel who then 
assisted the trainee in selecting the best Air Force specialty for him.  Army instruction did not 
completely go away, but it did become so watered down that soon after the Korean War, while 
the Army tried to increase the length of its basic training, the Air Force reduced its Boot Camp to 
six weeks for any recruit selected for technical training.154 
 While Navy and Air Force basic training may have been less physically or emotionally 
demanding than that offered by the Army or Marines, it was still Boot Camp.  Drill instructors 
and cadre told recruits when to eat, sleep, shave, shower, march, and even write home.155  In the 
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Navy, trainees learned not just the proper way to wear their uniforms, but how to fold and 
launder them.  Wet clothing had to hang dry, held in place by “tie ties,” little pieces of string tied 
into square knots with the loose ends tucked out of sight.  Each morning roaming inspectors 
graded the laundry and anyone unfortunate enough to have made mistakes might find his wet 
clothes thrown down on the deck.156  Trainees, in fact, found their every move subject to 
inspection and correction and men or women who did not conform to military standards faced 
punishment.  After getting caught chewing gum, a substance banned because of the possible 
damage to ship decks, Glen Schroeder had to wear the offending piece on his nose.157  One naval 
recruit who refused to shower regularly and wore dirty underwear got ordered to the shower 
where three members of his squad bathed him clothes and all.158  For countless others, minor 
infractions and mistakes resulted in the loss of weekend liberty or the assignment of extra duties 
or physically draining drills.159  As one veteran notes, the cadre may not have used corporal 
punishment, but “it doesn’t mean that they did not inflict pain.”160 
 Also, just as at Army basic training and Marine Boot Camp, Navy and Air Force trainees 
lived in cramped and uncomfortable quarters.  WAVE recruits slept in small cubicles with two 
double-deck bunks and four lockers while WAFs occupied two bed cubicles in barracks of fifty 
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or more women.161  Male Navy trainees often stayed in more typical barracks, but had to stow all 
of their belongings in sea bags and ditty bags that hung from the front of the bunk.162  
Surprisingly, Air Force enlistees could only dream of the luxuries enjoyed by those in other 
branches of the military.  Lackland Air Force Base, the Air Force’s primary basic training 
location, became so overcrowded during the war that rumors of suicides, epidemics, and deaths 
spread, prompting various investigations.  With almost 70,000 recruits crammed into the camp, 
which was built for less than 30,000, the Air Force could only offer tents for housing and the 
training program all but collapsed.  Senators accused the Air Force of greedily snapping up the 
country’s top notch volunteers, who hoped to avoid the draft, and denying the Army of quality 
manpower.  Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson publicly censored the Air Force, prompting further 
studies of the crowded conditions.  Red Cross, Air Force, and other reports eventually 
exonerated the Air Force, finding “no instance of actual hardship,” but countless recruits suffered 
the cold winter rains or hot summer winds in their leaky, rickety tent city.  The Air Force might 
have seemed an easy alternative to Army service, but training conditions at Lackland ranked 
among the worst in the military.163 
 In most cases, what happened at Navy or Air Force Boot Camp stayed at Boot Camp, but 
one offense in particular could haunt recruits for the rest of their lives.  Throughout the 1950s, all 
branches of the military scrutinized trainees for evidence of homosexuality, but the Navy and Air 
Force enforced the military’s anti-gay policy with special vigor.  In a reversal of World War II 
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practices, both began intense indoctrination programs designed to encourage revulsion toward 
homosexuals and impart a willingness to inform on those suspected of being gay.164  At their 
physical exams, future female airmen had to answer a series of questions like, “Do you prefer 
going to parties with all boys or all girls?” and “Have you ever had any feelings for women that 
you think might not be acceptable to other women?”  The Office of Special Investigations 
stalked possible lesbians, opening their mail, questioning them in the middle of the night, and 
interrogating their friends.165  For its part, the Navy treated WAVES to a three part series of 
lectures on the legal, medical, and moral consequences of homosexuality.  Line officers 
explained that women who “branded and disgraced themselves” with homosexuality would 
receive less than honorable discharges and could even be court-martialed.  Medical officers 
debunked the idea that homosexuals “are born and not made” and affirmed that lesbians too 
contracted gonorrhea and syphilis.  Chaplains warned against women alienating themselves from 
God and spirituality through even a single homosexual encounter.166  For men, the anti-gay 
lectures could be even more graphic.  Recruits received explicit advice on how to spot gays, 
reject their advances, and report them to officials.  In 1948, the Navy made a startling connection 
between homicide and homosexuality.  Instructors described “grisly murders” where “sometimes 
the bodies of these victims are horribly mutilated” and noted that the impulse which led to such 
events could usually “be linked to homosexuality.”167  For recruits careless or foolish enough to 
get “outed” at basic training or after, disastrous consequences awaited.  General discharges under 
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less than honorable conditions or dishonorable discharges carried with them more than shame.  
Even if a court-martial did not follow, the recipient of such discharges could lose the right to 
vote, the ability to work in any government or government-affiliated agency, and veterans’ 
benefits.168   
 The men and women who completed Navy or Air Force basic training, not unlike the 
trainees of other branches of the Armed Forces, welcomed graduation day.  Bands and buglers 
heralded the end of Boot Camp rigors as the recruits passed in one final review before beginning 
their new military careers.  Undoubtedly some Boots had mixed feelings as they reflected upon 
their new status, but most felt very proud of their achievement.169  Not only did they possess 
more knowledge, skills, and physical fitness than when they enlisted, but they had survived the 
trials of military training.170  Now, these newly minted servicemen and servicewomen had only 
to be fitted into their respective services, to enter the professions in which they were needed.  
Many would attend advanced training, some would ship out to the war zone, but all would go 
where ordered by Uncle Sam.171   
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National Guard and Reserve Training 
  
As early as the Revolutionary War Americans dreamed of an army of patriots, citizen-
soldiers who would muster in during times of national crisis and then go back to their own lives 
when peace returned.  The balance, though, often proved tricky—men too wedded to civilian 
ways remained difficult to manage and unskilled in the art of war while those too well-trained 
found themselves best suited for the regular military.  Still, in the years after World War II, 
Army planners, scrambling to devise a system which would both allow for a smaller regular 
army and provide the country with adequate military protection, decided to lean heavily on the 
National Guard.  Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and others gambled that Guard units, 
which answered to their respective states rather than to the Army except when federalized, could 
transform “weekend warriors” into a combat-ready M-Day or Mobilization-Day force capable of 
augmenting the Army at a moment’s notice.172  The sudden and unexpected outbreak of the 
Korean War, however, revealed the training and preparation of the Guard unworthy of such a 
burden.  The immediate deployment of Guard troops to Korea or anywhere else simply could not 
take place.  Only months of additional training, including Army basic training, could prepare 
guardsmen for active duty.   
In the mid-1940s, the Army had developed a six year training program for national 
guardsmen, but these plans never reached fruition.  Confronted with the reality of three year 
enlistments, the National Guard halved the length of its training in 1948.  Theoretically, recruits 
would spend one year each on basic soldier skills, beginning specialist training, and advanced 
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skills.173  But, a year of National Guard training throughout the 1940s and 1950s consisted of 
only 96 hours of weekly or biweekly drills and a two week summer camp, a very short time in 
which to produce qualified infantrymen or artillerymen.174   Also, because guardsmen never 
completed basic training of any sort, NCOs and officers not only had to hone the skills of their 
recruits, but to somehow fit lessons on military customs and rules into their schedules.175  
Personnel turnover further intensified this time crunch by ensuring that the thinly stretched 
Guard had to offer separate classes for men of different skill levels.176  Not surprisingly, the 
Guard recruits, who lived at home and trained in their own neighborhoods with friends or even 
relatives, lacked the kind of indoctrination given regular Army draftees or enlistees and remained 
amazingly independent of military life and unprepared for the battlefield.177  By early 1950, an 
Army Field Forces report lamented that “it is doubtful if the training and overall efficiency of the 
Guard will ever reach its desired standards.”178  The press agreed, stating that though guardsmen 
“were called soldiers, they were not soldiers, and, in the true meaning of the word, had never 
expected to be soldiers.”179 
National Guard training before activation for the Korean War might have been 
inadequate, but the fault usually lay with the system itself, with the lack of training time and 
equipment, and not with the NCOs and officers.  By 1950, many of those in charge of educating 
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recruits could claim wartime experience, having served in World War II or even World War I.180   
They knew the demands of battle and tried to impart as many martial skills as possible to their 
men in the time allotted.  On drill nights, guardsmen marched, trained on weapons ranging from 
rifles to 50 caliber machine guns, learned Army regulations and tactics, performed close order 
drills, and practiced the particular specialty of their company—artillery, maintenance, etc.181  
When summer came, they got the opportunity to play soldier for a couple of weeks at camp.  The 
men went on bivouacs where they lived in the field, learned to shave with cold water, and ate c-
rations.  Even here, though, discipline remained much more lax than in the regular Army.  Frank 
Rowan remembers that after being denied a pass, he simply snuck his girlfriend into the camp to 
spend the weekend with him, an action that would not have gone unnoticed or unpunished in 
Army basic training.182  Certainly, these experiences could not replace the basic training given to 
regulars. 
Consequently, when news of war in Korea broke, few guardsmen had been prepared even 
for their traditional role—taking over the stateside training responsibilities left behind by 
deployed reservists—and more than a few seemed surprised to be activated at all.183  Ordered to 
prepare for active duty, National Guard units had much to do.  The ranks had to be filled, no easy 
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activate.  Billy R. Smith, Memoir, (Korean War Educator), 4-5.  Also, Donnelly, Under Army Orders, 64. 
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task given that the draft took its allotment of eligible men and that the Guard could no longer rely 
upon high school student enlistments to pump up the numbers.184  Equipment had to be put in 
order and prepared for shipment to wherever the Army had decided to send the unit.  And, as 
much training as possible had to be squeezed in around administrative paperwork and 
processing.185  Then, the units gathered at the armories to be formally brought under Army 
orders, ready to ship out for further training. 
Before they could be of use to the Army either at home or in the war zone, newly 
activated guardsmen had first to go through basic training.  Like other Army recruits, they left 
home for camps around the country where they marched, fired weapons, passed through obstacle 
courses, and endured bivouacs.  But, the nature of the National Guard made for a different kind 
of basic training experience.  Guardsmen stationed at a camp near home could return to their 
families at night as long as they made it back to training by reveille.  Officers and NCOs 
refrained from much of the usual harassment of trainees and allowed enough free time that the 
men could wile away evenings at the PX or cruise the local bars in search of women.186  More 
importantly, because National Guard units had to put together a unit and not just train individual 
replacements, they had to continue to offer basic training to “fillers” even after original members 
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of the group had completed the course.187  So, at any given time, a National Guard unit might be 
conducting training on all levels from individual basic to regimental drills.  Command of all of 
this complicated training could fall to almost anyone because officers and NCOs continuously 
rotated in and out of the unit while attending various schools.  Arthur Kelly remembers that as a 
second lieutenant he became battery commander by default, saddled with the responsibility of 
conducting basic training, qualifying men for individual weapons, and getting everything ready 
for overseas orders.188  Similarly, at only eighteen years old, George Hubbard, who had been in 
the Army for just six months, began leading men through basic training.189   
Finally, after many months of individual, company, battalion, regimental, and division 
training and numerous proficiency tests, the Army deemed National Guard units ready for duty.  
Some remained stateside to function as training battalions, but the Army ordered many others to 
ship out to Japan or Korea.190  Not surprisingly, guardsmen headed for the Far East felt great 
apprehension about their new assignment, a fear only made deeper by the upheaval that their 
units faced on the eve of departure.  Even while packing equipment and conducting last minute 
drills, some units actually had to find replacements to bring them up to strength.  Levies taken by 
the Army to sustain divisions already in Korea drained off hundreds of members while Army 
                                                 
187 National Guard units often conducted basic training until their overseas departures.  As manpower needs in Korea 
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policies requiring fourteen weeks of basic for overseas duty disqualified some of the men on 
hand.191  Despite having enlisted in part to go with the men they knew, many guardsmen found 
as they boarded the troopship that they would instead be going alone.  Still, many felt proud that 
the Army had chosen to send them.192  When relatives of men in the Oklahoma Thunderbird 
Division staged a protest against the division’s overseas assignment, bombarding state and 
federal congressmen with letters demanding that the 45th not be sent to Japan or Korea, members 
home on leave discouraged such activities and put an end to the movement.193  Most guardsmen 
simply felt that they would rather deal with the communist problem at hand than leave it to 
become a larger problem for their children to solve and echoed seventeen year old Private First 
Class Joseph Popolo who said, “What comes, will come.  We are all ready to go if called.”194  
For National Guard troops, training often did not end with arrival in the war theater.  
Units in Japan and Korea continued to train, either completing drills that had been left unfinished 
or applying lessons from the situation at hand as they now understood it, before actually entering 
the conflict.195  Even so, regulars continued to eye guardsmen suspiciously and to believe them 
inadequate and poorly trained.196  Whether that was true in general or not, guardsmen did possess 
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varied and uneven levels of training, leading many after the war to conclude that before entering 
the Guard men should have to complete Army basic.197  Much as their militia forebears had to 
do, Korean War national guardsmen all too often learned their new trade “the hard way on the 
battlefield.”198    
 Like their brethren in the National Guard, members of the Reserves, especially the 
inactive Reserves, greeted the Korean War with gloomy unpreparedness.199  Although the post-
World War II Navy conducted Boot Camp for its reserve recruits, other branches of the military 
not infrequently allowed weekly meetings and summer camps to suffice for training.200  Worse 
still, some units, pressured to recruit and retain enlistees, made even this trivial amount of 
training voluntary.  In Evansville, Indiana, where high school coaches recruited a number of 
teenage athletes for Marine Corps Reserve service, reservists did not have to attend a single 
meeting or summer camp in order to maintain their reserve status.201  Additionally, in times of 
peace, reservists could quit any time they chose.202  As a result, training cadre could not afford to 
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make training too strenuous or meetings too dull.  Instead, Reserve get-togethers emphasized fun 
and games, leaving new recruits completely uninformed and unprepared for the possibility of 
actual combat.  Veterans too suffered from this lack of vigorous training as any skills they had 
acquired during active duty faded away through years of tepid or nonexistent drilling.203  Thus on 
the eve of the Korean Conflict the ready-to-go Reserves, like the National Guard, stood in dire 
need of time to train its members. 
Unfortunately, reservists stood next in line behind the tattered and understrength regular 
military to enter the Korean battleground.  All too quickly conditions grew grim along the Pusan 
Perimeter and the military had no choice but to call on the Reserves to deploy as replacements 
regardless of whether or not they had received adequate training.  Fresh faced high school and 
weathered veteran reservists alike found their fates suddenly sealed.204  In short order, they 
shuttled to military hubs, often located on the coast to allow for quicker deployment, for a couple 
of weeks of refresher training and then boarded Japan or Korea-bound ships or airplanes.205  
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Official policies called for underage or under-trained recruits to be removed from combat duty, 
but the drive for expediency sometimes meant that such rules got overlooked.206  One 
commander promised his teenage charge “all the boot camp you want” after returning from 
Korea.207  Another reservist notes that after serving at Inchon, Seoul, Chosin Reservoir, and the 
Guerilla Sweep the military advised him that his turn had come for basic training.208  Pat Burris 
recalls that a couple members of his Marine Corps squad enlisted after the war began and had to 
be taught how to handle their weapons while on the troopship.209  The Air Force sent “qualified” 
pilots, but many had not flown since World War II and a three week refresher could not prepare 
them for all that had changed since then.  Most reservists had been trained on propeller planes, 
not jets, and few had experience with the type of formation flying now deemed essential.210  
Reservists simply had to learn while on the job and in the war.  No wonder that many felt 
unprepared for war and that regulars frowned upon having to serve with reservists.211  But, as 
Martin Chamberlain, commander of the Seattle Organized Naval Reserves Number 1, declared, 
“Anyone who joins a reserve unit by that action has told Uncle Sam he’s willing to go.”212 
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In general, however grudgingly, most reservists during the Korean War accepted their 
assignments.  Infantrymen, some of whom had held a gun for the first time on their way to 
Korea, humped from village to village and battle to battle.  Seamen left their wives and children 
for months or years to ferry soldiers back and forth between the war and home or to cart supplies 
to the troops.  Pilots qualified on propeller aircraft learned through trial and error to fly jets over 
the Asian hills.213  But, some backlash from reservists did occur during the war.  Air Force pilots, 
frustrated that an inordinate number of reservists were being sent to Korea while regulars 
remained stateside, grumbled that “the regulars are policemen, so let them fight the police 
action.”214  Some attempted to evade duty by claiming a newly developed fear of flying or by 
trying to resign.  Finally, in April 1952, six flying officers training at Randolph Air Force Base 
staged a “stay-down” strike in part to protest the use of reservists in the Korean War.215  Well 
aware of both the inequities of the reserve call-up system and the problematic nature of reserve 
training, the House of Representatives introduced a new Armed Forces Reserve Bill in mid-1951.  
The bill provided among other things for reservists to be classified as either “ready” or 
“standby,” depending upon how much time had passed since basic training and/or active duty.216  
The bill came too late, however, to be of any use to the thousands of reservists uprooted from 
civilian life and sent to Korea with little regard for the current status of their training.  They 
would simply have to learn whatever else they needed to know when they arrived in the war 
zone or die trying. 
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Training Oversights and Distractions 
 
 As days of war spun into years in the Korean hills, pitting American troops against both 
North Koreans and Chinese “volunteers,” all branches of the Armed Forces stepped up efforts to 
make troop training tougher and more realistic.  The Army especially turned away from “spit and 
polish” to focus instead on the mechanics of combat.217  These revamped programs did manage 
to give recruits and draftees a more realistic foretaste of battle, but in a major training oversight 
the military failed to help trainees understand just exactly why they had been called to learn 
military skills at all and why they might have to fight in Korea.  As a result, even after arriving in 
the war zone, soldiers bitterly questioned their assignment, complaining “I’ll fight for my 
country, but damned if I see why I’m fighting to save this hell hole.”218  By the time Matthew 
Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army in Korea in late December 1950, the new had 
completely worn off the war and he discovered that rallying the troops would have to wait until 
after he explained why their mission mattered and how it related to the homespun values of 
freedom and democracy.219     
 While the military rested easy in its authority to train men and order them to whatever 
post seemed most appropriate without explanation or apology, such cavalier treatment did 
nothing for the morale of those being sent to fight in a war far from home and in fact disregarded 
the very nature of the American fighting man.  The crusade-like nature of World War II’s total 
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mobilization perhaps left the Armed Forces with amnesia, allowing them to forget that unlike the 
forces of many countries, American troops, pulled from the ranks of the citizenry, needed a cause 
to believe in before making what could turn out to be a total sacrifice.220  As early as the 
Revolutionary War, Baron von Steuben had written in explanation of Americans “You say to [a 
Prussian, French, or Austrian soldier], ‘Do this,’ and he doeth it.  But I am obliged to say [to an 
American soldier], ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that,’ and then he does it.”221  In the 
intervening century and a half, not much had changed and while Americans might have enlisted 
out of patriotism, vague notions of devotion to country could give only cold comfort to men 
caught in a “limited” but still very hot war.  If they were to serve and fight effectively overseas, 
Marines, Army infantrymen, pilots, and even sailors needed something more concrete to sustain 
and encourage them else their only focus would be on the day they could rotate home.222   
 A little under a year into the war, the Department of Defense introduced a new 
citizenship education program designed to impart servicemen in the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
with a better understanding of that for which they would be fighting.223  Developed by the 
Teachers’ College of Columbia, “Hours of Freedom” consisted of one hour sessions, each 
dealing with a basic concept of democracy.  Through lecture, discussion, debate, and 
dramatization, men would learn the value of an individual in free society, the differences 
between democracy and communism, people’s role in government, and presumably the 
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importance of American involvement in a place as seemingly small and insignificant as Korea.224  
Unfortunately, the new program debuted at Boot Camp, where young trainees crowded into 
classrooms too tired or bored to concentrate on the material at hand.  Also, not infrequently, 
those in charge of educating the men had little knowledge or experience themselves and no time 
to prepare.225  In the end, men continued to filter into Korea throughout the war with almost no 
information on why they had been sent, a poor recipe for combat effectiveness no matter how 
complete other training had been.226 
 Men might have had few thoughts on democracy while at training or on the way to war, 
but they often thought about home and family.  The military certainly attempted to make training 
all-consuming, but for many of those who would serve during the Korean War financial hardship 
and the problems faced by their families as a result of their military status became real 
distractions.  During World War II, Congress created a system of family allowances to eliminate 
dependency as a cause for automatic exemption, but such legislation, deemed too costly, had 
lapsed by the Korean War.227  As reservists and draftees mustered in, leaving civilian jobs and 
pay behind, they found it next to impossible to support themselves much less their families on 
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the $75 or $85 a month that the military paid them.  Despite the 1940 Soldiers’ and Sailors’ 
Relief Act, which offered protection against the loss of a home should a man be called to active 
duty, servicemen watched helplessly as creditors foreclosed on their houses and repossessed their 
belongings leaving wives and children to move in with relatives or fend for themselves.228  Such 
was the case with Jim Kasler, Donald Sipes, and Robert Gates.  Kasler, an Air Force lieutenant, 
made so little money even with his flying allotment that his wife and daughter had to move in 
with his parents.229  Sipes’ wife, left with a one year old and only $20 in her pocket when her 
Marine Corps reservist husband left for active duty, struggled with the thought that a sewing 
machine bought on time would soon be repossessed and that a home they had purchased could 
no longer be afforded but was also in no shape to rent or sell.230  Similarly, Barbara Gates, 
mother of two small children, agonized that not only did they lose the home they were 
purchasing with a G.I. loan when her husband left, but “they took the furniture, too.”231  How 
could servicemen focus on preparing to fight for their country when they were losing their very 
hearths and homes in the process? 
 By August 1950, the realization that America’s men at arms desperately needed financial 
assistance had become widespread.  Some states and localities responded quickly, offering cash 
or other benefits to the dependents of men sent to training or shipped overseas.  Washington 
State began to provide assistance to military wives with minor children through Welfare’s Aid to 
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Dependent Children program, convincing federal authorities to match funding.232  On the 
national level, President Harry Truman appealed to Congress to make benefit payments to 
military dependents and both the House and Senate debated various proposals.233  Ultimately, 
federal payments from the government to families of the lowest ranks of enlisted men found 
approval, but servicemen also had to chip in, sending money from their pay home.234  These 
allowances relieved some of the pressure felt by servicemen, but as late as 1952 the Senate 
sought a three percent raise for enlisted men and junior officers who continued to have difficulty 
supporting their families.235   
Largely because of the social climate of the 1950s which stressed the American male’s 
role as provider, servicewomen rarely benefited from legislation designed to assist service 
families.  Although paid more equitably in the military than in other sectors of the economy, 
female members of the Armed Forces found it almost impossible to qualify for the same 
allowances being handed out to the military dependents of men.  The government automatically 
allotted support to the wives, children, and even parents of male service members, but gave 
nothing to the husbands or dependent parents of servicewomen.236  In order to receive dependent 
benefits for their families, female service members had to prove that they contributed at least half 
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the support of their loved ones.  Not until the 1970s would this discriminatory application of 
military allotments be challenged.237   
Given quarters pay and other perks, officers usually had less cause to worry about money 
than the average G.I., but those headed to the battlefront sometimes had good reason to wonder 
whether they remained too “green” for war.  Many avenues existed for becoming a 
commissioned officer, not all of which provided a solid military education.  The United States 
Military Academy at West Point and other service schools as well as OCS proved rigorous and 
exacting, an excellent preparation for Korea or anywhere else a soldier might end up, but 
R.O.T.C. and other programs could at times be less so.  Also, even if an R.O.T.C. program 
challenged its members, they might not enter the regular service until much later.  One second 
lieutenant stationed in Japan by mid-1950 reflected that he had “experienced not a single day of 
active duty or training since the ROTC days at Purdue in 1948” and had been sworn in as a 
regular Army officer simply on the basis of having completed a graduate degree.238  Such 
officers could only turn to their outfit’s seasoned NCOs for help and hope that they learned fast 
enough to lead their men in war. 
Doctors and other specialists could get rank with even less military instruction.  Hank 
Litvin enlisted in a Navy program for doctors which gave ensign’s pay in return for two years of 
Navy service after residency.  Before he could go through Boot Camp or receive any training or 
indoctrination at all, Litvin ended up at Inchon where a supply clerk issued him a rifle and the 
unsought and unwanted opportunity for on-the-job training.239  More fortunate medical personnel 
did attend a short basic training before shipping overseas, but that did not mean that the military 
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had prepared them for all of their new duties.240  Many doctors and nurses arrived at MASH units 
or hospital ships with little knowledge of field medicine, surprised to find that their particular 
specialty mattered far less than the ability to learn fast and fill in where needed.241  In Korea, 
general practitioners became anesthesiologists or VD officers and surgeons operated literally by 
the book, performing procedures that they had never even seen done.242  Unfortunately for both 
the Armed Forces and the young soldiers counting on military doctors to piece them together 
again, the rotation system left doctors in the war zone for only about a year.  By the time a doctor 
became really useful, the military replaced him with an untrained and unskilled newcomer.   
Throughout the Korean Conflict, all branches of the military did what the government 
expected by churning out enough servicemen and servicewomen to alleviate the manpower 
shortage and keep the war effort alive.  To accomplish this, however, the Armed Forces all too 
often trained officers and enlisted men with haste, heedless of the fundamental needs of trainees.  
Soldiers would fight simply to avoid being killed, officers would lead despite inexperience, and 
doctors would try to save lives without knowledge of combat medicine, but shortcuts in training 
left many American troops less motivated and effective than they could have been.  Asked to 
make their lives forfeit, to leave their families behind come what may, those sent to Korea 
deserved to be trained not adequately, but well, and their sacrifices warranted an explanation of 
why their mission mattered. 
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Beyond the Mechanics of Warfare:  Training and Race 
 
 From the standpoint of the United States Armed Forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
military training existed only to create competent service members, not to alter prevailing 
societal attitudes or to effect social change.  Thus when President Truman issued Executive 
Order 9981 in 1948, requiring an end to racial discrimination in the military, most of the services 
responded glacially, refusing to integrate anything, much less their training camps.  Led by 
Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall and Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, the Army argued 
that segregation did not constitute discrimination and need not be ended.243  Following suit, the 
Marine Corps and Navy refused to mix white and black troops.244  Only the Air Force, led by 
Stuart Symington, accepted the order and quickly began to phase out all-black units and end 
racial preference as a factor in personnel policies.245  But, by the end of 1950, domestic political 
pressures and then manpower needs in Korea eroded resistance to desegregation and all branches 
of the service started to integrate at least basic training.246  Born primarily of military necessity, 
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changes in the racial composition of troops at Boot Camp or other training sites had little effect 
on military infrastructure, but did greatly impact individual troops.  Suddenly and intimately 
exposed to persons of other races, trainees learned lessons that went well beyond the mere 
mechanics of warfare. 
 For all its trappings of a modern industrial country—large cities, a proliferation of 
factories and businesses, a visible and active scientific community—America in 1950 remained 
astonishingly parochial.  Individuals and families, of course, had moved around both during and 
after the Second World War, but most Americans still knew little about people and places 
beyond their own street corners and neighborhoods.  Except perhaps in larger metropolitan areas 
where the fabled melting pot more closely resembled real life, people drew lines to keep 
themselves separate from those who looked or seemed different from themselves.  In particular, 
and most especially in the South, racial separation maintained a not quite invisible and almost 
unbridgeable chasm between white citizens and others.  Thus when men and women followed 
the beat of Uncle Sam’s drum to newly integrating training centers during the Korean War, they 
could only guess at what life would be like shared with people from the other side of the line. 
 Carefully packed among the toothbrushes, underwear, and other personal possessions, 
most recruits and trainees carried with them to training camp their own ideas about Americans of 
other colors.  White troops often took for granted that African Americans would be dirty, foul-
mouthed, lacking in self-control, and untrustworthy in combat.247  And, the stereotypes did not 
always end there.  Asked in 1950 how he felt about integration, one twenty year old private 
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replied that blacks were human but shouldn’t be mixed with white soldiers because “some of 
them, the bestest [sic] percent, are still like Head Hunters.  They have bad blood, some of them 
are like animals.”248  A few whites did voice the opinion that the “Negro soldier has the right to 
rate the same as any other man no matter what,” but a greater number resented the very idea of 
sharing sleeping quarters or a mess hall with blacks.249  For their part, African Americans often 
entered service with the notion that no matter how well they performed white comrades and 
superiors would never give them the credit they deserved.  For others, especially those who had 
experienced Jim Crow first hand, negative feelings ran deeper and some freely admitted “I hate 
white people.”250 
 Entering the Armed Forces did not automatically erase trainees’ personal biases on the 
issue of race, but in general Boot Camp and other training centers offered little opportunity for 
men or women to act upon such prejudices.  Regardless of what one might have preferred, from 
the moment of swearing in recruits and inductees had no alternative but to do things the military 
way—even if that meant bunking, eating, or sweating with someone of a different color.  And, as 
the process of turning civilians into “Government Issue” continued, new habits and ideas began 
to supplant those so carefully brought along by trainees from home.251  As black and white 
soldiers shared tents, meals, conversation, and the rigors of training, they discovered a multitude 
of similarities and often developed not only a new tolerance for one another, but also interracial 
friendships.252  White trainees, at first resentful of being placed in interracial outfits or barracks, 
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came out of the experience averring that “now some of my best friends are of the Negro race.  I 
can see no reason at all why colored and white cannot get along together in the Army.”253  Some 
concluded that it “is all in your mind….If you can live with whites you can live with most 
colored.”254  Even national guardsmen “changed my thinking… [blacks are] just the same as we 
are.”255  As Charles Moskos noted, “The thickness of a man’s lips is not a factor if he offers you 
a drink from his canteen in the Texas desert.”256  African Americans underwent a similar 
transformation in racial attitudes.  The enlisted man who hated white people went on to say that 
“if all white people were like the boys in this company it wouldn’t take long before everybody 
would get along well.”257 Indeed, Southerners marveled at “the amiability of the white and 
colored here [on the military reservation].”258  As servicemen and servicewomen of different 
colors trained and spent time together, they became more accepting of individual comrades and 
more positive about desegregating the military as a whole.259   
 Racially mixed training also produced troops more favorable toward integration in 
general.  Having spent a good deal of time at basic training getting used to the idea of associating 
freely with soldiers of many colors and nationalities, men and women, both black and white, who 
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ended up at southern duty stations found themselves indignant at the existing inequalities of Jim 
Crow communities.  Suddenly it seemed strange to them that bus stations, airports, movie 
theaters, and even municipal buildings had “white only” and “colored only” water fountains, 
restrooms, entrances, and sections.  They resented the local customs and laws which prevented 
friends who dined and drank together on post from sitting together on the bus to town and from 
frequenting the same bars or restaurants once there.  While the various services accepted the 
segregation and discrimination just outside their gates, troops who through integrated training 
had been taught to judge worth by character rather than color sometimes had trouble leading this 
double life.  Some argued that the South, like the Army, should simply be integrated, that after a 
time people there “would accept the American Negro as an individual who is only reaping the 
benefits of those rights due him under the Constitution of the United States.”260  Others took a 
more active approach.  In San Antonio, white servicemen ordered food for their black buddy 
who by prearrangement was to join them at a white restaurant.261  Lieutenant Thomas Williams, 
a pilot in training at Craig Air Force Base, refused to sit in the colored section of a bus traveling 
from Florida to Alabama, stating that he did not feel obligated to obey laws which were 
unconstitutional.262  Gilbert Branche, sent to Biloxi, Mississippi by the Air Force, ignored a shoe 
store clerk when told not to try on any shoes because white folks would not buy anything tried on 
by a black man.263  In Columbus, Georgia, men headed to and returning from Korea rioted in 
response to police brutality toward black soldiers and the beating of a uniformed African 
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American by white policemen at a night club.264  Throughout the Korean War era, incidents like 
these proved few and insignificant—acts of civil disobedience belonging more to a later 
generation—but they clearly illustrate the changing viewpoints of men and women trained in 
integrated settings.  Boot Camp did not necessarily educate trainees to become social radicals, 
but the close contact it provided between the races did chip away at stereotypes and foster 
expectations of a more integrated world.265 
 Certainly not all of those who went through mixed training altered their original ideas 
about people of a different color.  Moreover, even within the military integration faced 
difficulties.  As late as 1951, at least one Army base, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had yet to 
implement anything other than token integration and at other locations tensions between black 
and white troops actually erupted in violence.266  Additionally, even if trainees accepted a more 
racially diverse corps, officers and noncoms sometimes resisted the changes ordered from above.  
One Army Division Commander when asked about integration replied that “It’s God’s law of the 
fish in the sea, the birds in the air, the animals on land.  You don’t mix them.”267  In Fort 
Jackson, South Carolina, two white sergeants brutally beat an eighteen year old black private and 
at Camp Atterbury officials allowed the 31st Infantry (Dixie) Division Military Band to wear 
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gray uniforms reminiscent of Confederate attire.268  Sent to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri for 
Boot Camp, Stanley Stone wrote his mother that the Army discriminated against blacks by 
forbidding them to go into any of the nearby towns and that “we are being trained by some 
Negro hating white officers who are Southern bred…we are cursed at and berated and the 
Southern Negroes here are afraid to move.”269  Leadership and circumstance could make all the 
difference in how men who trained together felt about each other. 
To its credit, though, the military did try to prevent such racial incidents and uphold its 
commitment to institutional integration and equality of service.  On posts throughout the country, 
PXs, movie theaters, and even swimming pools ceased to operate on a segregated basis.  Men 
and women who worked together during the day found themselves able to socialize on their own 
time as well.  Troops did not always take advantage of this opportunity.  On some reservations, 
blacks and whites informally divided up recreational facilities or limited their use to service 
members, especially if the potential existed for men and women to come into close contact.  
Often clubs became segregated on dance nights or sponsors enforced the unwritten rule that men 
would dance only with partners of their own color.270  Whatever impact integrated training had 
on the racial attitudes of trainees, it seldom prepared them for unbridled social integration.  The 
most liberal might espouse equality yet still affirm “I don’t think they should marry one 
another…but that’s all.”271   
For African Americans, mixed training in the 1950s sent mixed messages.  On the one 
hand, from the moment of swearing in black men and women could expect to be treated just as 
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any other recruit or draftee, a rare luxury in an America still divided by color.  They would 
proceed to processing, be issued clothing, enter basic training, and eventually receive an 
assignment based on their skills and performance.272  With few ratings now restricted, blacks 
could even move into positions where they gave orders to whites—a situation deemed “nothing 
less than a miracle” by veteran Reuben Carter.273  But, after being trained alongside whites, 
African Americans could then find themselves assigned to all black units.274  Throughout the 
Korean War, the Army maintained segregated units and even re-segregated some units.275  Also, 
both during and after training, African Americans learned that military protections ended the 
moment they stepped off the base.  All branches of the military demanded that service members 
bow to sectional customs, including segregation, or face the consequences alone.  Commanding 
officers in the South passed out maps of local communities showing black troops which 
neighborhoods, streets, and sections of town they could go to and warning that anyone breaking 
the rules would be at the mercy of the local police.276  Townspeople in some places bragged that 
“When the colored [soldiers] come to town, they conform to the way we do things.”277  Taking a 
lassiez-faire approach to relations between nearby communities and uniformed blacks, the 
military even declined to intervene when locals clearly mistreated soldiers off post.  In 
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Columbus, Georgia, police routinely terrorized black servicemen, beating them, taking their 
money, jailing and fining them, and warning them to stay out of town—and yet the Army did 
nothing.278  At a Greyhound Bus terminal in Memphis, Tennessee, policemen beat Corporal 
Jonathan Thomas on the head with a nightstick when he answered “Yeah” instead of “Yes Sir” 
when they asked if he had a ticket.279  White townspeople forced Sergeant Herbert Bradshaw 
from his car at gunpoint in Brownsville, Tennessee, dragged him to a building, and had a civilian 
beat him with a pop bottle as four police officers looked on.  Tellingly, protests of Bradshaw’s 
treatment came not from the military but from the NAACP.280  Southern military installations 
might themselves have been perfect examples of integration and racial harmony, but during the 
Korean War era, the Armed Forces did little to ensure fair treatment to its members off post.281  
Integrated training and service instilled many African Americans with a new pride and sense of 
worth, but the realization that their equality—even from the military standpoint—ended at the 
reservation gates left them bitterly aware that in the real world they remained simply black. 
The military had only one goal when conducting training, to produce more effective 
infantrymen, sailors, and airmen.  But, the very nature of the process, tearing down civilian 
identities and rebuilding individuals, left men and women more open to new ideas and 
experiences.  When boot camps and basic training integrated in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the Armed Forces merely saw the development as an easy way to boost efficiency, but for the 
tens of thousands of recruits of all colors who learned to live together it became a mild 
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revolution.  Perhaps unintentionally the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines imparted a new 
attitude toward racial equality along with weapons training and close order drills.  Not all 
servicemen and servicewomen took the lesson to heart, but along with battlefield experiences, 
mixed training influenced many who returned to civilian life to envision a less monochromatic 
future for America. 
 
Ready for Duty 
 
 The weeks or months of training may have seemed to last forever, but for every soldier, 
sailor, airman, and Marine the time eventually came to report for duty.  Most hoped for a lucky 
break—stateside orders to keep them safe and sound or perhaps assignment to some European 
post where they could see the world and while away the time owed to Uncle Sam.  War in Korea, 
though, meant that many of those completing basic or advanced training in the early 1950s began 
their military adventure aboard a crowded troopship bound for the Far East.   
 Men destined for Japan or Korea usually had only days to prepare for departure and much 
to do.282  All civilian clothing and personal effects except for handheld musical instruments, 
radios, or cameras had to be sent home.  Since cars could not be driven to the point of 
embarkation, they too had to be sold or stored.283  Medical and dental records had to be updated 
and farewells had to be said.284  Some men hurried home for a few days with family or friends or 
                                                 
282 GIs usually received a two week “delay en route” before having to arrive at a new duty station.  
283 “Most of 45th to Get Leave Before Sailing,” Daily Oklahoman, 27 February 1951, 1. 
284 Men leaving from Schofield Barracks remember that time was so short that dentists simply pulled teeth instead of 
filling cavities.  See Irwin Cockett in Baldovi, ed., Foxhole View, 8. 
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to marry their sweethearts before shipping out.285  A few attended parades given in their honor 
by hometown folks.286  Still others made the most of the freedom they had left by hitting bars 
and clubs and forgetting for a moment what lay ahead.  Then, just as they had before basic 
training, men piled into buses, trains, and “cattle cars,” this time on their way to the piers at San 
Diego or Seattle.287   
For the first time in a long time, the men could relax and reflect upon where they had 
come from and where they were headed.  Thoughts of home like freight cars hooked to an 
overnight express sped through their minds as did a million questions.  Would home be as sweet 
when they returned in a year or two—if they returned at all?  Would other neighborhood kids 
grow up and join the Army?  Why had they been chosen to serve when many others had 
successfully defied the draft?  What would it be like to live or maybe die so far away from 
remembered streets and familiar faces?  Had the military already changed them?  The answers 
could only come later and for some they would not come at all. 
Eventually those slated for overseas service reached the docks.  As they boarded the 
ships, crowds cheered them and bands played in their honor.  Sometimes officers addressed the 
moving sea of olive drab.  “God bless you, soldiers.  You are the best-fed, best-equipped, and 
best informed army in the world.  Complete your mission and we will be here to welcome you 
                                                 
285 Just as during World War II, the Korean War served to hurry nuptials.  Feeling that their time was short, couples 
quickly tied the knot before men shipped overseas.  Jessica Weiss, To Have and To Hold:  Marriage, the Baby 
Boom, and Social Change (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2000), 22.  For a personal account, see Martin 
Pestana in Baldovi, ed.  A Foxhole View, 10. 
286 This was especially true for National Guard troops whose home communities frequently gave them a huge and 
emotional send-off.  When Oklahoma’s 45th Division got overseas orders, locals put on an hour long parade 
complete with an address by the Governor who assured those in attendance that “I felt a feeling of pride to see these 
fine men march by…you feel that way when you see your own men going away…and I’m not afraid for the future 
of this country when I look into their faces…I’m proud.”  “Marching Boots Crunch 45th Farewell,” Daily 
Oklahoman, 27 March 1951, 1. 
287 The Marine Corps used “cattle cars” to transport men from the Staging Regiment at Camp Pendleton to the Navy 
Pier in San Diego.  These were semi-trailers with wooden benches along each side and down the middle.  Each 
carried about 45 men with packs and rifles.  Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 12. 
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home.”288  Then, troopships pulled out of the harbor with courses set for the land of morning 
calm and men standing on the decks waving goodbye and wondering if they would ever see 
home again. 
Even for men accustomed to military life, troopships offered some nasty surprises.  
Living quarters consisted of bunks stacked four or five deep floor to ceiling and about eighteen 
inches apart.  The narrow aisles soon became cluttered with seabags, field packs, and weapons.  
Helmets, though, proved in short supply.  Men unused to sailing soon became violently seasick, 
vomiting into whatever they had handy.  For days, the latrines remained occupied with helplessly 
sick soldiers.  At the mess hall, which consisted of rows of waist-high counters that men stood at 
while eating, the floor became a gross mixture of spilled food, water, trays, and vomit.  Weather 
permitting, men stayed on deck to avoid the putrid smells and sights of the ship.289   
Most men eventually developed sea legs on the two to three week journey, but they still 
looked forward to dry land, no matter if that put them closer to the war.  Upon arriving in Japan 
or Korea, everyone rushed to the deck to catch a glimpse of the Asiatic landscape.  Soldiers 
gaped in awe at the rugged beauty before them.  “Its [Korea’s] mountains and trees seemed to 
come right down to the water’s edge.  Of course, if we had any inkling the hell that was awaiting 
us there we might not have thought it so beautiful.”290  Soldiers prepared to disembark.  The time 
had come to put their military training to the test.   
                                                 
288 Wolfe, Cold Ground’s Been My Bed, 73. 
289 Many personal accounts go into great detail about life aboard the troopship.  See Bernstein, Monsters and Angels, 
217-249; Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 12-14; and George Tsegletos, As I Recall:  A Marine’s Personal Story 
(Bloomington, IN:  1st Books, 2003), 2-3. 
290 Harold Mulhausen and James Edwin Alexander, Korea:  Memoirs of a U.S. Marine (Oklahoma City:  Macedon 
Publishing Company, 1995), 14. 
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CHAPTER 4:  IN COUNTRY IN KOREA—A WAR LIKE ANY OTHER? 
 
“Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that they had forgotten; you may fly over a land forever; you 
may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and 
keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young 
men in the mud.”—T. R. Fehrenbach.1 
 
“I keep asking myself what I am doing here.  The funny thing is I can’t answer my own question.”— 19 year 
old corporal in Korea.2 
 
“They may call this a police action, but men are loseing there [sic] lives the same as in the last war.  We are 
fighting here for the freedom of the people, the same as in World War II.  Why are we any different from the 
‘G.I.’ of the last war?”—Letter to Senator Robert A. Taft from men on the line.3 
 
“I have one request.  If I don’t survive, please don’t leave me to rot in Korea.  When the Army permits, let me 
come home to rest.”—Sergeant Robert Jamieson in a letter home.4 
 
“My memories aren’t of gallantry or brave deeds that won a battle, but they do represent a good number of 
guys who did their assigned duties and performed much-needed services during the Korean War.”—Korean 
War veteran.5 
 
“My war was one of long periods of boredom with a few flashes of intense terror.  I returned safe and sound 
to a nation that did not seem to know I had ever been gone.”—Korean War veteran.6 
 
With memories of World War II still playing in their heads, newspaper reporters 
canvassed Korea throughout the Korean War in search of “human interest” stories for hometown 
readers.  No doubt they hoped and expected to find troops filled with the same patriotic spirit and 
singleness of purpose as in the last war, but the tired and ragged young soldiers they encountered 
simply could not supply the pithy anecdotes that would have made such good reading back in 
Gainesville, Texas or Old Forge, Pennsylvania.  Arriving in country, servicemen, and, in the case 
of military nurses assigned to the war theater, servicewomen, often took a dim view of the land 
                                                 
1 T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War:  A Study in Unpreparedness (New York:  Macmillan, 1963), 3. 
2 Quoted in Richard J. H. Johnston, “G.I.’s in Korea Handicapped by Unawareness of Mission,” New York Times, 13 
August 1950, 1. 
3 See Sergeant Edward W. Moffett, Sergeant First Class William H. Bloss, and Sergeant Wade H. Beans  to Senator 
Robert A. Taft, 15 May 1951, Papers of Robert A. Taft, Sr., Box 1077, Library of Congress.  (Hereafter Taft Papers, 
LOC) 
4 Sergeant Robert Jamieson, Letter home, 29 July 1950, quoted in Louis Baldovi, ed., A Foxhole View:  Personal 
Accounts of Hawaii’s Korean War Veterans (Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 29. 
5 B. A. “Gus” Wentz, quoted in Linda Granfield, I Remember Korea:  Veterans Tell Their Stories of the Korean 
War, 1950-1953 (New York:  Clarion Books, 2003), 20. 
6 Arnoldo A. Muniz, quoted in Granfield, I Remember Korea, 33-35. 
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Uncle Sam had called them to defend.  Few had ever seen such poverty.  Here existed a place 
where to own a shovel made a person rich, where orphaned children survived by eating garbage, 
and where the stench of human waste permeated every breath.7  Even those most sympathetic to 
the Korean people had to wonder what such a place could be worth.  Not surprisingly, then, 
when asked what they were fighting for, troops seldom mustered the bravado for the kinds of 
answers journalists wanted to hear.  Instead they insisted “I’ll fight for my country, but damned 
if I see why I’m fighting to save this hell hole” or “I’m here because the goddam president of the 
United States would put me in jail if I didn’t report for duty.”8  They asked themselves over and 
over, “What the hell am I doing here?  Why should I be fighting for this stinkin’ rice paddy?”9  
And, like one nineteen year old corporal who found himself in Korea during the early months of 
the war, too many of those in the war zone discovered that “I can’t answer my own question.”10 
Hastily pulled from civilian life, with its baseball games and high school dances, or from 
the somewhat sedentary peacetime American military, the men and women stuck at ground view 
during the Korean War can be forgiven for not immediately understanding the reasons for their 
sacrifices or the forces which swept them to that remote corner of Asia.  An abbreviated, limited, 
half-won, seldom remembered conflict, Americans today, more than half a century later, still 
grapple with America’s first hot war of the Cold War.  What justified American involvement in 
                                                 
7 Numerous veterans’ accounts describe the utter poverty of Korea as well as the unsanitary living conditions.  See 
Seymour Bernstein, Monsters and Angels:  Surviving a Career in Music (U. S.: Hal Leonard, 2002), 265-267; 
Mattie Donnell Hicks, Interview by Hermann J. Trojanowski, 25 February 1999, WVHP, OHC, UNCG, 5; 
Raymond Sturgeon in John Darrell Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits:  the Story of American Air Force Fighter 
Pilots in the Korean War (New York:  New York University Press, 1996),118-120; and Aubrey Loving, Interview 
by Natalie Shocklee, in Virginia Havard, ed., By Word of Mouth (Lufkin, TX:  Lufkin High School, Kwik Kopy 
Printing, 1990), 20-21. 
8 Richard J. H. Johnston, “G.I.’s in Korea Handicapped by Unawareness of Mission,” New York Times, 13 August 
1950, 1 and Frank Bifulk in Joseph R. Owen, Colder Than Hell:  A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir 
(Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1996), 175. 
9 Private First Class Peter Santella, quoted in Henry Berry, Hey Mac, Where Ya Been?  Living Memories of the U. S. 
Marines in the Korean War (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 220. 
10 Johnston, “G.I.’s in Korea Handicapped by Unawareness of Mission,” New York Times, 13 August 1950, 1. 
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Korea?  What were the political implications for the United States?  How can victory be 
measured?  Who really won and by how much?  Frequently, though, Korea ends up only in the 
footnotes of other, longer or more successful wars and even scholars sometimes settle for citing 
the numbers:  Almost 6 million men and women served in the United States Armed Forces from 
June 1950 to July 1953, the Korean War era, but only 1,789,000 actually went to the Korean 
theater.  Of those, 36,940 died in country, 92,134 suffered non-fatal wounds, and 8,176 ended up 
missing in action.11  But, beyond the statistics, it has become clearer in the last fifty years just 
how and why American troops ended up on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and perhaps why they 
remain stationed there today. 
Before World War II, America had little interest in Korea, the small, backward colony of 
Japan.  It possessed a certain barren beauty in the form of rough, jagged ridgelines, but aside 
from a few dams built to produce hydroelectric power and some stretches of Japanese rail lines, 
Korea had little to offer monetarily or strategically to the United States.12  After World War II, 
Korea was the same—a country of dirt roads and populations living on the edge, mired in 
poverty and illiteracy and susceptible to devastating waves of diseases—but now the world 
looked different to policymakers in Washington.  The fall of the Nazis and Imperial Japan should 
have made the world a safer place, but instead it merely divided nations into two very polarized 
                                                 
11 Statistics for the Korean War can be found in a number of places and occasionally they vary slightly.  See Tom 
Heuertz, “The Korean War + 50:  No Longer Forgotten, Teaching Resources,” Box FF “A.0957-A.0986,” Folder 
A.0974, Center for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University, Independence, Missouri (hereafter 
CFSOKW) and “Section XI:  Mortality and Combat Service,” “Section 11,” 1, U. S. President’s Commission on 
Veterans Pensions (Bradley Commission):  Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 61, Dwight David Eisenhower 
Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter Bradley Commission and DDE Library).   
12 For further descriptions of Korea, see James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York:  
William Morrow and Company, 1988), 21-24; Walter LaFeber, “Truman and Foreign Policy:  The Korean War,” in 
Robert D. Marcus and David Burner, eds., America Since 1945, 2d ed. (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 39; 
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 10-11; and Captain Janice Albert, “Air Evacuation From Korea—A Typical Flight,” 
The Military Surgeon 112:4 (April 1953), 256.  Many veterans’ accounts of the war also include descriptions of the 
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camps, those who believed in “free” government and those who adhered to the doctrines of 
communism.  As the allies dismantled Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the 
United States had to decide what to do about these territories, whether to move in and block 
Soviet influences or risk losing them to communism forever. 
 The choice seemed clear, even for places as seemingly remote and irrelevant as Korea.  
Thus, American units, like their Russian counterparts, moved into Korea even before World War 
II officially ended.  In a sort of gentleman’s agreement, the uneasy allies accepted a temporary 
split of Korea at the 38th Parallel, with the thought that the country eventually would be reunited.  
Until then, Russians would remain above the line and Americans would stay below it.  
Unfortunately for the Koreans, time brought no resolution to the tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and what had begun as a temporary division hardened into a 
separated Korea.  In North Korea, Kim Il Sung created his own little communist state while in 
South Korea Syngman Rhee leaned heavily on U. S. aid to fashion a pro-American country if not 
exactly a democratic one.13  Satisfied enough with the status quo and confident that it would 
stick, the United States began withdrawing servicemen until the last 7500 troops left in mid-
1949, leaving only a token number of Americans in Korea to staff the Korean Military Advisory 
Group (KMAG).14 
 While the Americans and Russians seemed complacent about the arrangement in Korea, 
neither North nor South Korea shared that contentment as both still dreamed of unifying the 
                                                 
13 Rhee’s government, while loosely fitting the democratic mold, can not be considered a democracy.  Rhee 
employed fraud and even repression to remain in power.  However, Rhee’s government remained dependent upon 
and friendly to the United States and in the end that, combined with the fact that South Korea did not turn to 
communism, proved enough to make it worth saving. 
14 For more detailed coverage of these events, see Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 18-33; Stokesbury, A Short 
History of the Korean War, 24-31; Jerald A. Combs, The History of American Foreign Policy (new York:  Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1986), 340-345; and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 1987), 23-45. 
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country.  Finally, after years of border skirmishes, Kim Il Sung made his move, sending the 
North Korean People’s Army, or the Inmun Gun, over the border in the early morning hours of 
June 25, 1950.  Composed of hardened veterans fresh from fighting in China and supplied with 
modern weaponry, including Russian-built T-34 tanks, the Inmun Gun quickly crushed the far 
inferior and underequipped South Korean forces it encountered and began a quick march south.15  
President Harry Truman found himself in much the same position he had occupied in 1945.  
Should he let South Korea fall into communist hands or should he gamble American lives and 
resources on the chance that the country was worth the cost of saving it?  Only a short while 
before, South Korea seemed not even worth the $110 million in promised American aid, only 
slightly more than half of those funds having been delivered by June 1950, but now, in the wake 
of China’s recent fall to communism, Truman felt compelled to draw a line in the sand.16  Within 
days Truman ordered American troops to the defense of South Korea in the name of “collective 
security” and called upon the United Nations to join in as well.17  Whether soldiers at the time 
understood the forces at play in bringing them to Korea or not, American troops fought in Korea 
because of vague, if lofty American ideas about containing communism and because of Harry 
Truman’s unwillingness to let South Korea become another China either in reality or in the 
minds of the American public.  They fought because one half of a country invaded the other and 
to the President of the United States and to a good many other people that action threatened 
“human liberty,” and “the free way of life.”18 
                                                 
15 See Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 42-49; Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue:  A History of the United States 
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16 Marcus, America Since 1945, 40. 
17 Ibid., 42. 
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 Throughout the war, it became almost as difficult for troops to discern what military plan 
directed operations in country as to figure out the reasons for U. S. involvement in Korea.  Men 
engaged in the actual combat of wars often have trouble envisioning the larger picture, but the 
nature of the Korean Conflict made strategies and objectives especially troublesome to figure 
out.  Unlike World War II, where men served in different theaters of the war but had the same 
ultimate goal of total victory, the war in Korea unfolded in different and distinct phases, 
sometimes without benefit of clearly defined war aims.  Unfortunately for those whose lives 
remained forfeit to the cause, the Korean War proved a haphazard affair.  In the end, one’s 
wartime experiences very much depended upon the luck of the draw and when and where a 
person served in the war zone. 
American air and ground personnel committed to Korea in the early months of the war 
had no idea what to expect.  Most of them had been stationed in Japan on easy duty as 
occupation troops and they did not really understand that what President Truman persisted in 
calling a “police action” was in fact a war.  Rounded up from lifeguard duty, mess halls, and 
both support and infantry units, the first men sent to Korea to hold off the North Korean advance 
and save South Korea from communism believed their officers who reassured them that they 
would be back to the good life in Japan in thirty days after “handily whip[ping] the North 
Koreans’ asses.”19  In reality, they would be gone quite a bit longer than that, many of them not 
returning for years, if at all.   
In this first phase of the Korean Conflict, Truman initially charged American troops with 
simply hanging on in the peninsula and not allowing themselves to be driven into the sea.  Even 
this limited task proved difficult.  In sharp contrast to the seasoned troops of the Inmun Gun, 
                                                 
19 Corporal Harrison Lee quoted in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 3. 
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American soldiers often lacked the conditioning and training necessary for effectively waging 
war.  Some of the men stationed in Japan or elsewhere and subsequently hurried to Korea in June 
or July 1950 had already cracked under the pressure of battle in World War II and been placed 
on “limited service,” a bad omen for their potential combat performance in this war.20  Others 
had become physically unfit for the rigors of battle.  Huffing and puffing up the hills of Korea in 
August 1950, Sergeant Marcelo Vendiola could not help but notice that “no one was in physical 
shape.”21  Commanders did not help matters any when they plugged men into units wherever 
they were needed regardless of expertise.  Truck drivers, ROTC graduates, and men who hadn’t 
seen an M-1 since basic training had to become gunners, artillerymen, and infantrymen literally 
overnight.22  As one colonel of the Eighth Army noted, “They’ve had to learn in combat, in a 
matter of days, the basic things they should have known before they ever faced an enemy.  And 
some of them don’t learn fast enough.”23   
Regardless, for weeks upon weeks men entered Korea in what they perceived to be 
scattered bands along a fluid and ever-changing front.  Casualties mounted as did the numbers of 
Americans taken prisoner by the North Koreans.24  Maybe the generals had a plan, but on the 
ground it looked like the war would last forever and the sacrifices would never amount to 
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anything at all.  Still, by September 1950 these piecemeal groups had managed to secure a 
perimeter, the Pusan Perimeter, around the southeast corner of Korea.  While far short of 
anyone’s definition of victory, this achievement did at last encourage President Truman and his 
officers in the field to begin planning the reclamation of South Korean territory still held by the 
North Korean People’s Army and the second phase of the Korean War.   
The successful landing of Marines and soldiers at Inchon Harbor on September 15, 1950 
transformed the war in Korea.  What had for Americans begun as a shaky defensive operation 
now metamorphosed into a tactical offensive.  The war without end gave way to almost certain 
victory as United Nations and United States ground forces trapped and neutralized what units of 
the Inmun Gun remained between the Pusan Perimeter and roughly the 38th Parallel.  South 
Korea had been saved and American G.I.s, ragged and worn down from their months in country, 
began to talk of going home for Christmas or even Thanksgiving.25  If not for General Douglas 
MacArthur’s determination to exploit North Korea’s military setbacks and reunify Korea 
American-style, these hopes might have been realized and the war ended as early as October 
1950.26  Instead, with heavy boots and heavy hearts, and quite possibly without President 
Truman’s blessing, the full force of the Eighth Army along with other U.N. troops crossed the 
38th Parallel on October 9, 1950 with a new objective, the conquest of North Korea.27  After a 
week or so of hard fighting, the North Koreans up and retreated, leaving Americans to capture 
Pyongyang, the northern capital, and advance toward the Yalu River, the border between North 
Korea and Manchuria.  Americans once again smelled victory and the sweet aroma of Christmas 
                                                 
25 For an example, see Corporal Irwin Crockett in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 88-89. 
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dinner that would welcome them home before long.  The United States had achieved its original 
goals in Korea and more. 
Unfortunately, filled with hubris, General MacArthur, with President Truman in tow, 
failed in the drive toward triumph to heed warnings from communist China that should United 
Nations forces cross the 38th Parallel, “the Chinese People’s Republic will send troops to aid the 
People’s Republic of Korea.”28  As American, United Nations, and ROK forces dutifully 
gathered in North Korea in late October 1950 to mop up the remnants of war, a new and 
unexpected third phase of the Korean War erupted.  Stationing about 180,000 “volunteers” in 
front of the Eighth Army and another 120,000 in the mountains around Chosin (or Changjin) 
Reservoir, the Chinese made good on their threat.29  By early November, ROK forces began 
reporting engagements with Chinese units and before long all of the United Nations troops in the 
north learned to dread the haunting whistles and bugle calls that accompanied attacks by Chinese 
Communist Forces.30  As in the early days of the Korean War, American troops had to pull back 
and try to find a line they could hold.  Unlike those early months, the enemy resisted even their 
retreat and men caught at Chosin Reservoir and elsewhere had to fight no matter which direction 
they chose to go.  Battle took its toll on soldiers and Marines alike, and the bitter Korean winter 
exacted a heavy price from those held in its grip.  Surprised by both Chinese intervention and 
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temperatures plunging well below zero, sometimes as much as thirty degrees below zero, the U. 
S. Armed Forces had yet to supply many of the troops with adequate cold weather gear.31  
Fighting day and night for weeks at a time against a determined and far more numerous foe as 
socks and guns froze to their feet and hands, soldiers quickly became casualties of both enemy 
fire and frostbite.  From their vantage point, more than just real estate, taken so easily and 
quickly after the Inchon Landing, passed into Chinese hands.  Fingers and toes and lives went 
missing, too, and these were lost forever.   
Back in Washington and Japan, war planners had to reevaluate not only the strategies of 
the war but the entire war ethos.  What should the U. S. after Chinese intervention now hope to 
accomplish in Korea?  Largely unanswered throughout the rest of the war, this question still 
weighs heavily on the American conscience.  But, by this stage in the game, men in the field did 
not really care anymore what politicians and generals wanted to gain from the war.  They had 
already determined that “the only thing of value it [Korea] holds for the men here is a 6x6x6 plot 
of burial ground and what future is that to look forward to?”32  Many of them had entered the 
conflict in its early days, prepared to spend a month or so in country.  One month turned into six 
or seven and in that time they had pushed forward, pulled back, gained ground, given it up again, 
and sought refuge in the very same shelters going both directions.33  After months of dirt and 
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grime and countless tragedies, they still could not see what, if anything, Korea could be worth.34   
“A lot of them were saying, ‘Fuck this place, I want to go home.’”35   
 By July 1951, the war in Korea settled into its fourth and final phase, a deadly stalemate 
between Chinese volunteers and United Nations troops.  All along the 38th Parallel both sides 
dug in, forming “a rambling messy ditch or series of ditches five to seven feet deep.”36  
Reminiscent of France during World War I, men lived and fought for months from dusty, 
littered, fixed positions on a static line.  To be sure, Americans and Chinese alike initiated 
actions beyond the main line of resistance (MLR), as in the outpost war in the hills around the 
parallel, but by and large G.I.s had it right when they complained that “the Army wasn’t going 
anywhere, and everyone knew it.”37   In some places demoralized Army troops established a 
temporary and informal truce with the enemy across the way, causing a few Marines to wonder 
at the “blatant lack of aggressiveness on the part of our Army.”38  More than a year into the war, 
young men both in the war zone and stateside wanted to know, “How can the President have 
‘guts’ enough to ask my fellows to sign up for the armed forces or draft them, after seeing what a 
heavy loss we’ve already had?…I still don’t know what we are fighting for.”39 
                                                 
34 As in other phases of the war, soldiers serving in Korea after Chinese intervention and before the stalemate 
continued to seek clarification of the reasons for their presence in the peninsula.  Having seen many of the gains 
made after the Inchon Landing erased, they concluded, “Never have American men fought in a more useless war.”  
See Letter to the editor of the Ft. Wayne News Sentinel from Lt. Gale O. Buuck in Congressional Record, Appendix, 
82nd Congress, 1st sess., January 1951-October 1951, vol. 97, A1834. 
35 Andy Barr in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 77. 
36Description of the line by a replacement, quoted in Lee Ballenger, The Final Crucible:  U. S. Marines in Korea, v. 
II:  1953 (Washington, D. C.:  Brassey’s, 2001), 34.   
37 John A. Sullivan, Toy Soldiers:  Memoir of a Combat Platoon Leader in Korea (Jefferson, NC:  McFarland and 
Company, 1991), 19. 
38 Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 205-206.  In Korea, as in other wars, a healthy rivalry existed between the different 
branches of the U.S. military and between the various components of each.  In their memoirs and oral histories, 
Marines often accuse soldiers of having conducted fewer patrols, ambushes, and raids.  For their part, soldiers in the 
regular Army not infrequently call into question the quality of reserve troops.  For a discussion of reserve troops 
versus regular soldiers, see Howard Matthias, The Korean War:  Reflections of a Young Combat Platoon Leader, 
rev. ed. (Tallahassee, FL:  Father & Son Publishing, 1995), 53. 
39 Bute Findley to Robert A. Taft, 8 December 1951, Taft Papers, Box 1061, LOC.   
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With public opinion at home wavering on the Korean War and the realization that the 
reunification of Korea would cost too much in terms of American lives and money, the United 
States decided that the time had come to compromise.  NSC 48/4 called for a unified, 
independent Korea, but if war with the Soviet Union could be avoided, Washington would now 
accept a defensible border for South Korea somewhere in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel.  On 
June 29, 1951, General Matthew Ridgway, the United Nations Commander, let North Korea and 
China know that the U. N. was prepared to negotiate an armistice.  The first meeting of peace 
negotiators opened on July 10, 1951 in Kaesong, the ancient capital of Korea.  The talks went 
nowhere, adjourning until October 1951, but the fact that the United States was seeking to solve 
the conflict on the bargaining table set the tone for the last two years of the conflict.40  From the 
perspective of those Americans called to fight the war, “The Chinese sat down at the peace tables 
of Panmunjom in July of 1951 because they were hard pressed.  And instead of pushing harder, 
we sat on our asses for the rest of the war.”41   
The Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy continued to ship reluctant replacements into 
what remained a hot war, but negotiators in Panmunjom and tight-fisted officials back home 
compelled the Armed Forces to limit their efforts as the war might end soon anyway.42  On the 
ground, troops suffered not only from ammunition shortages and the feeling that their country 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 Owen, Colder than Hell, 171.  After receiving “Dear John” letters, many men broke down.   
40 For the more detail on the history of this phase of the war, see Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, 
129- 159. 
41 Sullivan, Toy Soldiers, 17-18.  See also Berry, Oral History by Caudill, 36. 
42 After the first year or so of the war the rotation system, discussed below, carried out of Korea the men who had 
begun the conflict, replacing them with draftees or recruits who had 9 months to a year to serve in country before 
getting their own tickets punched and rotating out.  Many of these were fresh from basic training and untested in 
battle.  For examples, see Baldovi in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 198 and Tom Clawson in Tomedi, No Bugles, No 
Drums, 149. 
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had forgotten them but from the frustration of accomplishing nothing.43  Fighting within full 
view of the balloons floating above Panmunjom, one nineteen year old sergeant complained, 
“We are doing nothing but holding on to what we already have and fighting to get back what we 
lose.  Then, after getting it back we sit down and wait for them to try and take it away again.  We 
should be pushing on and getting this war over and done with.”44  Another G.I. observed, “Most 
of us are pretty fed up with the peace talks over here.  One guy said last night he wished we’d 
stop all the backing and filling and get on with the fighting.”45  Fighter pilots echoed these same 
sentiments when pointing out their frustration at having “to watch the enemy strike at them from 
what General Douglas MacArthur has called their Manchurian sanctuary.”46  Washington 
ordered American aircraft to stay strictly below the Yalu River, leaving them unable to knock out 
enemy anti-aircraft guns or pursue the enemy MIGs which crossed the border between 
Manchuria and Korea at will to attack them.47  Until the bitter end, however, the peace talks 
reigned supreme.  United Nations commanders planned offensives in order to hasten China’s 
acquiescence of terms at the table or to sweeten the pot for the United States and other U. N. 
member countries, not to bring a victory like the soldiers of World War II had won, and the men 
                                                 
43 By October 1952 ammunition was in short supply in part because domestic manufacturers had reduced their 
production in the belief that the war was almost at an end.  In 1953, the Marine Corps ordered marines to “pick up 
your brass,” meaning that after a battle they would comb the field for spent cartridges to be sent back by tank to be 
recycled.  Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 45-47.  Also see Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 439. 
44 Sergeant William Janzen, quoted in Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 48.  For similar sentiment, see Boris Spiroff,  
Korea: The Frozen Hell on Earth:  A Platoon Sergeant’s Diary, Korean War, 1950-1951 (Baltimore, MD:  
American Literary Press, Inc., 1998), 36.  “With our capability, our aircraft, and our armament, we should not be 
fighting a limited war.  If allowed to go all out, we could win it.” 
45 From an extract from a letter sent home from a GI in Korea, quoted in U. S. Senate, Congressional Record, 82nd 
Congress, 2nd  sess., 8 January 1952-25 February 1952, vol. 98, part 1, 979. 
46 Quoted in William C. Barnard, “Jet Pilots Joke About Exploits, But Yalu Border Angers Them,” reproduced in U. 
S. House, Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., 26 April 1951-24 May 1951, vol. 97, part 4, 5284. 
47 See U. S. House, Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., 26 April-24 May 1951, vol. 97, part 4, 5284-
5286.  This source also discusses the low morale of troops in Korea given the debate over the war at home and 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s testimony that the U. S. no longer had any hope of victory.   
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in Korea knew it.48  Eventually, they reassured themselves, negotiations would bring peace.  All 
that many of the troops hoped for now was to live to see it.  No one wanted to “be the last guy 
killed.”49    
At 10:00 p.m. on July 27, 1953, the guns finally fell silent in Korea.  Twelve hours earlier 
the representatives of North Korea, Lieutenant General Nam Il, and the United Nations, 
Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, had met at Panmunjom to sign a ceasefire agreement.50  
Though only an armistice and not a treaty, soldiers on both sides of the line could at long last lay 
down their weapons and most could return home.  Newly elected President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower informed the American public that this ended “the fighting between the United 
Nations forces and the Communist armies.”51  Perhaps breathing a sigh of relief, Americans 
returned to their business and all but forgot about the bitter little war in Korea that had claimed 
36,940 American lives.  But on the men and women who served and fought in country from June 
1950 to July 1953, the Korean War left indelible marks.  Like the Revolutionary War, the Civil 
War, the two World Wars, Vietnam, Iraq, and all the wars fought from time immemorial, the 
Korean War forced participants to experience new, often unpleasant things, and to rethink the 
certainties that once had defined their lives.  But the Korean War, a limited, integrated, 
unfinished war against a new type of enemy, also became for those who participated in it a war 
like no other. 
                                                 
48 Some authors point out that later in the war U.N. forces were told to stop aggressive tactics and fight a more 
defensive war.  For an example, see Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 262. 
49 Arthur L. Kelly, Interview by Russell Harris, 16 December 1993, 54 (Kentuckiana Digital Library at 
http://kdl.kyvl.org).  This sentiment is echoed again and again in the writings of Korean War veterans who served 
after July 1951.  For another example, see Sullivan, Toy Soldiers, 19.  “To get killed was to be wasted and no one 
wants to be wasted.” 
50 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 447-448 and Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, 249-251. 
51 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Radio and Television Address to the American People Announcing the Signing of the 
Korean Armistice,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower:  Containing the 
Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1953 (Washington, D. C.:  United States Government 
Printing Office, 1960), 520. 
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Into the War Zone 
 
On June 27, 1950, just two days after the Inmun Gun’s attack on South Korea, President 
Truman ordered the first Americans, naval and air personnel stationed in the vicinity of the 
peninsula, into the war zone to support ROK forces.52  United States Navy destroyers, like the 
USS Mansfield, De Haven, Collett, and Lyman K. Swenson, and cruisers, like the USS Juneau, 
hurriedly answered the call, abruptly transporting men from peacetime patrols to firing positions 
along the Korean shoreline.  There, American sailors entered the conflict, shelling land positions 
and establishing a blockade that would prove useful for the duration of the war.53  Similarly, 
airmen, so recently enjoying life in their own little enclaves in occupied Japan, very quickly 
became commuter warriors.54  With airstrips all but nonexistent in Korea, pilots and their crews 
began flying missions out of Japan and over Korea, returning home to wives and kids, backyard 
barbecues, and “O” Clubs at the end of the day.55  With the American Navy and Air Force in 
place, the first deployment of U. S. ground forces landed in country on July 1, 1950, followed 
just days later by 57 female Army nurses charged with setting up a hospital at Pusan.56   
Dispatched swiftly and unexpectedly, these first American arrivals in Korea, especially 
those on the ground, often simply dropped into the war zone with no particular preparation.  
Desperate in the early weeks of the war to stop the North Korean advance, the Army pulled men 
                                                 
52 For the chronology of events, see Hastings, The Korean War, 345-350. 
53 The first naval activity in country actually began the day after Truman’s order when the USS Juneau fired on 
positions near Samchok on June 28, 1950.  See Paul M. Edwards, To Acknowledge a War:  The Korean War in 
American Memory (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 2000), 110. 
54 The Navy, Air Force, and Marines all supplied airmen for the Korean War.  Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 161. 
55 Lisle Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street:  America in 1950 (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 
1999), 253.  In the early days of the war, airmen flew out of Japan because Korea had little to offer by way of 
airstrips and the fluid nature of the war made the construction of air bases impractical.   
56 Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military:  An Unfinished Revolution (Novato, CA:  Presidio, 1982), 149. 
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from all units and military occupational specialties in Japan to form a fighting force for Korea.  
With no time to spare for additional training or even the notification of families, the men of Task 
Force Smith and later other outfits of the 24th Infantry Division, airlifted straight into Korea 
where the Army expected them to begin fighting almost immediately.57  Even when 
replacements shipped in from duty stations other than Japan after the initial deployments, the 
process of entering the war zone remained frenetic.  Sailing from Sasebo to Korea in July 1950, 
Private First Class Susumu Shinagawa received an M-1 rifle and ammunition to go with it, but 
no poncho or combat boots.  Possessing only dress shoes, he had to borrow boots and stuff them 
with toilet paper to make them fit.58  Worse yet, Marty Nelson arrived in Japan only to be rushed 
off to Korea without a rifle.59  Certainly, this could not have been the introduction to war that 
most American servicemen expected.  Once in Korea, however, these early troops could count 
on the gratitude of the South Koreans.  In a scene to be oft repeated during the first couple 
months of the war, more than 1500 townspeople gathered in the drizzle to applaud and cheer 
Americans passing through Taejon on July 2, 1950 while a brass band played in their honor.60   
Aside from a few dramatic landings, like the ones at Inchon Harbor in September 1950 or 
of replacements sent to North Korea in the winter of 1950, American arrivals in country settled 
into more predictable and systematic routines as the war progressed.  Both Army and Marine 
replacements almost always filtered to the front by way of Japan, docking in Kobe or Yokohama 
                                                 
57 “U. S. Troop Transfer Is Smooth,” Daily Oklahoman, 1 July 1950, 5;  Robert Roy in Tomedi, No Bugles, No 
Drums, 3; and Baldovi, A Foxhole View, xvii.  Sadly, some men died in Korea before their wives and families could 
even be notified of their deployment.  In an oral history, Sidney Berry remembers that his wife boarded the last 
transport for dependents of men stationed in Japan and by the time she arrived the husbands of some of the women 
she had traveled with had already been killed in action in Korea.  Lt. General Sidney Berry, Oral History by Dr. 
Orley Caudill, 1980, 24, volume 198, Mississippi Oral History Program, University of Southern Mississippi, 
Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 
58 Susumu Shinagawa in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 10. 
59 Robert F. Hallahan, All Good Men: A Lieutenant’s Memories of the Korean War (New York:  iUniverse, Inc., 
2003), 13-14. 
60 “Taejon Cheers as GI Caravan Rolls on North,” Daily Oklahoman, 2 July 1950, 2A. 
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for a few hours or days.  With any luck, men headed to Korea got enough liberty to enjoy the 
crowds at the pier, hire rickshaws for sightseeing, or simply head into town to shop or search out 
ladies for one last bit of female companionship.61  Then, the time came to resume travel.  Some 
returned to the troopships, but most boarded trains bound for the inter-island ferries at Sasebo.62  
Already tired, men found the train rides wearing.  Not only did the trains take hours or even days 
to reach their destinations, but smoke funneled into the cars through open windows and at best 
restroom facilities consisted of oblong holes in the floor of the car guarded by latrine orderlies 
who made sure that people disposed of their waste before exiting.63  At the docks of Sasebo, the 
troops climbed aboard the flat-bottomed ferries with their weapons, packs, and c-rations and 
waved goodbye to the G.I.s and Japanese who had gathered below to throw rolls of confetti and 
shout “Sayonara” while the bands played.  Leaving under blackout orders, after having seen the 
grim look on the faces of those returning from the combat zone, young replacements began to 
consider that “this is a one way passage for many of us” and wonder “who will return in 
coffins.”64  Perhaps for the first time they realized that they were in fact sailing out of one world 
and into another and that regardless of how many men went with them they would enter the war 
alone. 
No matter what month or year men and women arrived in Korea during the war, getting 
settled in proved a real challenge.  First impressions of the peninsula often served to reinforce 
that Americans did not want to be in this place at all.  For some, the haunting, “ghostly shadow 
                                                 
61 Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 14. 
62 While the ferries did not provide the most comfortable means of travel, the troopships often proved far more 
unpleasant at disembarkation.  Marines landing at Inchon Harbor (not during the famed September invasion) 
describe having to climb down the sides of the ships on net ropes while carrying field packs, rifles, and helmets.  
They then had to drop into landing craft which would carry them to the dock.  See Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 
15. 
63 Addison, The Battle for Pusan, 4-6. 
64 Bernstein, Monsters and Angels, 264. 
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of Korea rising out of the mist” gave them pause, but for most the smells and sights of the land 
made them long for home.65  While still miles out, those aboard ferries could smell the fecal odor 
emanating from Korean rice paddies and farms, and upon landing the scents of charcoal, garlic, 
smoke, unfamiliar food, and gunpowder helped create a sickening combination.66  As days of 
war lengthened into months and years, newcomers saw only devastation as they looked around 
them.  Broken buildings, ripped up roads, hungry refugees, ever present clouds of dust and flies, 
these characterized Korea. But, however much they might have wished to turn back around to 
Japan or the United States, soldiers, Marines, doctors, nurses, and later Air Force personnel had 
no choice but to dig in and stick it out in Korea for the remainder of their tours.   
Harried and desperate in the first days of the war, the U. S. Army could do little to help 
personnel acclimate to their new surroundings or to improve living and fighting conditions in 
country.  The need for soldiers at the front frequently outweighed protocol which called for 
staging areas to orient soldiers before turning them loose in the combat zone.  Men in the 
vanguard of the Eighth Army Far East Command docked at Pusan or elsewhere while South 
Korean bands played and then rushed off to the battle on trucks or on narrow gauge railroads 
built decades earlier by the Japanese.  Reaching positions late at night or early in the morning, 
they furtively dug foxholes, sometimes while under fire by North Korean artillery.67  Even when 
soldiers had the chance to pass through a staging area, communications could fail with 
unpleasant results.  One soldier recalled that after arriving in Pusan his outfit marched to a 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 265. 
66 Stanley Weintraub in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 188 and Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 14. 
67 See Private First Class Arnold Winter in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 25. 
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warehouse “staging area.”  After spending the night there, the men realized that their staging area 
was actually a collection point for the human feces used by Korean farmers.68   
Later in the war, both the Army and Marine Corps established more regular reception 
centers for their troops.  Soldiers got unit and station assignments in Pusan while Marines 
trucked into ASCOM City to await assignment and transport.69  At ASCOM City, Marines 
heading to the MLR turned in their seabags, which carried most of their personal possessions, 
and prepared to live out of field packs, called “Willie Peters” because of waterproofing.  After a 
couple of days Marines moved out by train, with new replacements stopping at the battalion 
command post for four or five days of orientation.  Here Marines heard lectures about the 
Korean War in general and the units opposing them, made practice patrols at night in the 
paddies, and received additional equipment.70  Unlike Marines, soldiers sometimes shipped 
straight to the line from the reception center without any sort of explanation of what to do or 
what to expect.71  As one Army draftee put it, “That’s what scares you the most when you’re 
new.  Nobody tells you anything.”72   
Once at the front, all that men could do was wait for the war to come to them.  Some, like 
Marine Second Lieutenant John Nolan felt prepared, perhaps even anxious for the fight to begin.  
                                                 
68 Vendiola in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 30. 
69 Arthur L. Kelly, Interview by Russell Harris, 16 December 1993, 24. 
70 Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 15-18. 
71 For more on Army replacements being hustled straight into combat, see Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers:  
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“I thought that was what I had been trained to do, educated to do, I felt ready to do it.”73  But 
most found the anticipation of battle harrowing.  As men neared positions on the line, they grew 
quieter, more afraid and more contemplative.  Some examined the faces of those who had 
already experienced battle, taking note of the “thousand yard stare” and determining that “days 
of combat without sleep, water, and food and being close to being killed every day must have 
done that to them.”74  Others began to wonder how they would perform under fire and whether 
they would survive at all, realizing suddenly that “I will soon have to kill a man or be killed by 
him.”75  All in all, whether one arrived before the Inchon Landing or after the entrance of 
Chinese volunteers, the minutes, hours, or days before one’s first experience in battle filled 
soldiers and Marines alike with “a spooky feeling.”76  War might prove different altogether, but 
the experience of waiting for it was “all very strange and terrifying.”77 
 
Fighting in Korea 
 
 Whether in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines, a good many of the men serving in 
theater during the Korean War did end up in combat sooner or later.  Precise figures remain 
elusive, but recent surveys of veterans suggest that upwards of 70% of those stationed in country 
saw action.78  Certainly, in this limited, conventional ground war, Army and Marine infantrymen 
                                                 
73 John Edward Nolan, interview by J. Cantwell, 29 December 1999, 2, online at American Century Project, St. 
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75 Ronald J. Landry, “Excerpts,” in “Chosin House:  Poems and Prose,” Box FF, Folder A0964, CFSOKW. 
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had the greatest risk of finding their way onto the battlefield and suffered the most casualties and 
fatalities, but Navy and Air Force personnel also served and died on the front lines during the 
war.79  Flying from aircraft carriers off the coast or from bases in Japan or Korea, pilots flew 
more than a million sorties over the Korean peninsula, dropping bombs, providing air cover to 
troops below, and engaging in deadly duels with enemy MIGs, all while trying to evade hostile 
fire.80  Men aboard ships delivered soldiers and Marines to the war zone, but also not 
infrequently became combatants themselves.  They cleared coastal waters in small 
minesweepers, manned the guns while “softening up” land targets with heavy and sometimes 
reciprocated bombardment, evacuated soldiers and civilians, and tendered protection and support 
to men on the battleground.81  Regardless of branch of service, American servicemen in Korea 
endured combat and shared an uncomfortable intimacy with war.  The passage through battle 
often left survivors with not only ideas about the true costs and realities of armed conflict but 
with physical or emotional scars that would mark them for life.   
                                                                                                                                                             
that these only include information from veterans still living at the time of the survey.  A 1987 survey found that 
48.5% of veterans served in Korea and 35.2% experienced combat, thus 72.5% of men in country saw action.  “1987 
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Manpower Procurement:  A Policy Analysis (Lexington, MA:  Lexington Books, 1972), 65. 
80 American Air Force pilots flew over 700,000 missions, Marine units 100,000, and Navy pilots 170,000.  Together 
these dropped 700,000 tons of ordnance and 30,000 tons of napalm and expended more than 100 million rounds of 
machine gun ammunition.  They destroyed 1000 locomotives, 10,000 railroad cars, 80,000 vehicles, close to 600 
boats, 65 tunnels, 1000 bridges, and 100,000 buildings.  They also killed an estimated 200,000 enemy troops, 
wounding as many as half a million more.  Jennie Ethell Chancey and William R. Forstchen, Hot Shots:  An Oral 
History of the Air Force Combat Pilots of the Korean War (New York:  Harper Collins, 2000), 237-238.  See also 
Paul M. Edwards, To Acknowledge a War: The Korean War in American Memory (Westport, CT:  Greenwood 
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 For ground troops, the topography and climate of Korea could hardly have been worse 
for fighting.  Marines and soldiers at every stage in the war had to hump up and down steep, 
craggy hills weighed down by M-1 rifles and packs stuffed with c-rations, extra socks, and 
ammunition—all the necessities of life within war.82  Members of crew-served weapons added to 
their loads heavy, bulky pieces of equipment and even heavier large caliber rounds.  One 138-
pound BAR man complained that he had eighty pounds of gear with which to keep up.83  Before 
even arriving at the battlefield, men grew weary.  And, often, reaching the battlefield meant 
attacking uphill with grenades and bullets raining down from the North Koreans or Chinese 
entrenched above.  As Corporal Jay Hidano put it, “Braving enemy fire was one thing, but 
having to crawl up the steep slopes with bullets buzzing and striking all around us was just 
madness.”84  Generals, politicians, or reporters on the sidelines might have dreamed up romantic 
names like “Heartbreak Ridge” for the hills of Korea, but those doing the marching agreed with 
one wry soldier who retorted it’s “more like Ass break Ridge.”85 
 The hills of Korea became nemesis to many a G.I. during the war, but extremes of heat 
and especially of cold made this war particularly miserable.  Summertime in Korea meant 
monsoons and temperatures soaring well over 100 degrees with humidity reaching the 90 percent 
range.  But, if troops longed for cooler weather, they soon had cause to regret it.  Winters dished 
out even harsher conditions on the peninsula as temperatures dipped to 30 or 40 degrees below 
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zero.86  Men trying to live, much less fight under such conditions had real troubles.  As at Chosin 
Reservoir when Chinese volunteers overran American positions, men succumbed not just to the 
enemy but to the freezing cold.  A few froze to death in their foxholes and a great many more 
suffered from frostbite, losing toes or developing other problems that would plague them for 
life.87  Socks and even equipment froze to unprotected skin.  Pete Behasa remembers one man 
having to urinate on another man’s hand to free his palm from the rifle muzzle where it had 
stuck.88  Water had to be cut with alcohol, c-rations had to be chipped out of the cans and melted 
in one’s mouth like ice cubes, and vials of morphine had to be kept warm in the mouths or 
armpits of medics and corpsmen.89  The permafrost-like ground made digging foxholes and 
graves a misery if in fact they could be shoveled out at all.  Sometimes the dead just had to be 
strapped onto the running boards of vehicles, buried in holes blown out of the earth with TNT, or 
left until the spring thaw.90  Hot and tired or cold and tired, the ground troops of Korea had to 
manage to survive the elements and find the resolve to pick up their guns and fight. 
 Stowed away aboard ship or flying above the ridgelines, sailors and airmen had less 
cause to worry about the Korean landscape or climate when involved in engagements than their 
infantry counterparts.  Still, especially for pilots, the weather and nature of the peninsula posed 
certain challenges.  So long as airmen remained airborne, they did not need to worry about what 
lay below.  But, if forced to crash land or abandon the aircraft for any reason, pilots experienced 
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some of the same problems as ground soldiers as well as a few all their own.  The rugged layout 
of the land, a series of slopes and valleys, made emergency landings risky at best.  Even if a pilot 
could lay the craft down safely, how could he be rescued?  Other pilots unfailingly did what they 
could to save a fallen comrade, risking their own lives to circle the crash site and hold off the 
enemy until rescue helicopters could arrive.91  But, this wasn’t always enough.  Men burned to 
death after crashing into hillsides and froze to death after parachuting into Korea’s icy cold 
waters.  In winter, a downed airman could expect to live for only twenty minutes after landing in 
the sea—a very short time in which to mount and complete a rescue mission.  After the first four 
minutes in the drink, a man’s hands froze stiff, his face turned purple, and his feet became 
useless.92  The Korean Peninsula itself could kill airmen as handily as the North Koreans or 
Chinese. 
 Aside from extremes in weather and topography, the combat experiences of men in Korea 
proved largely reflective of the American war experience as a whole.  No one knew how 
individuals or units would perform until after the first couple of battles or missions.  Thinking of 
the competency of a BAR man almost tossed out of the military before the war, Uzal Ent noted 
one “can’t tell beforehand who’s going to perform well in combat.”93 Similarly, an outgoing 
platoon leader warned new platoon leader John Nolan, “You really won’t know what you have 
until you go through a fire fight with the members of your platoon.”94  Spit-and-polish 
servicemen sometimes washed out when it came to the business of killing and surviving while 
other types discharged their duties heroically.   
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In the Air Force, the widespread lack of prewar training, especially early in the war, made 
it equally difficult to predict how men would fare under combat conditions.  Pilots learned new 
formations through “trial and error” in the Korean skies and certified combat-ready just hours 
before setting off on missions in aircraft they had seldom or never flown before.95  Upon arriving 
at his outfit, “Boots” Blesse, an F-80 pilot, learned that he would have to fly a P-51 on his 
mission the following morning.  Not yet certified to fly that particular aircraft, Blesse spent the 
rest of his day training in a “clean airplane,” completing three hours of flight time and ten 
landings.  The next day Blesse set out in a storm, his P-51 loaded down with napalm rockets and 
a .50 caliber machine gun.96  Similarly, Bob Ennis, an Air Force pilot with no flying time at all in 
B-26s before the war learned to fly them in Korea and Robinson Risner was declared “combat 
ready” after seven hours and thirty minutes flying time in the F-86.97  How Blesse, Ennis, Risner, 
or anyone else would do under enemy fire before they had gone through it remained a mystery at 
best. 
So just what was combat like in Korea?  Firefights, at least for infantrymen, began in a 
number of different ways.  Early in the war, when they enjoyed numerical superiority, North 
Korean troops simply attacked en masse, pushing forward in a huge, rolling human wave.  In 
instances where Americans had surrounded themselves with concertina wire, the first North 
Koreans to reach the barrier threw themselves onto it, allowing those behind to move ahead by 
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stepping on them.98  Regardless of the number of dead, soldiers of the Inmun Gun kept 
advancing until they reached enemy positions or died trying.  With the possible exception of men 
who served in the Pacific during World War II or in the Philippines during the Spanish American 
War and Philippine Insurrection, few Americans had ever faced an enemy like the North 
Koreans.  The North Korean determination and disregard for human life unnerved G.I.s who 
dreaded encountering the enemy or even smelling the tell-tale garlic on their breath or hearing 
the unpleasant burping sound their guns made when fired.99  As North Korean numbers dwindled 
and American forces grew on the peninsula, however, North Koreans husbanded their manpower 
resources more carefully, abandoning the costly human wave assaults.  Then, both sides usually 
initiated operations by pounding the enemy with artillery to soften targets.  Before sending men 
clambering up the hills, artillerymen from the attacking side shelled enemy strongholds until the 
land resembled nothing so much as a barren, pockmarked moonscape or something out of a 
nuclear holocaust nightmare.  As one soldier remembers, “At night I witnessed artillery fire so 
violent that it lit up the sky to an incredible degree.  I still wonder how anyone survived such 
terrifying onslaughts.”100 Amazingly, men did live through these barrages, but found them 
terrifying.  Like Private Baldovi, more than a few survivors of artillery attacks remember their 
mixed response of religiosity and profanity.  “I must have broken the record for saying the ‘Hail 
Mary’ and, at the same time, the profanities that came from my mouth would have embarrassed 
anyone.”101   
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When the Chinese entered the conflict in October 1950, they brought few tactical 
innovations to bear against American troops.  Like the North Koreans before them, Chinese 
volunteers “came straight at us, like a mob.”102  Even with mortars pouring down, the Chinese 
attacked in formation and “kept coming with absolutely no regard for their lives.  It was like 
committing suicide.”103  And, short on technology, the Chinese seldom attacked quietly.  The 
eerie wailings of bugles, sharp calls of whistles, rattling cans, and directional orders yelled in 
“sing-song” voices all alerted U.N. forces when an engagement was imminent.104  In Korea, 
where the scrubby, barren hills provided little cover for would-be attackers, Chinese tactics 
might have proved the undoing of the Peoples Volunteer Army, but the Chinese minimized their 
losses by attacking after dark when possible, a fact that most Americans despised. 105  Nighttime 
operations not only hampered the support efforts of American airpower, but also chipped away at 
American morale.  As one young soldier wrote home in 1951, “The Chinks never hit in the 
daytime, that’s the hell of it.  At night while I’m on watch…I shiver and shake whether it’s cold 
or not.”106  Even after the war stalemated and both the Chinese and Americans holed up in 
bunkers along the line, Chinese troops often withdrew to their foxholes at dawn, coming out 
again at night to fight.  With the “no man’s land” between the bunkers denuded, making daytime 
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patrols and raids suicidal, Americans had no choice but to operate in the dark as well.  
Ultimately, “It simply became a habit. We were quite comfortable in the dark.”107 
Engagements rarely lasted more than a few hours and almost never more than a few days, 
but once a battle got going combatants had little time for such mundane things as eating, 
drinking, changing socks, sleeping, or even relieving themselves. 108  In the best of 
circumstances, enemy fire had to be returned from afar and mortars and bullets had to be dodged.  
The skyline overhead filled with flares, tracer bullets, and searchlights in various shades of 
orange, red, and green.  And, if American troops got lucky, further up planes whizzed by to 
strafe ridges and unload deadly cargoes of napalm in much-appreciated support.109  Yet even 
these anonymous, distant interactions with opposing forces made quite an impression on 
participants.  If shells landed near enough, they sucked the breath right out of a man, leaving 
behind a blast of dust and gunpowder to remind him that at any moment his number might be up.  
When the enemy made it behind the lines or when Americans pressed into communist-held 
territory, the war had to be fought up close and personal.  Soldiers, and even Marines, who 
disliked the defensive nature of foxhole fighting, generally tried to shoot from the relative safety 
of their fortified shelters, but not infrequently in this war there were “so god damn many” of the 
enemy that they “just kept coming,” forcing Marines and doughboys alike to engage in hand-to-
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hand combat.110  Men used bayonets, gun butts, knives, fists, and even helmets to stave off 
attackers.  This close combat coupled with smaller squads than in previous wars and the need to 
use teamwork to destroy targets ensured that most Korean War infantrymen would fight and that 
a larger percentage of them would be willing to fire their weapons than in the last war.111 
Not surprisingly, chaos sometimes prevailed on the battlefield.  No matter how well-
planned an engagement, close combat and the nature of warfare in Korea fostered confusion.  At 
the Inchon Landing, one of the most carefully orchestrated actions of the Korean War, Marines 
discovered too late that their Korean interpreters could not speak English, guide boats had not 
arrived to lead them in, and their own boats had no compasses.112  Communications throughout 
the war rested upon equipment salvaged from World War II and one location had to reach 
another by being patched through by other places on the line.113   In some units, men did not 
even speak the same language.  KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army) 
replacements frequently knew no English and the mixture of Koreans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, 
and white or black Americans in the same platoons or companies meant that language classes 
had to be conducted when in reserve so that everyone could communicate on at least a basic 
level in battle.114   
Also, hungry, thirsty, dirty, exhausted, and terrified, men in the thick of battle got lost in 
the moment, their attention “sharply focused on … [their] immediate surroundings, which 
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nothing else gets into at all.”115  In such an atmosphere, things could and did happen.  One new 
platoon leader confessed that in his first Korean engagement he forgot his rank and began to 
function as a rifleman.116  Another soldier recalls that when a North Korean tried to surrender 
someone discharged a weapon causing everyone else to shoot in reaction.117  In July 1950, at a 
small hamlet in South Korea called No Gun Ri, refugees allegedly first fell victim to misdirected 
American-conducted air strikes and then to the fire of soldiers of the U.S. 7th Cavalry who got 
spooked and mistook them for elements of the North Korean People’s Army.118  In other 
instances, ground troops went temporarily berserk.  In the bayonet charge which won him the 
Congressional Medal of Honor, Lewis Millett “hit somebody in the throat with a bayonet, 
another one in the head” and killed a bunch of Chinese but later had “no memory of that at 
all.”119  During one firefight, a platoon mate of Vernon Warren determined he had to escape the 
war and stuck his hand out of the foxhole until he got shot.120   
Seldom knowing “the reason behind what we were doing, what the objective was, or 
what was coming next,” men on the front lines could hardly view battle as anything more than a 
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personal, “everyday affair of survival” and react accordingly.121  Desperate to survive, more than 
a few men simply tried to run away from enemy fire, bugging out without orders to retreat.  ROK 
troops and the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment developed such reputations for this, perhaps 
undeserved, that American G.I.s joked that the acronym KMAG (Korean Military Advisory 
Group) stood for “Kiss My Ass Goodbye” and composed little ditties like “The Bug Out 
Boogie.”122  But, meant as a derogatory comment on the nature of black soldiers and units, lines 
like “When them Chinese mortars begin to thud/The old Deuce-Four begin to bug./When they 
started falling ‘round the CP tent/Everybody wonder where the high brass went./They were 
buggin’ out/Just movin’ on” as aptly described the behavior of many non-African Americans.123  
Whether men broke ranks of their own accord or followed orders to retreat, their situation grew 
only more precarious upon leaving the field.  Alone or in small groups they lacked leadership 
and direction.124  Throwing away weapons or canteens with no one to stop them, those fleeing 
argued amongst themselves over which direction to take or what to do, greatly increasing their 
chances of becoming casualties or prisoners of war.125     
For men on the ground in Korea, combat could provide a source of exhilaration and pride 
unlike anything that they had previously experienced.  The adrenalin rush and self-confidence 
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that came with performing well in firefights and escaping injury or death proved “enormously 
satisfying.”126  But, battles also engendered great fear and anxiety in those who fought them.  In 
the heat of engagements with the enemy, participants “got the feeling that death was right around 
the corner and the next shell had my name written on it” and they were “scared as hell.”  “I 
almost wished I would get hit so I could be sent to the rear area to get away from the nightmare I 
found myself in.”127  Afterward, the lingering uncertainty of when the next attack would come 
caused some men to nearly crack.  At night they didn’t sleep because “there’s too much to worry 
about; such as … are those little yellow bastards going to hit us tonight.”  They got jumpy when 
they heard gunfire, no matter how distant, and shook uncontrollably, cold with the fear that their 
luck might finally have run out.128   With time enough to think, many G.I.s also became 
consumed with guilt, saddened because they had taken another life, given orders that got men 
killed, or survived while someone close to them perished in battle.129  A few turned to drugs like 
phenol to quay their apprehensions while others developed strange and dangerous habits like 
going around in their sleeping bags or trying to get “million dollar wounds” without being 
killed.130   
“Everyone has a limit” and in Korea some soldiers and Marines reached theirs, 
succumbing to combat fatigue.131  In their foxholes, along the line, and even in reserve men 
broke down.  With teeth chattering they sobbed uncontrollably, shivered, sweated, called 
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repeatedly for their mothers, and refused to take comfort. As Terry Addison says of one who 
cracked, “The war had gotten into his guts and he could not get it out.”132  Over the course of the 
Korean Conflict some 12% of American troops suffered combat stress reactions requiring 
treatment.133  Acting on research begun in World War I, which suggested that evacuating a 
person from the war zone intensified shell shock, doctors in Korea generally treated mental 
health casualties just behind the lines with a few days rest, simple psychotherapy, and/or a 
supply of barbiturates.  As a result, a majority of patients returned to duty, sometimes in a matter 
of days, ready again to face the rigors of living in a war zone.134  This is not to say that they went 
back the same men they had been before their breakdowns.  War, in which “things happen that 
are worse than anything you’ve ever seen and maybe anything that you could imagine,” left 
indelible imprints even on those well enough to rejoin their units.135   
The shared experience of battle usually served to draw men involved in the ground war in 
Korea closer together.  As one veteran puts it, “These were my friends from combat, and no 
other activity or environment forges stronger relationships.”136  In part, they realized that their 
own survival depended upon the willingness of those around them to fight, risking their own 
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lives on behalf of the group.137  When the bullets began to fly, a man could no longer count on 
anything or anyone except for himself and his buddies.  “You’re depending on them, and they’re 
depending on you.”138  But, the connection ran deeper than this.  Men who fought together 
developed familial feelings for each other with the result that they struggled not just for their 
own survival but with a willingness to die or suffer wounds for their comrades.  Of a mortally 
wounded radio operator in his unit, Martin Stephens remembers, “He did that for his pals.  He 
did that for us.”139  Similarly, Douglas Humphrey, twice hit and finally killed by a grenade, 
refused to leave an attack because “he wanted to stay and help his friends as much as he 
could.”140  These ties compelled men to remain in position during combat and made leaving the 
war zone a difficult task for more than a few men when they rotated out.141  Instinctively they 
knew that “there is something you get in battle that you get nowhere else.  There is a camaraderie 
that is unique.”142  In the years after the war, many battle buddies would remain in close contact 
with one another, sharing an unbreakable bond forged decades earlier in the hills of Korea.   
Just as combat in Korea cemented friendships among those who fought together, it 
fostered a deep loathing among Americans for the North Koreans, Chinese, and sometimes for 
Koreans in general.  Saddened by their losses and terrified by the experience of battle, G.I.s 
blamed the enemy for their misery.  If the North Koreans had not invaded South Korea or if the 
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Chinese had just stayed home, American soldiers would not be fighting and dying over Korea’s 
worthless, barren hills.  And, the North Koreans especially did not fight fair.  Americans greatly 
resented the atrocities perpetrated by North Koreans early in the war when they brutally 
murdered Americans who by rights should have been treated as prisoners of war.143  They 
concluded, “Those Gooks!  They’re not even part human!”144  Unsurprisingly, “many men 
fought with a visceral hatred of the enemy.”145   Sometimes that hatred transferred to all Koreans.  
South Korean civilians looked so much like North Korean adversaries that it could be difficult to 
tell the difference.  How many times had a cloud of South Korean refugees shielded approaching 
North Korean soldiers disguised as peasants?  And, with a culture so perceptibly inferior to the 
American way of life, many soldiers wondered what made any of them worth saving anyway, 
especially if the price might be one’s own life.146  A few Americans, however, did find a measure 
of compassion for their Asian adversaries.  Fred Lawson felt sorry for Chinese soldiers sent in 
tennis shoes to fight in the cold of North Korea and Uzal Ent acknowledged that the enemy “was 
serving his country and following orders, just as I was doing for my country.”147  But, such 
instances proved rare.  Like most men in war, the soldiers and Marines in Korea contentedly and 
perhaps necessarily vilified those whom they had to kill.   
Generally stationed well away from the front lines and flying above much of the 
pandemonium, men involved in the air war experienced combat differently than their infantry 
counterparts.  Unlike men on the ground, pilots and airmen often felt bulletproof.  “There’s no 
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thought of getting shot down yourself.  It’s always the other guy who runs out of luck.”148  They 
had flight schedules telling them when they would fly missions and engage in combat, giving 
them the luxury of preparing both mentally and physically for the challenge ahead.149  Also, 
many pilots, especially those dueling in the skies with MIGs, looked forward to facing the 
enemy.  Though American pilots realized that other humans operated hostile aircraft and lived in 
the hillsides being bombed out, aerial warfare seemed impersonal to them.  In general they did 
not see the blood spilling or the bones shattering.150  They saw only puffs of smoke and flames 
on the ground and hunks of metal falling from the sky.  Machines, not people, engaged in combat 
and suffered casualties.151  Like a giant video game, Korea afforded airmen the opportunity to 
score points by shooting down enemy planes or destroying targets, and those points in the end 
translated into rank and medals for those lucky or skillful enough to collect them.152  “Wrapped 
inside the cocoon of a high-tech fighting machine,” aerial warfare in Korea definitely differed 
from “crawling through the mud, gun or knife in hand” on the front lines.153  And, at the end of 
                                                 
148 Navy pilot Jim Service, in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 159.   
149 Airmen did not always use their time to prepare for combat.  All too often pilots drank heavily the night before a 
mission, reporting for duty with a hangover.  Some even had to throw up on the taxiway before take off.  However, 
almost all airmen did visit the latrines just before flying and with good reason.  Planes afforded no restroom 
facilities and word of frequent in-flight “problems” had caused flight suits to acquire the nickname “poopsuits.”  
Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 82. 
150 Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 90. 
151 See Pasqualicchio in Chancey and Forstchen, Hot Shots, 79.   
152 Pilots had to provide evidence of kills in order to get credit for them. Photographs would work, or confirmation 
by a wingman.  Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 71-72 and 88-89.  Also, Bob Ennis in Tomedi, No Bugles, No 
Drums, 163. 
153 Pasqualicchio in Chancey and Forstchen, Hot Shots, 79.  F-86 pilots flew 3 missions a week and 100 missions per 
tour of duty.  After every 30 missions, pilots received an Air Medal.  After 100, they got a Distinguished Flying 
Cross.  Ace status was awarded to men with a certain number of kills and silver stars to men with spectacular 
service.  In the Air Force, rank came as a direct result of performance in combat and number of missions flown.  
Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 85-86. 
 197
the day, pilots flew back to the base or aircraft carrier where they could cozy up with a nice shot 
of whiskey while being debriefed and then hang out at the “O” Club until time for bed.154 
All of this is not to say that pilots and their crews escaped the horrors of battle.  Airmen, 
regardless of branch of service, risked their lives every time they went on a mission.  Many died 
in the line of duty, “blown to bits as their shot-up planes exploded before they were able to reach 
the runway or crushed to death because a parachute didn’t open when they bailed out,” many 
more became prisoners of war, and some developed debilitating mental illnesses or the fear of 
flying.155  Despite their belief in luck, almost none left Korea without a close call to remind them 
of their own mortality.  Like Bud Biteman, they had scars or bullets as mementos, reminding 
them “how thin and fragile is the thread of ‘luck’ and just how close I came to using my entire 
allotment.”156  Also, pulling the trigger on targets sometimes proved anything but impersonal.  
After shooting a MIG, Harold Fischer pulled up alongside the burning, dying aircraft.  Inside, the 
trapped pilot had no power, no place to land, and no way out of the insufferable heat.  All Fischer 
could do was fire a few rounds behind the plane to try and shorten the pilot’s misery while 
reflecting that the enemy consisted of only flesh and blood after all.157  Other pilots had orders to 
fly low and strafe enemy troops, drop napalm in areas where both North Korean or Chinese and 
American forces would be hit, and stop waves of refugees by shooting into the crowd.  They 
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discovered that talking about such missions in the “detached atmosphere of the Operations 
Office” differed considerably from actually implementing the plans and seeing people killed 
from a lower altitude.158  Still, unlike most infantrymen who could not wait to get out of the war 
zone, many pilots lived for the missions.  They extended their tours of duty, flew on holidays, 
used sexual language to describe their aircraft and their kills, and feared any injury which might 
keep them from flying again.  “That’s all we wanted to do, all of us.  To be able to get up the 
next morning and fly an airplane.”159  
In Korea, as in every war, whether one served on the line, in the cockpit, or aboard ship, 
death lay at the heart of battle.  In the name of country or in the interest of self-preservation, men 
in combat killed other men, inflicting collateral damage in the process.  For some American 
servicemen, the transformation from civilian to combatant happened effortlessly.  “It’s like 
killing a rabbit if you’re a hunter…You look at the enemy in abstract terms…as a cobra 
snake…it’s something that needs to be destroyed.”160  For a few the changes came too easily and 
too completely.  “We were highly successful killers and the greed to continue our trade was a 
force that drove us on…All we wanted to do was kill gooks.  Kill gooks this minute, kill gooks 
by the thousand, kill them with hot lead, cold steel, or ripping explosives—but kill gooks.”161  
But for most Americans, killing did not come naturally and the suffering and deaths they caused 
or witnessed affected them profoundly.  Half a century after the war, Walter Benton still 
remembers with regret the ancient Korean woman he met on Christmas Eve 1950 while awaiting 
evacuation from Hungnam, North Korea.  Bringing her to the warmth of the fire where he fed 
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her tomato soup, the 18 year old listened to the old woman’s tale of exhaustion and lost family 
and then tried to convince her to leave for a safer place.  While “White Christmas” played in the 
background, Benton watched from the deck of the ship as charges set off to destroy abandoned 
munitions eviscerated the old woman.162  Similarly, the memory of a Korean kid hit with napalm 
still haunts Jessie Forrest whose captain forbade him to shoot the boy and end his pain.163  Facing 
the deaths of North Korean or Chinese soldiers should have been easier, and at the time they 
usually were, but pulling the trigger left men with loads of emotional baggage to carry long after 
the end of the war.  As James Appleton writes, “It is hard for a veteran to explain … what it is 
like to line up an enemy soldier in the cross hairs of your sniper rifle, as this unassuming 
individual walks along not knowing that in the next instance you are going to squeeze the trigger 
of your rifle and take the top of his head off, and his mother will have lost a son and he will 
never have children of his own.”164 
Not all men in country or even in battle killed someone, but scarcely a combat survivor 
rotated out of Korea without first tasting the bitter harvest of death that war produced in 
abundance.  In the last few months of 1950, soldiers not infrequently found their comrades 
murdered by the North Koreans.  Rather than taking prisoners, Inmun Gun troops often simply 
beat and killed enemy soldiers that they happened across.  As U.N. troops recovered South 
Korean land, they found the bodies of Americans with skulls smashed in and with hands lashed 
behind their backs and bullets in their heads.165  Aside from these, plenty of other deaths played 
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out in the lives of men in Korea, too.  Reluctantly leaving the safety of his foxhole to repair 
communications wires, Bennie Gordon returned to find his foxhole mate dead and for three days 
had to work around the body.  In the aftermath of the enormous and chaotic Chinese offensive in 
North Korea in the winter of 1950, Vernon Warren discovered a friend with his entire backside 
blown off.  Helpless, Warren bandaged the dying man and tried to calm him with reassurances 
that “you’re going to make it.”166  Jim Dick radioed the field to inform Lieutenant Griffin that his 
wife had given birth to a baby boy only to learn that Griffin’s head had just been blown off by a 
mortar round.167  Jessie Forrest watched his buddy jump on a grenade. The man saved ten or 
twelve lives but lost his own.168  After chasing a MIG all the way to China, Major Robinson 
Risner and pal Joe Logan ran out of fuel.  Risner made it to safety, but after Logan bailed out his 
neck became entangled in his parachute and he drowned.169  Becoming an instrument of death, 
Herman Lee Mingee relayed orders for his ship to open fire on a position where American 
Marines would be killed alongside North Koreans.170   Crews aboard aircraft carriers celebrated 
in high fashion when ejected pilots made it back safely because all too often rescue came too late 
to save men from the enemy or the icy waters below.171  Ships got torpedoed and sailors died in 
the line of duty.172  Such scenes played out tens of thousands of times in the three years that men 
fought over real estate in Korea.  Policymakers counted costs in terms of rounds of ammunition 
or dollars spent, but on the line men paid for the war with blood.  They understood what it was 
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like “to see your buddy, with whom you were talking … about girlfriends or home cooking, 
suddenly lying there in the trail with blood gushing out every orifice and he is trying to hold his 
guts in from spilling out on the ground.”173  And, this “loss of close friends is indescribable.”174  
Ever-present, the smell, sight, and pain of death pervaded the Korean War battle experience. 
 For most servicemen, the tally of American war dead and wounded grew longer and more 
personal than they had imagined it would.  As they watched comrades die, stumbled across 
bloodied G.I.s, and experienced close calls themselves, men became reminded of their own 
mortality and vulnerability.  Not only were they not bulletproof, but their lives and those of the 
men with whom they shared foxholes or cockpits and stories could be snuffed out unexpectedly 
in an instant.  Some, like Rolly Miller responded to such realizations by drawing closer to 
comrades, remarking “It’s funny how a severe action kind of makes you feel like a family.”175  
Others distanced themselves from those around them.  Like Doug Michaud, they “no longer 
wanted any buddies.”  They stopped asking new men their names and kept to their own company 
as much as possible.  That way, “If you get killed, I don’t know you and I don’t care.  You’re 
just another number, another rifle.”176   
Battle changed men on the inside.  In order to survive, soldiers and airmen simply had to 
put their emotions aside and “get on with what had to be done.”177  “One could not, must not, be 
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upset by death.”178  Thus, instead of crying over fallen comrades, men in Korea learned to greet 
the deaths around them calmly, matter-of-factly, perhaps even callously.  In his diary, Raymond 
Myers recorded that he “Drove the jeep all day.  We had chicken for supper.  Draper got killed.  
A round hit right in his hole.  All I could find was a piece of meat.  Nothing else.”179  Similarly, 
reporter Marguerite Higgins noticed that “When someone was killed they [the Marines] would 
wearily, matter of factly, pick up the body and throw it in the nearest truck.”180  And, upon 
seeing a dead friend, Private First Class Guy Robinson fixed his eyes on the man ahead and kept 
walking.181  In the war zone, on the battlefield, a man could only take note of the losses, attend a 
makeshift funeral if time allowed, and move on.  Only later, when a man left the war, could he 
begin to deal with the guilt, regret, and emptiness saved up from the tragedies of Korea.  Only 
then could he ask, “Could I have done better?  If I’d done a better job, would fewer men have 
died?”182  And only then could a man know if when he left the war, the war left him.  Combat 
did not stop for such questions, and, if one looked away for too long, he might run out of time for 
answers.  In battle, men necessarily had to focus their attention sharply on survival and if they 
succeeded in surviving, they somehow had to learn to live within the war.   
 
Living Within War 
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Undoubtedly, combat produced the most poignant memories for those who fought and 
made for some of the best stories later.  And, in the years since the Korean War, moviemakers 
and historians alike have almost exclusively memorialized battles like Pork Chop Hill or the 
retreat from Chosin Reservoir.  But, battles seldom lasted more than a week or so and never for 
any given person’s entire tour of duty.  Whether sheltered in foxholes or bunkers on the front 
lines, stationed at hospitals or aboard ship, or harbored safely in reserve within the confines of 
territory held tightly by the U. N., men and women lived within the war without constantly 
participating in it.  In reality, most, if not all, Americans spent far more time living in Korea than 
fighting there.  Their war was “one of long periods of great boredom with a few flashes of 
intense terror.”183  As Thomas McLain wrote his parents in the spring of 1951, “Combat sure is 
different than I figured.  I thought you fought day and night but sometimes it’s days before I 
even hear a shot fired….We seldom even see the Chinks.”184  Still, “nothing ever came easy in 
Korea.”185   
For men and women accustomed to luxuries like home-cooked meals, telephone service, 
electricity, clean clothing and bedding, furnaces, and running water, the primitive living 
conditions in country made them long for home.  Except in places like Seoul, where modern 
buildings existed, American military personnel lived in crude and simple dwellings.  Where 
practical, such as at airfields or mobile hospital sites behind the lines, tents surrounded by 
sandbags became temporary or even permanent shelters.  These had the distinct advantage of 
being above ground, but often they lacked electricity, running water, adequate heating and 
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ventilation, flooring other than dirt, and any semblance of privacy.186  Pilots, who below the rank 
of major shared “hootch” space with 6 to 12 other men, piled up packing crates and debris inside 
their tents to carve out private cubicles for themselves.  Standard furnishings included small oil 
burning stoves for heat, candles for light, and G.I. cots, but not much else.187   
Intended for common use, showers and latrines could be found outside somewhere, an 
unpleasant fact given the extreme winter temperatures in Korea, and these left little room for 
secrets among those who shared them.  At the “40-seater thunderbox” at one airbase, pilots sat 
shoulder to shoulder on a long wooden bench with holes in it to do their business.188  Elsewhere 
troops straddled shallow ditches, called slit trench latrines, or sat back to back when relieving 
themselves.189  For all of their privations, however, those who lived in Korea’s tent cities had 
many benefits unavailable to the men holed up in the country’s hills, including ready access to 
cheap labor.  Pilots and others often employed native laborers to clean the barracks and latrines, 
do their laundry, shine their shoes, keep stoves burning all night, serve them in the mess hall, and 
make life in country more pleasing and comfortable.190   
In the field and at the front, accommodations afforded far fewer luxuries to occupants 
than did the tents.  There, men lived in dusty, moist holes shoveled into the ground or hillsides in 
an attempt to protect themselves from enemy fire and attack.  For months they slept on “nothing 
better than the ground with some straw on it.”191  As the war stalemated, forcing men to live in 
the same positions for many months, trenches eroded and some shelters collapsed in landslides 
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or from the weight of wet sandbags, causing men to have to dig deeper.192   Over time, 
conditions in these permanent bunkers grew increasingly grim.  When men rotated out, they left 
behind piles of garbage and, in some cases, towers of human waste.  Not only did the number of 
men outstrip the available space at latrines, but the potential danger of traversing the ground 
between foxholes and bathrooms discouraged some from making any unnecessary trips to the pit 
toilets.  As a result, four inch “piss tubes” appeared outside of many dugouts, creating 
stalagmites of frozen urine in the winter and puddles of filth in warmer weather.193  Unlike 
latrines, nobody bothered to burn these makeshift urinals or police the mess men made using 
them.  Attracted by all the refuse, rats infested almost all living quarters, providing a constant 
source of irritation and illness for the men inside.194   
Soldiers and Marines stuck living in such places would have welcomed a bath or fresh 
clothing, but field conditions left many with virtually no access to showers or laundry facilities.  
When on the move, men might happen across places to bathe or wash, but they had little time to 
spare for personal hygiene and could end up regretting any such efforts on their part.  Trying to 
keep clean, Harry Van Zandt washed his only two pairs of socks just before being ordered to 
march.  For six days he wore wet socks inside of his rubber shoe packs with the result that his 
skin came off with the socks once he removed them and he developed a chronic case of athlete’s 
foot.195  When troops did park somewhere along the front, showers were far enough behind the 
lines to discourage men from frequenting them.  Along the main line of resistance and on 
outposts water had to be carried in, sometimes across “no-man’s land” in full view of the 
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enemy.196  As a result, men made the most of every drop of water they had.  On outposts, men 
boiled coffee, drank some of it, and washed their faces and brushed their teeth with the 
residue.197  Everywhere, soldiers and Marines got filthy quick and stayed that way.198  G.I.s 
worked, dug holes, sweat, bled, fought, and slept in the same pair of fatigues until relieved by 
another unit or sent into reserve.  After three weeks in Korea, Harrison Lee realized “I still had 
on the same set of fatigues that I was wearing when I landed at Pusan.”199  He was fortunate.  
Elgen Fujimoto spent 63 days on the line before he finally got to take a hot shower and change 
clothes.200  In wintertime, wearing the same uniforms could prove especially problematic.  
Though warm, the bulk of winter garments made using the bathroom a real challenge and some 
men couldn’t get out of them fast enough.201  Men smelled like the holes they lived in or worse, 
suffered from dysentery and lice, and developed hacking coughs that never seemed to go 
away.202   
As an added burden, throughout the war troops had difficulty obtaining all of the supplies 
and equipment that they needed or wanted.  Early in the war, soldiers had trouble getting such 
necessities as ammunition and anti-tank weapons.  Caught in North Korea in the winter of 1950 
when the Chinese entered the conflict, soldiers and Marines could still complain that they had to 
deal with ammunition shortages, but they could add depleted provisions of food and an 
inadequate supply of cold weather gear to their list of supply problems.203  By February 1951, 
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servicemen fighting near Seoul began writing home asking for food and canned goods to 
supplement the “gook rice” on which they had to survive.204  Once the war stalemated, it became 
more difficult to fill requisitions as politicians and bureaucrats tried to limit war costs while 
waiting for some kind of peace agreement.  Fighting on an outpost, John Sullivan complained 
that he had flamethrowers but couldn’t get the two dollar disks to ignite them.  He, probably 
accurately, placed the blame on a battalion commander who was “screwing around with some 
idiotic cost-reduction program.”205  On a personal level, men in the outposts and along the main 
line of resistance could seldom get little luxuries like candles or paper and pencils through the 
regular channels.  Unfortunately, as in most wars, troops in the rear echelons took many of these 
items out of supply shipments long before they could reach the fighting war up front.  If a soldier 
were determined or clever enough, however, he might be able to get some things on his own, 
much like Radar O’Reilly in the television sitcom M*A*S*H.  In Korea, possession often 
depended less upon official authorization than upon one’s ingenuity.  Men secured the things 
they wanted or needed by bargaining with other individuals or units.  Arthur Kelly remembers 
that his unit swapped lumber to the Marines for the use of a bulldozer so that they did not have to 
hand-dig their artillery bunker.206  All too often, though, not even a good trade could produce the 
necessary items.  Ralph Parr, a pilot, had a pair of flying gloves and a flight suit only because he 
brought them with him to Korea.  Other pilots simply did without these essential pieces of 
equipment early in the war.  And, Parr had to wear a broken jet helmet held together by masking 
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tape while other men donned plastic football helmets for flying because the Air Force had not yet 
issued jet helmets to those in Korea.207  In all wars, supplying the troops presents logistical, 
financial, and other problems.  The nature of the Korean War as a limited war intensified these 
issues, straining the resolve and commitment of people on the home front to the conflict and to 
the men fighting it.  Sadly, the Korean War proved too easy to ignore and men and women in 
country often found the things which might have eased the stresses of Korea beyond their reach.   
Despite occasional shortages, however, the military did usually manage to provide troops 
with regular rations of food.  Behind the lines, mess tents offered at least one hot meal a day, a 
luxury that troops in reserve took advantage of and appreciated.208  Most combat soldiers, 
though, even once the war turned static, found walking to the mess tent both dangerous and 
impractical and so they subsisted on the food delivered to their positions.  When possible, 
Korean laborers brought warm meals in containers to soldiers, but more often these G.I.s ate cold 
C-Rats straight from the cans.209  During the Korean War, C-Rats or combat rations consisted of 
several little cans of food, including entrees like spaghetti and meatballs, chicken stew, beans 
and franks (a favorite dish), ham and lima beans (an unpopular selection known widely as “ham 
and motherfuckers”), and beef stew as well as items like canned fruit, tinned biscuits, candy bars 
or chocolate, coffee, and beverage powders.   Meant to supply a man for an entire day, C-Rat 
boxes, shaped sort of like shoeboxes, also contained toilet paper, soap, cigarettes, gum, and little 
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can openers.210  As long as men stayed put at their holes, most of the ration might be consumed, 
but not uncommonly young Americans ended up pocketing and eating only the sweets—canned 
peaches or candy—and either abandoning the remainder when they moved out or trading it for 
local produce or someone else’s fruit or cigarettes .  Not surprisingly, soldiers and Marines lost 
weight while living on the line and many of them got cavities.211   
A host of other things made life in Korea unpalatable for Americans.  For those living in 
the foxholes and trenches across from the North Koreans or Chinese, enemy propaganda made 
life miserable.  In its most innocuous form, such efforts consisted of scattered leaflets 
admonishing the Americans to stop trying to grab Korea for themselves.212  But, the Communists 
found other, more effective techniques to demoralize and terrorize American troops before the 
war’s end.  Sometimes they beat drums or blew “Taps” at dark to remind their captive audience 
in the opposite trench line that Korea might offer them nothing but death.213  Other times they 
played American music in an attempt to make soldiers homesick or produced eerie sounds to 
frighten them.214  The North Koreans and Chinese also made nightly broadcasts over 
loudspeakers or on the radio.  These ranged from almost laughable attempts to convince G.I.s of 
the righteousness of the communist cause to more haunting presentations given in flawless 
English.  At least one American woman, Anne Walker Suhr, dubbed “Seoul City Sue” by 
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soldiers in Korea, lent her voice to the communist propaganda effort.  Suhr, a onetime Methodist 
missionary to Korea who had married a Korean national and adopted his communist beliefs, 
aired a radio program during the war in which she read aloud the names of dead Americans 
while jangling dog tags in the background.215  Frequently North Koreans and Chinese called out 
the names of the men and units across from them, making soldiers aware that the enemy knew 
who they were, and encouraging them to surrender or go home.  Black soldiers especially found 
themselves targets of psychological warfare.  Grant Hauskins, an African American veteran, 
remembers hearing, “Hey black soldier, what are you doing here, your war is not here but on the 
streets of America, where they treat you like pigs and dogs.”216  Regardless of color, patriotism, 
or corps, enemy propaganda had the effect of making young Americans living a world away 
from home more lonely, frightened, homesick, and tired of war.  And, in an environment where 
sleep came only with difficulty anyway, these chilling messages from the enemy further ensured 
a lack of rest for Americans on the front lines.217 
Along with physical discomfort, troops living within the war zone faced mental 
challenges.  Even during periods of calm, the landscape of Korea provided ample reminder that 
“the business of war is to kill.”218  At church services, men received communion with “rifles 
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slung from their shoulders” and wondered if they would be “forgiven for breaking the 
commandment, ‘Thou shall not kill.’”219  More conspicuously, American G.I.s frequently used 
enemy bodies as protective barricades or simply left them where they had fallen.  In winter, these 
froze solid, but in warmer weather they rotted on the concertina wire below the trenches, an 
unappetizing view for the men eating and living above.220  Arthur Kelly remembers walking past 
a leg sticking up out of the ground and wondering who the man was and if his family knew he 
was dead.  For him, this symbolized “the reality of war…an inhumane, sad thing.”221  Others felt 
a keen sense of tragedy or even guilt when confronted with the presence of refugees or orphans.  
Having lost everything, including family, South Koreans survived by begging or living off of 
American waste.  As Major Dean Hess, who founded the first Air Force sponsored orphanage in 
Korea, noted, “It was both heartbreaking and nauseating to see these ragged children lean over 
and dip their swill with tin cans, trying to scoop up choice morsels from our garbage.”222  Many 
Americans did what they could to alleviate the suffering around them.  G.I.s shared their food, 
donated time and money to relief projects, and provided medical assistance to civilians.  Some 
even advertised in stateside newspapers for shoes, clothing, candy, soap, and other things to be 
distributed to needy Koreans on Christmas Day.223  In the end, though, most could not help but 
feel haunted by the shattered lives and sad images all around them. 
American troops might have coped better emotionally with the devastation they 
witnessed if they believed the war had some larger purpose, but “very few of us involved in the 
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war understood why we were there.”224  Of course, almost everyone heard the rhetoric, that the 
U.S. had undertaken the defense of South Korea to protect the world against the spread of 
communism and preserve democracy in however small a place.  Many even accepted this as 
worthwhile.  “I was going to fight for a country against the aggression of North Korea and the 
arms and weapons support from Red China as well as the USSR….at the time and even today the 
fight was worth it!”225  In a similar vein, before he was killed in action, Rolly Miller wrote home, 
“We are fighting a godless thought … we’re combating this ideology.  If we accomplish nothing 
more than proving to the world we’ll fight with the little guy to protect his dignity as a human 
being, I feel we have done enough to justify the sacrifices we have made.”226  Stirred by 
patriotism, others asserted, “I love America and always will, and I’m ready to give everything for 
her—even life itself if that’s what God wants.”227   
In light of ugly realities like bombed out villages and American casualties, vague 
generalizations tended to ring hollow.228  As one G.I. put it, “We heard all the bullshit about 
fighting the spread of communism to protect our land of liberty.  What the hell did we know 
about communism?  Not a motherfuckin’ thing.”229  Reflecting upon democracy back in the 
States and the segregation that it tolerated, black soldiers in particular wondered, “What the hell 
am I doing over here” and “What had the commies ever done to us black people (that is, before 
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we came to Korea)?”230  Furthermore, as the war dragged on, Americans in Korea sensed that 
there existed no viable means of winning the war and no way of measuring victory anyway.231  
They might fight forever and still not make a dent in the Chinese army much less drive it off the 
Korean Peninsula.  Eventually, some men found their own rationales for fighting the war—to 
provide a more hopeful future for the children of South Korea, to ensure that communists would 
never again try to subdue a free nation, to prove their loyalty to the Constitution and the United 
States—and now, more than half a century later, most agree that their service meaningfully 
contributed to American national security and endowed South Koreans with the freedoms they 
presently enjoy.  But at the time, a lot of American servicemen thought of Korea as nothing more 
than “a miserable war … and a useless war” and their only goal was to survive it one day at a 
time.232  In 1951 David Duncan, a photographer for Life, asked a Marine in Korea, “If I were 
God and could give you anything you wanted, what would you ask for?”  The Marine didn’t ask 
for peace or freedom or even the chance to go home.  He simply said, “Gimme tomorrow.”233 
Whether or not they believed in their mission or in American involvement in Korea, 
Americans living in country struggled with their feelings toward the home front.  Certainly, 
almost everyone suffered from homesickness and tried to keep in touch with what was happening 
in the States.  Millions of letters passed back and forth between men and women in Korea and 
their loved ones back home.  Newspapers printed servicemen’s advertisements imploring people 
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to “Please Write this Lonely GI” or send homemade goodies like cakes and cookies to those 
serving overseas.234  And, people responded to such pleas.  In little towns and big cities all across 
America, women formed circles to buy and ship familiar sundries like paper, soap, shaving 
cream, razors, and candy to the war zone.235  A few young ladies even became romantically 
invested in the pen pals they made, bringing men closer to home in mind if not in body.236  Men 
also pumped new replacements for any sort of stateside news.237  They wanted to know what 
bands or songs were being played back home, what hometown newspapers were saying about the 
war, and who looked good for the World Series.  Like Edgar Miller, they tuned in to “Voice of 
America” on the radio.  “Even though it wasn’t my hometown, it was America, and the station 
brought ‘home’ to me as I listened.”238  Americans held tight to their memories and pictures and 
from their tents and dugouts they dreamed about returning to hot ham and egg breakfasts, clean 
sheets, cold beer, new cars, Sunday dinners, and all the other things about home and country that 
they “so completely took for granted before I left.”239   
But, while G.I.s often longed to rotate back to the States and worked to maintain 
connections with the home front, interactions from the war zone could prove disheartening and 
disappointing.  On a personal level, many men found their relationships with girlfriends, wives, 
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family, and friends strained by the long separation.  Letters might keep them in touch, but mail 
was at best a “poor substitute for conversation” and “woefully inadequate” at maintaining 
feelings of closeness.  Couples like Charles Bussey and his wife Thelma moved “further and 
further apart” with each passing month, and many men’s marriages unraveled while they 
remained stuck in Korea.240  Not uncommonly, men discovered that their spouses, unable to cope 
with the lengthy deployment, had sought comfort with someone else back home.241  Others, like 
Frank Bifulk, simply received “Dear John” letters which unexpectedly informed them that one 
less person was awaiting their return from the war.242  With no way to lobby for themselves in 
person, servicemen could do little but try to put the sadness behind them and focus on surviving 
in country.  Even when things seemed fine, soldiers and Marines worried about being forgotten 
or forsaken by the ones they had left behind and letters home reflected a deep need for 
reassurance.  As Thomas McLain wrote, “I’m not worried about myself hon, I’m worried about 
you.  I want to be sure and have your love when I get back.”243  Songs like “Dear John Letter” 
and “Korea Blues” revealed and perhaps deepened these fears of losing lovers or friends because 
of duty in Korea.244   
Under the best of circumstances, marriages and other relationships weathered the 
challenges of distance and time, giving men the feeling that they had someone to live for and 
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something to tie them to their old lives.  These connections, however, did not always result in 
complete satisfaction on the part of those who participated in the war.  Men in country needed to 
believe that they could rotate back to the States and be the husbands, brothers, sons, and friends 
that they had been before this conflict.  But, a great many feared that the things they had done or 
seen in Korea had worked too many changes on them, changes that people back home would not 
be able to accept.245  Combat veterans especially felt that “there was no way the folks at home 
could understand any part of my life.”246  And, to a large extent, they were probably right.  Back 
on Main Street, old notions of appropriateness still ruled the day, but in the topsy turvy world of 
the war where very little made sense anyway, different standards applied.  Here, profanity 
became the preferred, habitual means of expression and irreverence dominated the humor and 
outlook of the average G.I.247  In medical units, doctors rushed to the bedsides of critical patients 
who turned out to be skeletons outfitted with fake medical tags and diagnoses like diarrhea or 
fractured skull.248  Infantrymen sang ballads with verses like “F*** ‘em all, f*** ‘em all,/The 
Commies, the U.N. and all;/Those slant-eyed Chink Soldiers/Struck Hagaru-ri/And now we 
know the meaning of USMC….”249  Men sewed stars on their fatigues and declared themselves 
generals with the rationale that “Nobody in this chicken shit outfit promoted me, so I promoted 
myself.”250  And soldiers composed poems like “Appropriateness” which demonstrated that in 
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Korea few topics proved off limits for entertainment.  “Mortar shrapnel ripped his canteen from 
its web belt./We all laughed./Had it been his head/We would not have laughed ‘til later.”251  
Obviously these behaviors could not be explained easily by a son to his mother or a boyfriend to 
his sweetheart.  Consequently, letters from Korea remained quite guarded.252  Instead of talking 
about the brutal realities of battle, the loneliness and fear that permeated everyday life on the 
front, or their somewhat unconventional ways of dealing with the stress, men (and women) 
conveyed funny stories or dwelt on the mundane, generic topics that would find ready approval 
among their friends and families.253  Unfortunately, while censoring and sanitizing their 
correspondence helped G.I.s salvage their marriages and protect home ties, it also left them with 
the uneasy feeling that perhaps when they returned home these relationships might yet become 
casualties of the war and of the real, if unspoken, gulf that separated Korea from the home front.   
Depressingly aware that they were paying the costs of the Korean War with divorces, 
deaths, uncomfortable living conditions, moments of terror, and personal tragedies, many 
Americans in country came to resent both the United States Government and the American 
public.  As Private First Class James Cardinal put it, “The troops over here are mad, mad at 
America, Americans and America’s leaders.  We all feel we’ve been let down by our 
incompetent and blundering leadership, from the White House down.”254  Old enough to 
remember the respect and gratitude accorded to World War II veterans and too young to recollect 
their country’s treatment of veterans of earlier wars, service members in Korea felt entitled to 
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something more than they were receiving for their troubles.  On a basic level, men and women 
serving in the war zone wanted recognition that Korea was as much of a war as any that the 
United States had fought in the past, not merely a “police action” as President Truman and the 
press persisted in calling it.  They complained bitterly that “They may call this a police action, 
but men are loseing [sic] their lives the same as in the last war” and “they should make that 
comment to the parents or wives whose sons or husbands were killed in action.”255  They also 
felt that their country owed them the same benefits that it had seen fit to grant to the veterans of 
World War II.  From the hillsides and battlefronts of Korea, servicemen angrily demanded a 
comparable G.I. Bill.  Asserting, “I would like to go to college if I live thru this damn police 
action,” they asked “what is the government doing about us over here?”256  And, when the 
answers failed to satisfy them, they persisted.  “Why, sir,” one man wrote Senator Robert Taft, 
“are we excluded from the rights, the hostilities were over for 2 years and fellows who enlisted 
for a peacetime army for 18 months receive the benefits of the Bill of Rights, but those who are 
now in Korea, even if only for a year are forgotten or seem to be by our government?”257  
Eventually such lobbying paid off and Congress passed a Korean G. I. Bill of Rights, but for 
many veterans the seeming reluctance and slowness with which this was done served only to 
reinforce notions that America somehow regarded them differently than its sons and daughters of 
the Second World War. 
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Aside from a lack of political recognition, the troops in Korea had other reasons to feel 
like the home front had abandoned and forgotten them.  Every day Americans laid down their 
lives in service to country on the Korean Peninsula, but back in the States people seemed 
completely disinterested in the war.  Front page headlines advertised “a growing shortage of 
beef, graft scandals in the Government, strikes as usual, [and] prospects of a new-car scarcity.”258  
The war just did not seem all that newsworthy after the early months and especially once it 
stalemated.  As Bill Mauldin noted of the Korean War infantryman, “He fights a battle in which 
his best friends get killed and if an account of the action gets printed at all in his home town 
paper, it appears on page 17 under a Lux ad.”259  And, more than not paying attention to the war, 
people on the home front actually compromised the ability of men and women to carry out their 
duties in Korea—at least from the perspective of those in the war zone.  Strikes and the attention 
paid them not only distracted Americans, but deprived men in the field of the supplies they 
needed.  Shortages at home meant the rationing of things like ammunition and equipment in the 
war zone.  Of one strike a frustrated G.I. in theater wrote, “We felt it very definitely in the 
shortage of supplies and especially of equipment for several days.  It woke me up to how closely 
connected all the fronts we battle on are.  You begin to wonder if the old country realizes there’s 
a war going on over here.”260  Similarly, returning from Korea, another serviceman asserted, 
“Strikes at home make the GI feel … that people are so preoccupied with their own self-interests 
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that they seem to have forgotten that we are fighting a war. The shortages due to the shipping 
strike in New York last autumn could be felt in Korea within two weeks.”261   
Soldiers in country repeatedly complained that their country and countrymen left them to 
fight the war with secondhand weapons, trucks, jeeps, and artillery.262  With a Marine platoon 
somewhere in Korea, Richard Bevier pondered the fact that the warranty on his unit’s howitzers 
had expired as the manufacturer only guaranteed them for three years or 10,000 rounds of 
ammunition, whichever came first.  Wryly he concluded that the guns were still more dependable 
than the ammunition, much of which was dated 1940.  “It had probably been to the Pacific and 
back a couple of times.”263  More succinctly, James Boden observed, “Guns that would not work, 
ammo that would not fire.”264  Men fighting in Korea wanted people in the United States to 
“know and give a damn,” but believed that “they don’t know and don’t care.  Because it doesn’t 
touch them.”265  No wonder then, when they talked “about the old home country,” their 
conversations contained both “sadness and even a little bit of bitterness.”266 
If men or women felt unhappy about their situation in Korea, they could complain in 
letters or to members of the press, but seldom could they express themselves at the ballot box.  
With catchphrases like “If they are old enough to fight they are old enough to vote,” some 
senators and congressmen during the conflict pushed to lower the minimum voting age from 21 
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to 18.  They did not want men to “feel they are being shanghaied into the Armed Forces without 
having a voice in their own government.”267  Throughout the war, however, such efforts 
invariably failed, leaving thousands of young draftees eligible to fight in Korea but ineligible to 
vote in state or national elections.268  In the 1950s, color also excluded some of those in Korea 
from voting.  More than a decade before President Lyndon Johnson’s Voting Rights Act, many 
Southern blacks could not participate in the political process regardless of age and some Native 
Americans did not get the right to vote until the late 1950s.269  Finally, even if service members 
met all the requirements for voting in their home states, they might not be able to vote from 
Korea.  Some states banned absentee voting outright.  Restrictive voting laws barred as many as 
a million G.I.s around the world from voting in elections like the presidential race of 1952.270  
Other times, the process got so complicated that it discouraged Americans stationed overseas 
from attempting to cast absentee ballots.  In the 1952 presidential election, for instance, G.I.s had 
to apply for a federal postcard from a voting officer, fill it out, and mail it to his/her home state.  
When the ballot came, the G.I. had to go before the voting officer, mark the ballot, seal it in an 
envelope, sign it, get it notarized, and then take it to the registered mail window at the post 
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office.271  Needless to say, many found the procedure too cumbersome and many others could 
not possibly fulfill the requirements from where they were stationed.   
As a result, a few men settled for writing letters to their congressmen or hometown 
newspapers, but with mixed results.  In 1951 letters sent from an engineer detachment in Korea 
to stateside papers questioning the purpose of the war prompted a discussion in the House of 
Representatives as to whether or not the men should be investigated by the Army as possible 
participants in a communist plot.  Ultimately, Representative S. J. Crumpacker, Jr. from Indiana 
defended the soldiers saying, “We cannot expect to draft men and send them to fight and 
possibly die for us in Korea and then refuse to tell them why we are doing so and what our 
purpose is in fighting such a war.”272  But, in the deepening Cold War climate and in the middle 
of an unpopular and stalemated war the situation could have turned out far differently.  
Congressmen and Americans might as easily have seen communists or collaborators as tired and 
confused soldiers and these men might have faced courts martial for misconduct or worse as 
happened to returning POWs after the conflict. 
Perhaps G.I.s could not influence the government or public opinion back home, but a few 
did manage to work the system and find a safe and legal way to leave Korea before their tours of 
duty ended.  In the early 1950s Army policy allowed soldiers, even those stationed in the war 
zone, to apply to Officer Candidate School.  If chosen, an applicant returned to the United States 
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as soon as OCS could make room for him.  Army regulations then barred those men from 
reassignment overseas until they completed a minimum stateside tour.  Sensing the possibilities, 
infantrymen and artillerymen in Korea applied for OCS, shipped back to the States, and then 
resigned from their respective programs after only a couple of weeks.  They still had to finish 
their 21 or 24 months with the Army, but most of them had so little time left that they knew they 
would “sweat out” their release from the service in America and not in the deadly hills of Korea.  
Eventually the Army did close off this avenue of escape from the war theater.  By the spring of 
1952, new policies designed to deal with the problem stated that men who voluntarily withdrew 
from OCS before completion could be returned to the area from which they came without a 
stateside waiting period.  Men in Korea could still ask for OCS, but admission no longer 
guaranteed them a final exit from the war.  Still, dozens of men slipped out of the war zone and 
back home before the Army put these new rules into effect.273   
While in Korea, Marines, sailors, airmen, soldiers, doctors, and nurses, like young 
Americans everywhere, found ways to entertain and distract themselves.  Behind the lines, 
service personnel played chess and checkers, set up volleyball and basketball courts, had 
barbecues and beer busts, and formed poker clubs.274  They attended USO events when possible 
and indulged in drinking alcohol rations or black market booze.275  Early in the war, the military 
supplied enlisted troops with two cans of beer a day and officers with a bottle of whiskey a 
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month, just enough to fend off boredom and help one temporarily forget about the war.276  Even 
tea-totalers sometimes became drinkers in Korea, but perhaps nobody in country enjoyed liquor 
more than airmen.  Alcohol flowed freely in the various “O Clubs” and this fact, coupled with 
the availability of cheap liquor at base exchanges, helped make drinking the “primary 
recreational activity” of many of those stationed at or around airfields.  So common was over-
drinking among pilots that they learned to adjust the oxygen levels in their planes to cure 
hangovers.277  On the front lines and in the outposts, where drinking was usually prohibited, men 
made their own home-brew, called “apple jack,” secured liquor from foreign troops or the black 
market, and brought back beer or whiskey when they returned from R & R.278  Still, combat 
soldiers had little time for drinking and more commonly used cigarettes to fill their hours and 
days.  Stuffed into combat rations, cigarettes came cheap and easy in the war zone, a ready-made 
and nearly irresistible de-stressor.279  Like the soldiers of World War II, many veterans of the 
Korean War remember first smoking when in the Army or in the war.280   
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In addition to cigarettes and liquor, some men in the war theater found love or something 
like it.281  Especially for gay men, who faced persecution and suspicion back in the States, Korea 
and Japan provided the opportunity for both openness and fulfillment.282  Occupied with the 
business of war and survival and concerned primarily about the competence of their crews, 
commanders had little time to waste ferreting out the sexual orientations of those under their 
commands regardless of regulations.  Indeed, most homosexuals found commanders more than 
willing to look the other way so long as they performed well on the job.283  In the zone, one 
“could be as open as you wanted to be” and there existed little pressure to act straight.284  Gay 
men stationed in Japan frequented gay bars there, but willing partners turned up elsewhere as 
well.  Straight men in Korea, Japan, and aboard ship courted homosexuals when women were in 
short supply or likely to be infected with venereal diseases and when they needed sex but could 
not endure the thought of being unfaithful to their wives with another woman.285  In general, 
gays found serving overseas a refreshing experience, free of some of the fear and repression they 
suffered at home.  Even so, homosexuals did well to bear in mind that no matter how liberated 
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they felt in the war zone, homosexual acts still violated the military’s code of conduct and one 
who engaged in them could be punished accordingly.  Just one week before his three year 
commitment ended, the Navy brought Tony Lankford up on charges of homosexuality.  With “no 
representation, no rights, no nothing,” Lankford ended his tour of duty with a dishonorable 
discharge.286 
For straight men, local girls in both Korea and Japan could be had as prostitutes or long-
term “girlfriends” for a low price and, despite the admonitions of the military, many Americans 
hired them.  Concerned about the spread of venereal disease, at least one air base instituted 
“pussy patrols” to prevent airmen from having sex with Korean women, but undoubtedly 
clandestine relationships and the transmission of diseases continued in country.  Additionally, 
men in all branches of the military found action with no less willing and no less diseased 
Japanese partners when on leave or R & R in Japan.287  Such liaisons held consequences, both 
physical and emotional, for those who engaged in them.   
Many men did contract sexually transmitted diseases.  By January 1952, the VD rate of 
the 51st Wing soared to 8.12% and in the summer of 1953 a wave of gonorrhea and genital warts 
in the 45th Infantry Division forced many to undergo treatment before returning home.288  
Infection caused real problems in the field where men had trouble getting penicillin.  Richard 
Bevier remembers a man in his platoon having to treat his “affected area” by soaking it for two 
hours twice a day in a solution of potassium permangate mixed up in a sawed off beer can.  
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Seeking privacy, the man sat in one of the tractors, at least until the time when his crew got 
orders to fire while he was soaking and the unexpected recoil from the gun “not only splattered 
our friend from head to toe with purple stuff,” but “almost circumcised him in the process.”289   
Japanese and Korean women sometimes became pregnant, forcing G.I.s to either abandon 
their children when they rotated out or to begin the long, wrenching, and often unsuccessful 
process of trying to get their families to the United States.  Inevitably, even without the pressure 
of fatherhood, more than a few men either mistook their “business deals for real relationships” or 
actually fell in love with the women they employed, leading them to try and marry their Asian 
paramours.290  The US military did not ban such unions, but did discourage them with plenty of 
red tape.291  Many Japanese and Korean women did get to take their turn as war brides, but many 
others found this avenue to happiness a dead end.  Given the nature of the war zone and the 
slowness of the process, soldiers and Marines not infrequently died, rotated back to the States, or 
simply lost interest before they could obtain approval to marry their girlfriends.292  Aside from 
one-time lovers American servicemen left behind thousands of illegitimate sons and daughters, 
unrecognized by the United States and shunned by the Japanese and Koreans.293  Love affairs 
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blossomed in the war zone, quelling for a little while the loneliness and sadness of war, but all 
too often they ended disastrously for everyone involved. 
The military treated men and women who remained in Korea long enough to a turn at 
Rest and Recuperation, or R & R.  Early in the war this might be nothing more than a day or two 
of rest somewhere behind the lines where a frontline soldier or Marine could eat a hot breakfast 
and lunch, shower, get clean clothes, and maybe see a movie.294  By the spring of 1951, though, 
R & R had become a formal program in which men left the war zone for a five day rest in 
Japan.295  Men so looked forward to R & R that they were willing to take considerable risks in 
order to get it.  Harold DeVries remembers that when his turn came to go to Japan, his unit was 
pinned down by the enemy, but rather than lose the opportunity he left by crawling “down a road 
ditch with artillery hitting all around me.”296  Designed as a way to give men a break from the 
constant danger and stress of the battlefield, R & R proved a mixed blessing for participants.  
Men coming from hard fighting certainly needed the time to rest and relax, but not all of them 
could do this away from their units and buddies.  They worried about friends in the war zone and 
felt guilty every time they “took a hot bath, ate a hot meal, and slept on a nice bed.”297  Many 
also realized that after months of remaining on guard their bodies simply would not accept the 
sleep that they craved.298  Later in the war R & R took on a different flavor.  Men still tried to 
catch up on some much needed rest, but they also spent a good portion of their time drinking and 
chasing women, thus earning R & R the unenviable nickname “I & I” or “intercourse and 
                                                 
294 In his book, Terry Addison recalls being taken to the Pea Patch for a bit of rest in 1950.  See Addison, Battle for 
Pusan, 134-135. 
295 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 347-348. 
296 Harold DeVries, , Interview by Kirk Mathis, in Havard, By Word of Mouth, 8. 
297 Nick Nishimoto in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 63. 
298 Matthias, The Korean War, 131. 
 229
intoxication.”299  One female veteran stationed at a hospital on Okinawa during the war recalls, 
“I felt very disappointed in our guys’ actions away from home” and “to this day feel disgust at 
things I know of and have seen.”300   
Eventually, if one lived within the war long enough, his or her time to return home would 
come.  Doctors, nurses, and sailors ticked off the months and completed their tours of duty.  
Pilots finished the requisite number of missions.  Infantrymen and support personnel in Korea 
earned enough points to rotate out.  In an effort to be equitable, to allow service members who 
had risked the most or spent the most time in Korea to leave first, the military set up a rotation 
system for individual soldiers and Marines.301   For each month spent in theater, American troops 
received a certain number of points, ranging from four awarded to men stationed on the front 
lines to two given to men in the rear echelon.  Once a person accumulated thirty-six points he 
became eligible to rotate out of the war zone.302   
On the one hand, rotation, or the “Big R,” boosted the morale of those serving in country.  
With or without an end to the war, “every man would ship out of Korea for discharge or other 
duty station” when his year or eighteen months was up.303  But, rotation created many problems 
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for American service members in theater as well.304  With the military “mobilizing, 
demobilizing, and fighting a war, all at the same time,” troop commanders reflected that “we 
were creating real units until rotation.”305   For those trying to survive combat, it became 
increasingly clear that the loss of seasoned infantrymen and artillerymen and resulting influx of 
inexperienced replacements broke down unit effectiveness and integrity.306  Some career officers 
careened into the war zone just long enough to get their tickets punched, to put combat on their 
records, and then moved on to something more lucrative and perhaps less dangerous, leaving 
units in Korea without adequate or consistent leadership.307  Veterans in the ranks only 
reluctantly and slowly accepted replacements, adopting a “wait and see” attitude until new men 
proved their worth.  Non-commissioned officers sweat bullets before engagements, knowing half 
of their troops were green, fresh from basic training.308  Replacements had to make buddies and 
learn the ropes fast or risk finding themselves even more alone in the unfamiliar and unforgiving 
terrain of the war.  Unfortunately, too many of these replacements became casualties within 
hours or days of their arrival.  Gary Hashimoto relates how one young replacement arrived at 
dusk, dug in, and then was found stabbed to death the next morning.309   
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Men with little time left before rotation developed “short-timers syndrome.”  Worried 
about dying only weeks or days before their tours of duty ended, short-timers became 
increasingly reluctant to volunteer for dangerous duty, fight, or even stray far from their 
foxholes.  Some took to wearing their flak jackets and helmets round the clock and at least a few 
determined to “never, ever leave his bunker again” until time to go home.310  Generally soldiers 
tried to help short-timers out, but this meant the early loss of seasoned and competent soldiers 
from the field.311  Rotation did not provide a real end to the conflict and it hindered the war effort 
in almost as many ways as it helped, but for those lucky enough to sail back to the States before 
July 1953 it provided a most welcome exit from living within war.   
 
Leaving the War 
 
 Begun June 25, 1950, the Korean War lasted until the ceasefire went into effect at 2200 
hours on July 27, 1953.  Until that appointed time the shooting continued.  Then, men on both 
sides of the line celebrated, setting off live ammunition and waving at each other across the hills, 
“happy the war was over and we would be going home.”  But, except for prisoners of war (some 
900 of whom the Chinese would be unable to account for at the prisoner exchange), 8100 
Americans missing in action, 24 or so Navy and Air Force pilots detained by China as political 
prisoners, and those Americans still on duty in theater at the time of the armistice, the conflict 
had ended days, months, or even years earlier.312  In Korea, the American Armed Forces waged a 
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new kind of limited war, one designed to prevent a direct confrontation between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, preserve manpower resources in case of a wider conflict, and avoid 
overly taxing the patience of the American public.  Not a total war, Americans rotated out of the 
war zone individually after completing a certain length of service there rather than staying with 
their units and coming back as a group after hostilities ceased.   
 Strangely enough, the United States during the Korean War shipped not only survivors 
back home, but also the remains of G.I.s who had given their lives in duty to country.313  In both 
World Wars I and II, Americans killed in action were buried in temporary gravesites until after 
the fighting stopped, sometimes long after, when the wishes of the next of kin determined 
whether the bodies would be interred in permanent overseas cemeteries or returned to the 
States.314  At first, Korean War dead were treated the same way.  Around the Pusan Perimeter, 
members of Graves Registration companies, part of the Quartermaster Corps, collected bodies, 
identified them by comparing teeth to dental charts, cleaned out pockets, re-pinned any live 
grenades they happened across, shipped personal effects (except for pornographic pictures which 
by orders were to be thrown away) to family members back home, and arranged for a proper 
burial complete with a memorial service if time allowed.315  As early as mid-July 1950 a 
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temporary cemetery existed at Taejon and soon others sprung up at places like Kwan-ui, 
Sindong, Kum-chon, Miryang, Masan, and Taegu.316    
As the war progressed, however, American troops retreated, losing control of many of 
these cemeteries.  Perhaps uncertain that any territory in Korea could be permanently held by 
United Nations forces, Major General K. L. Hastings, the Quartermaster of the Far East 
Command, recommended the evacuation of all remains from temporary gravesites.317   Acting on 
this, the United States made the unprecedented decision to return deceased Americans to their 
homeland while still engaged in combat in Korea.  Graves Registration companies in country 
now had the double task of disinterring previously buried bodies for shipment and preparing 
casualties fresh from the battlefield for the trip home.  Most American dead passed through the 
Zone Headquarters of the American Graves Registration Unit at Camp Kokura, Japan for final 
identification.  There, staff members collected fingerprints and recorded information about “hair 
color, skin pigmentation, height, shoe size,…tattoos, scars, physical abnormalities,…bone 
malformations and peculiar tooth and cranial formations” and prepared reports and case histories 
to establish “beyond all doubt the identity of each individual.”318  Remains then passed through 
the mortuary to be embalmed, placed in caskets, and finally processed out.  At the mausoleum 
area, chaplains held weekly memorial services in which a symbolic flag-draped casket escorted 
by an Honor Guard was placed by the flagpole and treated to religious rites, the firing of three 
volleys, the sounding of Taps, and the lowering of colors.  From March 22, 1951 to September 
1953, most American war dead—except for a few unidentified soldiers buried as token 
representatives of the United States at the permanent United Nations cemetery and bodies 
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unrecovered in both North and South Korea—were loaded onto ships to begin their final journey 
back to the country for which they had given their lives.319  This at least gave some small 
measure of comfort and solace to men like the young sergeant who wrote home in July 1950, “I 
have one request.  If I don’t survive, please don’t leave me to rot in Korea. When the Army 
permits, let me come home to rest.”320   
Receiving permission to rotate out, survivors left the war zone with far less ceremony 
than their fallen comrades.  If they served in a unit short of men, the Army or Marines might 
offer them promotions in exchange for a few extra months of Korean duty, but other than that 
they simply said their farewells and left with little more than their well-worn fatigues and combat 
boots.321  Most men and women, after initial processing at battalion, regimental, or divisional 
headquarters and perhaps a delousing, once again passed through Japan to await the troopship 
which would ferry them home.322  Some went wild, buying clothing or trinkets with the money 
saved up from unspent paychecks, reveling in dozens of pairs of clean, white underwear and 
tailor-fitted dress uniforms.323  Others thought about America, “where people are free to vote and 
just plain old free.  Where the sound of guns and the sight of blood are in the past, where you get 
hot dogs, hamburgers, banana splits, and hot rods, where American women don’t bend over and 
kiss your ass…and damn a thousand other things that I left behind.”324 They looked forward to 
“getting home to the wife I had married two days before shipping out to Korea” or to the children 
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growing up in their absence.325  Men who had served on the line wondered “whether I was more 
homesick for Decatur or for Love Company” and “couldn’t stop thinking about my buddies.  I 
loved them so.”326  Feeling a great loss they asked, “Sure, I was out of it, but what about all my 
friends who were still fighting?”  Still, those exiting the war theater “knew how a man on death 
row must feel when he gets a reprieve.”327  They were safe at last and “happier than hell.”328  
Eventually it came their turn to board the homebound ships, yelling “You’ll be sorreee!” to new 
replacements entering the zone.329  After just a few more weeks of military food, fire or guard 
duty, gambling, and waiting, they would be home, “back to the greatest country on the earth.”330 
Although crowded together aboard transport vessels or planes, men and women, leaving 
the Korean theater left the war alone.331  Instead of unit members shipping in and out together, 
most individuals moved into outfits where needed and left at different times as their tours of duty 
expired or as they accumulated enough points to earn a final rotation back to the States.  Instead 
of  benefitting emotionally from making the long trip home with men made close through the 
shared experience of combat or service, Korean War veterans had only the hard goodbyes “with 
guys you’ve shared so much with” and then close quarters with unfamiliar faces, “all strangers, / 
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like me, on their way home.”332  En route, men talked about the war, “the only subject we could 
discuss intelligently,” and thought about the Americans still fighting.333  “Remembering was one 
way of keeping people alive, and the least I could do.”334  They also tried to prepare themselves 
for the transition from war to the safer, slower life they would soon enjoy.  Reminiscing with 
others who had experienced the same things or “endured situations which made my own seem 
like a picnic,” some men found that “by the time we reached the United States after three weeks 
at sea, most of us had been drained of any meaningful hang-ups.”335 “Thirty-three days from 
Inchon to San Francisco.  The transformation is / complete.  By the time we re-enter / society, 
society has re-entered us.”336  Some, though, had more difficulty putting the war behind them as 
they passed from one life to another.  This time around they traveled “with baggage I can’t just 
check through.”337  They “had adjusted to being in the war zone and could not figure out how 
they were going to react when they got out of the…combat zone and back into civilian life.”338 
To those leaving, rotation meant “it wasn’t my war anymore; it belonged to other men,” 
but it also “wasn’t a real end to the war.”339  And because the calendar rather than victory 
brought them home, veterans of the Korean War had no meaningful way to measure what they 
had accomplished during their time in country.  The losses, of course, seemed evident.  The tug-
of-war over real estate left the Korean countryside broken and cities devastated.  A 1951 Time 
Magazine article declared, “Peace if it comes will find Korea’s cities dead.  In Seoul the gutted, 
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white-domed capitol of the Republic of Korea stands like a skeleton among the city’s ruins.  
Suwon’s huge, half-destroyed gate, once a monument to Korea’s kings, guards only rubble 
now.”340  By the end of the conflict, virtually every village and city on the peninsula had been 
damaged, which in human terms translated into many millions of Koreans killed or rendered 
homeless.341  The United States pumped billions of dollars into the effort, but casualties 
skyrocketed, numbering almost 34,000 dead by the end of the war.342   
And what had they won?  Even when peace finally came, “no land had been occupied, no 
grand goals had been reached, no clear victory had established a winner, no surrender received to 
mark the end of the war.”343  American troops held the same line they might have had in the fall 
of 1950.  An October 1953 Gallup Poll revealed what the American public thought about this 
achievement; they would not support renewed hostilities even to hold the territory already 
purchased at so dear a price.344  As they rotated out, men “didn’t feel like you accomplished a 
hell of a lot” and they “carried around a feeling that somehow we hadn’t given it [Korea] the 
same effort [as in World War II].”345  “I remember coming back from Korea…I was almost 
embarrassed being in Korea because we didn’t win.  We cut a deal.  We got a draw.  We failed 
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where our older brothers had won.”346  They contemplated that, “We should have used our arms 
the way they were intended to be used…Because you hold and cradle guys in your arms that die 
right there talking about their wives and wishing they could see their kids again.”347 
In light of the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, and the rise of North Korea as a 
potential nuclear threat, most veterans of the war in Korea now, fifty years later, recognize that 
their victory lay in preventing North Korea and China from imposing communism on the 
Republic of South Korea, as well as possibly deterring communist efforts elsewhere.348  They 
agree that, “One forgotten war may eventually turn out to have been the decisive conflict that 
started the collapse of communism.”349  But, at the time, men and women often felt that success 
had to be gauged in smaller, more personal terms.  “I’d made mistakes.  But I’d done things that 
had merit…I hadn’t lost any men through stupidity or from fear.  If you summed it up, that was 
the real achievement, what you had to keep with you.  I was going home whole, that was 
something pretty important too.”350  In surviving, they had learned lessons like “it’s okay to 
cry… [and] there are no winners in war and…we must learn to live in harmony with this 
world.”351  And, dropped into the war zone and left to experience fear, compassion, and the sting 
of death, the men and women serving in the Korean Theater grew up.  Leaving “youth and 
immaturity behind,” they “returned, still young but no longer innocent.”352  
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CHAPTER 5:  OUR FIGHT?  WOMEN, RACE,  
AND THE WAR ZONE 
 
“They came in unshaven, dirty, looking about forty years old.  And most of them are still in their teens.”—
Commander Haire serving on a hospital ship in theater.1 
 
“When I first went to Korea, each soldier that came in the operating room seemed like my brother.  It took a 
little while to get over that.  We did a little crying, then got back to work.”—Julia Baxter, Army veteran.2 
 
“We could not let ourselves down…We couldn’t let our race down.  We couldn’t afford to fail.”—James 
Monte, African American veteran.3 
 
“Would they trust us if they were in our place?”—Curtis Morrow, African American veteran.4 
 
“I hate white people.  Now if all white people were like the boys in this company, it wouldn’t take long before 
everybody would get along swell.”—African American soldier.5 
 
“Black man shot Chinese who was about to shoot me in back.  Need I say more?”—white veteran.6 
 
 When North Korean troops fired the opening shots of the Korean War, an American 
servicewoman, not a Marine or soldier, first answered the country’s call to duty.  Stationed in 
Korea at the time, Army nurse Viola McConnell suddenly found herself in charge of evacuating 
not only the wives and children of Americans assigned to KMAG, but also foreigners 
desperately trying to get out of the country.  Fearful of the “international incident” which might 
occur were the communists to shoot down a plane full of refugees, Ambassador John J. Muccio, 
who opposed any evacuation on the grounds that if the North Koreans captured Seoul they would 
certainly grant Americans diplomatic immunity, refused to allow air transportation.  Instead, 
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McConnell shepherded some 643 people, including babies, pregnant women, alcoholics 
suffering withdrawal, and at least one senile woman to a Norwegian fertilizer ship built to hold 
twelve passengers.  Aided by an Army wife and several missionary nurses and one female 
missionary doctor, McConnell saw to it that the nearly 300 infants on board received rations of 
formula, that sick people got tended to, and that passengers made it safely to Japan in two days 
only a little worse for the wear. 7    
Not long after McConnell’s ordeal ended, General Douglas MacArthur called upon Major 
Mildred I. Clark, director of nurses for the Far East Command in Tokyo, to put together two 
Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) for Korea.  Though nearing completion of her tour of 
duty, Clark readied volunteers for this new assignment.  Part of an advance party, Major 
Genevieve Smith became one of the first American Army casualties of the war when the aircraft 
transporting her party to Korea exploded.8   
Clearly, from the onset of hostilities in Korea the United States military had a place for 
women in this new war just as they had in the last one.  But, not until after June 1950 would it 
become clear where that place would be.  A limited war in a small, distant, and seemingly 
insignificant country, the Korean War not only failed to capture the imaginations of Americans, 
but also did not require the same wholehearted effort which had characterized World War II.  In 
the early months of the conflict the Armed Forces needed women to fill positions stateside to 
free men for combat.  Later, as manpower levels increased, there simply appeared little reason to 
send most servicewomen into harm’s way.  Thus far fewer female military personnel would end 
up serving overseas in the Korean War than in the Second World War.  Still, nurses and other 
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personnel did complete tours of duty in the war theater, many of them quite close to the action.  
Serving in MASH units near the front lines, on hospital ships, and on evacuation planes carrying 
out wounded infantrymen, most servicewomen realized their value to the effort and few doubted 
that Korea was their fight as much as it was any American’s fight.  But, would they experience 
this war the same as the men in the foxholes? And would their participation in this war somehow 
change them or transform their lives? 
Allowed into the military in greater numbers than ever before, African Americans had 
these same questions.  Being black, they had others as well.  Not every African American soldier 
or Marine called the South home, but all had at least heard about segregation and its injustices.  
Also, even up north one still encountered pockets of old Jim Crowism.  How could a country 
allow such a discriminatory system to remain intact and yet think nothing of asking the very 
victims of that system to lay down their lives on the field of battle in the name of liberty?  Why 
should African Americans risk their lives in Korea when home promised nothing more than 
second-class citizenship?  Yet, most African American servicemen, regardless of whether or not 
they came to believe that their real fight remained the struggle at home for equality, did not 
abandon their duty stations in Korea.  Historians, then, are left to ask the questions.  Did service 
in the war theater alter the views of African Americans serving there on race, country, or 
comradeship?  In the end, was Korea also the black soldier’s fight? 
 
Women in the War 
 
 Despite the efforts of General Mark Clark and others to pressure the various Armed 
Forces into sending more women, especially nurses, to the war zone, relatively few women 
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served in Korea or even in the Far East during the Korean War.9  Back in the States, the military 
still suffered from the shortage of nurses that began with the end of World War II and female 
recruitment remained a particularly challenging task.10  Many of the fathers, brothers, and 
boyfriends who had served in the last war most assuredly did not want their daughters, sisters, 
and girlfriends to don uniforms and serve in this one.  And, many women just wanted to begin 
their lives as wives or mothers without the bother of a service commitment.  Moreover, all 
branches of the military primarily used women to replace men in either the United States or 
Europe so that male service members could be sent to Korea as soldiers, corpsmen, sailors, or 
support personnel.11  Units on the line, especially in the early months of the war, needed men to 
replace casualties more than they needed nurses to help save them.  After all, without someone to 
man the guns and fight, the entire war effort would simply collapse.  Thus servicewomen 
available for duty in the Far East tended to be in short supply and putting women there remained 
a low priority for all the services.  In the end, though, hundreds of servicewomen did complete 
tours of duty in Korea and thousands more supported the troops in theater.12 
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 In early July 1950, Army nurse volunteers sent to Pusan to help set up a hospital became 
the first American servicewomen to enter the Korean War.  In less than a month, almost fifty 
more nurses joined them, bringing the total number of American military women in Korea to 
nearly a hundred.13   By the spring of 1951, more than 300 Army nurses were scattered across the 
peninsula “at field, station, evacuation, and MASH hospitals.”14  Army nurses traveled with the 
troops, waited for them behind the lines, and went to pick up casualties aboard hospital trains.15  
Not to be outdone, Air Force and Navy nurses also contributed their share to the war effort, 
becoming flight nurses with air evacuation units and staffing hospital ships.16  Countless other 
servicewomen in all branches of the military lived and worked at hospitals and installations in 
Japan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Philippines in direct support of the Americans fighting in 
Korea. 17  In addition to nursing, women staffed commands throughout Japan, including the Far 
East Command Headquarters, and performed administrative, communications, intelligence and 
other duties.18  
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 Because of the fluid nature of the war and the desperate need for medical personnel, most 
women who served in theater did so as nurses.19  Just as at any hospital back home, they got 
patients cleaned up and settled in and made them as comfortable as possible wherever they 
happened to be.20  Nurses also kept up with supplies and ordered replacements when necessary.21   
But, particularly in the war zone where the number of casualties quickly became overwhelming, 
nurses took on greatly increased responsibilities.  They learned to triage patients independently, 
begin blood transfusions, suture wounds, and initiate courses of antibiotics, and they frequently 
performed these tasks and more without the direct supervision of a doctor.  At MASH units, 
nurses worked with male corpsmen, teaching them the procedures necessary in combat 
medicine.22  As doctors could seldom be spared for a long trip, nurses generally ran the show as 
the highest ranking officers aboard hospital trains and they did everything from disinfecting the 
cars with DDT to managing medical aid men and treating patients.23  Even in Japan WACs could 
count on being assigned as ward masters, a position traditionally given to male NCOs.24  A 
member of the U. S. Navy, Captain Katherine Keating became the first woman officer to relieve 
a man at sea when ordered to the U.S.S. Haven as a pharmacist.25  In contrast to stateside service, 
which offered comfort and predictability but also little room for advancement as women were 
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herded into “pink collar” jobs, duty in the war theater tendered military women many more 
opportunities to learn new skills and to act in supervisory roles.26    
 Though never stationed right on the front lines like combat troops or corpsmen and 
medics, servicewomen in the Far East during the Korean War served under difficult and stressful 
conditions.27  In Korea, nurses with field and MASH hospitals followed behind the troops, living 
and working in “tents, barns, schoolhouses, rice mills, churches,” and whatever other structures 
seemed practical under the circumstances.  So close to the lines, they sometimes suddenly found 
themselves in the thick of the action.  Nurses on their way to Pusan in October 1950 had to take 
cover in ditches for fourteen hours while an engagement unfolded around them.  Later that year, 
servicewomen in North Korea had to be evacuated to ASCOM City when Chinese volunteers 
overran American positions.28  In country, women suffered many of the same deprivations as 
men.  They traveled in “flea-ridden conveyances,” went to the bathroom in slit trench latrines, 
showered outdoors, washed their clothes in tin pans and hung them to dry in the corners of their 
tents or Quonset huts, and suffered from shortages in supplies and gear. Uniforms, if they could 
be procured despite their scarcity, made summers even more unbearably hot and provided little 
comfort from the cold.  Catherine Neville remembers sending boots to a friend hastily shipped 
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over to Korea without warm enough clothing for the frigid winter temperatures.29  Life for 
women in Korea “was kind of rough.”30 
Even in outlying parts of the theater of operations, servicewomen ran into unexpected, 
even life altering difficulties.  Though many servicemen, especially those who had become 
wounded, revered military nurses and other female G.I.s, some did not.  Recalling her wartime 
service, Audrey Reid recounted that while overseas she was attacked twice by male members of 
the U.S. Armed Forces.  On Okinawa a soldier Reid knew sexually assaulted her and in Japan an 
Air Force enlisted man who offered her a ride from the airport after a delayed flight attacked her.  
Fearing she would be blamed, Reid reported neither incident.  Only twenty years later did Reid 
find the resolve to file a claim with the V.A., receiving a disability pension for post traumatic 
stress disorder.31   
Whether in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East, servicewomen faced long days and heavy 
workloads.  To accommodate the huge numbers of casualties, hospitals expanded almost beyond 
their capacities.  Hospital ships with room for about a hundred patients began stacking bunk beds 
two and three tiers high to make room for five thousand patients and sixty-bed MASH units 
somehow managed to service two hundred wounded and sick persons when the necessity arose.32  
G.I.s from the battlefield came by ship, train, helicopter, bus, and ambulance and “they just kept 
coming.”33  In some places, the civilians came too, infected with worms and tuberculosis or 
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somehow injured as a result of the war.34  Without rest and sometimes without nourishment, 
nurses stayed on duty for shifts lasting twelve, eighteen, or even more hours—however many it 
took to care for those depending upon them.35  No matter how much time women put in, though, 
they found it “just isn’t possible to get everything done.”36  When nurses finally laid down to 
rest, they slept in their long johns, half ready for another wave of casualties or an early flight into 
the zone to pick up medical evacuees.  They hoped that the ambulances rumbling in or the 
artillery in the background would rock them “to sleep in my Army cot from the 
reverberations.”37 
Caring for wounded and dying American G.I.s had a profound effect on servicewomen in 
theater.  In the field and in operating rooms and wards they witnessed scenes that would haunt 
them for life.  Commander Emery of the U.S.S. Repose wrote a letter home describing her 
patients, “eyes shot, legs shot off.  And others half dead with abdominal wounds.”  She went on 
to tell about a soldier who had been taken prisoner, “tied to a tree and had both eyes shot out.”38  
Commander Haire took note of the appearance of Marine casualties brought out of combat.  
“They came in unshaven, dirty, looking about forty years old. And most of them are still in their 
teens.”39  For Anita Bean, the image of “burnt bodies” would be the one she could not shake and 
carried with her out of Korea.40  At the time, most nurses felt like they could “just sit down and 
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35 Lois Colgate Merritt, Lieutenant Helen Fable, and  Nurse “Bing” (Commander Nancy J. Crosby) in Omori, Quiet 
Heroes, 18, 39, and 138-139.  Conditions permitting, normal shifts lasted eight hours. 
36 From Commander Haire’s journal, 2 November 1950 in Omori, Quiet Heroes, 89. 
37 37“No Longer Forgotten:  African American Servicewomen During the Korean War Era” (online at 
http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/Exhibits/afamkoreaexhibit/afamkoreasplash.html) and Albert, “Air 
Evacuation From Korea,” 257. 
38 Commander Emery in Omori, Quiet Heroes, 106. 
39 From Commander Haire’s Journal, 2 November 1950 in Omori, Quiet Heroes, 89. 
40 Anita Bean, Korean War Veteran Survey, 6, CFSOKW. 
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cry for them [American G.I.s], if I had the time.”41  Many women, like Julia Baxter, did allow 
themselves a few tears.  “When I first went to Korea, each soldier that came in the operating 
room seemed like my brother.  It took a little while to get over that.  We did a little crying, then 
got back to work.”42  As much witnesses to the carnage of the battlefield and the “vivid 
inhumanity of war” as the men who fought it, servicewomen stationed in the Far East wondered 
“what people in America would do if they had to go through some of the things that you would 
see in the war.”43  As they well knew, the experience was nearly impossible to forget.  Time 
might dull some of the feelings of fear and remorse, but “the smell and sights do not leave 
you.”44  
Despite the hardships of working or living in the war zone, American servicewomen 
frequently ended their tours of duty with a great sense of personal satisfaction.45  In country they 
had met successfully the challenges set before them, saved lives, learned new skills, and fulfilled 
their duty to country.  They discovered “where some of my weaknesses were, where some of my 
strengths were … and grew from that experience, both as a nurse and as a person.”46  Also, just 
like men who forged deep bonds in the midst of battle, women in Korea formed lasting and 
binding friendships unlike any they would “have again in your life.”  As war veterans, they 
became aware that “you can never fully share these things with civilians as they can’t possibly 
understand where you’ve been or what you have done or what it all feels like.”  But, they joined 
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an exclusive and special sisterhood of veterans in which others unequivocally “know how you 
feel and who you are.”47    
 
Race and the War 
 
 For the most part, the United States Armed Forces began the Korean War just as they had 
begun every war since the American Revolution, racially segregated.  Despite Truman’s 1948 
Executive Order 9981 mandating an end to discrimination in the military, segregation remained 
rampant.  Prior to the Korean War, the Air Force had begun phasing out segregated units, the 
Marine Corps and Army had flirted with integrating some types of training, and racial 
restrictions barring African Americans from certain jobs and technical schools within the Army 
had been eliminated.48  But, especially in the Marine Corps and Army, racial prejudices in both 
the upper echelons and lower ranks resulted in the continuance of all-black or in some instances 
all-Puerto Rican units.  Thus at the outset of the war, black men, whether or not they had trained 
in mixed outfits, often ended up serving in segregated units overseas.49   
 In theater, as at home, life in all-black units proved anything but “separate but equal” for 
the men stuck in them.  First, there existed the matter of reputation.  The American military and 
press generally accepted the belief that blacks could not perform as well in combat as whites, 
                                                 
47 Anita Bean, Korean War Veteran Survey, back of page 6, CFSOKW. 
48 Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power:  Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana 
State University Press, 1973), 90-93.   
49 Anne Hoiberg, “Military Staying Power,” in Sam Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness:  Cohesion, Stress, and the 
Volunteer (Beverly Hills, CA:  Sage, 1980), 225 and Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 
1940-1965 (Washington, D. C.:  Center of Military History, U. S. Army, 1981), 436.  The same seems not to have 
been true for black servicewomen.  MASH units and hospitals in the Far East Command, where most women in the 
war zone worked and lived, were integrated, as was the U. S. Army Nurse Corps.  Sarnecky, A History of the U.S. 
Army Nurse Corps, 316 and Bellafaire, “Volunteering for Risk.” 
 250
writing them off as unreliable and cowardly.  Early reports of the all-black 24th Infantry 
Regiment in Korea reinforced these stereotypes, alleging that black soldiers “melt into the night” 
only to return the next day with tales of getting lost.50   White troops fighting alongside the 
regiment disgustedly recounted how “blacks bugged out and left their artillery in place” and 
“made the black soldiers targets of racist remarks and actions.”51  Though less than exemplary 
behavior characterized both black and white units sent into the war zone in July or August of 
1950 before adequately prepared and equipped, derision fell disproportionately upon African 
Americans.52  Keenly aware of this, many blacks in Korea tried “to prove ourselves as equal to—
or better than—the white soldiers.”  They decided that, “We could not let ourselves down…We 
couldn’t let our race down.  We couldn’t afford to fail.”53   And, many believed that they 
succeeded.  They “had gone into combat and had fought well” and “given an even chance, we 
could out-soldier and out-fight any white soldier.”54  Occasionally, as in May 1951 when a white 
captain brought the men under his command to see an all-black Ranger unit, telling them “This is 
what happens when men don’t panic,” black troops received the praise that they craved.55  But, 
even long after Yechon, the earliest victory of the war and one for which courageous black 
troops deserved most of the credit, blacks had reason to complain that “Whitey would never 
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acknowledge all our deeds of honor” and point out their discouragement “that no other papers 
outside of our own have been willing to give them [black troops] credit.”56   
Given prevailing prejudices, few whites relished the idea of commanding all-black 
troops.  Not only did they assume African American soldiers or Marines to be less competent 
than white ones, but they viewed such an assignment as “the worst thing that can happen to him 
in the military,” a “dead end” for their careers.57  Consequently, segregated units too often 
became a “dumping ground” for officers unwanted in white units but less than committed to their 
new black ones.58  Also, despite Samuel Stouffer’s landmark study on American soldiers in 
World War II, which showed that blacks unequivocally preferred to serve under northern rather 
than southern whites, the Korean War military continued to assign white Southerners to 
leadership positions in units like the 24th Infantry Regiment with the idea that they had more 
experience dealing with people of color.59  Southern-born or not, many of the white officers 
assigned to black units served diligently and faithfully, but more than a few went into the job 
with a “patronizing expectation of failure” and others were simply “outright racist sons of 
bitches.”60  One commander in the 24th decided to make the men “mad enough to fight” by 
telling them how bad they were and other officers in the regiment routinely ridiculed the men in 
their charge rather than encouraging them.61 In a similar vein, appointed to replace Colonel Juan 
Cesar Cordero Davila as the regimental commander of the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry 
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Regiment after the Battle for Outpost Kelly, Colonel Chester B. DeGavre, a white West Point 
graduate, ordered all the men under him to “shave their moustaches ‘until such a time as they 
gave proof of their manhood’” and made some of them wear signs reading “I am a coward.”62   It 
certainly crossed the minds of black soldiers that the same officer leading them in Korea “could 
be the very one that put a rope around one of our necks next year someplace in the States” or 
might be “the very one to deny us the very rights that we are here fighting for the South Koreans 
to enjoy.”  At least amongst themselves, black troops asked, “How can they wonder why we 
don’t trust them?  Would they trust us if they were in our place?”63   
Making matters worse, African Americans found it difficult to rise in rank.  In segregated 
units, the Armed Forces tended to appoint white officers and pass over blacks when it came time 
for promotions, giving men the impression, “If you were black, to occupy the position of platoon 
sergeant or first sergeant it was mission impossible.”64  After integration, the problem persisted.  
“While Blacks and whites fought, slept, and ate together in Korea there was not a corresponding 
sharing of parity in terms of promotions and quality of MOS’s.”65  Despite some breakthroughs, 
most blacks found themselves trapped on the lower rungs of the military ladder in infantry, 
service, or supply outfits rather than climbing up in personnel services, intelligence, or the 
officer corps.  Now willing to allow African Americans to fight, the military exposed a slightly 
higher percentage of them to combat than their white counterparts.66  Blacks drew the worst 
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assignments and found little redress despite complaints.67  And, entering the officer corps did not 
provide any guarantees of equal treatment anyway.  In Dan Grimes’ platoon, the first lieutenant 
was a black medical doctor whom the Army had assigned as an infantry platoon leader.68  Still, 
when African Americans managed to secure promotions, they felt that they had beaten the odds 
and rejoiced that they had won “a battle in the continuing war against Jim Crow.”69 
Hindered by ineffective leadership, a lack of trust between officers and enlisted men, 
poor morale, and the general unpreparedness typical of all American units in the early months of 
the war, black troops perhaps did not perform as well in combat as they might otherwise have 
done, and many individuals suffered grave consequences because of it.  By the end of 1950, 
officers of the 24th had made complaints against 118 G.I.s in their care.  Of the 82 which led to 
courts-martial, 54 accused African Americans of displaying misbehavior before the enemy, 
namely cowardice.  With only 8 white soldiers charged with the same offense, African 
Americans concluded that “the Army’s policy was to punish Negroes more harshly than white 
soldiers. … It was common knowledge that Negroes went to trial for offenses that were only 
winked about when perpetrated by white soldiers.”70   The findings of the all-white investigating 
officers and the all-white Inspector-General Judge Advocate’s Office staff seemed to bear out 
these suspicions.  Thirty-two blacks were convicted and sentenced to death, life, or 5 to 50 years 
hard labor.  At the same time, courts-martial found only 2 of the 8 whites guilty as charged.  
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Convinced that they had been railroaded, several of the accused appealed to the NAACP for 
assistance with their defense.  As chief legal counsel of the NAACP, Thurgood Marshall arrived 
in Tokyo to conduct his own investigation and represent the men on appeal.  Initially denied 
entrance by General MacArthur’s office, Marshall ultimately concluded that “the condemned 
men had been the victims of deep-seated racial prejudice.”71  Eventually the NAACP succeeded 
in getting “reduced sentences or reversed convictions for most of the men it defended, but these 
cases illuminated the discrepancies between ideals and practice in a society plagued by 
racism.”72   
Stateside, the black press followed stories of the condemned men closely, especially the 
case of Leon Gilbert whose death sentence President Truman commuted, and a lively discourse 
played out in the editorials.  Some wanted to know, “Was Gilbert the only soldier or officer to 
crack under the strain? What happened to the whites who broke and ran?”73  Others hit home the 
point that “the treatment of the Negro troops in Korea is serving as a highlight of the oppression 
of the whole Negro people in America.”74  A few, though, decided that it would have been better 
for Gilbert if he’d just died instead of living to lower the morale of other soldiers “who 
erroneously believe that he was mistreated.”75  All in all, however, most black readers, no matter 
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how they felt about the individuals involved in the courts-martial, wanted the stigma of poor 
service “removed from their sons.”76  So did the men serving in Korea and Japan, whether or not 
they read the articles published in their absence. 
In theater, the perception that African Americans were being unfairly targeted by officers 
for courts-martial merely added to the discontent of black servicemen which continued to fester 
throughout the conflict.  Serving America overseas, blacks reflected that “colored Americans are 
dying in Korea today for less than a square deal.”77  Back home, especially in the South, the 
same country that now expected them to make grave sacrifices for it relegated them to second 
class citizenship.  William Weathersbee recalled that “We were ‘boys.’  No one ever referred to 
us as ‘men.’” And when his all-black Airborne Ranger Company, the 2nd, left for Korea, they had 
to enter through the back door of the Columbia, Georgia train depot while the all-white 4th 
strolled through the front.  “We were going to Korea together, but we couldn’t go through the 
train station together. … We couldn’t travel together in the civilian world.”78  Similarly, with 
orders for Korea in his pocket, a Kansas restaurant refused to serve Air Force officer John Smith 
and his fiancée, telling them, “We’ll fix you some sandwiches and you can pick them up in a 
brown bag at the back door.”79   
News from home confirmed that nothing had changed since they left.80  Along with a 
clipping about his meritorious service in Korea, Charles Dryden’s wife included a letter detailing 
how their four year old daughter had been separated from other children and given different food 
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at nursery school because of her color.81  Wives and mothers of men fighting in Korea had to 
band together in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to overcome discrimination in hiring at factories and 
businesses, their advocates pointing out that blacks “are doing a good job of fighting for 
democracy, but these women are denied a chance to work.”82  In Carthage, North Carolina, three 
men who raped a soldier’s nineteen year old wife while he fought in Korea got off with a 
sentence of 16-24 months in what the black press termed “Dixie justice.”83  And, as always, 
African Americans continued to be lynched back in the States, a sharp and painful reminder to 
men on the battlefield of “the racist attitudes of some of our fellow Americans back home.”  As 
one veteran points out, “It always left a bitter taste in my mouth, especially after viewing the torn 
bodies of comrades who maybe an hour or so earlier had been fighting at my side but now lay 
dead all around me.”84 
Even in the military and in the war zone, plenty of things reminded black soldiers and 
Marines of their status.  In a 1951 scandal involving Confederate flags hanging from Army 
tanks, Hunt Clement, Jr., the spokesman for the Secretary of Defense, ignored U.S. Army 
regulations forbidding the private use of “official, personal, or organizational flags” and asserted 
that “There is no policy on the display of that particular flag.”85   Almost a year later the Army 
gave permission to the 31st Infantry Division band to wear Confederate uniforms because the 
rebel gray “represents the regional origin of the division which enjoys all the heritage of the 
‘Deep South’ from which the division comes.”86  Worse yet, rebel flags fluttered in abundance in 
Korea and the Red Cross continued to label blood by race until faced with protests by United 
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Nations employees.87  In Japan, General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters sported a plethora of 
Jim Crow signs and “the ‘great man’ did absolutely nothing to clean up his command.”88  In the 
zone of operations, black men regardless of training and expertise often ended up unloading 
munitions in Pusan or working at some other “job beneath my training and intelligence.”89  
Symbolic of the low esteem in which the American military and society held “tan soldiers,” the 
all-black 24th Infantry Regiment and the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment became the first 
and only units to be disbanded and have their colors rolled while members continued to fight on 
the battleground. 
Confronted with such harsh realities, black troops suffered from low morale and 
questioned their role in America’s latest fight for democracy.   On a personal level they 
wondered, “Why should the black man fight when he’s not free?”90 And they “felt they were 
stupid to risk their lives unduly because when they got home they didn’t have the rewards 
citizenship should have provided.”91  They were “supposedly fighting to protect the freedom of 
American society, even as that freedom was denied us in our own country.”92   About the war, 
African Americans in uniform asked, “Can we as leaders of the ‘free world’ tell anyone about 
democracy when we have organizations like the Ku Klux Klan running people out of certain 
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places because of their color?”93  Undoubtedly a few agreed with activists back home who 
suggested that Korea “is not the Negro war” and that the Army integrated only so it could 
continue to use African Americans in its “fight to reduce other colored people to the same status 
as Negroes.”94  Contrasting the enemy with fellow Americans, black soldiers did not always find 
common cause with their countrymen. “Have the communists ever enslaved our people?  Have 
they ever raped our women?  Have they ever castrated our fathers, grandfathers, uncles, or 
cousins?”95 Blacks had “had to fight for the right to fight,” but now many pondered just where 
and against whom that struggle should be—in Korea against the North Koreans and Chinese or 
back in the United States against Jim Crow and second class citizenship.96 
Even so, manpower needs on the Korean front pushed the military to integrate units in 
country, chipping away at some of the walls separating Americans of different colors.  
Commanders of all-white units on the line, faced with heavy casualties and in dire need of 
replacements, began to grab men to fill their ranks without regard to race. In August 1950, the 9th 
Infantry of the 2nd Infantry Division already had two black officers and 89 black enlisted men 
and by December the division had absorbed so many African Americans that they composed 
roughly 11% of its troops.97  Convinced of the practicality of this ad hoc, unauthorized 
integration, other outfits followed suit so that by the time General Matthew Ridgway replaced 
Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander he could see firsthand the smooth transition to 
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mixed units in the field and the underlying potential for greater efficiency in the use of 
manpower.  On May 14, 1951, Ridgway requested permission to abolish segregation in the Far 
East Command and shortly thereafter it became policy to assign men individually to 
understrength units based on nothing more than military occupational specialty.98   
As early as the fall of 1951, changes could be felt.  Not only did the Army deactivate the 
24th, but the Marine Corps cancelled its last all-black unit designation. Almost 20% of blacks in 
the war zone were serving in units experiencing integration and a fair number of whites had been 
assigned to predominantly black units with black officers and NCOs.99  Also, National Guard 
units like the Oklahoma 45th, initially exempted from integration, began accepting African 
American replacements while in theater.100  With desegregation proving a great success on the 
battleground, raising morale among black troops and streamlining the channels delivering men to 
the field, officials in the Armed Forces began to lean toward full integration worldwide.101  That 
would take some time, however.  Not until September 1953 could the Army announce that 90% 
of its black strength was serving in integrated units and the Secretary of Defense could not 
proclaim the abolition of the last segregated unit of the Armed Forces until October 30, 1954.  
As late as 1955 the Navy continued to shuttle more than half of its African Americans into the 
Stewards’ Branch, prompting Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. of the Committee on 
Education and Labor to inform the Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Air that “No one is 
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interested in today’s world in fighting communism with a frying pan or shoe polish.”102  
Although the Korean War did not turn out to be a fully integrated war as did Vietnam later, it 
provided a testing ground for integration, bringing thousands of Americans of different colors 
and ethnicities into close contact with one another for the first time.  From the President to the 
top brass to the lowliest privates to the loved ones back home, everyone watched with the same 
questions in their eyes:  How would this experiment work and what changes, if any, would it 
bring?  
Both hope and apprehension surrounded decisions to integrate the military.  Officials 
optimistically recalled the end of World War II when black and white infantrymen fought side by 
side in Germany and “such a policy is working.”103  Soldiers had accepted the situation quickly.  
As one white platoon sergeant from South Carolina admitted, “When I heard about it, I said I’d 
be damned if I’d wear the same shoulder patch they did.  After that first day when we saw how 
they fought, I changed my mind.  They’re just like any of the other boys to us.”104  It had not 
mattered then who was “firing next to you when you’re both killing Krauts,” and the military had 
every expectation that the same would prove true for Americans fighting the communists in this 
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war.105  Many African Americans viewed desegregation in country as a stepping stone on the 
path to respect or even equality.  If they fought well and whites saw them fight well then there 
would be “no way they could justify their racist attitudes toward their fellow American comrades 
in war or peace.”106  Blacks expected that “When the white boys get back and tell of their 
experience with the colored over here…that will help some.”107  Then, “our struggles and 
sacrifices for freedom in Korea would result correspondingly in a larger measure of freedom, 
dignity, and opportunity for our loved ones at home.”108  On the line in Korea, weary soldiers 
and Marines were ready to welcome more men and “didn’t care who, what, or where they came 
from—we needed help.”109  “We could use all the men we could get.  The overriding thought 
was that, white or Negro, a Marine was a Marine.”110  They saw “no reason why the white boys 
should be fighting and the others not doing their share.”111  And, the more troops that flowed into 
the war zone, the better chance one had of surviving and rotating out when the time came.   
Still, members of both races had misgivings.  General Mark Clark believed that all-white 
units were the most effective and accepted desegregation only because “Negroes…demonstrably, 
cannot or will not fight effectively as all-Negro units, [so] there is really no choice…except to 
insert small percentages of them into white units.”112  Similarly, many white soldiers presumed 
that “black soldiers were not reliable and [in] many cases [were] a liability” and they “did not 
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trust them to stay and fight.”113  If the rumors were true, more soldiers did not mean an 
improvement in their situation and they would be better off waiting for white replacements, 
however long it took.  For their part, African Americans sometimes feared joining white units 
where they might suffer from discrimination or lose the comfortable positions that they had held 
in segregated units.114  As one enlisted man said, “I would rather be in a colored unit for the 
simple reason I don’t like them (white people).  I would rather be with colored people all the 
time.  You can’t always trust a white man.”115  And, many African Americans thought that even 
if integration functioned smoothly in the war zone, the gains in race relations would not last.  “It 
might work in Korea. White man is your friend as long as you’re protecting his ass.  In the States 
and over here it’s different. When the white man think he out of danger then he will act 
different.”116  In the end, though, it did not really matter how men felt about the idea of serving 
in a mixed outfit.  Like most decisions since they mustered into the service, the military would 
make this one for them.  Trained to obey orders, Government Issue in black, brown, yellow, 
white, red, or olive drab would do as told.  
Once a unit integrated, things could be tense for a while.  Having been raised on opposite 
sides of the color line, real differences existed between African American and white troops and 
both possessed deep-seated prejudices.  In general, whites objected to the way that blacks used 
the word “motherfucker” in a “freewheeling manner,” noticed uncomfortable dissimilarities “like 
the way they think about women, like their education and bringing up,” and had little regard for 
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black culture or capability.117  Influenced by the reputation of all-black units in Korea, they 
shunned the idea of incorporating non-white elements into their ranks.  Who wanted to be 
saddled with men who would simply bug out at the first hint of trouble?118  Furthermore, many 
whites strongly objected to serving under black officers, declaring, “We ain’t letting those 
niggers run us!”119  In instances where white Southerners made up a large percentage of an 
outfit, officers had to be particularly careful in making command and bunker assignments 
because “the distrust between the Southerner and the black man was still evident.”120  African 
Americans put into previously all-white units understandably often felt uncomfortable at first.  
Beverly Scott remembers the cool reception he received when transferring from the 24th.  
Although a communications officer, badly needed everywhere along the line, each unit he came 
to claimed to have no vacancies for his specialty.  Finally accepted by a primarily Hispanic 
outfit, Scott found other officers unfriendly and was passed over for the position of company 
executive officer although he outranked the other lieutenants.121  The first black in his unit, 
Ronald Johnson remembers, “I caught hell.  Constant fights, verbal abuse and did not feel that I 
belonged.”122  Others observed that “a few of the regulars were still a little too ‘cracker’”123  Put 
into mostly black units, whites did not fare much better.  They “had a sort of funny feeling, kind 
of out of place” and got “trouble from a few belligerent people.”124  Occasionally when blacks 
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and whites were shuffled together, riots erupted, such as in Tokyo in 1953 where a scuffle 
between different colored soldiers “over the merits of their respective combat units” led to a 
brawl in which several men were injured.125  Such incidents proved rare, however. On balance 
most integrating units in country could claim, “We had not one racial difficulty.”126  At most, 
troops of different races tended to congregate separately when possible instead of mixing 
unnecessarily.127   
Given time, men in mixed units usually came to look beyond race when judging their 
comrades.  In civilian life, people of a different color “were an unknown equation and subject to 
what we observed and heard from our parents and neighbors.”128 But, jumbled together aboard 
ship or in foxholes, men (and women) in the war zone “got to know each other” as individuals 
and their attitudes changed.129  Whites “found that the more time I spent with them [blacks] the 
less prejudice I had” and discovered “that a colored man is just as good as a white.”130  Blacks 
saw that “these ‘fay [white] boys ain’t so bad to get along with.  I find them no different from 
other folks.”  Even men with more deeply rooted racial biases came to respect the men with 
whom they served.  One white infantryman declared, “I didn’t like niggers nohow, but now I 
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think there are some exceptions who are good as white men.”  Similarly, a black enlisted man 
noted, “I hate white people.  Now if all white people were like the boys in this company, it 
wouldn’t take long before everybody would get along swell.”131  The familiarity with persons of 
different races fostered by military service in the Korean War helped many Americans 
understand that a person’s worth and character depended more upon “what their background is” 
than on the pigmentation of their skin and they came to believe, “If men would get used to each 
other as we do here, there’d be no trouble anywhere about race.132 
On the fighting front, transformations happened even more quickly and completely than 
behind the lines.  With a real enemy just across no-man’s land or over the next ridge, time simply 
did not exist for racism.  Men “were too busy…to entertain race problems.”133  “When you 
jumped into a foxhole for cover, you weren’t thinking about the color of the fellow next to you.  
That was the least of your concerns.”134  Also, combat forced men to depend upon one another 
for survival, ensuring that “one’s main concern [with another] was how well he could do the job 
assigned….Whether a guy was black or white was way down on any list, if at all.”135  Whites 
might have harbored fears that blacks would perform poorly when it mattered most, but in reality 
they proved “no better—or worse—than the rest of us” and most men in integrated units decided, 
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“I don’t think there is any difference between white and colored in combat.” 136  As Gilbert 
Pfleger puts it, “Black man shot Chinese who was about to shoot me in back.  Need I say 
more?”137  Sharing the experience of the battlefield, African Americans and whites formed the 
same kinds of unbreakable bonds that men of the same color did.  They became family.  “We 
were like real brothers.”138  As such, they wrote letters to each other’s mothers, stood up for each 
other when outsiders seemed to be dishing out unfair or unequal treatment, and risked their own 
lives to protect each other.139 In perhaps the most famous example of interracial camaraderie 
during the Korean War, Lt. Thomas J. Hudner, Jr., a white pilot, deliberately crashed his own 
plane in an effort to rescue Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the first African American to fly a carrier 
combat mission.  Brown died where he had landed, but the men of the Leyte did not forget him.  
They donated $3000 of their own money to a trust to provide Brown’s infant daughter Pamela 
with an education.140  Such friendships promised a new future not just for the men involved but 
for the country which sent them together into the furnace of war. 
Whether in integrated detachments or not, service in the Korean War Theater provided 
many African Americans with their first taste of life untainted by Jim Crow laws and customs.  
Segregation did exist in some places in Japan, but, particularly in Korea, G.I.s of every color 
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“were free to utilize all public facilities and accommodations.”141  They socialized with white 
friends, knocking back a few beers, killing time playing poker, or sitting down and shooting “the 
shit…for three or four hours.”142  At Yokota Air Base, blacks and whites not only flew and 
worked together, but they frequented the same “O” Clubs and visited socially in one another’s 
homes.143  In Gifu, Japan blacks readily mixed with a willing local population without arousing 
racial tensions.144  With such liberties available to them, blacks “felt freer in a foreign land than 
in the land of our birth.”145  Some felt so free in fact that they did not want to leave when it came 
their turn.  A few passed up rotation because “we are not sure…that we want to be reassigned to 
the United States.”146  And, in the exchange of prisoners of war, several black Americans chose 
to stay with the Chinese, at least until such time as conditions improved for African Americans 
back home.147  More often, though, African American troops, like their white counterparts, 
eagerly returned to the United States, many with a newfound determination to secure changes 
back home.   
After the war, James C. Evans, the Assistant on Racial Matters to the Secretary of the 
Army, pronounced “The greatest victory we had in Korea was the integrated use of our 
manpower.”148  Militarily, Evans was right.  Desegregation not only deepened the pool of 
replacements from which battered front line units could draw men, but resulted in “significant 
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improvements in the performance of Negro soldiers.”149  In integrated units, blacks often had 
better leadership, more supplies, and the feeling that maybe their service to the United States 
would result in something more than disappointment when they returned home.  As a result they 
fought better.  Also, African American participation proved something of a psychological coup 
in a war that the enemy would have liked to have cast in racial terms.150   
Socially, however, Korean War efforts at integration produced a mixed legacy.  
Certainly, close contact led individuals to develop intimate relationships with people of different 
skin tones and the memory of wartime interracial friendships translated into a shared willingness 
to tolerate or even support attempts at achieving racial equality back in the States.151  Passing 
through the Dallas, Texas airport on his way back from Korea, Sidney Berry remembers seeing 
separate water fountains for blacks and whites.  Having had a very close African American 
friend in Korea “that dramatically brought home to me that I was going back to my native South 
with its goddamned injustice… [and that experience] solidified my resentment of racial 
injustice.”152  Even if they couldn’t support social integration entirely, cracks in the proscriptions 
against the social mixture of the races could be seen among troops who served in integrated units 
in Korea.  Asked if he would take a black man home, one white enlisted soldier replied that he 
would not, except for his friend in the tent.  “Oh, that’s different.  He’s just like any of the other 
boys.  I’d take him home.  I wouldn’t think of treating him any different.  He’s a buddy of mine.”  
Similarly, a white infantryman resisted the idea that he would hang out with blacks back home 
because “No girl’d go out with me if I hung around with the black boys.” But, he clarified that 
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with regard to his African American friends from Korea, “That’s different.  I owe them 
something for sticking with me.  They’re swell guys and I wouldn’t let them down.  I’d do 
anything for them….But even so, maybe, I’d have to be careful.”153   
Despite such shifts in thinking, the camaraderie among men of different races fell far 
short of a revolution in American race relations.  Sometimes men went back to their old ways 
even before they reached America’s shores.  One African American remembers how on the ship 
home he came across a white G.I. whom he had carried injured off the battlefield.  When he tried 
to remind the man of their encounter, the soldier insultingly cut him short, saying “I know who 
you are boy.”154  When G.I.s returned to Georgia or Mississippi, they found that old habits 
remained the accepted ones among friends and family who continued to see the world in the 
same terms as before the war, in black and white.  And, returning after a long and emotionally 
exhausting tour of duty in the war zone, many Americans simply wanted to fit back into their old 
lives somehow, even if that meant leaving the fight for social justice in America for another time 
or another generation.  The Korean War softened men and women to the notion of racial 
equality, making them more likely to accept the goals of the coming Civil Rights Movement, but 
it did not necessarily bring that movement into being.   
Long after 1953, military service continued to offer African Americans their best shot at 
equality.  Unlike American society at large, the Armed Forces during and after the war began a 
steady process of desegregating the various aspects of life, including housing and schools.  In the 
end, that perhaps proved the most enduring legacy of the Korean War era.  The rewarding nature 
of military service encouraged blacks to make the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines a career 
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and as they did so their expectations and the expectations of those with whom they worked 
changed.155  Accustomed to working together, it became difficult for soldiers of different races or 
nationalities to envision living in a segregated world.  As veterans rejoined the ranks of civilians 
they brought with them a new vision of what America could and should become. 
While integration and the resulting mixture of black and white troops in Korea consumes 
most of the literature on race, it should be noted that the same sorts of interactions took place 
between white and black Americans and Hawaiians, Chinese-Americans, Native Americans, 
Puerto Ricans, South Koreans, Turks, Japanese, and many other peoples throughout the war.  
And, just as with relations between blacks and whites, sometimes interactions went well and 
sometimes they did not.  For example, American G.I.s generally considered South Korean troops 
undependable and tended to show little respect for them.  They put KATUSA replacements to 
work carrying heavy loads of ammunition or supplies, doing laundry, polishing boots, or 
cleaning rifles.156  This lack of regard sometimes caused problems for anyone who appeared 
Korean.  The American driver of a truck, mistaking Bertram Sebresos for a South Korean, 
refused to give him a ride until told, “I’m a GI too” and a white soldier tried to make Harrison 
Lee, a G.I. from Hawaii, do his laundry.  Back at his unit after being treated at a battalion aid 
station where a doctor thought he was a “yobo,” an ROK soldier, and made him wait six hours 
for assistance, two G.I.s assaulted Sergeant Clarence Young, trying to steal his jacket until he 
fired his M-1 in their direction and the captain set them straight on his status as an American 
soldier.157    
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But, just as white and black men had grown familiar with one another, so too they learned 
to live amongst people seldom encountered before the war.  Those who served with KATUSA 
units became impressed with the diligence and dedication of ROK soldiers and men in outfits 
with different nationalities came to look beyond the features of one’s skin or face.  As Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell, a Native American senator from Colorado, remarked long after his Korean 
War service, “There was a camaraderie [in the Air Force] that transcends ethnicity when you 
serve your country overseas in wartime.”158  In Korea, men learned “to understand people who 
are different from you….By working and fighting alongside these peoples of different colors, 
creeds, and backgrounds we are, at the same time I hope, beginning to learn how we may better 
live with them.”159  Imbued with the ability to generate such feelings in participants, perhaps the 
Korean War was for all Americans, black or white, male or female, their fight after all.   
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CHAPTER 6:  COMING HOME 
 
“We returned from battle, picked up our lives, went back to work, raised our families, and melted into the 
mainstream of society.”—Harold Mulhausen, veteran.1 
 
“We melted into society and did our best to get on with our lives.  We were a different breed of American 
fighting man. …We kept our war stories to ourselves unless we were with another veteran, or had a loving 
wife to comfort us if the memories got too rough.”—Rudolph Stephens, veteran.2 
 
“After my war/Nobody asked me what I felt—/Regret, mostly.”—From a poem by Ronald Landry, veteran.”3 
 
“On the train from San Francisco to San Diego, I thought, I survived, I’m alive. What more could I want?”—
Floyd Baxter, veteran.4 
 
 When 2nd Lieutenant Edmund Krekorian returned home from Korea, the city of Seattle 
welcomed him and others aboard the troopship in grand style.  Marine Corsairs escorted the ship 
to the harbor, flying off in victory rolls as a happy chorus of boat horns and whistles joined the 
shouts of hundreds of people gathered on the pier.  There, Miss Seattle waited with a bouquet of 
flowers to meet the men as a band played “The Star Spangled Banner.”5  Also returning by way 
of Seattle, Russell Rodda recalls most vividly the beautiful girls in bathing suits sent to greet the 
returnees.  As he walked down the gangplank, one of them hugged and kissed him and thanked 
him for doing his duty.6  Treated to “dancing girls, in net stockings and 12-inch skirts,” 185 
Thunderbirds of the Oklahoma 45th could scarcely turn their attention to the crowds tossing 
confetti and streamers and shouting “They’re home, they’re home, they’re home!”7  In San 
Francisco, Anthony De Angelis enjoyed a similar reception.  Tug boats came out to greet the 
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veterans with water salutes and once they had docked, civilians tossed beer up to the men while 
WACs boarded to carry their duffle bags off the ship.8  Greeted in World War II fashion, these 
men of Korea “felt good for the first time in a year!”9  “You just can’t imagine how excited and 
how happy, and the tears and the laughter and the, you know, you’re home!  H-O-M-E, home!”10 
 Unfortunately, as the war in Korea progressed and as troopships brought men and women 
back with more regularity, the nation’s interest soon waned and homecomings became a matter 
of routine rather than cause for celebration.11  Most of those who fought and served in the Far 
East do not remember grandiose displays of gratitude upon reentering the country, but instead 
passing under the Golden Gate Bridge or pulling into the harbor to find “no bands, no cheering 
crowds, and no tickertape parade.”12  Like Floyd Baxter, they wondered, “Where are all the 
people?”13  Remembering the heroes’ welcomes given many World War II veterans, they had 
expected something more than a few scattered relatives and maybe a Red Cross worker or two on 
the dock.  They were “in for a rude awakening.”14  Stationed on the hospital ship Haven, one 
nurse recalls the excitement of the wounded men on board.  Those “who could wear shoes were 
shining them up to a brightness that dazzled the eyes” in anticipation of impressing the onlookers 
whom they assumed to be awaiting their arrival.  Lined up in stretchers for the landing, they 
looked eagerly for well-wishers.  Sadly, “only a handful of apprehensive relatives and somber 
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ambulances” had turned out to see them home after their “many long, pain-ridden months” 
away.15  Thousands of others suffered the same disappointment.  “When we arrived, after all we 
had been through, all we had seen, all we had done in the line of duty, we were met only by the 
Red Cross.  They gave us donuts and coffee.  And, that was our homecoming.”16 
 Whether received warmly or not at all by the country that had shipped them off to war, 
one relative always awaited returnees as they disembarked—Uncle Sam.  Men and women might 
have completed their tours of duty overseas, but often they still owed the military days or months 
of service before they could officially muster out of the ranks.17  In any event, they had to 
process out before heading home on a thirty day furlough to visit their families and friends.18  
Like in-processing, out-processing required much patience on the part of servicemen and 
women.  Sent by train, bus, or convertible car convoy to places like Treasure Island, Camp 
Stoneman, and Camp Kilmer, “everyone was forced to stand in long lines.”  Moving from station 
to station over three or four days, they received physical examinations, blood and urine tests, 
“short arm” inspections, and shots and completed all the necessary paperwork.19  In some places, 
everything was merely a formality, prompting complaints that “I was just turned loose…I didn’t 
even know how to act around other people” and “The doctors did not give us real examinations.  
I came home with damage[d] eyes due to a steam explosion and a tremendous ears sound, due to 
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the noise from firing my gun.”20  Bitterly, one POW asserts, “Those Americans interviewing us 
after we were liberated never seemed to be that interested in our wounds or diseases.  They really 
weren’t interested in a damn thing except did we collaborate?”21   
But, some processors took the job more seriously.  Concerned that men who refused to 
speak about their wartime experiences would end up with mental problems, the staff at Treasure 
Island pulled “about every twentieth man…out of the line and told [him] to go to the talking 
doctor.”  They instructed veterans that “When we got home we should not be afraid to talk.  If 
someone asked us what happened overseas, we should go ahead and tell him.”22  Thomas Shay 
had to attend classes for two weeks “just to know how to act, how to talk to people … [and] the 
words to say….They told you how...it’s going to be eating supper…how to pass the potatoes 
[and] how to treat a lady and the words you used.”23  The military made available to men who 
had been held as prisoners of war booklets like “Welcome Back!” and “What Has Happened 
Since 1950” to explain their responsibilities upon returning and catch them up on events that 
they had missed.24  The services offered little else by way of debriefing or therapy to those just 
returned from the war zone, instead reminding returnees at the various processing centers that at 
least for the time being they were still Government Issue.  In addition to dealing with red tape 
and submitting to physical examinations, men and women once again began policing the area, 
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serving on K.P. duty, picking up trash, and even drilling.25 Finally, though, unless doctors 
determined that one needed further evaluation at a hospital or rehabilitation center, these new 
veterans of the Korean War received their discharge or leave, their pay, and a ticket home.26   
 Once released, most returnees felt elated and could not wait to celebrate the end of their 
war.  On their way to the train station or airport, they stopped off at bars and restaurants, ready to 
treat themselves to a first class meal or cocktail.  If they got lucky, some civilian would slap 
them on the back and say “We’re glad you’re back” and “Let me buy you a drink.”  Ordering 
steak, martinis, ice cream, and whatever else they fancied, veterans lived it up until time to 
depart for home.27  A few even continued the festivities along the way.  Changing trains in 
Chicago, Frank Almy and a few pals stopped by a bar where the owner told the servicemen “our 
money wasn’t any good there.  We had all we could eat and drink on the house.”28  Men aboard a 
seven car troop train headed for Ft. Sill began drinking heavily at the outset and then stopped the 
train en route to purchase more liquor.29  For a while, excited returnees just wanted to say, “Hey, 
here I am.  Come on America, here I am, ready or not.” They didn’t “think about the incidentals” 
that came with being back in the States because “for right now I’m home! ... There is no place 
like home.”30 
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 However, even before reaching one’s hometown, jubilance could turn to uncertainty.  
Very quickly it became apparent just how little thought ordinary Americans had given the war in 
their absence.  At a restaurant near Camp Carson, Colorado, Robert Baken told the waitress he 
had been in Korea.  Bewildered, she asked, “Korea, where’s that at?”  He realized then that “half 
the civilians in the United States didn’t know [where] Korea was at, and the other half didn’t care 
where it was at.”31  Rotating out of a MASH in Korea, one nurse had reason to recall the words 
of a friend stationed stateside, “The saddest part of this for you is nobody knows you’ve been 
away or where you’ve been.  You’ll know that when you get home.  Nobody will notice it.”  
Back in the United States she “just went back to duty someplace.”32 Indeed, a surprising number 
of people seemed completely apathetic not just about the conflict but about those who had done 
their patriotic duty and served in it.  Guards unceremoniously tossed Peter Soderbergh out of the 
Royal Hawaiian when he tried to see a show after his return and a bartender refused to serve 
Curtis Morrow when he went for drinks with some white friends.  Upon hearing “that the 
bartender had refused to serve a black Korean War veteran,” MPs wrecked the place, but that 
didn’t alter the fact that outside of the military a man’s service in Korea counted for little to 
nothing.33  As one veteran reflects, “You expect that the people would be more concerned about 
your service in Korea, but people showed indifference and were more concerned about their own 
interests.”34  Not surprisingly, a few returnees came to think “that all the true Americans were in 
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the service—that the outside was loaded with draft dodgers … [and] politicians who didn’t give 
a damn about the people.”35 
 Recently removed from the war zone, men and women also came to a few unsettling 
realizations about themselves before reaching their final destinations.  While still entering the 
straits of Seattle, one veteran had a “wave of uncontrolled grief and depression” wash over him 
and he “felt overwhelming guilt that I had survived.”36  Thinking of Korea, another noted that he 
had lost his best friend and nearly his life and “I know I lost myself, but no one cares.  I am not 
the same person who left here.”37  Using lots of cusswords in an interview, Jack Wright realized, 
“My language wasn’t the type you spoke around your mom, but I forgot where I was.”38  Jack 
Davis knew exactly how Wright felt.  He was scared “to open my mouth for fear of what foul 
language might come out.”  In fact, Davis felt uncomfortable around “polite and civil” people 
altogether regardless of their age or gender and he made them uncomfortable—a problem that 
would continue for quite some time.39  On a plane with other soldiers, Edmund Krekorian felt 
fine, but once civilians filled the seats around him he suddenly noticed “I had so very little in 
common with these people whose primary conversation was limited to baseball and the movies.  
They seemed to know very little about the war and cared less. …  I was no longer secure or 
comfortable.  I fell asleep trying to imagine what my wife looked like.”40  Hoping for the best, 
some veterans took comfort in the knowledge that “I was still myself and when I got home 
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would fall back into patterns of behavior, maybe even be civilized again. War changed you but 
you remained the same person.”41  Less sure, others wondered about their lives and thought, “I 
survived, I’m alive.  What more could I want?”42  Only time would tell. 
 
Home   
 
 Returning to their home towns from the war zone, many service members, especially 
servicemen, would have agreed with Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz that “There’s no place like 
home.”  Small towns in particular warmly welcomed their native sons and daughters.  Even if 
they did not host parades for the veterans, who often trickled home one or two at a time, there 
might be welcome home dinners, invitations to speak at the local high school, press coverage, an 
honorary police escort from the airport, the presentation of the key to the city by the mayor, or 
something more tangible like a state bonus to mark their completion of duty.43  Some, like 
Thomas Gaylets of Old Forge, Pennsylvania, relished the attention.  “It was a great feeling to be 
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home.”44  Others felt uncomfortable with all the fuss.  Having seen too many comrades die and 
too much misery, men who had served in combat often did not feel like conquering heroes and 
POWs most assuredly felt out of place around hometown folk.45  “For the first time I was 
someone else other than an EX POW or someone else from the military.”46  In such 
circumstances, how was one supposed to act?  A few men simply fled when friends or neighbors 
stopped by to see them or made it known that they did not want any big to-dos to be given in 
their honor.47   
In many places, though, especially larger communities and metropolitan areas, returnees 
did not have to worry about unwanted attention.  “It was kind of like glad you’re home.  That 
was it. … I felt lonely.”48  All too often nobody other than wives or parents had even taken note 
of their departures.  As Harlee Lassiter puts it, “No one else seemed to have missed me very 
much.”49  Seeing them again on the street or at the store, old acquaintances asked, “Where’ve 
you been?  I haven’t seen you around.”50  And, girlfriends quite plainly had moved on, getting 
engaged or even married.  Finding his old flame Elaine now married and pregnant, Barnett 
Wilson concluded, “Not only didn’t she want to wait for me, she didn’t miss me, either!”51  The 
same could be said of some spouses.  As contemporary newspaper accounts reveal, more than a 
                                                 
44 Thomas B. Gaylets in Spiller, ed., American POWs in Korea, 23. 
45 POWs especially did not feel heroic.  One writes, “People were calling me a hero and I really wanted to be one 
but I was not.”  Email Shorty Estabrook to Melinda Pash, 29 July 2004, in author’s possession. 
46 William M. Allen, My Old Box of Memories:  Thoughts of the Korean War (Self-Published, c. 1999), 87.  
47 Ibid., 88; Jack Wright in Knox and Coppel, The Korean War:  Uncertain Victory, 359; and Email Shorty 
Estabrook to Melinda Pash, 5 August 2004, in author’s possession. 
48 Ralph Cutro, Korean War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW.  Korean War homecomings proved harbingers of the 
homecomings received by veterans of the Vietnam War.  See Drummond Ayres, Jr., “The Vietnam Veteran:  Silent, 
Perplexed, Unnoticed,” New York Times, 8 November 1970, 1. 
49 Harlee W. Lassiter, Korean War Veteran Survey, attachment page, CFSOKW. 
50 Charles Rice in Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, 256.  Also Thomas C. Shay (AFC2001/001/5807), Folder 3, 
Interview by Kent Fox, 24 February 2003, 7, VHPC, AFC, LOC and Bernstein, Monsters and Angels, 338. 
51 Barnett R. Wilson (AFC2001/001/2783), Folder 1, A Korean Cruise—Moments of Life, Love, and War, 
unpublished memoir dated 1981, 160, VHPC, AFC, LOC.  Also, Richared E. Merrill, Korean War Veteran Survey, 
7, CFSOKW. 
 281
few men discovered that in their absence wives had sought comfort elsewhere.52  Believing their 
husbands dead, the wives of some POWs had even remarried, creating a sticky and unpleasant 
situation for men who had spent their captivity dreaming of nothing but home.  Daniel Schmidt’s 
wife, now married to Alfred Fine, suggested through a magazine reporter that Schmidt and Fine 
should both woo her again so she could decide between them.  Astonishingly, she also insisted 
that Schmidt was lucky since “It’s better to come home and find your wife happily married than 
running around with everybody.”53  Although perhaps more rare than instances of marital 
infidelity, some veterans found relatives little interested in their return.  Floyd Baxter’s brother 
briefly met him at the train station but then quickly announced that he and his girlfriend had 
“some place else to go.”  Baxter reflected “that things would never be the same again.”54  Even if 
they had not desired parades or parties, this was hardly the homecoming that most veterans 
expected or wanted.   
Except in a few cases, such as Baxter’s, those returning from the war at least could count 
on members of their immediate family to provide some measure of reassurance that they had not 
been forgotten completely.  Mothers, fathers, wives, sons, daughters, sisters, and brothers all 
turned out at train and bus depots to lovingly greet their own.  Met at the station in Springfield by 
his wife and kids, Arthur Kelly decided, “That’s all I needed.  I didn’t need anybody else.”55  
Once home, the signs that they had been missed proved unmistakable.  Walking past all the 
neighbors lined up on their front porches to stare and smile at him, former POW William Allen 
finally reached his house, finding it almost unchanged.  His mother had kept his room exactly as 
                                                 
52 Some of these cases led to incidents of violence.  See “Free GI’s Wife in Slaying of Married Lover,” Pittsburgh 
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53 “No Bands Playing,” Newsweek 46:7 (15 August 1955), 21. 
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55 Kelly, Interview by Harris, 16 December 1993, 69. 
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he left it.  She also went to great lengths to make all of his favorite meals and, along with his 
father, worked hard to not “say something wrong.”56  Jack Wright’s stepfather offered him 
unlimited use of the family’s new Studebaker, saying nothing though Wright nearly tore it 
apart.57  Numerous wives, having kept the faith for almost two years, cried real tears of joy upon 
seeing their husbands again for the first time and did everything in their power to provide solace 
and warmth. 
Although most family members tried hard to make their husbands or sons and daughters 
feel comfortable at home again, it quickly became apparent to almost everyone that adjustments 
needed to be made.  At first, fathers and mothers had difficulty accepting that the men before 
them could no longer be viewed or treated as “their ‘high school boys’ who left home” and that 
created problems. 58  Though their children might still appear young, their experiences had made 
them no longer youthful.  With his mind “drift[ing] back to my buddies still in Korea,” one 
veteran “broke down and cried,” angrily rejecting his mother’s attempts at comfort by saying, 
“No!  You, or anyone else who was not there, can never understand what it was like.”59   
Married just before soldiers shipped out for training or the war zone, some wives had to 
learn to handle the problems and moodiness of unfamiliar husbands, uncertain whether this was 
the man they married or the man the war made.  Such was the case of one wife who expressed 
horror when her soldier-husband used a new gun to kill a porcupine without reason.  Unable to 
feel guilt, he asked her, “What in the hell did you think I was doing for the last nine months?”  
The incident marked the beginning of failure for the marriage.60  Relations could also be strained 
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between husbands and wives who had been married longer.  When John Pitre came home, he 
noticed, “Life at home had changed.  My wife was different.”61  Like couples who hardly knew 
each other at all before a soldier’s deployment, they had to find ways to reconnect after months 
or years of separation.62  Regrettably, many couples failed to piece their marriages back together, 
eventually divorcing.  Not able to deal with the guilt he felt about “the killings that I did during 
the Korean War” or communicate with his family, Tony Velasquez endured a “tragic divorce 
from my loving wife.”63  Korean War veterans, in fact, divorced at about twice the rate of men 
who served in World War II and were 26% more likely to divorce than men of their generation 
who didn’t serve at all.64  Some, like Gilbert Towner, a Marine who saw heavy combat in Korea, 
divorced more than once, finding marital bliss only decades after the war or not at all.65   
Men might have envisioned coming home and picking up their lives right where they had 
left off, but that was seldom possible.  Women, so recently expected to take care of the home and 
make all the important decisions, found it difficult to relinquish control to a returning spouse.66  
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They enjoyed managing the money, setting the rules, and doing as they pleased.  Even wives 
who wished for a return to the way things had been before the war could not always make that 
happen.  This proved especially true with regard to the care and discipline of children.  For a 
wife, two years was not a short while, but to children it was an eternity and many initially 
refused to accept their fathers.  Arthur Kelly’s three year old daughter ran and jumped into his 
arms almost immediately, but his son ran halfway down the sidewalk toward him and then 
doubled back to the house.  Later, after having been chided by his father for flipping soup out 
onto the table, Kelly’s son slammed the door in his face saying, “I told you to go back to 
Korea.”67  Only eight months old when her father left, Charles Bussey’s two year old daughter 
“didn’t know me” when he came back, referring to him as “that man.”68  Frightened of the father 
she hadn’t seen since she was six weeks old, Lee Philmon’s two year old daughter didn’t stop 
crying until he bought her a Coke.69  Before men could reestablish their position within the 
family, they would have to mend relationships with spouses or children that barely knew them or 
with aging parents, a daunting task requiring a more subtle and patient approach than some of 
those who had survived the war zone could muster.70   
Regardless, even if home no longer felt quite like home anymore, most men and women 
returning from the war theater tried to make the best of things and get on with their lives.  As 
after World War II, many got married almost immediately.  Ronald Ransom didn’t even wait for 
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his 30-day leave to end before tying the knot and James Becker got hitched just two months after 
his return.  Harvey Moore, carried home from the war with only one leg, went A.W.O.L. from 
Walter Reed Hospital to wed the 16-year old sister of his overseas service buddy in Camden, 
New Jersey.71  Others worked on starting or enlarging their families.  In addition to 
accomplishing this in the old-fashioned way, a few remembered promises made in Korea or 
Japan and adopted orphaned children that they had known and grown fond of there.72   
Buying their way into the consumerism of the 1950s, returnees also made major 
purchases after their return.  Younger than the veterans who marched home from the Second 
World War, and perhaps not yet ready to commit to anything as significant as a spouse, a 
multitude of Korean War veterans spent savings and back pay on new cars to drive them through 
bachelorhood or readjustment.  And, thanks to the 1952 Veterans’ Readjustment Act which 
guaranteed loans to veterans for real estate, about one third of Korean War era veterans had 
somewhere to park their wheels as they purchased their first home before program benefits 
expired in the 1960s.73  Others used the funds to buy businesses or farms.  Like many 
government programs, this one was laden with red tape and G.I.s complained of the difficulty of 
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finding willing lenders and of the loan origination and other fees attached once they did.74  Black 
veterans in particular had difficulty getting loans, being refused “for the most irrelevant reasons,” 
such as speaking “to the wrong individual.”75  African Americans found it difficult to find places 
to buy as well.  Neighborhoods geared toward G.I. Bill customers, such as those built by the 
Levitts, often enforced segregation.76  For those who managed to obtain loans, the government 
financed 60% of a home up to $7500 and 50% of a business up to $2000 and sometimes offered 
incentives.77  Before September 1, 1953, veterans could qualify for a gratuity payment of 4% of 
the guaranteed portion of their loan up to $160.78  As after World War II, the housing market 
took off once Korean War veterans returned and started snatching up real estate.79  In some 
places, lenders and sellers even “newly discovered” a “Negro market.”80 
Ultimately, as back and mustering-out pay ran out returnees had to look for a way to 
support themselves.  Some clever G.I.s turned their wartime skills or contacts into careers.  
Robert Wilkins, a salesman at Hanson Chevrolet in Detroit before Korea, took down the names 
and addresses of other POWs while in captivity and after his release sent out letters offering 
them a $300 “Wilkins Discount.”  With 500 replies and 21 sales in just a few months, Wilkins 
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“did not have to worry about getting his old job back.”81  But, other veterans had less ingenuity 
or maybe less luck.  With jobs in rather short supply, they had to turn to benevolent 
organizations or to their Uncle Sam for help.  Groups like “The 52 Association,” first formed 
during World War II, targeted wounded veterans for assistance, offering hand-holding in 
addition to a job placement program.82  Meanwhile, the government resurrected such staples as 
job reinstatement and veterans’ preference.   
Reemployment rights, begun with the 1940 Selective Service Act and revived in 1951, 
dictated that employers give returning veterans their old jobs back so long as circumstances had 
not changed to make that impossible.83  To be entitled to their former positions, though, veterans, 
both male and female, had to apply for reinstatement within 90 days of their discharge and have 
a certificate of satisfactory military service.  And, employers were under no obligation to pay 
returnees any more after their return than they had been receiving when they left. Like Samuel 
Woodham and Barnett Wilson, veterans did go back to their former employers, sometimes 
pushing for raises or better positions. But, regardless of the law, others discovered that old bosses 
would not rehire them or simply decided that they wanted to do something else.84  These would 
have to look for work elsewhere. 
In addition to using the Veteran’s Employment Service (USES) to obtain job counseling, 
vocational guidance, and assistance in locating a suitable position, those returning from Korea 
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could invoke veterans’ preference laws to better their chances of finding employment.85  Under 
veterans’ preference laws, honorably discharged veterans who served active duty with any 
branch of the Armed Forces got points added onto federal competitive exam scores, moved to the 
top of certification lists, had preference in appointment to federal government and civilian 
positions, received waivers of age/height/weight requirements, had certain jobs like elevator 
operator reserved for them, and secured retention rights protecting them from reductions in the 
work force.86  No small amount of public resentment and resistance developed in response to 
veterans’ preference laws in the years after the Korean War, but the courts consistently upheld 
the statutes, giving Korean War veterans the same veterans’ preference benefits enjoyed by other 
veterans before them.87 
Of course, even with assistance, not all veterans of the Korean War could land a desirable 
job or, in some cases, any job.  As in World War II, these less fortunate veterans qualified for 
unemployment if they could not find work after separating from the military.  Less generous than 
World War II’s 52-20 Club (fifty-two weeks of $20 unemployment checks), the Korean War 
unemployment program allowed unemployed veterans $26 a week for 26 weeks.88  Also in 
contrast to World War II provisions, men first collected unemployment from their home state 
and then applied for federal unemployment compensation to make up any differences in 
                                                 
85 “The New GI Bill: Who Gets What?,” Changing Times (May 1953), 21-22. 
86 U. S. Office of Personnel Management, “VetGuide Appendix D:  A Brief History of Veterans Preference,” online 
at www.opm.gov/veterans/html/vghist.asp and Congress and theNation, 1945-1964, 1369.  
87 John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice in America (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 47.  For examples of public dissatisfaction, see “Should Veterans Enjoy Job 
Preference for Life?,” Saturday Evening Post 225 (30 May 1953), 10 and Stanley M. Rumbough, Jr. to Charles F. 
Willis, 23 April 1953, Central Files, Official File, OF152-H, Box 819, DDE Library. 
88 As with several of the benefit programs designed to help returning Korean War veterans, this was not available to 
female veterans who had married since coming home or to veterans with dishonorable discharges.  Federal 
unemployment compensation came to Korean War veterans with the passage of Public Law 550, or the Korean G.I. 
Bill. 
 289
benefits.89  Although Korean War veterans usually had a waiting period of several months before 
they could collect, the money, when it finally came, certainly made a huge difference to the 20% 
unable to find a position in the slowing economy.90  In all, about one million veterans of Korea 
took advantage of the unemployment offered them, but, according to government reports, they 
did not “milk” the system.91  Over half of the Korean War veterans getting unemployment 
received no more than $300 total and only 15% collected $600 or more.92 
Whether actively seeking work or not, some veterans ultimately decided to delay their 
reentry into the civilian work force for a while.  Many, especially after the passage of the Korean 
G.I. Bill in 1952, marched back to school to earn a degree or learn a new trade.93  Many others, 
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despite the low esteem in which the public held military service as a career, decided to re-up or 
enlist in a different branch of the Armed Forces.94  As Shorty Estabrook puts it, “I didn’t have 
much else going for me.”95  Compared with veterans of other American wars in the 20th Century, 
those returning from Korea were most likely to choose a military career.  Perhaps because so 
many already had accumulated years of service from World War II or from time spent in the 
Reserves or National Guard, they decided after Korea to sign up for regular duty and “never 
looked back and never gave it a second thought.”96  While only 5.9% of World War II veterans 
and 12.3% of Vietnam veterans were discharged with a military retirement after twenty or more 
years of service, 16.7% of Korean War veterans earned this manner of separation.97  This is all 
the more remarkable given that in the years after Korea and before the build-up in Vietnam the 
Army began to muster out “marginal soldiers,” flushing 100,000s of men from the ranks, Korean 
War veterans included.98  In the clean up, men like Major John Walker, an African American ex-
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Korean War POW with only six years left before an Army retirement, found themselves out on 
the streets at the behest of a Department of Army Board.99 
Over time, as veterans discharged the last of their wartime obligations, such as visiting 
the relatives of dead comrades or working off the last days of active duty, they tried to settle into 
their new cars, houses, marriages, and jobs.  Many hoped that memories of not only the war but 
of military service in general would soon recede, replaced in their minds with the normalcy of 
Sunday sermons, weekend matinees, regular work schedules, clean linens, and family.  But, 
looking around them, veterans, especially those who separated from the military, could not help 
but sense that maybe they hadn’t so much left Oz as ended up in some other corner of it.  Two 
years or more of military service had carried men and women further from home than they had 
ever traveled before and worked to change their outlook on a great many things.  In their 
absence, the world kept turning, too, but somehow it had revolved in different directions.   
 
Returnees, Race, and America 
 
By the time Korean War-era service members began filtering back into civilian life, the 
American military had truly become a world all its own.  Manpower pressures in Korea finally 
breathed life into Harry S Truman’s Executive Order 9981, breaking down segregation if not 
eliminating it in the various branches of the Armed Forces.  Along with increased integration in 
the field came changes on bases around the country.  Under President Eisenhower, the 
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Department of Defense carried forward an initiative to integrate schools on military installations, 
some before the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. the Board of Education.100  Despite 
local resistance, especially in Southern schools with long-term leases and in states with laws 
forbidding educational integration, by August 1955 only schools at Pine Bluff Army Arsenal in 
Arkansas, where there were no school-aged black children, and Fort Meade, Maryland had not 
complied.101  Also in the mid-1950s, the V. A. eliminated segregation in all of its hospitals and 
homes.102  As returning African American veterans rotated back from the war to find that they 
would have to wait for a hospital bed, they and the black press wanted to know, “What excuse is 
there for penalizing the sick while integrating the well?”  In response, Harvey Higley, the 
Veterans’ Administrator, announced the move of his agency toward “wiping out segregation.”103  
So quickly did veterans’ hospitals accomplish this task that in 1956 one white patient complained 
that he “was denied treatment for a serious stomach disorder by the Shreveport Veterans Hospital 
unless he agreed to submit to integration with Negro patients.”  The incident triggered a 
resolution by the American Legion Red River Post No. 118 against this infringement of the 
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“cherished rights of those who were disabled in the service of their country,” but to no avail.104  
As for life on post, the military worked toward abolishing even the appearance of discrimination. 
When a black dentist at Chanute Air Base complained about separate barber shops for blacks and 
whites, the Air Force moved quickly to consolidate the shops.105 On installations around the 
country, service clubs, swimming pools, movie theaters, athletics, and other recreational venues 
widely opened to all regardless of color during and immediately after the Korean War.106   
This is not to say that integration always went smoothly in the military.  Jumping into the 
Officers’ Club pool at Maxwell Airbase, Charles Dryden, an African American veteran of World 
War II and Korea, “was amazed how quickly I became the sole occupant.”  And when Dryden 
invited a comrade to stay with his family, the man declined saying, “Where I come from, white 
people just don’t even socialize with colored people.”107  Overseas, a note left on the mess hall 
door of the 61st Artillery Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division warned, “No n—s and dogs 
allowed, white only.”108  Black Korean War veterans at Camp Polk in 1952 complained that the 
Army located them so far from everything that they had to pay cab or bus fare even to reach 
places on base.109  At Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, the Army fired Juanita Lewis, a black hostess, 
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after she made it clear she would no longer officiate at dances with Jim Crow rules forcing 
African American troops to “sit in the corners and the rear and look on [while whites dance], or 
trudge slinkingly over to the line for refreshments.”110  At Fort Benning, Georgia, Grant 
Hauskin’s commander told him that he would never be promoted as long as he stayed married to 
his white wife.111  And, throughout the 1950s the military encouraged everyone from privates to 
generals to accommodate the discriminatory practices of local communities, even refusing to 
interfere when soldiers got into trouble with civilian law enforcement officials over segregation 
issues.  The Air Force reprimanded one black pilot for refusing to move to the rear of a city bus 
in Alabama, noting “Your open violation of the segregation policy is indicative of poor judgment 
on your part and reflects unfavorably on your qualifications as a commissioned officer.”112   
Still, the U. S. military establishment in the 1950s far surpassed civilian society in racial 
progressivism, so much so that sometimes servicemen and women almost forgot that the 
communities around them lived differently.  To the embarrassment of all, one colonel at a 
southern base unthinkingly sent black soldiers along with whites to a picnic held by a local 
organization.113  Although not until a decade after Korea, this apparent color-blindness instilled 
by Army life and regulations led many within the military and government to push for an end to 
discrimination in cities and towns dependent upon the bases for economic support.  In an effort 
to better the lives of those under them, some commanders in the South pressured movie theaters, 
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restaurants, and stores off post to accommodate all G.I.s regardless of race by making all 
segregated establishments off-limits to military personnel thus cutting off potential revenues.114  
Similarly, in an effort to deal with the inadequacy of off-base housing available to non-white 
servicemen, the Department of Defense in 1968 forbade military personnel from living in 
segregated housing.  Not surprisingly, with their livelihoods in jeopardy, locals soon integrated 
recreational facilities and rental properties.115  The Department of Defense also targeted off-base 
public schools attended by military dependents for integration, threatening to cut off public 
funding or use eminent domain as a justification for seizing them.  Eventually, many schools 
built on land outside of military posts but with federal funds integrated as a result of this pressure 
brought to bear on them.116  Military communities became islands of racial parity floating in an 
American sea of inequality and segregation. 
Certainly, those separating from the military soon after their tour of duty in Korea did not 
experience the full impact of military integration.  But, regardless of when one mustered out, the 
rebaptism into civilian life proved an awakening after living in the increasingly integrated 
society of the Armed Forces.  While home front attitudes had shifted a little bit with regard to 
race, leading more than half of Americans polled in 1958 to agree that at some point in the future 
blacks and whites would share schools, restaurants, and public accommodations, the realities of 
life had stayed much the same.117  As one black lieutenant put it, “When you get into town, it is 
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the same old pattern that most know about.  We have complete mixing on the post, but when you 
go into the city, it’s just the same old story.”118   
After several Oakland, California restaurants refused entrance to one soldier in uniform, 
his wife asked, “Why did he serve thirty one years and nine months in the Army?  Why did he 
fight for his country?  Where is the country that he fought for?”119  America as it existed in the 
1950s had few adequate answers to those questions.  In the South especially, time seemed to 
have stood still.  Nearly a decade after the racial violence that accompanied African American 
soldiers home from World War II, southern towns remained relatively unsafe for blacks in 
uniform as well as in general.  Just trying to vote, arguing over racial epithets, driving a car, or 
walking down the street made blacks the targets of police and civilian brutality in places like 
Alabama and Mississippi.120  In Rupert, Georgia, Private Macy Yost Snipes defied the local 
white establishment by casting his vote in 1956 and paid with his life.  Whites in the county 
would not even let Snipes’ body be buried in the family plot and underscored their resistance to 
black voting by running Snipes’ family out of town.121  As late as 1960, the Marine Corps 
refrained from assigning black Marines to certain duty stations because of concerns for their 
welfare or the unavailability of off-post housing.122   
Widespread discrimination in employment continued to limit opportunities for black 
veterans.  Southern communities, for example, restricted blacks, even veterans, to certain 
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occupations.  In one Mississippi city black ex-G.I.s could only use their veterans’ preference to 
become letter carriers and in the Montgomery, Alabama V. A. office they could only be 
employed as custodians.  At Maxwell Air Base in Montgomery, all black workers started in the 
mess hall regardless their skills or qualifications.123  After the war Vernon Warren went back to 
school to become a certified public accountant, but when he tried to land a job in his field, he 
“found the doors shut tight….He was still a black man.  The war had changed him, but it had not 
changed that.”124 
Outside of the South inequalities existed as well.  Motels and eateries across the country 
routinely refused service to black patrons, making it necessary for African American servicemen 
and women traveling to their hometowns or next duty stations to either obtain a copy of the 
“Green Book,” a travelers’ guide listing places where blacks could stay, or risk having to sleep in 
the train station, their car, or on the street.125  Neighborhoods in several California cities refused 
to admit or accept non-white homeowners or occupants.  Real estate operators in Garden Grove 
refused to sell a home to Dr. Sammy Lee, an Olympic diving champion who toured Asian 
countries for the State Department in an effort to fight communist claims of racial prejudice in 
the U.S., because of his Korean ancestry.126  White residents in Los Angeles set off a bomb at 
black war veteran William Bailey’s home and left a note declaring, “We will bomb Negroes 
out.”127   Elsewhere, whites formed mobs, planted crosses in the yards of blacks, and threw 
stones at the homes of people they wanted out.  Sometimes, as in the case of black World War II 
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veteran Wilbur Gary, the law supported one’s right as an American to live where they chose, but 
undoubtedly scare tactics forced more than a few families to simply move on.128  In Phoenix, 
Arizona, the veterans’ cemetery allowed whites killed in action to be buried without clearance, 
but African American Thomas Reed’s body was kept on ice after shipment back from Korea 
because rules stipulated that blacks could only be buried after the receipt of three notarized 
letters from veterans’ organizations.129  Similarly, a Sioux City, Iowa cemetery refused to allow 
the burial of John Rice, a Winnebago veteran of World War II killed in Korea, because he was 
not of the “Caucasian race.”130   Asked to join a fraternity at Boston University, former Marine 
Jack Orth learned, much to his disgust, that the organization had rejected fellow ex-Marines 
because of their race.131   
Confronted with Jim Crow segregation and bigotry, the unsavory hallmarks of American 
life outside of the U. S. military, many returnees felt confused, even angry.  Having marched to 
war armed with the belief that their wartime service would result somehow in a “larger measure 
of freedom, dignity, and opportunity for our loved ones at home,” black and other non-white 
veterans wondered, “Who was my worst enemy, really?”132  Were communists abroad as bad as 
racists at home?  And, white veterans, possessing intimate friendships across the color line from 
their service in the Army or Marines, felt “deeply perplexed about the racial discrimination” 
leveled against their comrades.133  But what would they do about it? 
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In light of the activism and controversy stirred up by the Vietnam War and veterans of 
that conflict, historians have tended to view Korean War veterans as passive, easily accepting the 
status quo and peacefully melting back into society after returning from the war.   Indeed, raised 
during the Great Depression and World War II, most veterans of Korea early learned and 
internalized the lesson that no matter the circumstances one had no other choice but to 
uncomplainingly forget personal preferences and get on with the tasks at hand.  The culture of 
conformity which rose with the Soviet threat in the years after World War II reinforced the 
inclination to subvert one’s own desires for the security of the country.  Consequently, Korean 
War veterans, whatever their ideas on the matter, did not launch any great crusades to win equal 
civil rights for Americans of all colors.   
However, Korean War veterans individually did protest Jim Crowism and contribute to 
the quest for social justice in invaluable ways.  One black non-commissioned officer, frustrated 
at having to move to the back of the bus when it left the base, made a point while on post of 
sitting “right behind the driver, just to watch the cracker burn up.”134  During the Vietnam War, 
Clarence Adams, who had originally gone to the People’s Republic of China at the end of the 
Korean War but then returned to the United States, made radio broadcasts telling African 
Americans, “If you are going to fight, you need to go home and fight for your own cause.  
You’re being wasted for a cause that isn’t even yours.”135  Others joined the N.A.A.C.P. and 
contributed to its “Freedom Fund” to “help improve our democracy.”136  So many blacks at some 
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American Legion posts joined the N.A.A.C.P. that two white posts unsuccessfully tried to get 
these kicked out of the organization on grounds that they were “dabbling in partisan politics.”137  
Additionally, Black veterans risked their lives to register to vote and turned out at the polls.138   
Korean War veterans also joined veterans’ organizations which made it their business to 
make a difference.  The American Veterans Committee (AVC) attracted some Korean War 
veterans as members and this socially progressive veterans’ organization fought against Orville 
Faubus in Little Rock, Arkansas, demanded an end to racial segregation at the federally funded 
and supervised Columbia Institution for the Deaf in Washington D.C., called on the District of 
Columbia to pass and enforce a law banning discrimination in public recreational places, 
petitioned President Eisenhower to intervene in Prince Edward County, Virginia where the 
Board of Supervisors decided to cut off all funding to public schools after required to integrate 
them, and worked tirelessly to tear down the walls of segregation.139  Representatives of the 
Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America presented the Platform Committees of the 
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Democratic and Republican National Conventions with a call for further “programs of education 
and legislation to wipe out racial and religious discrimination.”140   
More aggressively, some Korean War veterans, especially African Americans, 
“contributed to the increasing use of armed self-defense in the postwar decades.”141  In 1964, 
World War II and Korean veterans came together to found the Deacons for Defense and Justice 
to protect people involved in the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement, deter white violence in the 
South, and fight the Ku Klux Klan.142  Veterans brought to the table not only a new sort of 
militancy, but also technical expertise and the kind of courage learned on the battlefield.  
Protected by the Deacons of Defense, Civil Rights worker Robert Lewis notes, “We had veterans 
that have been to Korea and place like that knew how to make stuff, just like the Molotov 
Cocktails.  So we knew how to make the time bombs, too.”143  Similarly, Albert Turner, thinking 
back to the summer of 1965 when he worked in Crenshaw County, Alabama registering voters, 
remembers that the local leader accompanying and watching over them was a Korean War 
veteran.144  Generally working within the system, Korean War veteran activists did not seek or 
achieve the sort of visibility that their sons and daughters of the next war would, but in many 
small ways they did make lasting contributions to the movements that reshaped American life 
with regard to race.  In part because of the vision instilled in servicemen and women by the 
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military in the 1950s and 1960s, Americans of all races and nationalities came to live together in 
an integrated, if not yet color blind society.   
 
Old Wounds and New Lives 
 
Whether they knew it or not, many veterans of the Korean War “had more problems than 
anyone realized when I first came home.”145  They might have exited the war but it most 
certainly had not yet left them.  As a result, many veterans did strange things after their return.  
Accustomed to living in a prisoner of war camp, William Allen left burning cigarettes all over 
the house, throwing them on the floor without realizing it.146  Another veteran, eating breakfast 
with his parents, unconsciously asked them to “pass the f—king sugar.”147  Irwin Crockett dove 
for cover when a truck backfired.148  Kenneth Dixon trembled and shook until he could not hold 
a cup of coffee and knew of men who returned unable to talk.149  While loving the smell and feel 
of clean sheets, some slept on the ground just as they had in Korea.  Others showered multiple 
times a day or soaked in the tub for hours.  After months spent in cold and filth, they could not 
get enough hot water and they wanted to be clean again.  “The dirt and grime of Korea was still 
in my pores and embedded under my fingernails.  I had to soak it away.”150  Used to having to 
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remain on guard in the foxholes, David Van Leeuwen almost killed his brother when he came to 
wake him up and Arthur Smith narrowly missed hitting his mother when she entered the room 
while he was sleeping.151  Charles Bussey awoke frequently to “check security” and Jack Wright 
took to roaming the streets at night.152  Some slept with guns under their pillows, making for a 
few close calls when someone inadvertently woke them up or startled them.153  More 
astoundingly, some veterans lashed out with tremendous violence.  Anderson Williams, a combat 
veteran, prowled around at night throwing rocks at women drivers, a habit which ultimately cost 
him $3000 in fines and his driver’s license.154  Samuel Fikes choked his wife to death in a “jilted 
lover’s quarrel” and Thomas Howell allegedly beat a ten year old boy after asking him, “Are you 
Jewish.”155  To varying degrees, these nervous and jumpy returnees had trouble acting normal.  
“After all, who or what did I have to compare normal living with?”156 
Odd behaviors usually subsided with the passage of time, but mental issues stemming 
from veterans’ overseas experiences often continued.  From the trenches or hospitals in Korea 
and Japan, it had seemed that all would be well if only a person could return safely to family and 
friends.  Once home, returning veterans wanted to “wallow in all this happiness [at returning], 
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but somehow I just couldn’t.”157  For a great many, the war wouldn’t go away.  When awake, 
they worried about friends still caught on the battleground and “could not stop thinking about all 
the buddies I’d lost in Korea. … Like me, they’d been looking forward to a future; one that 
would never happen for them.”158  They felt guilty “because I had survived and all my friends 
didn’t” or because after they left friends died or got wounded and “I still felt responsible.”159  
Sleep brought little respite from feelings of guilt or memories of the war as nightmares made 
everything real again.  In Charles Bussey’s dreams, “Chinese soldiers trampled over my shallow 
grave and double-timed over me” and in Leonard Korgie’s he begged an officer not to send him 
back to Korea despite orders.160  More terrifying, Hoppy Harris dreamed that “the decomposed 
bodies of the enemies I have killed come rising from their graves, and I rush madly about trying 
to push them back into their graves, but they will not stay there.  They keep popping back as if 
trying to get at me, seeking revenge for my having sent them to an early grave.”161  As months 
and years passed, some men found their lives less frequently interrupted by sad or intrusive 
thoughts or frightening nightmares, but for many these never completely went away.  As one 
veteran writes, “My long ago war, so hauntingly remote/Still rings in my ears like an exploding 
shell,/Shattering this cozy peace surrounding me/And shouting old memories.”162 Over half a 
century since the conflict ended, Gilbert Towner “grieve[s] for the men that are still in the 
ground around Chosin Resevoir” and William Dannenmaier wonders if the dreams that trouble 
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his sleep will end when he dies or “as I have sometimes thought, I died as a young soldier.  Then, 
those dreams are my eternity.”163   
After participating in the great life and death drama of the war, no matter how terrible, 
many veterans found civilian life boring and inconsequential and had great trouble settling down 
and becoming civilians again.  Keyed up from Korea, Jack Wright was “restless as hell.”  To 
take the edge off while on leave, he “spent every dime I made,” including his back pay.164  
Others developed a “crazy longing to return to the front.”165  Of more significance, many felt 
“like an alien when I came home” and developed negative attitudes toward regular life or toward 
themselves.166  To Seymour Bernstein, “all seemed temporal and unreal” and, after witnessing so 
many tragedies in Korea, the worries of the people around him seemed petty.167   Similarly, 
William Dannenmaier believed, “Life was transient, ludicrous, and I was meaningless in it.”  
Seeing people gathered to talk and laugh, he wanted to scream, “Why are you laughing?  They 
didn’t know what the world was like. They had no knowledge of the pain and anguish in the 
world.”168  Numb to the new realities around them, returnees had difficulty talking to non-
veterans, “enjoying the things I once did,” trusting people, making the most basic decisions, and 
expressing emotions.169  Sensing their own blandness toward death, believing they “could kill 
anyone, stranger or friend, and walk away without concern,” and frightened by their “tendency to 
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look at those who annoyed me and consider the best way to get rid of them,” they had reason to 
question whether they would ever really live again.170  Unmistakably the war aged and 
transformed those who experienced it.  As one veteran puts it, “I lost something in Korea.”171 
Eventually, veterans tried to come to terms with what they had experienced in the Far 
East and find ways to readjust to life at home.  Initially, many sought out old friends in hopes of 
finding a place to fit in again.  Frequently, these encounters proved counterproductive.  Not only 
did old high school or college chums know little about the war, they expected returnees to “be 
again the person I was before I went overseas,” but “it was too late for that.”172  Elmer Payne 
nearly got into a fist fight when his old high school classmates insisted that he was “‘lucky’ not 
having to face the draft.” Deciding he’d better stay away from them in the future, Payne avoided 
them even at his fifty year reunion in 1998.173  In any case, those who had remained behind 
seemed so inexperienced and naive compared to the men and women who had served in the war.  
“Somehow I felt I had nothing in common anymore with these guys; I couldn’t relate to them. 
We were the same age, but they seemed younger than me.”174  Veterans just had “experiences 
that they could never relate to, whereas they had had life experiences that I would someday be 
able to relate to, but did not yet have.  Theirs was college, mine combat, face to face with the 
chance of death, all day, every day for over a year.”175  Worse yet, “time had moved on for them 
whereas it was just starting for me.”176  Men and women at home had married and started 
                                                 
170 Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents, 225. 
171 Ralph David Fly, Memoir (Korean Ware Educator), 28. 
172 Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents, 225. 
173 Elmer “Palmer” Payne, Korean War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW. 
174 Floyd Baxter in Knox and Coppel, The Korean War:  Uncertain Victory, 360-361.  Also John M. Pitre, Korean 
War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW and Harlee W. Lassiter, Korean War Veteran Survey, attachment page, 
CFSOKW. 
175 Clarence Jackson “Jack” Davis (AFC2001/001/1644), Folder 1, Unpublished letters and postscript, 180, VHPC, 
AFC, LOC. 
176 Allen, My Old Box of Memories, 88. 
 307
families, gone to college, gotten good jobs, and purchased homes.  Veterans couldn’t help feeling 
that they “had a time gap in my life that could never be filled” and consider “myself hopelessly 
behind everyone else.”177  Thus efforts to reconnect sometimes ended only in bitterness and a 
simmering anger that people at home had gone on to live comfortable, undisturbed lives while 
other Americans had suffered the pain and sadness of Korea.178 
Realizing that “no one wanted to hear about where I had been, what I had done, and what 
I had seen,” many veterans tried to repress their memories and “forget most of the bad 
experiences.179  They seldom talked about the demons haunting them, the “killing, maiming, 
frostbite, barbed wire, fear, trembling, doubt, arson, exhaustion, death, or blood” that had entered 
their psyches in Korea and remained to punish them after coming home.180  POWs especially 
kept quiet and guarded about their experiences.  Almost as soon as they had been freed, the 
military began warning them not to speak about what had happened to them in the camps and to 
be careful not to reveal any secrets.181  Also, by the time POWs finally reached the States, the 
U.S. Army and others had begun a witch hunt, looking for “collaborators” and making the public 
suspicious of anyone who had been captured by the Koreans or Chinese.182   At a parade hosted 
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for returning POW Jack Flanary in Benham, Kentucky officials from the VFW barged in to 
announce “‘rumors’ that the sergeant had been ‘responsive to communist indoctrination.’”183  
The FBI and CIA badgered and investigated almost all POWs for years after their return.184  
Caught in the repressive social climate of the deepening Cold War, many veterans, whether 
POW or not, decided, “This is not good.  I’d better just keep my mouth shut.”185   
Men or women desperate or brave enough to try and talk about their experiences right 
after the war found most Americans ill-equipped or unwilling to help them.  As Paula Schnurr, 
an official at the Veteran Administration’s National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in 
2000 admitted, both the government and research scientists ignored the post-combat emotional 
problems of Korean War veterans.186  And, even when returnees got to what should have been 
the right places, the staff and personnel didn’t know what to do with them.  Visiting physicians 
and psychiatrists, Charles Bussey determined that they “had no idea of appropriate treatment for 
my problems,” forcing him to try and cope on his own.  Similarly, checked into a veteran’s 
hospital, Walter Adelmann received a diagnosis of battle fatigue but was released without any 
effective treatment.187  Furthermore, government budget cuts in the mid-1950s resulted in the 
curtailment of psychiatric services for veterans, even for those already approved for and engaged 
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in treatment, making the likelihood of finding a professional to talk to about wartime experiences 
more unlikely.188  
Sharing with other veterans might have provided relief for men still stinging from combat 
or captivity, but not all veterans’ groups welcomed Korean War veterans.  Not legally recognized 
as war veterans by the government until the late 1950s, Korean War veterans occasionally found 
themselves turned away by organizations like the VFW and American Legion, created and 
controlled by World War I or World War II veterans.189  Both the American Legion and VFW 
refused to allow Verlin Rogers to join until years later, claiming that the “Korean War was ‘not a 
war’ and I did not qualify.”190  Some veterans claim that the American Legion took rejection a 
step further.  In To Acknowledge a War Paul Edwards asserts that the American Legion blamed 
American servicemen for the stalemate in Korea and “supported a smear campaign” which 
painted these new veterans as not only soft on communism but morally weaker than the veterans 
of other wars.191  Unsurprisingly, even many years after the conflict, Korean War veterans who 
had not properly readjusted tended to believe that their problems “were my fault, some weakness 
in me.”192 
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“Screwed up mentally and … not ready for our world,” returnees, especially men, 
commonly turned to alcohol or drugs to drown their troubles.193  “I drank an awful lot.  I tried to 
use alcohol to overcome my problems.”194  Walter Adelmann drank for two months after his 
return and for Jack Orth “drinking became the order of the day, and that became more and more 
of a problem.”195  For many veterans of the Korean War, trying to do “the best I could” and 
unable to put the conflict behind them, early months of drinking spiraled into years or lifetimes 
of alcoholism or substance abuse.196  Ted Hofsiss drank heavily through part of another 
reenlistment and Vernon Warren came home drunk nearly every day throughout his career as a 
postal carrier because “there was nothing he could do to push the war out of his mind.”  Bennie 
Gordon used alcohol to “numb the pain, and keep the nightmares away” for decades until put on 
medication and now “tries not to leave his house, unless he has to.”197  Not simply an illness of 
veterans, alcoholism did plague Korean War veterans, particularly those who participated in 
combat, at rates somewhat elevated above those of their contemporaries.  And, because these 
returnees were trying to cover one problem, the inability to forget the past and get on with their 
lives, with another, substance abuse, they often failed to recognize the “severity of their 
problems and … [did] not avail themselves of the opportunity for treatment.”198  Consequently, 
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many veterans of the “police action” in Korea still struggle with the bottle, their failed marriages, 
lost careers, and shattered dreams trailing behind them.199 
In retrospect, many veterans realize that PTSD, or post-traumatic stress disorder, lay at 
the heart of their difficulty in readjusting when they rotated home, but, at the time, the 
servicemen and women returning from the war zone knew nothing “about post combat stress or 
anything like it.”200  Born into a generation reared to show the same can-do spirit exhibited by 
Americans during the Great Depression and the Second World War, most internalized and 
accepted the lesson that they were “to solve our own problems.”201  To do otherwise 
demonstrated not just a lack of resolve, but revealed unacceptable and embarrassing personal and 
moral weaknesses.202  This, coupled with a lack of programs designed to assist veterans in 
resuming a normal life, meant that only rarely did Korean War veterans find their way in the 
1950s or even the 1960s or 1970s to specialists at the Veterans Administration or elsewhere who 
could explain to them what was wrong.203  One doctor noted that even once treatment became 
available, Korean War veterans stubbornly resisted regular psychotherapy until “satisfied that 
their problems will not be solved through their own resources, such as by an educational or 
occupational adjustment; working with non-psychiatric physicians … or utilization of some other 
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external means.”204  Instead, they suffered silently and alone.  Severe headaches crippled 
returnees as did flashbacks, irritability, nerve problems, restlessness, depression, nightmares, 
feelings of insufficiency, fatigue, and difficulties in concentration.205  One man had recurring 
bouts of painful hives caused by “post anxiety reaction.”206   Some were such “a mess” that they 
could not raise their own children or hold down any type of job.   
POWs and men who endured heavy combat fared less well than the typical veteran.207  
As a result of the extreme conditions under which they had been held, POWs became mistrustful 
of people, uncomfortable in crowds or social settings, emotionally detached from loved ones, and 
unable to focus.208  As Charley Davis noted, “I still size people up as soon as I meet them.  I 
listen to the way they talk, and I watch how they act and react.  I want to see if they are real or 
pretending to be something they are not … In the camps you had to make sure someone wasn’t 
going to get you in trouble over something you said.”209  Robert Maclean could not even take 
advantage of the G. I. Bill to go to college because being in the classroom “felt like I was back in 
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prison camp again.  I couldn’t concentrate on anything they were trying to teach me.”210  As ex-
POW Shorty Estabrook wrote, “Life has been cruel for many of us and we are time bombs 
ticking.  We never did adjust properly.”211 
On a day to day basis, men affected with PTSD tried to forget the war, but “the memories 
of that horrifying time” never completely went away.  As Rudolph Stephens notes, “Somewhere 
in the recesses of my mind will always be a place that will haunt me for the rest of my life.  A 
place called Korea.”212  Without professional help, many remained mired in mental issues caused 
by the war.213  Not until some twenty or thirty years after the armistice did therapy become 
readily available to Korean War veterans afflicted with PTSD, and then only by accident.  In the 
wake of the Vietnam War and the return of that conflict’s battered veterans, the V.A. began to 
train therapists and offer and advertise counseling for men and women adversely affected by 
their wartime service.214  At the about the same time, public awareness increased and Korean 
War veterans saw advertisements for therapy sessions on billboards at veteran’s hospitals, read 
about PTSD in newspapers and magazines, and watched television programs dedicated to the 
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topic.215  In response, Korean War veterans followed the lead of their sons and daughters of the 
Vietnam generation and began to attend meetings and address the problems that for so long they 
had tried to face alone.  Suddenly, the government as well as doctors and researchers began to 
take a real interest, funding and conducting studies of Korean War veterans and the incidence of 
PTSD.  These efforts showed that in sharp contrast to previous assumptions, Korean War 
veterans not only had symptoms of PTSD right after the war, but that these older veterans were 
still feeling the effects.216 By the late 1980s, V.A. hospitals, like the one in Tampa, Florida, were 
accepting Korean War veterans at their PTSD clinics and actively sending out letters to find 
others in need of medical help or assistance in getting compensation.  Many of those contacted 
had not dealt with the V.A. for years, if ever, and had no knowledge of the services or benefits 
available to them.  “They are angry with the VA to begin with, and they’re angry with the public.  
A lot of them have drinking problems, and they have a hell of a divorce rate.  There’s lots bottled 
up inside us because of what we went through, but nobody cares but us,” or so they thought.217 
Thirty, forty, even fifty years after the battles that left them scarred and hurting, Korean War 
veterans suffering from PTSD finally began to reclaim their lives as civilians and heal.218  
Visiting the V. A. hospital in Fresno and attending sessions with a V. A. psychiatrist and PTSD 
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counselor, Tony Velasquez writes, “The nightmares, the flashbacks, the anger, depression and 
the guilt about the people I killed in Korea will never go away, but I am learning to control and 
to cope with my memories of the Forgotten War and my survival guilt.”219  As another veteran 
says, “The more you talk about it, the more you get rid of it.”220  Unfortunately, some men did 
not live to see the improvement that outside aid might have worked on their lives.  In addition to 
the thousands who died of natural causes in the intervening decades, some veterans chose to 
commit suicide, often soon after coming home, or engaged in risky behaviors that ended with 
their untimely deaths.221  Parents and friends were left to explain that their son “had returned 
from the wars much the worse for his experience” or that “he had been highly nervous since he 
was discharged from the Army more than a year ago.”222     
While many veterans languished after coming home, other returnees ultimately did find 
effective strategies for melting back into regular life and overcoming the trauma of war.  After 
only three days home, Jack Jackson took a job driving a dump truck where his language and 
mannerisms would not offend anyone and where co-workers helped him acclimate to his new, 
old life.  Within about a year he felt comfortable in polite society, unafraid that he would 
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embarrass himself or someone else.223  Gilbert Towner eventually “began reimmersing myself 
back in my culture, sweathouse, religion (Indian) and cultural events.”  Although still awakening 
“back in the war” at three each morning, Towner managed to create a lasting marriage and quit 
drinking.224  Harold Mulhausen became a workaholic, a habit that created some other problems 
but kept his mind off the war.225  His life “messed up” for several years, Clyde Queen got “the 
help of good people” and “got my life back and I turned out to be a good, and productive 
citizen.”226  Queen joined various veterans’ organizations and made a career in federal law 
enforcement.  Drinking heavily after his return, Douglas Anderson went to work on a remote 
ranch for a year where he began to heal, losing much of his bitterness.227   
Perhaps no one single activity helped as many veterans recover from their wartime 
experiences when they first came home, though, as continuing to serve in the Armed Forces.  
Men who mustered out soon found themselves adrift in an unfamiliar and unwelcoming world 
full of strangers.  “After being stateside for a total of 4 days, you no longer have the security of 
belonging to a known society of like persons, and you have been cast free into an unknown 
environment that seems alien for a long while.”228  Back home, “everything had changed 
including myself … [I] no longer fit in.”229  Also, no matter how much one had hated the rigor 
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and discipline of their particular service, military life proved a hard habit to break and those who 
did not stay in for a while had some degree of trouble ordering their own lives.  “At first it 
seemed I couldn’t make a decision for myself.  I missed having some one tell me what to do.”230  
But, the only way these new civilians could reclaim some part of what they felt they had lost was 
to make visits to nearby installations, “just to be in a military environment.”231  Returnees who 
re-upped or who had time left on their enlistments in general had an easier time adjusting after 
their return.  They just “went to a new duty station and continued my career” without having to 
give much thought to the war they left behind.232  And, they reentered a community where “we 
didn’t need to say much to each other.  Didn’t need to, we both understood.”233  As Ralph Cutro 
observes, “It was nice to get back among Marines.  We helped one another to adjust.”234  
Similarly, Jack Wright found “when I got back with other Marines I settled down and began to 
feel comfortable around people again.”235  This sense of belonging, the unspoken acceptance of 
their peers, and the structure that continued military service provided all greatly aided in the 
successful transition from war to “normal” life for many Korean War veterans.236   
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Just as returnees had to deal with the emotional trauma of war after coming home, 
Korean War veterans often had to struggle with physical impairments and injuries.  New medical 
techniques and modes of transportation pioneered in Korea ensured that men returned from this 
war with wounds that would have proven fatal in World War I or even World War II.237  Doctors 
in the field perfected the use of type O blood and plasma, experimented with antibiotics, and 
began substituting arterial repair for amputation when treating severed arteries.238  The military 
moved medical detachments closer to the front lines and began to use helicopters to transport the 
wounded more quickly.239  As a result, only 2.5% of men wounded in Korea died compared to 
4.5% in World War II.240  Ironically, in some cases the lower mortality rate meant that instead of 
dying, Korea’s wounded came home to live with more serious and unusual injuries than 
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anticipated.241  Even if that were not the case, many of those who survived returned with medical 
conditions that would affect their health and well-being for life. 
Among other things, returning Korean War veterans suffered from such obvious 
disabilities as amputated limbs, shrapnel buried in their body tissue, lost eyesight, diminished 
hearing, ruined teeth, paralysis, tuberculosis, bleeding ulcers, and the loss of fingers or toes from 
frostbite.  After arriving home, many more became afflicted with bouts of malaria or other 
diseases, discovered that they had intestinal parasites, or simply realized that physically they 
were not the person they had been before going to Korea.242 Those in the worst condition went 
immediately to Army or Navy hospitals where military staff members generally provided 
competent and compassionate care.  Frank Muetzel, an amputee, remembers that nurses wined 
and dined patients at one base, welcoming them home with joyful, if unauthorized parties, and 
allowing them to use the Navy Officers’ Club.243  After mid-April 1953, some hospitalized 
returnees received an even bigger and more unexpected treat.  President Eisenhower decided to 
deactivate the U.S.S. Williamsburg, giving it over to the Red Cross to provide one day cruises on 
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the Potomac River for wounded veterans.  On board, the Red Cross entertained their special 
guests with movies, music, guided tours, sun-bathing, lunch, and a picnic supper.244   
Despite good medical care or special treatment, the spirits of wounded men could swing 
low.  Muetzel felt shattered that his injuries signaled the end of his military career.  A Marine 
since 1944 with little training other than as rifle platoon leader, “the separation from old friends 
and the life I’d chosen and loved came as a tremendous blow.”  Similarly, having lost a leg, 
Richard Newman found his “will to live was down to about zero.”245  Once men left the hospital, 
they faced more hardship as they discovered what men who returned home right after the war 
already knew—that the American public and government had little interest in the Korean War or 
in those who had fought it.  Muetzel found a Silver Star on his bed after returning to the hospital 
from a party with nothing but a cover letter attached saying that it had been “delivered with 
appropriate ceremony” and, at the Bank of America, a loan officer who saw Muetzel hobble in 
on crutches wearing his uniform and ribbons denied him a new car loan, saying, “I see you want 
to go back to school.  You won’t need a car there, anyway.”246   
For those healthy enough to process out without directly entering a hospital or 
rehabilitation center, healing could take longer and come at far greater cost.  The V.A. remained 
the “best kept secret” from veterans who received little information about it at discharge.247  
And, even those with service-connected wounds or disabilities who knew where to go didn’t 
always receive the kind of care to which they were entitled.  Developed during World War I and 
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later expanded to care for veterans with service-related medical problems, the veterans’ hospital 
system proved woefully inadequate at ministering to the needs of veterans in the 1950s.248  Cost 
cutting measures and administrative wrangling during and after Korea led to the closure of 
various hospitals and the resignations of many V.A. doctors just as more of both were needed 
handle the influx of casualties coming out of the Far East.249  As a result, would-be patients had 
to wait for service.250  Arriving home in September, former POW Shorty Estabrook, who now 
considers himself “medically dumped,” did not get de-wormed until November.251  Richard 
Curtis, a veteran of both World War II and the Korean War, could not get a hospital bed for the 
treatment of alcoholism and mental illness until his brother obtained the intervention of James C. 
Hagerty, President Eisenhower’s press secretary, in 1959.252  Edward McAllister’s wait finally 
ended when he collapsed and died at a construction site where he was working during a two-
week delay in admittance by the Veterans’ Administration for service-connected hypertension 
and heart disease.253   
Other veterans of Korea would wait far longer, years or decades more, before receiving 
V.A. treatment.  Although recruiters had promised many volunteers “in no uncertain terms, free 
medical care for the rest of our lives,” such guarantees went unfulfilled once a person separated 
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from the Armed Forces after Korea.254  At least initially, V.A. hospitals required that men and 
women, except service-disabled and impoverished veterans, give proof that the condition they 
were seeking treatment for was service-connected.  Not infrequently that turned out to be an 
impossible task.  Thousands of men suffered cold injuries at Chosin Reservoir, but at the time 
there were too many casualties of a more immediate nature for doctors or corpsmen to document 
frostbite cases.255  Similarly, by the end of a battle in which one sustained injuries, there might be 
no one left able to verify the combat-related nature of their wounds.  The V.A. x-rayed Gilbert 
Towner, finding shrapnel residue in each place where he was wounded, but without four people 
to sign an affidavit that he had been shot in the war, Towner was left to fight the V.A. for the 
next 27 years to “get almost what I think I deserve.”256  Frostbite victims fared worse.  Men 
whose toes or fingers peeled off with their boots or gloves as a result of exposure to the bitter 
cold of Korea did receive medical care at the time, but the V.A. denied that cold injury problems 
did not end there.  As men whose feet or hands had frozen in the war came forward later as aging 
veterans with throbbing feet, phlebitis, skin cancer, tingling fingers and toes, peeling skin, fungal 
infections, night pains, arthritis, misshapen toenails, joint deterioration, and other long-term 
conditions stemming from frostbite, the V.A. declined to help them.  Too often, veterans of the 
war in Korea simply accepted the denial of their claims.  Instead of exploding and declaring that 
“no chair-bound jerk in Washington is going to pull that stuff on him”—as World War II 
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veterans would have done—Korean War veterans left the V. A. office with a “Yes, Sir” and little 
by way of questions.257   
Ultimately, though, the V.A. did make hospitals and doctors available to more Korean 
War veterans.  In May 1951, the V. A. hospital in Tucson, Arizona refused to treat David 
Arellano, a former Marine who served five months in combat in Korea as a bazooka-squad 
gunner, for a throat infection because it was not service-connected.  The hospital manager noted 
that he had seen several similar cases and while sympathetic could do nothing to help because 
the United States is “not at war in Korea, so these men are not eligible for treatment” as war 
veterans.258  Widely circulated, Arellano’s story outraged the public and prompted President 
Truman to call a press conference and urge Congress to remedy the technicality in the law.  
Within a week, a new bill signed by Truman guaranteed Korean War veterans “all benefits of 
hospital and domiciliary care, compensation or pensions, and burial benefits for themselves and 
their dependents as provided for persons who served during the period of World War II.”259  
Much later, those who sustained frostbite in Korea finally got satisfaction.  After intense 
lobbying on the part of the veterans themselves, the government finally conceded the long-term 
health effects of exposure to cold and in the late 1990s began to offer free medical care and 
monthly checks to veterans of both World War II and Korea who served at places like Chosin 
Reservoir in the winter of 1950.  V. A. sources conceded “I don’t know how anyone could have 
been there and not had frostbite given the conditions:  the bitter cold, the lack of protective gear, 
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the constant combat.  Half the casualties were due to the cold.  Frozen Chosen is right.”260  
Furthermore, these would not need further evidence that their problems were service-
connected.261  Such changes opened up V.A. medical care to thousands of Korean War veterans, 
but even so not everyone benefited.  Some died before becoming eligible for treatment, the V. A. 
continued to deny the claims of others, and many Korean War veterans simply chose not to use 
available V. A. resources.262  Perhaps because of early difficulties in getting V. A. assistance, the 
widespread feeling that American troops had “lost” the war in Korea, or the upbringing of men 
and women raised to shoulder their own problems and not take “handouts,” Korean War 
veterans, unique among American war veterans, did not flock to use V. A. care after serving in 
the war zone or in combat.263   
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Whether or not one managed to get V. A. or other medical care, not all wounds and 
injuries could be fixed, leaving a number of veterans to cope with altered bodies and altered 
lives.  Arms, legs, fingers, toes, and whatever else had been lost in the war zone could not just be 
glued back on and a host of other things would never mend either.  Processing out, officials told 
Arthur Smith to just sign the papers and list everything that was wrong with him and “we’ll take 
care of it.”  Three years later, at age 22, Smith had a lingering back problem, frostbitten feet, 
shrapnel coming out of his skin, false teeth, and cuts on his face which prevented him from 
shaving.  Nobody could make Smith like he had been before the war or stop the grief these 
changes brought to him on a daily basis.264  His feet blasted off by a mortar in Korea, Ted 
Hofsiss, still a teenager, would never run again, instead enduring pain for the rest of his life from 
his wounds whenever he tried to walk.265  Afflicted with bleeding ulcers from his turn in Korea, 
another veteran would almost die from his service-related ailment and eventually have to quit 
working altogether because of it.266  William Dannenmaier never entirely recovered his hearing 
and fifty years after the war noted that he still had problems with his teeth.267  Robert Casella, 
who stayed on in Korea after the truce, developed an eating disorder which continues to cause 
him to awaken late at night and rush to the kitchen to eat, allaying feelings of starvation.268  
Perhaps unaware of the extent of their injuries when they returned home, other veterans fell 
victim in the years after Korea to cancer caused by the DDT used to delouse them, smoking-
related cancers rooted in the addiction to cigarettes they started smoking while in service, and 
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age related problems due to exposure and frostbite.269  At the 1985 first meeting of the Chosin 
Few, a veterans’ group composed of Army and Marine veterans who survived the Chinese attack 
at Chosin Reservoir, men noticed that “everybody was having problems walking, getting up.”  
They marveled that they shared symptoms like excessive sweating, infected tissue, skin cancer, 
oddly shaped toenails, sore legs, swollen feet, and sensitivity to cold.270 Despite the V.A.’s 
reluctance to recognize late onset cold injury symptoms as service-related, these men “had their 
lives compromised by this injury.”271  Before help became available in the 1990s, they used 
Krazy Glue to fill cracks in their feet and stuffed maxi-pads in their shoes to absorb the weeping 
fluid.272  Similarly, POWs, who had survived unimaginable privations in North Korean or 
Chinese camps, often never fully recovered from the effects of malnutrition, diseases like 
beriberi and pellagra, cold injury, long marches, and primitive wound care.  In fact, follow-up 
studies show that even 12 years after their release Korean POWs exhibited excess morbidity, 
disability, and adjustment problems when compared to civilians, non-POW veterans, and the 
POWs of other wars.273  Undeniably and irreversibly, the Korean War etched its mark on the 
minds, bodies, and lives of those who participated in it. 
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Public Law 550, Compensation, and the Korean Veteran 
 
Living with the aftereffects of war and enjoying little by way of acknowledgment for 
their sacrifices, many Korean War veterans wanted some sort of compensation for what they had 
lost performing their duty to country.274  Remembering World War II’s G.I. Bill, 81% of those 
who had served overseas felt entitled to the same educational opportunities afforded earlier 
veterans and another 78% believed that the government should offer their generation low-cost 
home loans.275  Even veterans who thought that Uncle Sam owed nothing to the able-bodied or 
able-minded believed that service-disabled veterans should receive compensation in addition to 
medical care.  Congressmen and senators seemed to agree that veterans of the war in Korea, like 
their World War II predecessors, were due something from the government in gratitude for their 
service.  Asking the House of Representatives in 1952 to extend all the benefits of the original 
G.I. Bill to Korean veterans, Congressman Thomas J. Lane of Massachusetts argued, “They 
fought for us and are coming home to us.  Only a year and a half has been taken from their lives 
                                                 
274 Like both World War I and World War II veterans, Korean War veterans in general felt entitled only to benefits 
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according to the calendar … however, we can not reckon the extent of their displacement, or the 
rehabilitation that may be required.”276   
However, though agitation and efforts to pass G.I. Bill-type legislation for Korean War 
veterans began almost as soon as the war, just who should receive benefits and what benefits 
should be granted remained a source of contention for years both in Congress and in the public 
arena.277  Almost everyone conceded that “adequate benefits should be provided for those who 
have disabilities which are related to their military service” and that men and women who 
continued to serve in the Armed Forces beyond the Korean War era should not be eligible for 
participation in “readjustment” programs. 278  Beyond that, a wide range of opinions existed.  
Some people argued the unfairness of giving assistance to veterans not possessed of any special 
physical or financial hardship since this created a favored class of citizens who would be better 
off in their old age than other Americans.279  Others suggested that only those men and women 
who “bled and suffered in Korea, in the waters around it, or in the air over it” should receive 
government aid.  Still more pointed out that “servicemen and women are “subject to orders” and 
insisted that all Korean-War era veterans be the beneficiaries of legislation related to veteran 
readjustment no matter where they completed their tours of duty.280   
Ideas about what benefits Korean War veterans should receive ran the gamut from 
offering an extension of the World War II G.I. Bill in its entirety to Korean veterans to providing 
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them with a pared down version of it to offering them no special programs at all.  Only two 
weeks after the start of hostilities in Korea, the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans’ 
Affairs began to solicit advice from veterans’ organizations, federal agencies, and educational 
associations “on the desirability of extending readjustment benefits to veterans of the Korean 
Conflict.”  With most responses favorable to offering Korean veterans something, the House of 
Representatives on August 19, 1950 established a Select Committee to Investigate the 
Educational Program under the G.I. Bill to better inform their debate on what these new veterans 
should receive.281  Known as the Teague Committee, after its chairman Congressman Olin E. 
Teague of Texas, this group found that while “legions of veterans availed themselves of the 
educational and training benefits under the G.I. Bill,” the program had been “marked by errors, 
abuses, waste, managerial inefficiency, and in some instances, corruption and larceny.”282  The 
Teague Committee recommended that a new G.I. Bill be written for veterans of the Korean 
Conflict and that it include various safeguards to protect against some of the troubles 
encountered in the administration of the World War II G.I. Bill.283  
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On July 14, 1952, the Korean G.I. Bill emerged as Public Law 550 “to provide vocational 
readjustment and to restore lost educational opportunities to” men and women who served in the 
Armed Forces after June 27, 1950 and separated from the military under other than dishonorable 
conditions after at least 90 days active service.284  Less generous in terms of time and money 
than the World War II G.I. Bill, Public Law 550 did make educational and training benefits, 
unemployment compensation, mustering-out pay, and free assistance in finding jobs available to 
Korean War veterans.  With regard to education, Korean veterans earned 1.5 months of 
assistance for each month spent on active duty not to exceed 36 months.  Rather than splitting 
monthly payments between schools and veterans, as had been the case for World War II 
veterans, the government directly paid this new wave of G.I. students monthly stipends meant to 
cover tuition and living expenses.  Those returning to school full time received between $110 
and $160 a month depending upon the number of their dependents and on-the-job and farm 
trainees got from $70 to $130 a month.  Regulations allowed veterans to use Korean G.I. Bill 
funds to pursue college or high school degrees or to obtain farm or other institutional or on-the-
job training, but not to pay for bartending, dancing, photography, music, athletic, or public 
speaking courses except as part of an approved degree program.   Forced to declare an 
educational goal to the V.A. before embarking on any sort of training through the G.I. Bill, 
Korean veterans could only change their course of study once and enroll at schools which had 
been in operation at least two years and which had no more than 85% of students receiving G.I. 
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Bill money.285  Under these new restrictions, the Korean veteran found that the “field [was] 
narrower than his brother had after World War II.”286   
Still, Americans anticipated that Korean War veterans would flock to college campuses 
and other schools after the passage of their G.I. Bill just as those returning from the Second 
World War had done.  But, despite rumors in the summer of 1953 of high numbers of 
enrollments and predictions that “their numbers will swell before the approaching fall semester,” 
the expected deluge of Korean War G.I. students did not materialize.287  When the fall semester 
of 1953 opened, journalists marveled that “Korean War veterans are not taking advantage of the 
Korean G.I. Bill of Rights with nearly the alacrity that veterans of World War II showed in 
respect to the original G.I. bill of rights.”288  Returning to school, thinking that “Korean War 
veterans would soon flood college campuses and that we would reprise roles played in 1946-50 
by returning World War II veterans,” veterans discovered the same thing.  Throughout their 
training or schooling, Korean veterans found that they did not attend “in large enough numbers 
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to know and recognize each other” and did not get “the same feeling of respect from students or 
faculty accorded to the World War II veteran.”289   
Certainly, the 5.7 million Korean War veterans eligible for G.I. Bill benefits could not 
have the numerical impact on schools that 15.6 million World War II veterans had simply 
because there were fewer of them.290  Less easy to explain, though, is why, when 7.8 million or 
about 50% of World War II veterans took advantage of training and educational benefits, only 
2.4 million or about 42% of Korean War veterans did.291  In the 1950s, reporters and others 
posited a number of reasonable explanations for this apparent failure of Korean War veterans to 
use the educational benefits granted them.  Howard Rusk suggested that these younger veterans 
of Korea did not receive the same type of indoctrination in their rights and benefits upon 
separation from the military that the older and perhaps more worldly World War II veterans got 
and thus did not even know about the various programs funded by the government.292  This 
makes some degree of sense as the law did in fact prohibit the V.A. from approaching veterans to 
“inform them of their personal status in the veterans’ benefit program,” limiting officials to 
responding only to individuals who sought them out first.293  Private groups, like Veterans 
Benefit Inc. of Memphis, Tennessee, formed to help veterans learn about and apply for benefits, 
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but undoubtedly many Korean War veterans never knew about any of the entitlements bestowed 
on them by Congress.294  Also, as Benjamin Fine pointed out, a number of Korean War veterans 
did not need Korean G.I. Bill-funded training.  The post-Korea economic climate, while slowed 
some by the war, still had enough health to make it relatively “easy for the veterans to get jobs.”  
Furthermore, about a million veterans of the Korean War had served in World War II, enabling 
them to use the first G.I. Bill, and thousands of others had taken deferments and completed their 
educations before entering the military.295   
The stipulations of the Korean G.I. Bill also made educational and training benefits less 
attractive to veterans than if Congress had tailored this piece of legislation to more closely 
resemble the original G.I. Bill.  In trying to curb corruption and waste, Congress inadvertently 
made it more difficult for Korean veterans to opt for government subsidized G.I. schooling.  
While paying veterans directly had seemed the perfect remedy for bloated tuition bills, since 
schools would have to compete for the dollars of frugal G.I.s, stipends seldom kept pace with 
inflation.  Writing his parents in 1952, one Marine bemoaned the fact that while he had 36 
months of college coming to him, the $110 dollars a month allotted by the government fell far 
short of his current $450 a month salary.296  Female veterans had greater reason to complain.  
Male veterans automatically received extra monthly pay for their wives and children, but female 
veterans, even those with dependent spouses, did not qualify under the law for any addition to 
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their allowances.297  Facing budget crunches, Korean veterans regularly petitioned lawmakers for 
more money, charging that rising school fees and increased costs of living made it impossible to 
live on G.I. allowances.  By and large such pleas fell on deaf ears, putting degrees and 
certificates out of reach for some financially strapped veterans.298   
Additionally, Congress’s attempt to exclude fly-by-night operations by limiting G.I.s to 
institutions with student bodies composed of no more than 85% G.I. Bill students hampered their 
enrollment.  With so many men and women taking advantage of the two G.I. Bills and so few 
other students willing or able to pay their own tuition and expenses, many colleges as well as 
other types of schools had great difficulty maintaining the mandated ratio of 15% tuition-paying 
students.  This had devastating consequences.  Like other institutions, a popular tailoring school 
in Jacksonville, Florida had no choice but to relegate many Korean War G.I. applicants to a 
waiting list which in some instances moved their entrance date beyond the termination of their 
eligibility for benefits.  Thus blocked from pursuing their chosen fields of training, Korean 
veterans could do little else but decide upon another course of study, using up their one-time 
change of objective, or write their congressmen and senators that, “I answered the call of my 
Country to protect it and all of its civilians and I do not feel that it is fair and right for me to be 
denied the privilege of better preparing myself to be a more useful citizen because of the fact that 
a sufficient number of the citizens I fought to protect do not care to go to school.”299  In 
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particular, African American veterans suffered under this Korean G.I. Bill restriction.  
Effectively barred from enrolling in many “white” schools and subjected to discriminatory quota 
systems, black veterans often had to try to gain entrance into black colleges or trade schools and 
programs.  But, even more than Americans in general, the black non-veteran population could 
not afford to pay their own fees and many segregated institutions could not attract enough 
tuition-paying students to make their programs viable options for those wishing to use the 
Korean G.I. Bill, making it even more difficult for black G.I.s to find eligible institutions to 
attend.300   This, coupled with the fact that many employers excluded African Americans from 
on-the-job training programs, made it extremely challenging for black veterans to use their 
benefits whether living in the South or elsewhere.301 
Time limitations attached to the Korean G.I. Bill’s educational benefits also prevented 
some veterans from using them.  Viewing Public Law 550 as a measure to help veterans readjust 
economically and educationally to regular life after leaving military service and not wishing to 
create a permanent class of privileged citizens, Congress mandated that veterans initiate their 
courses of training by August 20, 1954 or within two years of their release from the military not 
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to exceed the Korean War service period by more than seven years.302  Most of those who 
mustered out after their wartime tours of duty had no trouble meeting these deadlines, but men 
and women who remained on active duty sometimes did.  Barred from using the G.I. Bill while 
still in service, time ran out before they could enter school.  Any significant break in service 
started the clock ticking.  Reenlisting in the Army in February 1955 after less than ninety days of 
freedom, Donald Dippe had both his application for G.I. Bill educational benefits and his appeal 
rejected by the Veterans’ Administration which calculated his time of eligibility from his first 
discharge.  Frustrated, he reflected, “I did not realize when I reenlisted … that at that moment I 
had thrown away a College Education.”303  And, once commenced, schooling could not be 
stopped for longer than twelve months without a veteran risking the loss of his or her 
entitlement.  When the outbreak of the Vietnam War necessitated the recall of men to active 
duty, Congress had to pass legislation to prevent those who had not yet begun their studies under 
the G.I. Bill and those who had started but would now be interrupted from losing their 
benefits.304  Enacting a G.I. Bill for peacetime veterans might have solved some of these 
bureaucratic nightmares and put an end to some of the injustices caused by time limits, but most 
Americans, including officials at the V.A., opposed such measures in principle and proved not 
yet inclined to pay for the provision of “education and training benefits to peacetime veterans 
who had not been disabled as the result of their service.”305 
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Other problems with Public Law 550 probably deterred some men and women from 
taking advantage of their benefits, but Korean veterans, especially those who had served in the 
Far East, had reasons all their own for not using the G.I. Bill.  Heroics had played out on the 
battlegrounds of Korea and in the hospital wards of Japan, but back home Americans did not 
seem to think of that when they thought about the war at all.  Instead, magazine and newspaper 
articles drew attention to the “brainwashing” of POWs that allegedly occurred or to the fact that 
this conflict had not been won in the same way as World War II.  To be sure, the government had 
handed out medals, about 50,000 of them, but not always to those who deserved them and not to 
POWs injured in captivity or in the action that lead to their being taken captive.306  And, what did 
it mean that some of the relatives of posthumous Medal of Honor recipients refused to accept 
those tokens of the nation’s esteem?307  Maybe Chesty Puller, a Marine Corps hero himself, had 
it right when he declared, “Stalemate, hell!  We lost the first war in our history, and it’s time 
someone told the American people the truth about it.  The Reds whipped the devil out of us, pure 
and simple.”308  In light of public attitudes and feeling that perhaps they had not quite finished 
the job entrusted to them overseas, more than a few Korean War veterans hardly thought 
themselves worthy of the kinds of benefits used so readily and nonchalantly by the veterans of 
World War II.  Like Verlin Rogers, they decided not to apply for G.I. Bill programs because 
“others deserved the money and help more than I did.”309  Also, born into that generation of kids 
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raised during the Great Depression and the Second World War and reared to take responsibility 
and to earn respect by displaying independence, Korean veterans frequently persisted in trying to 
carve their own paths through life without any assistance, especially from the government.  As 
Everett McFarland, who refused to use the G.I. Bill, later noted, “This cost me in terms of money 
but I was beholden to no one.”310 
In the end, enough Korean War veterans availed themselves of educational benefits under 
the Korean G.I. Bill that the federal government spent nearly $4.6 billion on their schooling and 
training alone.311  In general, this investment paid off handsomely for both veterans and the 
United States.  Like their World War II counterparts, Korean War veterans proved to be good 
students.312  At first stigmatized as a “silent generation” one without spirit or interests, Korean 
veterans displayed concentration, resiliency, and determination in their studies and careers.313  
This was especially true of female veterans who, in spite of often beginning their training later 
than men, used a greater percentage of their entitlements than male veterans.314  And, unlike 
World War II G.I.s, of whom only 25% of G.I. Bill participants worked toward college degrees, 
more than half of Korean War veterans who used government allowances attended universities 
and colleges and many shifted into higher paying occupations.315 Of Korean veterans who later 
                                                 
310 Everett J. McFarland, Korean War Veteran Survey, 8, CFSOKW. 
311 Fisher, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Congressional Documents Related to Educational Benefits Legislated 
for the Veterans of World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam Era Under the G.I. Bill, 32 and Sar A. 
Levitan and Karen A. Cleary, Old Wars Remain Unfinished: The Veterans Benefits System (Baltimore:  The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 3. 
312 Veterans of the Vietnam War also tended to do well in school after coming home.  See Drummond Ayers, Jr., 
“The Vietnam Veteran:  Silent, Perplexed, Unnoticed,” New York Times, 8 November 1970, 1. 
313 “A Generation on Trial,” New York Times, 28 August 1954, 14.  Also F. Fraser Bond, “It’s Fun to Teach GI’s,” 
The American Mercury 87 (July 1958), 69-72. 
314 Female veteran participation rates, though, were much lower than that of males.  Robert H. Feitz, Female 
Veterans’ Usage of the Post-Korean Conflict GI Bill (Office of Information Management and Statistics Statistical 
Policy and Research Service Research Division 711, March 1985), 12.   
315 “Education of Veterans” in Veterans in America, Central Files, Official File, OF55 1959, Box 244, DDE Library 
and Congress, House, President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, Readjustment Benefits:  General Survey and 
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went on to use V.A. educational assistance, only 24.9% had attended college before separating 
from the military.  After using the G.I. Bill, that rate increased to 57.4% and the percent of 
veterans possessing the equivalent of a college degree jumped from 8% to nearly 37%.316  It can 
be no wonder that Korean veterans credit their G.I. Bill with “providing me with opportunities 
that would not have been available” and moving them from modest backgrounds into professions 
like law and teaching and up into the middle class.317  But, in getting an education or by 
participating in job training, Korean veterans also gave back to their country by providing it with 
a new generation of doctors, engineers, scientists, businessmen, and teachers and by raising the 
national educational level.318  Also, armed with more complete educations and employed in 
higher paying fields, many Korean veterans paid back in taxes the entire cost of their G. I. Bill 
benefits within about 15 years of re-entering the work force.319   
In addition to the Korean G. I. Bill, the federal government offered a smorgasbord of 
entitlements to worthy candidates.320  Disabled veterans had the opportunity to select from a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Appraisal:  A Report on Veterans’ Benefits in the United States, 78, 84th Congress, 2nd sess., Committee Print 289, 
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316 While the percent of veterans attending college and earning degrees also rose among Korean veterans who did 
not use the G.I. Bill, the climb was less dramatic, going from 16.1% to 27.4% and 7.2% to 10.9% respectively.  
“National Survey of Veterans, 1979,” 2196-197, NA, RG 015, Box 1.  One scholar argues that the social climate 
extant in America and the push for more formal education rather than the passage of the World War II and Korean 
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Nam, “Impact of the ‘GI Bills’ on the Educational Level of the Male Population,” Social Forces 43:1 (October 
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317 George Pakkala, Korean War Veteran Survey, 12, CFSOKW and Eugene R. Grace, Korean War Veteran Survey, 
13, CFSOKW.  See also Al Avisato, Jr. in the Extension of Remarks of Senator Spessard L. Holland of Florida in 
Congressional Record—Appendix (Senate), 84th Congress, 2nd sess., volume 100, (January 1954-1 December 1954), 
A69. 
318 “Education of Veterans” in Veterans in America, Central Files, Official File, OF55 1959, Box 244, DDE Library 
and Congressman Radwan in Congressional Record (House), 84th Congress, 2nd sess., volume 102, part 2 (27 
January 1956-17 February 1956), 2099. 
319 “A Generation on Trial,” New York Times, 28 August 1954, 14. 
320 Veterans benefits in America date back to at least the Revolutionary War when the Continental Congress passed 
laws to award soldiers land grants and pensions.  The first general pension came in 1818 for needy service veterans 
and was expanded in later years to include men who did not meet earlier eligibility requirements.  After World War 
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number of programs and benefits to “restore every disabled veteran to a useful place in our 
economy and society,” including medical and dental care, vocational rehabilitation, insurance, 
pensions or other monetary compensation, automobiles, housing for paraplegics, and loan 
guarantees.321  Soldiers who had served on the front lines in Korea could apply for special 
combat pay through their local Veterans Administration.322  POWs could file claims for about 
$2.50 a day for every day they were held as a POW, $1 for each day that they received food or 
care below the standard outlined by the Geneva Convention and $1.50 for each day held in 
inhumane conditions.323  Wounded veterans could hope for disability ratings resulting in 
compensation and pensions.324  Legislators, veterans’ organizations, and individuals proposed 
other measures as well, such as a minimum compensation rating of 30% for ex-prisoners of war, 
paid transportation for POWs to motels in Florida which offered them free vacations, and 
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324 Pensions ranged from $15 to $150 a month based on the extent of disability.  Amputees and the blind received 
more, but only those discharged with service disabilities could collect a pension.  “We’ve Been Asked: About Aid to 
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service-connection for cancer or psychosis developing within two years of service.325  Some of 
these ideas failed to bear fruit, but a fair number of returnees tried, with varying degrees of 
success, to take advantage of the V.A. and government offerings which did become available.326  
By June 30, 1972, the government had paid Korean War veterans and their dependents over $5 
billion in compensation, $740 million in pensions, $6 million for automobiles and special 
devices, and $14 million for homes for paraplegics.  Adding in loan guarantees, burial 
allowances, various educational and training programs, health care, and administrative costs, the 
government’s expenditure on veterans of the Korean War added up to nearly $17 billion.327 
However, competing with World War II veterans for public sympathy and the 
government purse and returning to a social climate tainted by Cold War fears and the feeling that 
the war in Korea had ended in a draw, Korean War veterans did not always get what they were 
entitled to when they came home.  Four months after filing a claim for his combat pay, Alfred 
Mishos wrote Senator Robert Taft in frustration, “I served 9 months with a front line unit…I 
have not received one dime or an explanation why.  I have a beautiful set of rotten teeth which 
the Army could have taken care of but were more interested in sending me to Korea.”328  Plagued 
with a variety of problems caused by the war, Arthur Smith got notice that the government did 
                                                 
325 Cross Reference Sheet, Robert Mernit, 24  April 1953, Central Files, Official File, Cross Reference Sheets, 
OF154-1+, Box 133, DDE Library and Disabled American Veterans (DAV), Resolutions 195, 295, and 293, Central 
File, PPF47, Order of Demolay, Box 808, Folder “47 Disabled American Veterans (1),” DDE Library. 
326 Although using V.A. services somewhat less frequently than veterans of other wars, Korean War veterans 
accounted for a hefty percent of those receiving pensions and service connected compensation in March 2000.  Of 
370,200 veterans receiving pensions, 86,300 were Korean War veterans and another 172,600 were getting service-
connected compensation.  U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Analysis, 
Office of Program and Data Analyses, Data on Veterans of the Korean War, June 2000 (online publication at 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc). 
327 Amazingly, by June 30, 1972, the government had spent close to $100 billion on World War II veterans and their 
dependents and over $50 billion on World War I veterans and their dependents. And, though the Vietnam War was 
just ending, those veterans had already collected more than $7 billion.   Levitan and Cleary, Old Wars Remain 
Unfinished, 3. 
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not consider his ruined teeth or frostbitten feet a disability and he got nothing.329  In 1995 Gilbert 
Towner finally got a rating of 60% disability from a doctor for his frostbitten hands and feet only 
to have the V. A. counter with a rating of 10%.330  The V. A. recognized another veteran’s 
bleeding ulcers as service-connected right after the war, but he still had to fight for several years 
after becoming unable to work before the government would give him a pension.331  It took 
Fernando Gandara fifty years to get a 40% disability rating for his damaged ears.332  Perhaps 
POWs fared the worst.  The Army held hearings to determine whether or not POWs had 
collaborated and, without producing any tangible proof of guilt, the V. A. proceeded to deny 
some men benefits and the $2.50 per day compensation.333  Joseph Hammond, a Bronze Star 
recipient rated at 40% disability for gunshot wounds, had his claim for $2507 turned down by a 
V. A. commission on the basis of vague accusations and then had his appeal dismissed because 
the examiners stalled until the deadline passed.  When Hammond asked to see the evidence 
against him, the chair said it was “classified.”334  Only much later would the stigma of Korean 
War POWs be removed and V. A. services be offered through an outreach program.335  Anyway, 
when men who had been wounded or held captive in Korea finally received their checks, 
pensions, or government-funded schooling, they often found that these scarcely compensated for 
what they had been through. 
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Regardless of whether or not veterans qualified for any special compensation or took 
advantage of the educational opportunities guaranteed by Public Law 550, they usually did not 
come out of Korea or out of the military empty-handed.  In addition to any back pay accrued and 
not yet paid, veterans out-processing also got mustering-out pay.  Under Title V of the Veterans’ 
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, the Korean G.I. Bill, service members who served 60 or 
more days outside the continental U. S. got $300, $100 at discharge and $100 a month for two 
months thereafter.  Those who served less than 60 days got a onetime payment of $100.336  
Returning from the war zone, John Hatcher boasted that he had $1200 in his bank account and, 
with a year of back pay accumulated while he was in Korea and a reenlistment bonus in hand, 
Anthony DeAngelis had “more than I ever had in my whole life!”337 Plenty of places existed for 
veterans to spend any newfound wealth.  Some, like Richard Chappell, traveled around taking 
vacations and seeing America, the country for which they had endured so many hardships 
overseas.338  Others used the money to buy new cars or television sets, get married, or have a 
good time.  Veterans also took the opportunity to invest these funds to better their future 
finances.  They purchased homes with G. I. loans, bought into businesses, and converted their 
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$10,000 military insurance policies, taking over the premiums and guaranteeing themselves 
future dividends.339   
The men and women who served in the Far East during the Korean War marched to their 
duty stations with the imprint of World War II’s tickertape parades and national unity embedded 
in their memories.  But, instead of returning to the grateful nation they remembered, veterans of 
Korea came home to a civilian society marked by indifference to the war, racism, and sexism.  
Turning to the government for which they had offered up a year or more of their lives, veterans 
found not only insensitivity to their physical and psychological suffering, but also a reluctance 
on the part of lawmakers to compensate and reward them for their services in the same way that 
men and women of the Second World War had been.  In response, some Korean War veterans 
“quietly resumed their civilian lives … and set out to forget Korea,” determining that “if we 
thought that we would receive any lasting public reward for our service, we were mistaken.”340  
But, a great many others determined to make the most of their lackluster benefits and, like 
Robert Chappel and Elmer Payne, could claim years later that “today I’m reaping the benefits 
from it [military service] and I’m glad I did it” and “I actually benefited from military service 
which opened the door to a very rewarding career and pleasant retirement.”341   
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CHAPTER 7:  MORE THAN EVER A VETERAN:  SERVICEMEN AND 
WOMEN OF THE KOREAN WAR  
 
 “South Korea has prospered like a weed.  If we had been allowed to finish the job maybe North Korea would 
be an ally and free instead of an opponent and not free.”—Everett J. McFarland, veteran.1 
 
“I don’t think I thought it [the Korean War] worthwhile in 1953—but I do now!”—John “Jack” Orth, 
veteran.”2 
 
“Today … I don’t have mixed emotions.  It [the war] was a waste of beautiful young lives. Who ordered this 
ridiculous poke at the enemy?  Was it a politician sitting on his fat duff in Washington?  War is senseless.  
There has to be a better way of settling differences.”—William Montgomery, veteran.3 
 
“Even though war is a horrible thing, I learned many things during my stay in Korea, and I also grew as a 
person.”—Aubrey Loving, veteran.4 
 
“Those who have devoted service to this country will never be forgotten.  Their sacrifice will live on forever in 
the hearts of all who cherish freedom.”—Angelo Biviano, veteran.5 
 
 As men and women straggled back to the States from the Far East during and after the 
Korean War, a few Americans and groups did seek to honor them and memorialize their 
sacrifices.  Citizens of Springfield, Massachusetts, for instance, built “the only known Korean 
Memorial for the Korean Veterans,” completing it by May 1955.6  Similarly, the United Nations 
dedicated a plaque to the Korean War dead at its headquarters on June 21, 1956.7  And, on 
November 11, 1954, Armistice Day officially became Veterans Day in the United States, in part 
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to recognize these new veterans.8  But, with public support for such efforts as tepid in the 1950s 
as attitudes toward the war had been, early attempts to construct lasting monuments in 
remembrance of either the Korean War or veterans of that conflict often failed.  As with the 
American Battle Monuments Commission’s proposal to build a memorial in South Korea, 
neither enough interest nor money could be generated to sustain projects.9  Tired of arguing that 
America “hadn’t ‘lost’ in Korea” and quieted by the country’s apathy, many Korean War 
veterans made their “earliest contribution to our generation of silence leading to our forgotten 
war” by trying to put the war behind them and forget that they were veterans at all.10  All the 
same, Korean War service shaped the lives of the men and women who completed tours of duty 
in theater, and, later, sometimes years or decades later, members of the “silent generation” found 
their voice as American war veterans. 
 Looking back now after nearly a lifetime, most veterans of the Korean War see 
connections between their days in service and the way their lives unfolded after the conflict.  
Injured physically or mentally, some recognize that they have yet to recover from wounds “so 
deep that they scarred my very soul.”11  Others continue to wrestle with the unpleasant lessons 
they learned in the war, such as that “children and innocent people suffer.”12  A few note that 
service adversely affected their careers.  “The guy who stayed home and went to college got the 
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better job.  I operated a machine.  He was probably up in the office.”13  Most, however, 
acknowledge that they “learned many things during my stay in Korea, and … also grew as a 
person” and that they “learned a lot about myself” and “can give part of the credit for my good 
fortune to the Corps.  My experience as a Marine was a very positive thing.  As an enlisted man I 
learned self-discipline.”14  Like Edgar Miller, who bought and ran a business and became mayor 
of a small town, veterans credit both the military and their wartime experiences with instilling 
the skills and character traits in them that enabled their success in the civilian world after 
mustering out.15  
 Indeed, financially, Korean War veterans do seem to have profited from or at least not 
been impeded by their military service.  In general, veterans of modern wars, including World 
War II, “suffer an earnings penalty in the civilian economy.”16  Removed from the regular work 
force for years, out of the loop for promotions and job-related training, and perhaps hindered by 
physical or emotional impairments caused by the war, veterans have a difficult time catching up 
to their non-veteran peers in terms of salary and occupational status.17  For veterans of wars other 
than Korea it took as many as ten years for the disparity in earnings to even out if it ever did.18  
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But, maybe because they reentered a comparatively stable economy or because they were 
younger than veterans of some wars when they returned, Korean War veterans tended to fare 
somewhat better than both the veterans of other wars and their non-military contemporaries.19  
By 1979, studies indicated Korean War veterans, rather than making less than men or women 
who had not entered the Armed Forces, had considerably more income, some 17% more.  In fact, 
in that same year Korean War veterans had the highest median income of all groups of wartime 
veterans as well as the highest rate of home ownership.20  More likely than veterans of World 
War II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War to have earned a college degree, Korean War 
veterans in the work force managed to get the “highest rate of return for years of education.”21   
White veterans of the Korean War, especially those with less than a high school diploma, 
proved adept at converting military experience into civilian earnings, but minority veterans 
showed themselves even more able to make their service pay off.22  Whether because a record of 
military service encouraged employers to hire them, because veterans’ readjustment programs 
helped neutralize discrimination and other barriers to employment, or because service gave them 
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more confidence and higher expectations, African American and Hispanic veterans of Korea far 
surpassed their non-veteran counterparts economically.  For at least a decade after joining the 
work force, non-white Korean veterans pulled in 10% more income than their civilian equals.23  
True also for minority veterans of other wars, one thing that distinguished Korean War black 
veterans was their greater resiliency to unemployment.  In 1979, when more than 10% of black 
World War II veterans were out of work, the rate of unemployment among black Korean War 
veterans remained about half that.24  In addition, some Mexican veterans received more than 
increased income as a result of their service.  Responding in part to the 1952 deportation of 
Alberto Gonzales, a 21 year old Mexican Purple Heart recipient wounded in Korea after crossing 
the border and enlisting in the U.S. Army, congressmen pushed to allow all Mexicans “who bore 
arms for this country to apply for United States citizenship and to remain here until they got it.”25   
While remunerated in some ways for participating in the Korean War, most veterans 
struggled after separation with the feeling that Americans had forgotten not just their personal 
sacrifices and the very memory of those who lost their lives on the Korean Peninsula but the 
conflict itself.  In the 1950s and 1960s, World War II veterans dominated Memorial Day and 
Veterans Day events and parades as well as most veterans’ organizations.  By the 1970s, 
veterans of the Vietnam War began demanding their share of public attention.  Where, in 
between World War II, the “Good War,” with its victorious veterans and Vietnam, the “Bad 
                                                 
23 Krueger, “Warning:  Military Service Can be A Drain on Later Earning Power in Civilian Life,” New York Times, 
11 November 2004, C2. 
24 The rate of unemployment among black Korean War veterans hovered at just 5%.  “National Survey of Veterans, 
1979,” “Final Report,” 13, NA, RG 015, Box 1.   
25 “Two Support Mexican,” New York Times, 21 March 1952, 45.  Evidently, this early effort failed, but later 
measures supported giving men who served in Korea the same naturalization rights as in other wars.  See 
“Naturalization Privileges for Korean War Veterans” in Congressional Record (Senate), 85th  Congress, 2nd sess., 
volume 104, part 14 (14 August 1958-20 August 1958), 80 and “Proposed Citizenship Legislation for Veterans of 
Korean War” in Congressional Record (Senate), 85th  Congress, 2nd sess., volume 104, part 1 (7 January 1958-30 
January 1958), 531.   
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War,” with its vocal veterans did Korea, the “forgotten war,” with its silent veterans belong?  
Slowly, especially after the dedication of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C. in 
November 1982, Korean War veterans, who had not yet been honored with a national memorial, 
began to reflect upon their own war and wonder, “We did what our country called us to do.  Is it 
too much to ask that we be recognized for what we did?”26   
After many years of silence about their wartime experiences, Korean War veterans found 
their identity as veterans rekindled.27  Many for the first time began joining existing veterans’ 
organizations like the VFW and the American Legion or pledged membership in newer groups 
like the Chosin Few (formed in 1983 for veterans of the action at Chosin Reservoir in the winter 
of 1950), the Korean War Veterans Association (incorporated in 1985), and Korean War 
Veterans International (formed in 1986).  Attending meetings and reunions, they met up with old 
buddies and made new friends “among men who could understand what it means to have been in 
combat.”28  Here, Korean War veterans finally found some of the understanding and camaraderie 
that had characterized the post-Korea lives of men and women who stayed in the military after 
the war and which had been missing from their own.  They felt that “I fit right in and I like 
that.”29  Although separated from each other for many years and only seeing each other 
occasionally, “when we reunited it was as if time had stood still.  The unspoken words, emotion, 
and common destiny are perhaps the glue that hold our sprinkled … parts together for ever 
after.”30   
                                                 
26 Mulhausen and Alexander, Korea:  Memories of a U. S. Marine, i. 
27 Many veterans note that they never even told their children, or in some cases wives, that they served in Korea.  
See Ibid., ii and Glen Wilson in Steve Vogel, “After 50 Years, Veterans of Korea are Still Haunted by Memories,” 
The Washington Post, 26 June 2000, B1.  
28 Harlee W. Lassiter, Korean War Veteran Survey, attachment page, CFSOKW. 
29 Email Shorty Estabrook to Melinda Pash, 29 July 2004, in author’s possession.   
30 Ted W. Peddycord, Korean War Veteran Survey, 12, CFSOKW. 
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Reconnecting with other veterans had a healing effect on those who served in Korea, but 
it also provided the impetus for them to push for more outward recognition of their needs and 
rights as veterans and of the “forgotten” war they had fought so long ago.31  As one veteran 
noted, “after 40 years of being quiet, we’re ready to rattle our sabers.”32  By the late 1970s, and 
especially after the construction and unveiling of the Vietnam War Memorial, veterans of Korea 
began to lobby for a national memorial of their own.33  Eli Belil, deputy mayor of Marlboro, 
New Jersey, took it upon himself to correspond with various government agencies, the American 
Battle Monuments Commission, and veterans’ organizations to draw attention to the fact that 
Korean War veterans had nothing to show for their duty to country except “a few fading pictures 
amongst themselves and scars that neither time nor the Government’s apathy will heal.”34  In 
1985, just three years after the dedication of the Vietnam War Memorial, forty veterans followed 
Balil’s lead, forming the Korean War Veterans Association to, among other things, “establish 
war and other memorials commemorative of any person or persons who served in the Korean 
War.”35  Largely in response to the push by Korean War veterans and the KWVA, Congress in 
October 1986 authorized the erection of a Korean War memorial, but only allocated $1 million to 
the project, making veterans responsible for raising the other $5 million on their own.36  On June 
14, 1992, Korean War veterans finally broke ground on the Korean War Memorial in 
                                                 
31 For more on the healing effects of reunions, see Glen H. Elder, Jr. and Elizabeth C. Clipp, “Wartime Losses and 
Social Bonding:  Influences Across 40 Years in Men’s Lives,” Psychiatry 51:2 (May 1988), 177-198 and Gilbert 
Towner in Richard T. Cooper, “Vets Still Conflicted Over Korea,” Los Angeles Times, 19 January 2000, 1. 
32 Bob Barnett in Kelly O. Beaucar, “Korean War Vets…the Forgotten Ones,” The Herald (New Britain, CT), 14 
June 1998. 
33 Many accounts note the impact of Vietnam veteran activism on Korean War veteran activism.  It seems that 
Korean War veterans in part learned how to organize from this younger group and also became more desirous of 
recognition as they watched the country respond to Vietnam veterans.  See Cooper, Weekend Warriors, 219 and 
Albert J. Parisi, “Korean War:  Memories, but…,” New York Times, 5 July 1987, NJ1. 
34 Albert J. Parisi, “Korean War:  Memories, but…,” New York Times, 5 July 1987, NJ1. 
35 “KWVA History in Brief,” online at http://www.kwva.org/brief_history.htm. 
36 Piehler, Remembering War the American Way, 158 and Albert J. Parisi, “Korean War:  Memories, but…,” New 
York Times, 5 July 1987, NJ1. 
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Washington, D.C. and on July 27, 1995 President William Jefferson Clinton and Kim Dae-jung 
dedicated the completed memorial.37  Forty-two years after their war in Korea ended with an 
armistice, veterans of the Korean War won “one of the biggest battles we had to fight,” getting 
their memorial, a tangible reminder of the country’s gratitude.38 
In addition to struggling for a national memorial, some Korean War veterans in the last 
three decades fought for other things related to their veteran status.  In the 1990s, black veterans 
launched a campaign to force historians and the military to reevaluate the official record and 
produce an unbiased account of African American troops in Korea.  Though they failed to halt 
the 1996 publication of William T. Bowers’ Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry 
Regiment in Korea, and though later works reaffirmed that all-black units performed poorly, 
these veterans did manage to force the reexamination of the facts which resulted in blame for 
poor performance shifting to the Jim Crow Army and away from individual soldiers.39  Other 
veterans strove and continue to strive for rights to government-funded medical care.  In 2002, 
Korean War veterans sued the government for the free lifetime medical benefits promised them 
by recruiters fifty years ago and in 2005 some joined in a lawsuit over cuts in medical benefits.40   
                                                 
37 The Korean War Memorial had to be rededicated in 1999 as Washington weather had eroded much of the original 
memorial.  Allan R. Millett, Their War for Korea:  American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians, 
1945-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), xviii.  In his preface, Millett makes an interesting comparison 
of the Korean War Memorial in the United States and the one in South Korea. 
38 William M. Allen, My Old Box of Memories: Thoughts of the Korean War (self-published, 1999), 92.  Many 
veterans note the importance of the Korean War Memorial in their lives.  See Ibid., 93-96 and Charles King in Bill 
Smith, “Black Soldiers Fully Shared Korean War’s Bloody Cost,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 February 2002, A1.  
39 Michael Ollove, “A Soldier’s Disgrace,” The Baltimore Sun, 28 April 1996, 1K; Michael A. Fletcher, “Korean 
War Veterans Seek to Block Book Critical of Black Unit,” Washington Post, 19 January 1997, A4; and Charles M. 
Bussey, Firefight at Yechon:  Courage and Racism in the Korean War (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 
2002), xvii.  
40 Curt Anderson, “Appeals Court Denies Lifetime Health Care for WWII, Korean Veterans,” The Associated Press 
News Service, 20 November 2002, online at http://infoweb.newsbank.com and Joe Galloway, “Vets Sue Over Cuts 
in Benefits,” Fayetteville (NC) Observer, 27 May 2005, 10A.   
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Perhaps most successfully, the survivors of the action at Chosin Reservoir in the winter 
of 1950 worked toward V.A. recognition of their frostbite-related maladies as service-connected.  
After the several hundred men gathered for the first meeting of the Chosin Few in 1985 
discovered they all suffered from diseases and conditions related to the frigid weather they 
endured in North Korea, they began to mobilize.  Marine Gunnery Sergeant Ernie Pappenheimer, 
who lost his toes and part of a foot to the cold, began researching frostbite complications.  Along 
with Dr. Stanley Wolf, also a veteran of the early months of the Korean War, Pappenheimer 
formed the Cold Injury Committee of the Chosin Few.  In addition to informing both veterans 
and doctors “about the latent effects of frostbite and cold injury,” this group “sent delegations to 
Washington, lobbying” for government recognition and medical assistance.41  Eventually 
persistence paid off and the Department of Veterans Affairs agreed to “broadly recognize the 
long-term effects of frostbite as service-related injuries.”42  In 1997, veterans of the Korean War 
began getting compensation for their cold injuries and in 2004 the Senate put forth a bill to 
require the V.A. to “carry out a program of outreach to veterans of World War II and the Korean 
Conflict on the nature and availability of benefits.”43  In the first year alone, as many as 4000 
Korean War veterans benefited from these changes in the V.A. stance on frostbite.44  It did, 
however, take V.A. doctors a little while to catch up to V.A. rulings and develop sensitivity to 
the needs of these older veterans.  Visiting V.A. doctors for the first time with regard to the later 
                                                 
41 Jonathan Bor, “Korean War cold Cripples Again,” Baltimore Sun, 1A. 
42 Michael Doyle, “Veterans Win ‘Cold War’ for Health Benefits,” Fresno (CA) Bee, 25 May 1997, A22. 
43 U.S. Congress, Senate, Bill S.2776, 108th Congress, 2nd sess., 7 September 2004, online at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108S.2776.  Also, Colonel John Zitzelberger continues to make “Cold Injury 
Information” packets available to veterans seeking to file a claim.  Letter and packet Colonel John Zitzelberger to 
Melinda Pash, July 2004, in author’s possession.   
44 “Out Front:  Againg World War II, Korea Vets Finally Compensated for Frostbite’s Ills,” Boston Globe Online, 6  
April 1997. 
 354
effects of frostbite, Korean War veterans noticed that “When they view frostbite patients they 
ask ‘Why didn’t you put on more clothes.’”45 
As Korean War veterans began to lay claim to veteran rights, the American public 
responded with increased attention.46  On July 27, 1988, church bells across America rang out at 
10:00 a.m. to mark the 35th anniversary of the armistice.47  In 2000, Bruce Salisbury, an Aztec, 
New Mexico resident, suggested putting one Purple Heart for every American who died in 
combat in Korea along designated highways, saying, “It would be hard to ignore or overlook 
Purple Hearts stretching for 37 miles along a highway.”48  New York held a “belated official 
homecoming” complete with a parade from Broadway to Battery Park for Korean veterans in 
June 1991.49  As evidenced by the onlooker who asked if the festivities celebrated Desert Storm, 
to which one veteran replied “Do me a favor, walk the other way. We’ve waited 40 years.  
Desert Storm can wait a couple of months,” not everyone knew exactly what the parade marked, 
but still 250,000 people showed up.50  Denied the “Republic of Korea War Service Medal” in the 
1950s because of rules forbidding American military personnel from wearing medals issued by 
foreign governments, Korean veterans got another chance to apply for one in the 1990s.51  From 
the late 1980s to the present time, numerous communities designed and constructed state and 
                                                 
45 Robert W. Chester, Sr., Korean War Veteran Survey, 10, CFSOKW. 
46 South Koreans also expressed their gratitude to Korean War veterans and the country which had sent them.  In 
2002, when activists in South Korea staged protests against the United States, supporters of the United States and 
South Korean war veterans held pro-American rallies in front of a key U.S. Army base.  Jong-Heon Lee, “Korean 
Veterans Block Anti-U.S. Rallies,” United Press International, 3 January 2002, provided by COMTEX, online at 
http://www.comtexnews.com, article number A81238431.  See also Clipping “Korean War Veterans are Honored 50 
Years Later,” Vertical File “Veterans Recognized,” CFSOKW. 
47 “Church Bells to Salute Korean War,” Commercial News (Danville, IL), 7 June 1988, Box MM, Folder 1311 B, 
CFSOKW. 
48 Clipping “On Korean War Veterans,” The Examiner, 15-16 July 2000, Box CC, Folder A0908, CFSOKW. 
49 Sarah Lyall, “Act of Appreciation Assuages Korean War Vets,” New York Times, 26 June 1988, 25 and James 
Barron, “A Korea War Parade Decades Late,” New York Times, 26 June 1991, B1 and Peter A. Soderbergh, Women 
Marines in the Korean War Era (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 1994), 131. 
50 James Barron, “A Korea War Parade Decades Late,” New York Times, 26 June 1991, B1. 
51 The ban was lifted in 1954, but the medal was not offered again by South Korea until the 1990s. Clipping, Robert 
Burns, “Pentagon Clears Way for Vets to Wear South Korean Medals,” 23 June 2000, AR0664, CFSOKW. 
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local Korean War memorials or added Korea to existing war monuments.52  In Minnesota, one 
woman, “Billboard Sally,” lived in a tent on the edge of a billboard 25 feet off the ground to 
raise money for the state Korean War memorial.53  Korean War veterans, no longer silent or 
forgotten, not infrequently took charge of these efforts to memorialize them.  When Camden 
County, New Jersey officials planned to build their Korean War memorial on a traffic island on 
the highway, veterans successfully pressured them into changing the location.54 
Reestablishing their identity as veterans, many of those who served in Korea during the 
war decided to return once more to the “Land of the Morning Calm.”  Remembering the bullet-
riddled buildings, the hungry peasants “in a land ravaged by war,” and the shelters made of 
“corrugated tin, cardboard, and anything else that could be used,” veterans could scarcely 
imagine that the Korea before them had once been the site of their war.55  They marveled at the 
“hillsides covered with trees … [and that] Seoul was a huge modern city … with numerous 
skyscrapers, including the tallest building in the Orient … rebuilt … by men and women whose 
grandparents knew only oxen and the rice paddy.”56  Of course, not everything had changed.  
With North Korean troops still patrolling the 38th Parallel, searchlights illuminated the DMZ and 
soldiers continued to stand guard along the border between North and South Korea.  As one 
veteran says, “It was eerie to stand in a concrete-lined South Korean observation post located on 
                                                 
52 For a list of Korean War memorials, see the KWVA site at http://www.kwva.org/memorials/index.htm. 
53 “Billboard Sally” also raised money for the Minnesota Vietnam War memorial this way.  Don Boxmeyer, A 
Knack for Knowing Things:  Stories from St. Paul Neighborhoods and Beyond (St. Paul:  Minnesota Historical 
Society Press, 2003), 160-161. 
54 Albert J. Parisi, Untitled Article, New York Times, 11 October 1987, NJ20. 
55 Lee Ballenger, The Final Crucible:  U.S. Marines in Korea, v.II, 1953 (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001), 270 
and William D. Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents:  An Infantryman in Korea (Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 
1999), 226-227. 
56 Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents, 227. 
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the same spot where I had dug a foxhole.”57  For some, the trip reawakened old sadness and they 
“felt like a burn victim whose raw nerve ends are suddenly exposed to air.”58  But, after all, 
though they visited Korea, “it was not my Korea.”59  The war zone had metamorphosed into a 
land of happy, industrious people who “appreciate what we did and the sacrifices those men 
made.”60   
Nearly sixty years after the war that turned them into veterans, and in light of South 
Korea’s progress and the greater willingness of Americans to recognize the sacrifices of those 
who served in the Far East in early the 1950s, what do Korean War veterans now think of the 
Korean War?  Unsurprisingly, most “look back and think we did a good thing.”61  From their 
perspective, not only did the United States help “the Korean people gain something,” but soldiers 
in Korea “accomplished what the troops in Viet Nam were denied:  We drove the enemy back 
across the border and denied them the victory they so desperately sought.”62  Some veterans wish 
that “the Korean War had slammed the door harder on communism, for we had to sail the same 
ideological boat in the Vietnam War just a few years later, and the Cold War did not end for a 
decade and a half,” but they still acknowledge, “Had we not taken a stand on the Korean 
Peninsula when we did the Cold War would not be past history.”63  They also challenge 
Americans “who regard the defense of South Korea as worthless … [to] imagine what a unified 
                                                 
57 Clipping, Bernard E. Trainor, “A Return to No Man’s Land,” AR0186, CFSOKW.  See also Clyde H. Farnsworth, 
“Korea War Veterans Return for Another Look,” Special to the New York Times, 27 October 1985, 16. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents, 229. 
60 Ballenger, The Final Crucible, 267-268. 
61 Lloyd A. Greening, Korean War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW. 
62 Eric Hansen in William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend:  the Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953 
(Shippensberg, PA:  White Mane Publishing Company, 1996), 260 and Mulhausen and Alexander, Korea:  
Memories of a U. S. Marine, i. 
63 Richard G. Chappell and Gerald E. Chappell, Corpsmen:  Letters from Korea (Kent, OH:  Kent State University 
Press, 2000), 145 and Angelo J. Biviano, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 20, 1st Cavalry Division, 
Surnames A-L, Carlisle Barracks. 
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Korea today under a communist dictatorship would be like.”64  Arned Hinshaw goes one step 
further, positing that by draining Red China of resources the Korean War possibly saved 
Formosa from Chinese aggression.65   In the final analysis, most veterans of Korea agree with 
Jack Orth, “I don’t think I thought it worthwhile in 1953—but I do now!”66  And, they “look 
back with pride in our work and what we did,” believing “If I had to do it all over again, I would 
do it.”67   
For a few veterans, however, bitterness still lingers over America’s involvement in “a 
stagnant war that was not meant to be won.”68  They remain angry about the “waste of beautiful 
young lives” and want to know, “Who ordered this ridiculous poke at the enemy?  Was it a 
politician sitting on his fat duff in Washington?”69  Some argue that “The Korean War was a 
mistake as a limited war.  The Korean War should have been fought all out” or lament, “If we 
had been allowed to finish the job maybe North Korea would be an ally and free instead of an 
opponent and not free.”70  Like Burdette Thomsen they believe the United States “should have 
finished the job … When you play the game you play to win” or like Walter Klein they contend, 
“We could have done it in a good old American style and finish[ed] that thing off for a long, long 
time with the Chinese never again saying ‘Paper Tiger’ to the Americans.”71  Because of their 
                                                 
64 Angelo J. Biviano, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 20, 1st Cavalry Division, Surnames A-L, Carlisle 
Barracks 
65 Arned L. Hinshaw, Heartbreak Ridge, Korea, 1951 (New York: Praeger, 1989), 1. 
66 John “Jack” Orth, Korean War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW. 
67 William S. Stegall, Korean War Veteran Survey, 12, CFSOKW and Herman Lee Mingee, Interview by Wesley 
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68 Howard Matthias, The Korean War—Reflections of a Young combat Platoon Leader, rev. ed. (Tallahassee, FL:  
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experiences or because they blame the Vietnam War on failures in Korea, some of these veterans 
have decided “Korea, like most wars, settled nothing. There were few gains and many, many 
losses” or even that “war is futile.  No one ever wins except perhaps for the politicians and the 
people who manufacture combat equipment.”72  James Campbell, who at the time thought the 
war a worthy cause, now keeps a bumper sticker on his car, “Veterans for Peace.”73 
Nearly 2 million servicemen and women returned home alive from the Korean War in the 
1950s after paying a hefty price for the defense of South Korea.  Like veterans of the American 
Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the 
Vietnam War, Desert Storm, the war in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War, Korean War veterans lost 
their innocence along with fallen comrades, felt connections to the home front loosen or 
sometimes snap, and suffered physical and psychological wounds on the battleground.  
Reentering society, they fared sometimes worse and sometimes better than those who marched 
back from other wars.  But, Korean War veterans hold a unique place in the pantheon of 
American war veterans.  Reared during the Great Depression and World War II to place country 
above self, the men and women of Korea unhesitatingly “did what was my duty, my obligation” 
when Uncle Sam asked.74  They served in the shadow of the glorified soldiers of World War II, 
receiving little recognition for their own sacrifices and accomplishments.  When it became clear 
that the country preferred to forget not only the Korean War but those who fought it, Korean War 
                                                 
72 Matthias, The Korean War, 226 and Montgomery, The Mustache that Walks Like a Man, 227. 
73 James G. Campbell, Korean War Veteran Survey, 9.  During the Vietnam War, some Korean War veterans 
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veterans carried their burden of war quietly, almost imperceptibly.  But, requesting V.A. 
headstones at a rate only slightly lower than World War II veterans and accounting for 18% of 
all internments in national cemeteries, it seems clear that Korean War veterans remember their 
war and in the twilight of their lives choose to define themselves by it.75     
 
                                                 
75Almost 41% of Korean War veterans desire a V.A. headstone or marker while 44% of World War II veterans do.  
“National Survey of Veterans, 1979,” 238 and 245, NA, RG 015, Box 1.  U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Analysis, Office of Program and Data Analyses, Data on Veterans of the 
Korean War, June 2000 (online publication at http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc). 
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